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Introduction
In our book we intend to analyse the different bilateral and regional relations of the European 
Union which is a unique (sui generis) organisation. The duality of inter-governmental and 
super-national natures has influenced the external actions and foreign relations of the EU 
since the beginning.
In the first chapter Zoltán Gálik attempts to analyse the complex and sometimes volatile 
relationship of the European Union and the United States of America. The two economic 
giants possess the largest trade blocks in the world, they account for about 40% of global 
trade. At the world stage they are fierce competitors and at the same time strategic partners 
to each other. The chapter tries to highlight the multi-layer relationship from the economic 
dimensions to the security related partnership agreements. It invites the reader to understand 
the main causes of the huge trade wars between the two giants, the common sanctions 
systems, the basic pillars of their security cooperation and it describes their attempts towards 
the establishment of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership.
The next chapter elaborated by Anna Molnár describes the historical background of 
the relations between the Mediterranean region and the EU. The Mediterranean region is 
composed of 22 countries around the coastal areas of the Mediterranean Sea, and covers 
portions of three continents Africa, Asia, and Europe. The aim of the Euro–Mediterranean 
cooperation was to connect the Northern and Southern shores on the Mediterranean 
Sea. After a brief introduction to the development of the Euro–Med relations, the author 
describes the contemporary institutional relations and the budget and the financial tools, 
and the results and challenges of the cooperation.
In the third chapter Tibor Ördögh will present the relationships of the European 
Communities and Yugoslavia and Turkey, which meant a cooperation of economic 
proportions. Further on, he will examine the role played by the European Union during 
the Balkan Wars, and the progress of the Turkish Government towards the Union. He will 
continue with the development of relations, covering the creation of the policy of the EU 
regarding the Balkan Region, and the Stabilization and Association Agreement of the states, 
discussing the present relations, namely the brief introduction of gaining candidate status 
and the respective negotiations.
In her chapter Mariann Vecsey introduces EU‒Africa relations from the beginning 
of their partnership in 1963 and follows their cooperation from the Yaoundé Convention 
until the launch of the EU missions in Africa. It discusses the institutions and the financial 
background of the partnership; Africa receives more aid than any other continent, and 
the EU is the most enthusiastic donor. The chapter also examines achievements of this 
partnership of nearly 60 years, and the challenges ahead. It also introduces the new EU 
Global Strategy and how it refers to Africa.
After the 2004 enlargement, many new countries became neighbours of the EU. 
The chapter elaborated by Ágnes Tuka introduces the EU role in the region of Eastern 
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Partnership from the historical background through the concept of the New European 
Neighbourhood Policy to the new generation of Association Agreements. Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine all try to negotiate the closest possible 
deal with the EU. Although Russia’s influence is unquestionable, the stabilising function 
of the EU is getting more and more obvious in this region. In a separate chapter she 
examines the EU–Russia relations. Russia clearly became the most controversial player in 
the Eastern relations of the EU. The annexation of the Crimea and the destabilisation of 
Eastern Ukraine lead to the introduction of sanctions of the EU and the U.S. As the author 
argues, the once comprehensive collaboration is now heavily burdened and complicated.
Dániel Harangozó will present the relationship of the EU with the region of Central 
Asia. After a “late start” in the early 2000s, EU relations with the countries of post-Soviet 
Central Asia, newly independent in 1991, developed significantly in the last fifteen years. 
European strategy towards the region lacks focus nonetheless, and the EU’s influence pales 
in comparison with that of both traditionally dominant Russia and newly resurgent China. 
Moreover, EU policy in Central Asia faces three fundamental tensions: these are tensions 
between security or stability and human rights; between “ambitions” and “conditions”; and 
between regional and bilateral cooperation. To make an impact, the EU needs to develop 
a focused strategy that better recognizes its strengths and limitations, as well as the local 
realities.
The chapter elaborated by András Bartók gives an overview of the EU’s relationship 
with East Asia by looking at bilateral relations with important partners, namely the People’s 
Republic of China, the Republic of Korea, Japan, and ASEAN. The chance for the EU 
to become an important factor in the region is increasing; the current territorial and 
security tensions, while obviously posing significant risks for stability, might warrant 
deeper EU ties with the region to provide a stabilizing force. With regard to the foreign 
policy of the European Union, East Asia and sub-regional groupings have gone through 
a steady evolutionary process, increasingly becoming major partners for the EU. While the 
EU–China relationship obviously dominates the EU’s Asia Pacific considerations – simply 
by the sheer size of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and its trade with the European 
Union – a look at the development of an EU global and regional policy shows how other 
states and organizations have also become important partners.
“Latin America” is an expression of French origin from the 19th century. It designates 
countries on the American continent that belonged to mother states with neo-Latin lan-
guages in the colonial era; that is, they were either Spanish, Portuguese, or French colonies. 
The EU–Latin America relations are divided into two chapters in this book. In his chapter 
István Szilágyi deals with the EU–South America nexus, while Mónika Szente-Varga 
focuses on links between the European Union and states situated south of the United States 
and north of Colombia.
In his chapter Zoltán Gálik will consider how the European Union and its predecessors 
related to some of the major global and regional institutions, the United Nations, International 
Monetary Fund and the World Bank, the World Trade Organisation, the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, and 
the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe.
Tamás Hoffmann will analyse the relationship between the European Union and 
the United Nations. The cooperation of the European Union and the United Nations is 
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riddled with difficulties arising from often clashing national interests and the lack of ade-
quate representation in many UN bodies. Nevertheless, despite all the current uncertainties, 
the EU will continue to be a dedicated supporter of the United Nations.
The chapter of András István Türke, beyond giving an outline of the frameworks of 
EU–NATO relations, is to draft by some examples that behind the scenes which fault lines 
make internal cooperation difficult, with a strong emphasis on French opinions, as a key 
state of European integration. It presents firstly the historical and legal background, then 
the most important political steps of EU–NATO cooperation during the period 1990–2016 
and finally a history of police-military cooperation and rivalry in the operational field.
The contribution of Balázs Szent-Iványi discusses the EU’s common international 
development policy. First, it provides some details about the international development 
system, the broader context in which this policy operates. This is followed by a brief 
history of the common international development policy, discussing its origins, evolution, 
and the significant changes the policy went through after the turn of the millennium. 
The most important features of the policy, including the main principles and norms, 
funding, institutional set-up, and the allocation of EU aid are discussed, as are three key 
challenges: the diversion of aid from poverty reduction to other goals; the impact of the EU 
on the bilateral development policies of the member states; and the challenges associated 
with measuring the impact of aid.
The case study on the V4 (Visegrád Group or Visegrád Cooperation) is special in 
a book dealing with the EU’s regional and bilateral cooperation. This is because the group 
went through a fundamental transformation since its foundation in 1991. This chapter 
elaborated by Alex Etl explores how the EU–V4 relations have changed through the course 
of transformation from an external, regional domain to an internal partnership.
The V4 (Visegrád Group or Visegrád Cooperation) is at once a subregional, inter- 
governmental group and an integral part of the European Union. The analysis begins with 
a historical and institutional background of the EU–V4 relations. The  second part compares 
the success of the “Visegrád brand” with political, economic and social circumstances 
that detracted from the V4 solidarity and cooperation. The chapter suggests that enhanced 
Visegrád cooperation is only feasible in certain policy areas, whereas internal divisions 
inhibit the Group from deeper cooperation in the long run.
The Editors
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The European Union and the United States of America
Zoltán Gálik
The European Union and the United States of America have developed a very close but at 
the same time very controversial relationship from the end of the Second World War until 
nowadays. The process of the European integration was closely followed by the U.S. as 
the American and European political and economic elite always looked at each other as 
their primary allies during and after the Cold War. On the other hand, Europe and the U.S. 
possess the largest trade blocks in the world, they account for about 40% of world trade. 
From the beginning of the European integration they were competing at the global stage. 
Beyond the trade relations they also have developed a very profound and efficient security, 
defence and political relationship during the last decades. As the European External Action 
Service declares, the partnership relies on a “solid foundation of common values, including 
a commitment to the rule of law, the democratic process, free enterprise, respect for human 
rights, and alleviating poverty”. (EEAS 2017) The partnership was formalised only after 
1990 when both parties engaged in a joint discussion on a comprehensive future trade deal.
Changes at the World Stage
The economic, political and military hegemony of the European continent and within 
primarily that of the United Kingdom which lasted for centuries was challenged by 
the U.S. in the first half of the twentieth century. The monetary and trade hegemony of 
the U.K. collapsed after the First World War and the U.S. built up its own global hegemony 
with the creation of the Bretton Woods institutions, the dollar standard system and with 
the creations of its nuclear arsenal. The major powers of the European continent struggled to 
gain back their political importance. They became weak and relatively incapable to perform 
at the global stage, their global influence declined and the hostility between the U.S. and 
the Soviet Union determined the political and military landscape for the next four decades.
The U.S. always looked at the European partners as her primary political allies although 
she considered them very different from the beginning. The U.S. and the U.K. built up a very 
“special relationship” since the middle of the Second World War, West Germany tied its 
foreign policy towards the U.S. at the constitutional level, and the French relations were 
also close during the dawn of the European integration. The U.S. was not selective when 
economic or military interests were at stake: they opted to cooperate even with Franco’s 
Spain during the hardest dictatorship years. The U.S. needed a strong and economically 
active European continent which is capable to rebuild world trade, absorb the American 
goods and services and able to stabilise the new world economy.
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Western European countries remained very vulnerable in the face of the Soviet threat 
but the U.S. hesitated to decide the appropriate form of cooperation with them. Although 
the U.K., France, the Benelux countries began to create the regional security architecture 
with the creation of the Brussels Treaty in 1948, a new transatlantic security framework 
was also created with the establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation in 1949.
The U.S. also provided the necessary liquidity and investment level to the Western 
European countries with the Marshall plan (about USD 13 billion in current vale about 
USD 140 billion) and private and public loans, credits, grants and – they supported 
the establishment of the first intergovernmental institution among them with the creation 
of the Organisation of European Economic Cooperation in 1947.
The U.S. and European Integration
The 1950s was undoubtedly a decade of unprecedented economic growth for the U.S. and for 
the Western European countries. The U.S. was interested in the economic stabilisation and 
success of the Europeans and supported the creation of the first successful (e.g. European 
Coal and Steel Community, Western European Union) and also the failed institutions 
(European Defence Community, European Political Community) of the integration. The U.S. 
was interested in the creation of the ECSC providing a 100 million USD loan to the or-
ganisation and by naming a representative to the Authority with the rank of Ambassador.
The creation of the European Economic Community (EEC) and the EURATOM 
were much controversial from the U.S. perspective. The process itself was accompanied 
by profound changes between the once closely allied states. The Suez crisis was clearly 
a turning point in the break between the U.K., France and the U.S., and de Gaulle later 
further distanced the country from the U.S. political and military influence.
From the first time of its creation the EEC did not seem particularly well suited to 
the American interests. Although the free trade area helped the economic growth and 
stabilisation to go on a new level, the creation of the customs union threatened the liberal 
world economic order and the free market access of the U.S. goods. The establishment of 
the first huge common economic policy, the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) clearly 
went against the interests of the U.S. The EEC member states wanted to become a dominant 
agricultural producer at the world stage and with the creation of the CAP they created an 
artificial economic system in which free market access seemed almost impossible from 
the outside. It is therefore reasonable that the U.S. pushed the U.K. hardly to join the EEC 
during the first attempts in 1961–63 and in 1967, since it hoped that the Brits could be 
the “backdoor” for the European markets.
With the establishment of the EURATOM, the Europeans created an international 
organisation which is responsible for the creation of a common market for the development 
of the peaceful use of atomic energy. Nuclear energy played an important role not just 
from a military perspective but also it was seen as a key factor in strategic and economic 
terms. The McMahon Act, enacted by Congress in 1946, restricted the access to nuclear 
information to other countries between 1946 and 1958. With the creation of the EURATOM 
the Western European states established their own regulatory authority. Scientific 
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cooperation between the U.S. and Europe started in 1958 with the appointment of an 
accredited mission of the U.S. to the EUROATOM.
Early Relations with the European Economic Community
The Treaty of Rome established the foreign trade relation system of the European Economic 
Community. The EEC became an autonomous international legal entity capable to conclude 
trade agreements and treaties; it has the authority to act in the name of the member 
states. The external relations were divided into two main categories: preferential and 
non- preferential relations. The relations with the U.S. belonged to the latter. Article 113 
of the EEC Treaty provided the express authority for the Community to enter certain 
types of external agreements. It also expressed the uniform principles e.g. tariff and trade 
agreements, export policy, and measures to protect the interests of the member states in case 
of dumping or subsidies. It also offered protection against unfair trade practices by third 
countries, and the possibility to introduce remedies against improper commercial activities.
The Treaty provided the framework in which the negotiations should take 
place. The Commission makes recommendations to the Council which issues the directives 
for the negotiations, and it authorizes the Commission to open and conduct the negotiations.
One of the first agreements was signed in May 1958. (CVCE 1958) The objective of 
the agreement was to cooperate by promoting usage of nuclear energy.
During the first decades of its existence, the EEC also developed her international 
cooperation and aid system. The first arrangements were signed primarily between the EEC 
and former colonies of some member states, and the European Development Fund helped 
the transformation of developing countries. The partnership in development was established 
after 1969 with the U.S. (the Partners in Development report of the Pearson Commission 
of International Development created the framework for cooperation, [Pearson 1969]). 
Both the EU and the U.S. slowly introduced political conditionality in the development aid.
The early collaborations focused mainly to sectorial cooperation like environmental 
protection (1974), renewable energy (1982), nuclear safety and radiation protection (1986), 
but comprehensive trade negotiations did not take place between the EC and the U.S. 
As the European Communities absorbed new member states (in 1973 the U.K., Ireland, 
Denmark, in 1981 Greece and in 1986 Spain and Portugal) the importance of the Single 
Market has steadily become clear.
On the global stage the EC and the U.S. acted hand in hand several times during 
the 1970s and the 1980s. The member states of the European Community together with 
other highly industrialized nations supported the rearrangement of international order with 
the creation of the Smithsonian Agreement in 1971,1 and in 1989 agreed in the Washington 
Consensus, a broadly free market economic idea (free trade, floating exchange rates, free 
markets and macroeconomic stability).
1 The Smithsonian Agreement in 1971 ended the fixed exchange rate mechanism and introduced a new dollar 
standard system where the highly industrialized nations were pegged to the USD at a central rate with ± 2.25% 
fluctuation.
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The U.S. and the EC also worked closely together at the international trade institutions 
primarily in the GATT. The subsequent rounds of the GATT negotiations from the early 
1950s resulted the international trade liberalization, the new trade rules, tariff concessions, 
the plurilateral agreements, the Anti-Dumping Agreement, later the efforts to eliminate trade 
barriers that do not take the form of tariffs both in the territory of industrial and agricultural 
goods. Later the negotiations were extended towards investment measures (Trade-Related 
Investment Measures) and intellectual property rights (Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights).
Towards a Closer Economic Cooperation
The EU and the U.S. has begun to tighten a closer economic relationship in the 1990s. The end of 
the Cold War ended the division between the East and the West, the bipolar world was replaced 
with a new world order marked by two controversial tendencies: growing globalization and 
fragmentation. The fundamental redefinition of international relationships began to take shape 
on security, economic and environmental levels.
The Transatlantic Declaration on EC–US Relations in 1990 was the first document in 
which both parties declared their intentions to create economic partnership on many areas. 
It is important to keep in mind that the first agreements were not aimed to be free trade area 
agreements, only a very limited and timid rapprochement took place. The Transatlantic 
Declaration was intended “to build bridges across the Atlantic”, “promote peace, stability and 
democracy and development around the world”, improve the world trade, and to find common 
answers to global challenges.
The EU and the U.S. recognised they mutual commitment towards the multilateral trading 
system, and they shared the basic concepts of “transparency and the implementation of GATT 
and OECD principles concerning both trade in goods and services and investment”. (TD 1990, 2.) 
The areas of interest included competition and transportation policy, telecommunications, high 
technology, standardisation, science and technology, research in medicine, environmental 
protection, pollution prevention, energy, space, high energy physics, safety of nuclear installations, 
education and culture. The U.S. and the EU begun to hold bi-annual consultations between 
the parties at the Foreign Minister level, the Presidency Foreign Minister/Troika and U.S. 
Secretary of State level, and between the European Commission and the U.S. Government.
A more sophisticated approach was introduced in 1995 with the New Transatlantic Agenda 
which also consisted of a Joint EU–US Action Plan. This document concentrates more on 
political relations while the previous one is more economic-centred. The main declarations of 
the Transatlantic Agenda were held with four major goals: (NTA 1995)
• Promoting peace and stability, democracy and development around the world primarily 
in focus to the former Yugoslavia, “the support of Central and Eastern Europe in their 
efforts to restructure their economies, strengthen their democratic and market institu-
tions”, and “commitment to the achievement of a just, lasting and comprehensive peace 
in the Middle East”.
• Responding to global challenges.
• Contributing to the expansion of world trade and closer economic relations.
• Building bridges across the Atlantic.
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The next stage of the economic partnership was introduced in May 1998 at the London 
EU–U.S. summit. The parties adopted a joint statement on the Transatlantic Economic 
Partnership (TEP) which intended to extend the bilateral cooperation into the field of 
investment and trade. The agreement aims were intended to be achieved through regulatory 
cooperation, removal of trade barriers or through coordinated actions in international 
organisations. The agreement listed some special areas of interest where the EU and the U.S. 
would start formal negotiations:
• Dispute settlement
• Transparency
• Implementation
• Services
• Agriculture: food safety, plant and animal health and biotechnology
• Trade facilitation
• Industrial tariffs
• Intellectual property
• Investment
• Procurement
• Trade and environment
• Developing countries
• Electronic commerce
• Core labour standards
• Rule of law issues
• Mutual recognition
• Alignment of standards and regulatory requirements
• Consumer product safety
• Biotechnology
The signature of a Mutual Recognition Agreement made common standards in six specific 
sectors: pharmaceuticals, medical devices, electromagnetic compatibility, electric safety, 
telecommunication equipment and recreational craft.
The intensity of talks was clearly put to a new level. The Transatlantic Business 
Dialogue (TABD), the Transatlantic Labour Dialogue (TALD), the Transatlantic Consumer 
Dialog (TACD), the Transatlantic Development Dialogue (TADD) and the Transatlantic 
Environmental Dialogue (TAED) created a much wider space to conclude the talks between 
the EU and the U.S.
Under the TEP agreement free trade was planned to be extended between the EU and 
the U.S. until 2010, primarily in the field of liberalisation of services. But the two economic 
giants also intended to move beyond the WTO rules in the TRIPS and TRIMS.
Although the U.S. still looked at Europe as her primary ally, the profound geopolitical 
rearrangement started after 1990. The NATO was undoubtedly the cornerstone of the trans-
atlantic military relations unit the end of the Cold War, but after 1990 the U.S. began to shift 
the focus to other territories. The new security challenges transformed the NATO structure 
and military instruments, the “out of area” missions were introduced, and the U.S. began to 
use the “go it alone” policy more frequently which was accompanied by the “new coalition 
building” efforts. The EU developed its own security architecture with the slow incorporation 
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of the Western European Union’s instruments (Forces Answerable to Western European 
Union, FAWEU), but the NATO–EU cooperation was also strengthened during the 1990s. 
The NATO developed the European Security and Defence Identity at the Berlin Conference 
in 1996 (ESDI 1996) which focused among others on the “arrangements for the release, 
monitoring, and return or recall of NATO assets and capabilities made available, on 
a case-by-case basis, to support WEU-led operations”, “close NATO–WEU consultations 
on planning and conducting WEU-led operations using NATO assets and capabilities”. 
The Berlin Agreement later was extended with the Defence Capabilities Initiative (DCI) in 
December 1999, “with a special focus on interoperability”, “the deployability and mobility 
of forces, on their sustainability and logistics, their survivability and effective engagement 
capability, and on consultation, command and control”. The process was later extended with 
the Berlin Plus Agreement in 2002, with assured access to NATO planning capabilities and 
the availability of NATO assets and capabilities for EU-led crisis management operations.
In June 2005 the EU and the U.S. launched the EU–US initiative to enhance trans-
atlantic economic integration and growth. The initiative further deepened the regulatory 
convergence and extended the talks into the following 15 areas: pharmaceuticals, automobile 
safety, information and communications technology, standards in regulations, cosmetics, 
consumer product safety, consumer protection, enforcement cooperation, unfair commercial 
practices, nutritional labelling, food safety, marine equipment, eco-design, chemicals, 
energy efficiency, telecommunications and radio communications equipment, electromag-
netic compatibility, and medical devices. At the same time talks were opened on horizontal 
areas such as on general regulatory policies and practices related to better regulation like 
impact assessment methodologies, risk assessment methodologies and public consultation. 
(IEI 2005) The regulatory regime focus was extended to new areas of cooperation with 
measures against money laundering and terrorist financing cooperation.
The 9/11 terrorist attacks on the U.S., later the Madrid (2004) and London (2005) 
bombings gave a new momentum to the EU and United States to combat terrorism and to 
cooperate on judicial, policing and intelligence areas. The cooperation was an integral part 
of the so called Hague programme of the EU (started in 2004) which included anti-terrorist 
measures, and the promise of an integrated management of the Union’s external borders. 
The U.S. and EU agencies established reciprocal liaison relationships, the Europol has 
posted two liaison officers in Washington, D.C., and the United States has stationed an FBI 
officer in The Hague to work with Europol on counterterrorism. The Law Enforcement and 
Intelligence Cooperation Agreements (signed in 2001) were intended to share “strategic” 
information threat tips, crime patterns, risk assessments, and personal information (names, 
addresses, and criminal records). In 2007 an agreement was reached that set common 
standards for the security of classified information to facilitate the exchange information. 
The EU and the U.S. also concluded agreements on extradition and mutual legal assistance, 
but the U.S. death penalty and the extradition of EU nationals posed particular challenges 
to the process.
The areas of cooperation were covered by the strengthening border controls and 
transport security aviation and air cargo security, maritime cargo screening, visa waiver 
program, detainee issues and civil liberties.
Other significant cooperation areas include the improvement of U.S. cooperation 
with FRONTEX with the adaptation of a Transatlantic Registered Travelers System, 
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helping the EU to build a European Travel Information and Authorisation System and 
expand the Visa Waiver Program, establish a transatlantic arrest warrant, establish joint 
investigation teams, including Europol and Eurojust, cooperation in new areas of criminal 
investigation, including cybercrime, trafficking in humans and drugs, and arms smuggling, 
reach out together to third states to enhance greater cooperation in law enforcement, include 
transatlantic cooperation in EU discussions of the external dimension of internal security, 
provide a legal and organizational basis for U.S. cooperation with Europol. (AC 2009)
Common Sanctions Policy
The EU and the U.S. have many coordinated economic sanctions currently and in the past 
against countries like Russia, Syria, North Korea and partly Iran. These sanctions can 
target individuals, organisations, entities and even governments. The key objectives 
behind the sanctions can be the safeguarding of the common values, preventing conflicts or 
strengthening international security, preserving peace, consolidating democracy, the rule 
of law or acting against violation of human rights and principles of international law. As 
the world’s two major economic and political powers, the EU and the U.S. can significantly 
influence the ability of the targeted entities to interact with others in the international 
system. Along with the United Nations’ sanctions they are capable of efficiently block 
international trade with the sanctioned states. As the U.S. and the EU control the majority 
of the global financial infrastructure and resources, the effects of their cooperation could 
not easily be circumvented. Sanctions usually target the trade, the financial sector of a given 
country restricting the investment to and from the sanctioned actor.
Iran: Although the first U.S. sanctions were implemented against Iran in 1979 because 
of the hostage crisis in the U.S. embassy in Tehran, the EU joined the sanctions system 
only after 2006 because of Iran’s nuclear program which many observed as a front for 
the development of a nuclear weapon. The U.N. Security Council adopted resolutions 
requiring Iran to stop the uranium enrichment procedure and it introduced restrictive 
measures to persuade the country to comply with the resolution. Diplomatic discussions 
started between Iran and the E3/EU + 3 (France, Germany, U.K. + the U.S., Russia and 
China). The EU and the U.S. implemented the U.N. sanctions with the prohibition of 
investments by Iran in any commercial activity involving nuclear materials and technology, 
with introducing financial and travel restrictions on individuals, and with the freezing of 
funds and economic resources to individuals and entities. Iran and the EU + 3 finally agreed 
on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on 14 July 2015. In the JCPOA Iran 
agreed to stop some of its enrichment capacities, modified the Arak heavy water reactor 
and exported its enriched uranium. In exchange for that the EU and the U.S. progressively 
lifted the economic and nuclear-related sanctions. During 2017 President Trump indicated 
many times that he would not renew sanctions relief for Iran because the agreement did not 
cover Iran’s missile program. As the EU is backing the execution of the JCPOA, a potential 
divergence can occur between the U.S. and the EU primarily because of the U.S. ability to 
threaten European firms with Iranian business through  secondary sanctions.
Russia: During the Ukrainian crisis which involved the annexation of Crimea and 
Russian military intervention in Eastern Ukraine, the U.S. and the EU imposed common 
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sanctions on Russia. The first,  second and third round of sanctions from 2014 targeted 
individuals, companies and the Russian Government. The primary areas of sanctions were 
Russian energy, financial and arms entities. Along with diplomatic measures, restrictive 
measures including asset freezes and visa bans, the non-recognition policy of the illegal 
annexation of the Crimea Peninsula lead to a substantial restriction on economic exchanges 
with the Crimea (ban of imports, prohibition of investment, goods and technology for 
transport, telecommunications and energy sector, technical assistance). Both the EU and 
the U.S. restricted Russia’s financial, energy and defence companies’ ability to reach fi-
nancial resources at the international level with cutting the access to primary and  secondary 
capital markets. In September 2014 and later in February 2015 leaders of France, Germany, 
Ukraine and Russia signed the Minsk I and the Minsk II Protocols to halt the war in 
the Donbass region of Ukraine and eventually end the hybrid war at the territory of Ukraine. 
The EU decided to align the existing sanctions regime to the complete implementations of 
the Minsk Protocols and it prolonged them for 6 months successively.
Syria: The Syrian civil war started in 2011 but U.S. sanctions have been in place 
since 2004. The U.S. accused the Syrian Government of supporting terrorism, pursuing 
weapons of mass destruction and missile program and destabilising the region. After 2011 
both the EU and the U.S. responded with massive sanctions policy prohibiting any sale or 
services to Syria. The EU introduced restrictive measures against the Syrian regime with 
export and import bans, oil embargo, restrictions on investments and financial activity. 
(Council 2012) The sanction system was strengthened after the use of chemical weapons 
by the Syrian regime in 2013, 2014 and 2016 and after the bombing of Aleppo. Russia’s 
involvement in the conflict further escalated the situation and the U.S. imposed sanctions 
on Russia related to its involvement in the use of chemical weapons by the Syrian regime.
North Korea: Although U.S. sanctions were in place since 1950 the EU and the U.S. 
have worked together to deter North Korea to pursue a secret nuclear program after the Cold 
War. The extensive sanctions aimed to weaken North Korea’s ability to extend its plutonium 
based nuclear weapons program and persuade North Korea to engage itself towards 
the global non-proliferation and disarmament regime.2 The EU first introduced sanctions 
against North Korea in December 2006 by implementing the UN sanctions on the one hand, 
on the other hand by adopting autonomous measures among them arms embargo, freezing 
of assets, travel ban on individuals, ban on imports and exports that could contribute to 
the nuclear-related or ballistic missile-related programmes. As North Korea extended its 
nuclear weapons programme and conducted several nuclear bomb tests in 2006, 2009, 2013, 
2016 and 2017, the EU and the U.S. imposed further sanctions on the regime with export ban 
on dual-use goods and technologies, ban on delivery of banknotes and coins, prohibition on 
issuing or purchasing public or public-guaranteed bonds, prohibition on the opening of new 
branches, subsidiaries or representative offices of North Korean banks and the prohibition on 
the establishment of new joint ventures. The measures targeted the North Korean economy 
with the export and import prohibitions to any item which could help the development 
of the country’s armed forces, and both the EU and the U.S. helped the international 
community to carry on with the inspection of all cargoes to and from the country.
2 In 1993 North Korea announced a notice of withdrawal from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and in 
January 2003 North Korea announced its immediate withdrawal.
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The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership and 
the Transatlantic Free Trade Area
The United Stated slowly shifted the focus from multilateral agreements to bilateral free 
trade agreement in the 1990s. Nowadays the U.S. has free trade agreements with 20 
countries, which are the following: Australia, Bahrain, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa 
Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Israel, Jordan, Korea, 
Mexico, Morocco, Nicaragua, Oman, Panama, Peru, and Singapore.
On the other hand, the European Union also began to work on free trade agreements 
at the same time frame with the highly industrialised countries like Japan, South Korea, 
Australia and Canada.
In 2013 the European Union and the U.S. opened negotiations to establish 
the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). The agreement would create 
the world’s largest free trade of 850 million consumers. The TTIP is a comprehensive trade 
and investment agreement between the European Union and the United States. Through 
this agreement, they try to create one of the biggest free trade areas. This agreement means 
a significant step in the history of the European Union. It can make the EU economically 
much more open towards the United States. The main goals were the following:
• to make the European markets much more open
• to strengthen the investment relationship between the United States and the Euro-
pean Union
• to remove all tariffs on trade
• to reduce non-tariff barriers, which impede the flow of goods, including agricultural 
goods
• to decrease the differences in regulations and standards between the United States 
and the European Union, without lowering consumer, health and environmental 
standards
• to make the small- and medium-sized enterprises more competitive
The U.S. sends 17% of their goods exports to the EU, which totalled $495 billion while 
imports totalled $587 billion in 2014. The EU is the largest trade partner of the U.S. in goods. 
The U.S. ranks first as for the EU exports with 20.8% from the total and ranks  second on 
import with 14.6%. (EUTRADE 2016) The U.S. sends a smaller portion of its goods than 
services to the EU but the volume of trade is still significant.
The agreement is focusing mainly on three important areas: market access, cooperation 
between EU and U.S. regulators and trade rules. As for the first, the most important aim 
is to remove all customs on manufactured goods and agricultural products, and to make 
it easier for companies to provide services both in the U.S. and in the EU. In the  second 
field U.S. and EU regulators have to learn how to work together effectively during setting 
new regulations and they have to harmonise the regulatory framework. And finally trade 
rules include non-discriminatory access to natural resources, infrastructure, and renewable 
energy. The most complex issues are related to cross-border capital flow, energy industry, 
intellectual property rights, sustainable development and environmental protection, small 
and medium sized companies.
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Figure 1.
Imports, exports and trade balance between the EU and the United States, 2007–2017
Source: EUROSTAT 2017
The agreement would help both parties to cut the red tape that firms face when exporting 
and it can make foreign trade and investments easier. The EU will have the possibility to 
have higher impact on world trade rules and to spread European values globally. TTIP can 
boost employment and generate jobs and growth across the EU and the U.S.
On the other hand, experts are divided on the advantages and disadvantages of 
the agreement, its impact on growth, social conditions and labour market. (Batsaikhan–
Hüttl 2016) In some cases common regulatory standards could probably be lower than 
previously existing stricter European ones, many jobs may be lost in some regions, where 
industry is less competitive. Since companies may sue governments the latter may be more 
bureaucratic to avoid unwanted legal consequences.
The U.S. states would definitely benefit from the TTIP, particularly those with 
advanced manufacturing products like motor vehicles, chemicals exports and that are well 
integrated into the supply chains of the EU–U.S. automobile market.3
The EU estimates that the TTIP deal would increase the size of its economy with 
approximately 0.5% of its total GDP per year (about EUR 119 billion). According to a CEPR 
study (CEPR 2013) the most important sectors would be motor vehicles (40%), metal 
products (12%), processed foods (9%), chemicals (9%) other manufactured goods (6%), 
other transport equipment (6%).
The possible outcomes of the TTIP could range from the complete removal of tariffs 
but non-tariffs measures (NTMs) would remain intact to a complete removal of tariffs and 
NTMs. The NTMs could be reduced by 25% as well, and they can or cannot exclude beef 
and dairy products.
3 Particularly Tennessee, Kentucky, Georgia, Florida, South Carolina, Alabama, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Iowa, 
Nebraska, South Dakota, Ohio, Michigan, Illinois would make clear trade benefits (see Fifty States 2013).
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Figure 2.
The bilateral composition of trade in projected benchmark (2027)
Source: CEPR 2013, 9.
Both the EU and the U.S. have developed an open-up climate for foreign direct investment 
during the recent decades, although significant non-tariff barriers (NTB) constitute 
important limits to trade and investments. The NTBs are often in the form of domestic 
regulations, standards or quotas. The elimination of NTBs would have positive results in 
terms of avoiding redundancy and unnecessary costs as well as opening up potential new 
markets for small and medium sized enterprises.
Although the investment protection system would have clear advantages for the big 
multinational companies, it would also risk undercutting the European countries’ ability 
to regulate markets for certain areas like social, environmental or consumer protection.
Since the Lisbon Treaty entered into the competence to negotiate investment agree-
ments, it was transferred from the member states to the EU. Although Investor State Dispute 
Settlement Systems (ISDS) have been used in the member states’ bilateral treaties, the issue 
became highly controversial in the TTIP negotiations. In 2015 the European Parliament 
prepared its recommendations regarding the ISDS.
“The European Parliament stressed, […] the need to:
• ensure that foreign investors are treated in a non-discriminatory fashion, including 
in cases of grievances, while benefiting from no greater rights than domestic in-
vestors;
• replace the ISDS system with a new system for resolving disputes between investors 
and states which is subject to democratic principles and scrutiny, where potential 
cases are treated in a transparent manner by publicly appointed, independent pro-
fessional judges in public hearings;
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• include an appellate mechanism, where consistency of judicial decisions is ensured, 
the jurisdiction of courts of the EU and of the Member States is respected, and where 
private interests cannot undermine public policy objectives.” (EIP 2015)
Several other concerns arise in the field of standards on health, consumer rights and 
the environment, food safety and financial system regulations.
The governments of the EU member states gave the EU Commission a mandate to 
negotiate on TTIP in 2013. Between 2013 and 2016, 15 negotiating rounds were held, the last 
one in October 2016. Since than no new round of talks has been planned. The Trump 
Administration cancelled the Trans–Pacific Partnership in 2017 and the President showed 
scepticism about the TTIP, as well. The talks are likely to be frozen for years.
Trade Disputes
The EU and the U.S. intensively used the WTO Dispute Settlement System (Understanding 
on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, DSU) to solve the crisis 
situations between themselves. The Dispute Settlement Body established the panel and 
it appoints the arbitrators. After the consultation phase a neutral panel issues the report 
which can be appealed to the Appellate Body, oversees the implementation and the possible 
compensation.
Although the trade disputes got a very noisy acceptance in the media, only 2% of 
the total EU–U.S. trade was affected by the serious debates.
Major trade disputes between the EU and the U.S.
• Hormone-treated beef (1989–2009)
• Poultry (1997)
• Genetically modified organism (2004–2006)
• Banana trade war (1999–2009)
• Steel products (2002–2003, 2018)
• Aviation (2004)
Throughout the EU–U.S. trade disputes we can clearly see the complexity of trade nego-
tiations between the two economic giants. In the following chapters we look at the case of 
the hormone-treated beef, the genetically modified products and banana trade war.
Hormone-treated beef: In 1996 the EU banned the use of synthetic hormones and 
at the same time limited the use of natural hormones in meat products. Since the 1950s 
the U.S. has allowed hormones in these products because their usage made meat products 
more in line with consumer preferences. The ban restricted the export of the U.S. to the EU, 
and the case landed at the World Trade Organisation’s international dispute settlement 
panel. The judgement of the panel and later the Appellate Body found the EU in violation 
of international standards and criticised the EU for the lack of a proper risk assessment 
procedure, but it also stated that the EU could adopt stricter standards in these areas. The EU 
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did not accept the decision and maintained the ban. The U.S. introduced trade sanctions 
against some European agricultural product. Finally, in 2009 the U.S. and the EU agreed on 
a provisional solution (Memorandum on Beef Hormones), providing a reduction of sanctions 
imposed by the U.S. on EU products and improving the market access for high quality beef 
exported by the U.S.
Poultry: The U.S. is the  second largest exporter of poultry meat in the world. In 1997 
the EU banned the imports of U.S. poultry treated with antimicrobial rinses,4 substances 
the poultry processors use there in their export products. Consequently, the export to Europe 
collapsed. The EU insisted that its much stricter food safety rules do not allow the lifting 
of the ban although several scientific opinions indicated no risk to human health in regard 
to the so called pathogen reduction treatments.
The EU assumption was that the use of these procedures is necessary because of 
poorer sanitary standards earlier in the production process. The dispute was escalated in 
2009 when the Bush Administration requested WTO consultations with the EU. The U.S. 
argument was that although the GATT’s Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary (SPS) Measures allow member states to regulate their markets and protect 
their consumers and the environment but all these measures should be based on scientific 
principles. The case is not yet closed; both parties maintain divergent views primarily on 
their food safety regulation regime.
Genetically modified organism: European and American consumer preferences 
are significantly different in case of genetically modified organism. Consumer concern 
is historically lower in the U.S. and the Europeans are more suspicious on this area. In 
1998 the EU and later some member states (France, Germany, Italy, Greece, Austria) also 
introduced a moratorium on GMO products which angered the U.S., Argentina and Canada. 
The biggest trade collapse occurred in the corn market where the import volume shrank by 
about 90%, but the dairy industry was touched, as well. As in case of the hormone-treated 
beef, the EU was not able to provide any serious scientific based argument supporting 
the ban, and according to the U.S. the EU violated the WTO’s Agreement on the Application 
of Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) measures, which was later echoed by the WTO’s 
dispute resolution panel. In 2006 the EU accepted the decision and it provided a time-table 
to terminate the prohibition on the already approved GMO products. During the last 
decade the EU was slowly moving into GMOs and it has built the legal framework for them 
(Directive 2001/18/EC, Regulation [EC] 1829/2003, Directive [EU] 2015/412, Regulation 
[EC] 1830/2003, Directive 2009/41/EC).
Banana trade war: Banana trade is a multi-billion-dollar business a year. Both the U.S. 
and the EU made significant efforts in the past to provide their allies (in case of some EU 
member states for former colonies) market opportunities via a trade preference system. 
These opportunities limited the market access of other countries. Before the establishment 
of the Single Market, member states followed their own trade policies in this area, but 
after 1993 the Internal Market of bananas was set up granting duty-free import and quotas 
for the Lomé Convention countries. The system was not open for the Latin American 
countries and caused significant barriers to the global banana trading companies, like 
Chiquita which faced tariff quotas in the EU market. On the other hand, primarily French 
4 Chlorine dioxide, acidified sodium chlorate, trisodium phosphate, and peroxyacids.
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and German companies enjoyed special rights and slowly took over the business from 
traditional distributors.
The case which was supported by the U.S. was referred to the WTO in 1996. The ruling 
in 1996 and the ruling of the Appellate Body in 1997 found the regime discriminatory 
and in violation of the WTO trade rules and gave the EU 15 month to change the system. 
Although the EU made some concessions, the U.S. was not satisfied with the modifications 
and with the backing of the WTO imposed retaliatory 100% tariffs on approximately 
520 million USD worth of EU exports roughly equal to the lost banana trade. The dispute 
was not settled until 2009 when the Geneva Banana Agreement was agreed by the U.S., 
the EU and the Latin American countries.5 The EU changed the tariff-rate quota system to 
a tariff-only system which required the renegotiation of all the non-preferential agreements. 
According to the 2012 EU commitments, the tariff rates were decreased from EUR 
148/tonne in 2009 to EUR 114/tonne in 2017.
Steel products: The U.S. imports about 35 million tonnes of steel a year and the EU is 
the biggest exporter accounting for approximately 5 million tonnes. The EU and the U.S. 
already fought a trade war between 2002–2003 and the Trump Administration also imposed 
25% and 10% tariffs on European steel and aluminium products in 2018.
In 2002 President George W. Bush announced temporary 8–30% tariffs on imported 
steel targeting mainly European and Japanese companies. The primary reason behind 
these measures was to protect the domestic steel producers which struggled to survive and 
to restructure in the 1990s. The system helped in some way the domestic steel producers 
but at the same time they were counterproductive since they penalised the U.S. consumers 
of foreign steel. The WTO found the U.S. tariffs illegal and it allowed the EU to retaliate 
with imposing sanctions worth USD 2.2 billion. The EU measures usually target textiles, 
orange juice, steel and automotive products. In December 2003 the Bush Administration 
finally stepped back from the trade war with the EU and Japan and the punitive tariffs were 
lifted on steel import.
On the one hand, the short term positive impacts of the protective measures would be 
insufficient in the long run. U.S. manufactures are often relying on cheaper foreign products 
mainly from the EU, China, Canada and higher import prices would lead to higher consumer 
prices at the domestic market. On the other hand, the revitalising of the steel sector is highly 
questionable. In addition to the large integrated steel companies, the so called mini mills6 
are more and more responsible for steel production in the U.S. Productivity has increased 
significantly during the last decades. According to the statistics in the U.S. the 10.1 man-
hours to produce a ton of steel in the 1980s was decreased to 1.5 hours, in some cases just to 
30 minutes. The work force employed by the steel industry in the U.S. shrunk significantly. 
More than 650 thousand people were employed in the 1950s but nowadays the industry 
employs only 140 thousand workers.
The impact of the U.S. tariffs could be immediately felt in the European steel industry. 
After significant mergers and acquisitions European steel companies are much bigger than 
their U.S. rivals. The world’s largest steel company, ArcelorMittal, was created in 2006 
5 Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Venezuela and 
Peru were involved in the dispute.
6 Mini mill is a facility which produces steel products from recycled scrap metal.
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when Spanish–French–Luxembourger Arcelor was taken over by the Indian owned Mittal 
Steel. The German steel industry with the dominant player, Thyssenkrupp, supplies about 
half a million tonnes of steel a year to the U.S.
Aviation: The American Boeing and the European Airbus companies dominate 
the global market for jet airliners. In defence of the two arch-rivals, the U.S. and the EU 
often accuse each other of receiving unfair state aid. In 1992 the EU and the U.S. signed 
the U.S.–EU Large Civil Aircraft Agreement which limited the launch aid subsidies 
to 33% of the development cost of the aircrafts, eventually agreeing on a progressive 
reduction of state aid. In addition to the direct impacts, the U.S. regularly accuses the EU 
with the funding of large scale R&D projects from the civil aviation to satellite navigation 
systems. At the same time the EU targets the U.S. Government with aerospace industry 
support.
The EU and the U.S. have been accusing each other with illegal state founding at 
the WTO since 2004. The U.S. unilaterally withdrew from the 1992 Agreement that year. 
The WTO case lasted until 2012 and the organisation confirmed that the U.S. Government 
helped to found the aviation industry with USD 5–6 billion in WTO-inconsistent subsidies 
between 1989 and 2006. One the other hand, it cleared the EU on the main charge: the EU 
support for the launch of the Airbus 380 aircraft was not a prohibited export subsidy, and 
the EU’s R&D programmes are fully compatible with WTO rules. (EC 2012)
Technological cooperation
Beyond the comprehensive trade negotiations, the EU also opened discussion with the U.S. 
on many technology-related areas. The open aviation area negotiations were launched in 
2003, with the aim of creating a legal and economic basis for transatlantic air services. 
The European Common Aviation Area (ECAA), is the world’s most liberalised aviation 
market since 2006. The cooperation with the U.S. would lift the restrictions on investment 
by foreign entities, would provide transparent conditions, regulatory convergence and 
harmonisation of air transport standards in safety, security and the environment. (OPENAVI 
2007)
Another important area is military and civilian marketplace for global navigation 
systems. In the 1970s the U.S. developed the Global Positioning System (GPS) which 
provides high accuracy geo positioning for the aviation industry and for mobile phones. 
The EU challenges the GPS with its home-grown Global Satellite Navigation System 
(GNSS) Galileo system. The GNSS provides positioning and timing information with 
higher accuracy than the GPS. Fortunately, the EU and the U.S. have begun to make the two 
systems interoperable. The cooperation agreement of 2004 provides the opportunity for 
the two systems to interoperate via a common signal for the services.
The EU and the U.S. are also cooperating on a broad range of scientific programs: 
under the EU’s Horizon 2020 framework American research programs were also featured. 
The U.S.–EU Science and Technology Agreement and the Implementing Arrangement 
facilitate the cooperation. Potential future strategic areas of cooperation could be on 
the Atlantic Ocean Research Alliance, advanced energy research cooperation and health 
initiatives.
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Working Together at the Global Level
The EU and the U.S. work together at the global level on many different areas. According to 
the Atlantic Council the main issues are the strengthening of the global financial regulation, 
coordinate approaches to global economic governance, consider a more focused and 
effective G20, establish task forces to lead reform of the World Bank and the IMF, work 
for fundamental governance changes in multilateral institutions, consolidate European 
representation at the IMF, end the U.S.–European leadership duopoly of the World Bank 
and IMF. (AC 2009) The efforts also demonstrate a strong commitment towards G20 partner 
countries to develop a “Green Code” of multilateral trade disciplines. The EU and the U.S. 
also aim for coordinated approaches to the major emerging economies, like India and China. 
Since neither the EU nor the U.S. has a free trade agreement with India, they try to reach 
a joint trade agreement, rather than negotiate rival accords.
In addition to these issues, the EU and the U.S. try to improve the effectiveness of 
development policies and humanitarian assistance with stronger policy dialogue and 
coordination, promote partnerships with key private and public-private institutions, and 
targeting primarily low income countries.
Impact of the BREXIT
The decision of the United Kingdom to leave the European Union could have a profound 
impact on the EU–U.S. relations. The U.K. hopes that exit from the EU would create 
new trade opportunities for the country especially with the creation of new free trade 
agreements with the U.S., Australia and New Zealand. The U.S.–U.K. would focus primarily 
on the (financial) services sector. Although for the U.S. Ireland remains the gate towards 
the European Single Market, the U.S. will lose a key ally and a great influence making 
capacity from Europe.
Britain’s decision significantly shifted the EU’s political centre of gravity. The EU 
has seen a shift back to the “Caroling” model of a core EU where the Franco–German 
axis has a major effect on the EU’s strategic decisions and day-to-day decision making. 
As we noted in the introductory section, the U.S. intentions with the support of a British 
EEC membership had exactly the adverse effect. Although the leaders of the U.K. want to 
have a “deep and special” relationship, rushing into a trade agreement could easily harm 
the U.K.’s interest. The U.S. – as the other countries all over the world – are first interested 
in the kind of relationship the U.K. will have with the EU.
A comprehensive free trade deal would allow the U.S. to reach the Single Market 
with fewer limitations. Currently 15% of all U.K. goods exports already go to the U.S. 
and trade can significantly be boosted in the future. A free trade deal could be a long term 
project and negotiations could take years to complete; they need to cover a broad range 
of issues to be compliant with WTO rules. Mutual recognition of product standards and 
regulatory equivalence, questions regarding mergers and acquisitions can extend the talks 
for long years. The question of U.K. membership of NAFTA is also making rounds. 
As with the EU–U.S. TTIP, the main benefit would be the elimination of on-tariff and 
technical barriers via regulatory convergence for services and goods. This could not be 
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easily harmonised with UK–EU regulatory convergence. On the other hand, a NAFTA 
membership would expose the U.K. economy to highly competitive U.S. export which 
would cause damage for the country. The EU–U.K. supply and distribution chains could 
also be hurt if the regulatory alignment would make different standards for the two markets. 
The U.S. would support a Norway-style agreement with the EU through the European 
Economic Area Membership.
Conclusion
Although the EU and the U.S. already share the largest trade and investment relationship in 
the world, they have begun to intensify their cooperation recently on a comprehensive free 
trade and investment partnership. The process is overseen by the Transatlantic Economic 
Council. The two economic giants are promoters of free trade in the world; they are 
cooperating both at the bilateral and at the multilateral level. As the European Union has 
started the “strategic partnership” framework, the once primarily preferential agreement 
oriented foreign policy is now more and more focused on advanced relations with highly 
developed economies. With this strategy the EU can maintain the role of a global actor at 
the world stage both politically and economically.
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The EU and the Mediterranean Region
Anna Molnár
Introduction
In 2017, more than twenty years after the launch of the Barcelona Process, it is obvious 
that European stability cannot be separated from regional security, political stability, and 
sustainable economic development of the Mediterranean area. Europe is under the pressure 
due to migration crises in the Mediterranean area, and fragile and quasi-failing states 
(Syria, Libya) and even religious extremism (SISIS) have posed serious challenges for 
the EU foreign policy. It is not surprising, therefore, that after the review of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in 2015, there has been a greater emphasis on stability in 
the relations between the EU and its neighbours.
The Mediterranean region (cradle of modern civilization) is composed of 22 coun-
tries around the coastal areas of the Mediterranean Sea, and covers portions of three 
continents: Africa, Asia and Europe. The aim of the Euro–Mediterranean cooperation 
was to connect the Northern and Southern shores on the Mediterranean Sea. In our days 
the costal part of West Balkans also belongs to the Mediterranean. It is the consequence of 
specific historical events that the countries located on the Adriatic shores and belonging 
to the Mediterranean, originally were not part of the cooperation. Due to the fact that at 
the time of the establishment of the Euro–Mediterranean Partnership these countries were 
part of the still existing Yugoslavia, where one war followed the other and the state was 
literally disintegrating, joining the process was not a realistic option.
The European Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) started in 1995 with the launch of 
the Barcelona Process “to create an area of peace, stability, security and shared economic 
prosperity, with full respect of democratic principles, human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, while promoting mutual understanding between cultures and civilisations in 
the Euro-Mediterranean region.” (Barcelona Declaration 1995) Despite its success in several 
cases, the EU and the Partner Countries now face a worsening situation in the Middle East 
and North Africa (MENA) region, and the Eurocentric approach of this partnership is 
debated by external and internal actors. (Huber–Paciello 2016)
Following the end of the bipolar world, the EU developed the ambitious goal of 
 becoming a real “player” in the MENA region. Although the United States dominated the so-
called “Enlarged Mediterranean” or the “Greater Middle East”, new threats and challenges 
to international security and stability (e.g. international terrorism and radicalisation) made it 
clear that the Mediterranean policy of the EU needed rethinking. After the end of the bipolar 
international system, firstly in a unipolar, and then, since the end of the millennium, in an 
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even more complicated and constantly changing multi-polar international system, the role 
of the Mediterranean has been increasing again and again. (Ehtesham–Mohammadi 2017)
In my paper firstly I describe the historical background of the relations between 
the Mediterranean region and the EU. Secondly in order to carry out my analysis I give 
a brief introduction to the development of the Euro–Med relations. After describing 
the contemporary institutional relations and the budget and financial tools, finally I analyse 
the results and challenges of the cooperation.
Historical Background
The EU member states have been linked to the countries of the Southern Mediterranean 
for centuries. Although this region has similar characteristics and common historical back-
ground, the Northern and Southern shores of the Mediterranean Region are characterized 
by contradictions: secular versus religious, democracy versus authoritarian regime, rich 
versus poor, high level of industrialisation versus low level of industrialization, integrated 
versus disintegrated region, eldering population versus young population. On the other 
hand, there are strong interdependencies on several issues (energy, migration, economy) 
between the two parts.
The relationship between the EC–EU and the Mediterranean region goes back to 
the period of the bipolar system. Until the 1990s the EC created four types of relations 
with the Mediterranean states: firstly, preferential trade agreements (1969 with Morocco, 
Algeria, and Tunisia; 1975 with Israel);  secondly, association agreements; thirdly, 
cooperation agreements; and fourthly, accession agreements. The association agreements, 
for European countries, meant preparation for accession (e.g. Greece in 1962, Turkey 
1963), while the cooperation agreements for non-European countries provided trade 
preferences (e.g. Morocco in 1976). Within the framework of the Global Mediterranean 
Policy (PMG) launched in 1972, the European Community (EC) negotiated bilateral trade 
and co-operation agreements with Southern Mediterranean countries (with the exception 
of Libya) to strengthen commercial, economic, financial and social cooperation.1 During 
the process of the Southern enlargement in the 1980s, accession agreements came into force 
with the European Mediterranean countries (Greece in 1981, Spain in 1986).
In June 1990, the European Commission proposed a new Mediterranean policy for 
the Period 1992–1996. This new strategy, known as the Renovated Mediterranean Policy 
(RMP), increased the budget for financial co-operation with the Mediterranean region 
on the initiative of the Southern European countries. (Molnár–Siposs 2011) In Rome in 
December 1990 a sub-regional cooperation was decided on, following the French recom-
mendation. The planned cooperation was to connect the Northern and Southern shores of 
the Mediterranean Sea. The “4 + 5” Group was created by four countries of the European 
Community (France, Italy, Portugal, Spain) and the five countries of the Arab Maghreb 
Union (UMA); subsequently the group developed into “5 + 5” with the accession of Malta.2 
1 Euro–Mediterranean cooperation (historical). Source: http://www.medea.be/en/themes/euro-mediterrane-
an-cooperation/euro-mediterranean-cooperation-historical (Accessed: 30.01.2018)
2 Created in 1989 by Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia with the aim of promoting the process 
of integration among the countries of the Great Maghreb.
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The initial success of this cooperation was limited due to its mainly economic objectives. 
Following the Gulf War, the Algerian crisis and the “Lockerbie” case of Libya the initiative 
lost its buoyancy. (Molnár 2011, 70.)
In 1990, during the Italian Presidency of the Council, the Italian Foreign Minister, 
Gianni De Michelis, supported by Spain, unsuccessfully proposed the creation of 
a Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean region (CSCM), following 
the example of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). (Carnovale 
1995, 226.) The idea was to create a structured cooperation on the basis of comprehensive se-
curity approach of the three-pillar system of the CSCE. (De Perini 2018) Despite the failure 
of the CSCM proposal, the RMP eventually led to the creation of the Euro–Mediterranean 
Partnership (EMP). In 1995, during the Barcelona Euro–Mediterranean ministerial meeting, 
representatives of fifteen EU member states and eleven Mediterranean countries, together 
with Palestine authorities, signed the so-called Barcelona Declaration. This document is 
divided into chapters on the political and security, economic, and socio-cultural “baskets” 
of the partnership. These three key areas, following the successful model of the OSCE, 
the Barcelona Declaration thus intended to create a zone of peace, stability, security, shared 
prosperity and deepen the dialogue between the cultures of the Mediterranean area. (Bin 
1997, 3; Molnár 2011, 70.)
The Barcelona Declaration renewed relations in several ways. It was, for example, 
the first time that cultural dialogue received an important role. Thus, the EU recognized as 
its equal partners the countries situated on the Southern shore of the Mediterranean, treating 
them not merely as a market for European products, energy providing centres, or migration 
resources. It also played an important role in strengthening civil society and facilitating 
dialogue and partnership, and deepening cooperation. In launching the Barcelona process, 
the EU chose to apply soft power in hopes that the fundamental values of the European 
Union would take root in the partner states with the consideration of the local characteristics.
The importance of the Southern region declined during the Eastern enlargement that 
took place in the 2000s, as the EU rethought its financial and institutional framework. 
Among the twelve new member states there were only three Mediterranean countries 
(Cyprus, Malta, and Slovenia), and having new borders to the East the Southern region pro-
visionally lost its strategic importance. After publishing the Strategy Paper on the European 
Neighbourhood Policy in 2004, the conception of a Wider Europe gave a new definition to 
the EU’s outlook; European neighbourhood relations: as relations with the Mediterranean 
countries were placed on a political level similar to the relationship between the EU and 
its Eastern neighbours. (European Commission 2004) Following the so called “big bang” 
enlargement in 2004, the ENP hoped to create a “Ring of Friends” around the EU by 
strengthening bilateral relations with the partner countries.
In 2005, the “Year of the Mediterranean”, the Barcelona Summit reinforced the EMP, 
adding migration as a fourth key area. The EMP continued as the multilateral forum for 
dialogue and cooperation, while the ENP guaranteed bilateral relations through association 
agreements and actions plans with the partner countries. Since the 1990s the EU has 
signed new types of association agreement with the Southern Mediterranean countries 
(with the exception of Syria and Libya) after 1999. Today one of the main goals of these 
agreements has been to create a deep Euro–Mediterranean free trade area. The bilateral 
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relations reinforced by the Action Plans3 were complemented by the multilateral partnership 
of the Barcelona Process. (The Euro–Mediterranean Free Trade 2010)
In February 2007, Nicolas Sarkozy, then French Minister of Internal Affairs, proposed 
the establishment of a Mediterranean Union connecting the seven Mediterranean EU 
countries and the non-EU member states on the shores with a kind of reinforced integration 
and cooperation. In December 2007, German Chancellor Angela Merkel criticized the idea, 
claiming it risked splitting the EU. Merkel argued that “cooperation between some member 
states has to be also open to the rest and it has to be approved by all member states. […] It 
cannot be that some countries establish a Mediterranean Union and fund this with money 
from EU coffers”. (Mahony 2007) Merkel highlighted the importance of the equilibrium 
between the Southern and Eastern dimensions of the European neighbourhood policy. 
(Horváth 2008)
As a compromise, the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) was established without 
a separate budget in 2008, when France held the presidency of the EU. The union was 
significantly weaker than the French proposal and, the six main areas of the UfM (the 
environment and water, transport and urban development, business development, energy, 
higher education and research, and civil protection) emphasized the economic aspects of 
relations. (Molnár 2011; Euro–Mediterranean Partnership) Thanks to these compromises, 
the EMP was re-launched by the partner states with the aim of giving new vitality to 
the partnership. At the Paris Summit for the Mediterranean in 2008, EU member states 
and their Mediterranean partners (representatives of 43 countries) decided to construct 
The Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean on the basis of the Barcelona 
Declaration. (Joint Declaration 2008) The Barcelona Process remained the predecessor of 
the Union for the Mediterranean. In November 2008, the Marseille meeting of the Euro–
Mediterranean Ministers of Foreign Affairs introduced a new institutional structure 
including the co-presidency representing the EU and the Mediterranean Partner Countries.
Although the failure of the EMP has never been declared officially, its relaunch in 2005 
and the creation of the UfM in 2008 implied it. The success of the EMP, and of moderni-
sation and democratisation, depends not only on the EU, but also on the political will and 
capacity of the neighbouring countries taking part in the process. National ownership has 
an unquestionable role.
Development of the Euro–Med Relations
Today the EMP, in the framework of the UfM, comprises all twenty-eight member states 
of the European Union and fifteen partner states across the Southern Mediterranean 
and the Middle East.4 Members face common problems, such as maritime pollution and 
3 The Action Plans are political documents on the agenda, objectives and priorities for future relations, contains 
the following key areas: 1. political dialogue and reform; 2. economic and social cooperation and development; 
3. trade related issues, market and regulatory reform; 4. cooperation on justice, liberty and security; 5. sectoral 
issues including transport, energy, information society, environment, research and development; 6. the human 
dimension covering people-to-people contacts, civil society, education and public health.
4 Albania, Algeria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Mauritania, Monaco, Montenegro, 
Morocco, the Palestinian territories, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey.
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maritime safety, energy or higher education issues and business development. (Union for 
the Mediterranean 2017a)
Since the late 1990s, the Euromed Association Agreements between the EU 
and the Mediterranean partner states (MPS) provide the basis for bilateral relations, while 
on the institutional level the former three pillars of the Barcelona Process have been filled 
up by the multi-lateral forums of the Euro–Med dialogue.
The European Union concluded seven Euro–Med association agreements between 1998 
and 2011. These agreements set out a framework for North-South political dialogue. They 
also promoted the gradual liberalisation of trade in the Mediterranean area. Negotiations to 
deepen these association agreements through the establishment of deep and comprehensive 
free trade areas and further liberalisation of trade continue today. (Euro–Mediterranean 
Partnership s. a.a)
In December 2008, Syria and the EU started negotiations on an association agreement. 
In May 2011, following the events of the Arab Spring, the EU decided it would not “take 
further steps with regard to the association agreement with Syria and, therefore, the signing 
of the agreement is not on the agenda.” (European Council 2011) Following the deterioration 
of the security environment, negotiations for a framework agreement between the European 
Union and Libya halted as well. Libya remains outside the ENP, but could join financial 
support programs, like the European Neighbourhood Partnership Instrument ENPI. Libya 
enjoys observer status in the UfM. (Euro–Mediterranean Partnership s. a.a)
Table 1.
Euro–Mediterranean Association Agreements
Partner End of negotiations Date of signature Entry into force
Tunisia June 1995 June 1995 March 1998
Israel September 1995 November 1995 June 2000
Morocco November 1995 February 1996 March 2000
Palestine December 1995 February 1997 July 1997
Jordan April 1997 November 1997 May 2002
Egypt June 1999 June 2001 June 2004
Algeria December 2001 April 2002 September 2005
Lebanon January 2002 May 2002 April 2006
Syria currently suspended — —
Libya currently suspended — —
Mauritania — — —
Source: Euro–Mediterranean Partnership s. a.a
The Euro–Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) has developed over the past decades 
bringing about a new regional approach that formed the basis of creating the European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and later the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM). Nowadays 
the EU’s Mediterranean policy is based on the framework of these two institutionalized 
programs which are formally connected. The mainly multilateral framework is supported 
by the UfM created in 2008 on the basis of the Euro–Mediterranean Partnership launched 
in 1995 by the Barcelona Declaration, while the European Neighbourhood Policy created in 
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2004 provides a primarily bilateral form of cooperation based on association agreements and 
Action Plans; the UfM complements the ENP. We have to emphasise that ENP, having two 
dimensions, was based on two “polices”: the Eastern and the Mediterranean Partnership.
The geographic extent of the UfM is larger than the Southern dimension of the ENP. 
The UfM contains not only the member states of the EU and the Southern Mediterranean 
partners of the ENP, but also Turkey, Mauritania, and the Balkan countries situated 
on the Adriatic Sea. When the EMP was created, Yugoslavia was “disintegrating” and 
participation in the Partnership was not an option. The EU later signed stabilization and 
association agreements with these Western Balkan countries to prepare them for the EU 
accession and to advance regional cooperation. (Molnár 2011, 73.)
Member states of the European Union Other ENP countries (all but Libya are UfM members)
UfM members, which are not ENP countries, part of the EU or 
its enlargement agenda
Russia
EU enlargement agenda
ENP countries
Figure 1.
European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP)
Source: Wikipedia https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Neighbourhood_Policy
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Member states of the European Union Suspended members
ObserversOther members
Figure 2.
Union for the Mediterranean member states
Source: Wikipedia https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Union_for_the_Mediterranean
Holding out real prospects of EU membership allows the EU to influence its partner coun-
tries. In such cases there are fewer conflicts of interests between the economic or security 
interests of the EU and its member states, and its partners appear more determined to launch 
reforms and fulfilment of the Copenhagen criteria. In cases of the Northern and Eastern 
countries (Greece, Spain, the Western Balkans), the EU played a much more effective role 
in the process of reform (effective Europeanisation). (Featherstone–Radaelli 2003) 
For the countries of the Southern Mediterranean Basin, however, which lacked any real 
chance to join, the EU leadership has been less successful, coupled with scarce funding 
opportunities; with different socio-economic and political development of these SMP 
countries, the EU has not been able to fulfil a major incentive role for the implementation 
of real political and economic reforms. The European Union and its member states serve, 
in a limited way, as models of modernization for the region, but this is sometimes still 
overshadowed by distrust from the colonial past.
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The Mediterranean policy of the EU (and its MSs) can be understood in the framework 
of three aspects in which the goals laid down in the Treaties and the practice are oscillating 
between several extremes: 1. normative/liberal and realist approaches; 2. political, cultural 
or legal values vs. economic and security reasons; and 3. policies supporting bottom-up or 
top-down development. The combinations differ depending on the security environment 
of the region and the political will of European governments. Regional policies using 
multilateral or bilateral frameworks augment EU efforts. (Molnár 2016)
One of the novelties of the UfM was the concept of co-ownership. Although the UfM 
provides a multilateral framework for the Southern dimension of the ENP, it is a separate 
international organisation, and it has more members than the ENP. As a direct continuation 
of the Barcelona Process (EMP), it is inspired by the goals defined in the Barcelona 
Declaration. Until the events of the Arab Spring, however, the EMP and the UfM had 
little impact on the economic development and democratisation processes of the Southern 
neighbours whose development model differs from the European one. The persistent 
Arab–Israeli conflict and the events of the Arab Spring, as well as weak initial economic 
results and some bureaucratic arguments about the institutional structure of the UfM 
weakened cooperation and inspired scepticism among the Southern Mediterranean partners.
After the events of the Arab Spring it was clear the ENP and the UfM had to be re-
thought and changed fundamentally. The structure and the working method of the UfM were 
established subsequently. The EU recognised its limited role in the region, as highlighted 
by a report of the European Parliament:
“The Arab Spring has had the effect of a wake-up call for the EU. It illustrated the lim-
itations of the ‘stability versus human rights’ paradigm and prompted a fundamental 
rethinking of EU policies. Double standards in the past have undermined the EU’s 
credibility in the Arab world and have created a mistrust of its intentions. In response to 
the Arab Spring, the EU has promised to shift away from ‘business as usual’ to ensure that 
support for human rights and democracy will be central to its cooperation in its Southern 
neighbourhood. Enabling civil society to function, to advocate for citizens’ priorities and 
rights and to hold governments and donors to account, is an essential part of supporting 
reforms that build sustainable democracy. Positive and negative incentives will also have to 
be applied as appropriate, and benchmarks developed to assess progress in human rights, 
democracy and the rule of law.” (European Parliament 2012, 5.)
The ENP was under review and, in 2011, a consensus emerged that the renewed policy must 
concentrate more on issues related to good governance and respect for human rights. A new 
incentive approach based on the principles of differentiation was elaborated. The so-called 
3M (Money, Markets, and Mobility) of Catherine Ashton, former EEAS HR, was introduced 
in the framework of the ENP. (Ashton 2011) These connected democratic reforms with 
financial support: the country that has more results in the democratic reform progress 
receives more financial aid, more possible mobility of legal migration, and more access to 
the European market.
In 2011, despite the creation of the European External Action Service (EEAS), 
the EU was unprepared to face the challenges created by the Arab Spring. The financial 
and sovereign debt crisis hit several EU MSs and decreased the effectiveness of EU 
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crisis management capacities. The EU MSs responded slowly and in a contradictory 
fashion to the 2011 crisis in the MENA region. Opinion held that the then-existing 
authoritarian regimes could not guarantee regional stability and security in the long-term, 
and democratisation processes were highlighted. The emerging security challenges forced 
a rethinking of the conceptual framework of the ENP, as well. The European Commission 
(EC) subsequently reshaped the ENP, proposing a different approach for each country, 
and the EU decided to offer “more for more”. The new approach emphasised sustainable 
democracy through the 3M incentives.
European politicians initially were optimistic about the democratisation processes 
in the MENA region, and about the EU’s role as an external promoter of democracy. 
The EU institutions firmly stood by the need to support the transition to democracy. This 
was manifested in several documents and statements, but the question remained: were 
the EU and the MSs really ready and able to support these ambitious objectives? European 
politicians sometimes oversimplified these processes, making simplistic analogies between 
the 1989 Central and Eastern European changes and the Arab Spring. (Rompuy 2012)
Political events in Egypt (2013), along with the migration and refugee crisis caused by 
military conflicts and fragile states (e.g. Syria and Libya), highlighted the issue of security 
again. In March 2015, the European Commission and the European External Action Service 
initiated a public consultation with governments, academia, and civil society organisations, 
both within the EU and in the ENP partner countries, to realise the extensive review of 
the ENP. Following the consultation period, the revision of the ENP was finalised in 
2015. (Joint Communication 2015) EU Commissioner Johannes Hahn stated that: “New 
challenges, from violent conflicts in our neighbourhood to uncontrolled migration, from 
organized crime and terrorism to energy stoppages, all demand a robust European answer. 
We have to become smarter at exporting stability. If not, Europe will keep importing 
instability. As one observer has remarked, the “ring of friends” the EU originally aimed 
for, has become a “ring of fire”.” (Hahn 2015)
On 18 November 2015, the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security 
Policy and the European Commission presented the main lines of the review of the ENP, 
which offered “more tailor-made, more differentiated partnerships between the EU and 
each of its neighbouring partners to reflect different ambitions, abilities and interests”. 
(Joint Communication 2015, 4.) The review emphasised that greater mutual ownership and 
joint responsibility of the partners is more successful in supporting reforms than the EU’s 
approach based on the “more for more” principle:
“The incentive-based approach (“More for More”) has been successful in supporting 
reforms in the fields of good governance, democracy, the rule of law and human rights, 
where there is a commitment by partners to such reforms. However, it has not proven 
a sufficiently strong incentive to create a commitment to reform, where there is not 
the political will.” (Joint Communication 2015, 5.)
Although the ENP has been trying to encourage reforms recognising the specific features 
of each country, in general it has not had enough time to show real results in most cases; 
Tunisia is an exception.
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In 2015, High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Vice-President of 
the European Commission (HR/VP) Federica Mogherini, turning away from the Eurocentric 
approach of the previous Mediterranean policy, argued that:
“We should switch from the idea that the European Union is at the centre, surrounded 
by the neighbouring countries, to the idea of a new partnership based on cooperation. 
A stronger partnership with our neighbours is key for the European Union, while we face 
many challenges within our borders and beyond. We are confronted with threats that are 
global and have to be tackled by the international community in a united way. We have 
to build together a safer environment, try to solve the many crises of our common region, 
support the development and the growth of the poorest areas, and address the root causes 
of migration.” (ENP Review 2015)
Mogherini singled out five pillars of the work: “First, focus on economic development 
and job creation;  second, cooperation on energy; third, security; fourth, migration; fifth, 
neighbours of the neighbours” to “strengthen together the resilience of our and our partners’ 
societies, and our ability to effectively work together on our common purposes.” (ENP 
Review 2015) This meant, again, an emphasis on the economic and security aspects of 
this policy framework that would lead to a “more than partnership, less than membership 
relation”, but without a new security strategy the real strategic framework was still unclear.
In preparation for the new security strategy of the EU, and parallel with the review 
of the ENP, in December 2013, the European Council gave a mandate to the High 
Representative, in close co-operation with the European Commission, to “assess the impact 
of changes in the global environment, and to report to the Council in the course of 2015 
on the challenges and opportunities arising for the Union, following consultations with 
the Member States”. (European Council 2013) The report on the strategic review was 
presented to the European Council in June 2015. The European Union in a Changing 
Global Environment, A More Connected, Contested and Complex World warns that: “the 
EU’s ‘soft power’ is waning as the memory of the ‘big bang’ enlargement recedes and other 
actors strive for influence in its neighbourhood. Today’s challenge is to revive the reform 
momentum through credible policies of integration and association.” (Missiroli 2016, 139.)
During this time, the structure of the UfM was also rethought. With the accession 
of the Central and East European member states and the creation of the UfM, the EMP 
expanded to include twenty-eight EU member states and fifteen Mediterranean countries. 
Since the creation of the UfM, cooperation has gone through three phases. Between 2008 
and 2011, under the co-presidency of France and Egypt, cooperation in the framework of 
the UfM was launched, and the Secretariat of the UfM in Barcelona was set up. Between 
2012 and 2015, under the co-presidency of the European Union and Jordan, the capacities of 
the Secretariat were reinforced, the working methods of partnerships were elaborated, and 
the activities of the UfM were increased, giving new momentum to Euro–Mediterranean 
regional cooperation. Following the revision of the European Neighbourhood Policy, 
meetings of foreign affairs ministers of the UfM took place in November 2015 and January 
2017 in Barcelona to start a new phase of cooperation. Since 2016, considering the serious 
challenges in the Mediterranean region and the opportunities there, the UfM’s identity and 
added value was highlighted. Further consolidation of this regional cooperation has been 
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started to create an “enhanced common regional agenda for the Mediterranean in order to 
effectively and collectively address the current challenges.” (Union for the Mediterranean 
2017b, 1.) The 2016 annual report of the UfM noted three priorities of regional integration 
(regional human development; regional stability; and regional integration) to be addressed 
through a “pragmatic and ambitious approach”. (Union for the Mediterranean 2017c, 6.)
Figure 3.
Development of the Union for the Mediterranean
Source: Union for the Mediterranean 2017a, 8.
In January 2017, the ministers of foreign affairs approved a strategic document as a road 
map (RM) for strengthening the UfM as the expression of co-ownership in tackling 
the common challenges to regional stability, human development and regional integration 
in the Mediterranean. According to the document, forty-seven regional cooperation projects 
worth more than 5 billion Euros in total have been labelled under the umbrella of UfM. 
The document highlighted the security-development nexus yet again, stating that: “there is 
no development without security and no security without development.” With the adoption 
of the RM, the ministers of foreign affairs of the forty-three UfM countries agreed to 
strengthen the role of the UfM in enhancing regional cooperation and integration in 
the Mediterranean. The four areas for action were: 1. enhancing political dialogue amongst 
the member states; 2. ensuring the contribution of UfM activities to regional stability and 
human development; 3. strengthening regional integration; and 4. consolidating UfM 
capacity for action. (Union for the Mediterranean 2017b, 4.)
Contemporary Institutional Relations
The Union for the Mediterranean has a North-South co-presidency, currently exercised 
by the External Action Service of the EU, representing EU Member States, and Jordan, 
representing the Mediterranean partners. In 2012, the Council of the EU (FAC Conclusions 
of February 2012) decided that the High Representative assumes the Northern co-presidency 
when the Union for the Mediterranean takes the format of Foreign Ministers Meetings. 
The Commission assumes the Northern co-presidency during Ministerial Meetings 
that solely concern matters falling within areas of exclusive UfM competence. The EU 
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External Action Service leads the Senior Official Meetings of the UfM for the Northern 
co-presidency. (Union for the Mediterranean 2016a)
The UfM secretariat headquartered in Barcelona is in charge of identifying and 
promoting activities like regional projects in different sectors. The current head (Secretary 
General) of the Secretariat is Fathallah Sijilmassi. The Secretariat of the UfM is financed by 
contributions from the European Union (50%) and the partner states (50%). The activities 
of the Secretariat are overseen and coordinated by the Senior Officials Meeting (SOM) 
which consists of Senior Officials from the ministries of foreign affairs of the forty-three 
countries. This body approves the budget and work programme of the Secretariat. It is 
also in charge of preparing the Ministerial Meetings. It also examines project proposals, 
guaranteeing coherence with the guidelines derived from the Summit of Heads of State and 
Government, and from the Ministerial Meetings. The SOM takes decisions by consensus. 
(Euro–Mediterranean Partnership s. a.b; Union for the Mediterranean 2016b)
The Union for the Mediterranean has the following six priority areas: 1. business devel-
opment; 2. social and civil affairs; 3. higher education and research; 4. transport and urban 
development; 5. water and environment; and 6. energy and climate action. The UfM has 
a number of key projects managed by the Secretariat: the de-pollution of the Mediterranean 
Sea; the establishment of maritime and land highways; a joint civil protection programme 
on prevention, preparation, and response to natural and man-made disasters; development 
of alternative energy sources; the creation of Euro–Mediterranean Universities (in 2008 
in Slovenia, in 2016 in Morocco); and the Mediterranean Business Development Initiative, 
which supports small businesses. (Union for the Mediterranean 2016a)
The partnership co-operation and dialogue that was established by the Barcelona 
Declaration is based on several institutions and forums. The Conferences of Ministers 
of Foreign Affairs (CMFA) and the Senior Officials Meetings (SOM) are responsible for 
the discussion regarding all dimensions of the partnership. The ministerial meetings, 
including sectorial meetings, are also the main bodies of multilateral and regional 
cooperation, responsible for the economic and cultural cooperation and dialogue, as well 
as the all-embracing development of the partnership. Ministerial conferences have been 
called on different thematic fields such as water management, industry, energy, migration, 
tourism, cultural heritage and culture, and the environment.
Since 2004 the Euro–Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly (EMPA), a body for 
political cooperation, has become one of the most important institutions of the Barcelona 
Process. The first consultative parliamentary forum was organised in 1998, and it became 
a genuine EMPA in 2004 on the basis of the proposal of the European Parliament. The EP 
resolution was approved by the fifth Euro–Mediterranean Conference of Foreign Ministers 
(Valencia, April 2002). The EMPA held its first session in Greece in March 2004. In 2010 in 
Amman, the EMPA’s name was changed to Parliamentary Assembly of the UfM (PA–UfM).
The main roles of this separate consultative parliamentary body of the UfM are: 
“enhancing the visibility and transparency of the Euro–Mediterranean Partnership and 
bringing its work closer to the interests and expectations of the public; [and] adding 
democratic legitimacy and support to regional cooperation.” (Parliamentary Assembly s. a.a) 
The PA–UfM, which works in close cooperation with the UfM Secretariat, holds at least 
one plenary session annually and has a total of 280 members, equally distributed between 
the Northern and Southern shores of the Mediterranean (140–140). The PA–UfM has an 
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annual presidency that is held in rotation by the four members of the bureau, ensuring 
parity and alternation between South and North chairs. The presidency of the bureau has 
been held by the EP (2012–2013), Jordan (2013–2014), Portugal (2014–2015), Morocco 
(2015–2016) and Italy (2016–2017). (Parliamentary Assembly s. a.b) There are five standing 
committees within the PA–UfM: the Committee on Political Affairs, Security, and Human 
Rights; the Committee on Economic and Financial Affairs, Social Affairs, and Education; 
the Committee on Improving Quality of Life, Exchanges between Civil Societies and 
Culture; the Committee on Energy, Environment, and Water; and the Committee on 
Women’s Rights in the Euro–Med Countries. The PA–UfM adopts non-binding resolutions 
or recommendations. (Parliamentary Assembly s. a.b)
To promote dialogue between cultures and civilizations within the framework of social, 
cultural, and human partnership, in 2005, the Anna Lindh Foundation was established in 
Alexandria. It has become the largest network of civil-society organisations, and its goal 
is to promote the inter-cultural dialogue in the Mediterranean area. It has worked from 
the beginning as a network of national networks, and now contains more than 4,000 member 
networks, including NGOs, public institutions, universities, foundations, local and regional 
authorities, individuals and private organisations. (Anna Lindh Foundation s. a.)
The European Neighbourhood Policy complements the UfM with bilateral relations 
between the EU and the Southern Mediterranean countries. Cooperation in the framework 
of the ENP builds upon several Association Agreements (AA) between the EU and 
the partner countries. On the basis of the AA’s bilateral Action Plans (AP), the EU 
and the ENP partner countries in the Southern Mediterranean region (except Libya, Syria, 
and Algeria) agreed to launch a political and economic reform agenda for a period of three or 
five years. The goals of the ENP, such as reforms to democratisation or economic integration 
are supported by the financial funds of the EU, mainly by the European Neighbourhood 
Instrument (ENI).
Every year from 2015, ENP progress reports were published by the EEAS and 
the Commission to describe the development of reforms in the neighbouring countries. 
Since the review of the ENP, the progress reports have been replaced by association 
implementation reports that assess the state of implementation by the partner country and 
by the EU. These documents focus on the progress toward key reforms agreed between 
the two parties.
Budget and Financial Tools
Between 1994 and 2004, the main financial tool of the Barcelona Process was the MEDA 
Program (similar to the PHARE and TACIS programs), with additional loans available 
from the European Investment Bank. For the MEDA I programme (1994–1999) 3.4 billion 
Euros, and for the MEDA II programme (2000–2006) 5.4 billion Euros were allocated. 
Following the establishment of the ENP and for the programming period 2007–2013, MEDA 
(and TACIS) were replaced by a single financial instrument, the European Neighbourhood 
Partnership Instrument (ENPI), with approximately €12 billion available. In the 2014–2020 
period, the European Neighbourhood Instrument, ENI promotes the fulfilment of the ENP 
objectives, for which 15.4 billion Euros have been allocated.
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The implementation of reforms is supported by geographic instruments, like the ENI, 
and by thematic instruments, like the Civil Society Facility (CSF). There are other EU 
instruments and programmes to promote partnership with neighbouring countries (like 
the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), the Non-State Actors 
and Local Authorities in Development (NSA–LA), and the Instrument for Stability (IfS). 
“The EIDHR is designed to help civil society become an effective force for political reform and 
defence of human rights. Building on its key strength, which is the ability to operate without 
the need for host government consent, the EIDHR is able to focus on sensitive political issues 
and innovative approaches and to cooperate directly with local civil society organisations 
which need to preserve independence from public authorities, providing for great flexibility 
and increased capacity to respond to changing circumstances.” (EIDHR s. a.) The European 
Investment Bank (EIB) and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(EBRD) provide loans, as well.
The Western Balkans and Turkey are in the pre-accession process and, as candidates 
and potential candidates for membership in the EU, are not covered under the EU’s 
neighbourhood policy. These countries therefore do not belong to the area of the ENP. In 
2007, in place of all previous pre-accession programs, the Instrument for Pre-Accession 
Assistance (IPA) was introduced by the European Commission to help all pre-accession 
activities in candidate and potential candidate countries. Under the financial framework of 
2014–2020, the part of the Western Balkans that belongs to the Mediterranean receives EU 
funding through IPA II. (Molnár 2011, 73.)
The Union for the Mediterranean has no budget from which to finance its activities and 
projects, since it was conceived as an instrument to mobilise private funds from investment 
and development banks and other international bodies.
Results and Challenges
The EU, as a normative-civilian power, (Manners 2002) has placed great emphasis 
on the protection, spread, and voluntary acceptance of its principles (peace, freedom, 
democracy, the rule of law, fundamental human rights and freedoms, respect for human 
dignity) by third countries, particularly in the MENA region. (Whitman 2011, 1–25.) 
It is not surprising that the EU’s Mediterranean policy has been criticised by several 
stakeholders, like the Southern partner states, experts, and academics, as it contains con-
tradictions between the stated policy goals and practice. (Del Sarto–Schumacher 2005; 
Vallelersundi 2004; Tocci–Cassarini 2011; Tocci 2011) According to many, the EU and 
its MSs, in implementing the Mediterranean Policy through a more realistic and pragmatic 
approach, has placed more emphasis on economic and security issues than on normative 
goals. While the EU kept trying to convince the partner countries of the necessity of political 
and economic reforms, it put up with the existence of authoritarian (but pro-Western) 
regimes in favour of regional stability and secure energy resources. Regimes that assisted 
in tackling the migration crisis also found favour. It is not surprising, therefore, that from 
time to time the EU and its MSs have been criticised as hypocritical. (Hansen–Marsh 2015)
The last twenty years, and especially the Arab Spring, have shown that the lack of 
political will among the Southern Mediterranean partners, the low level of financial support 
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provided by the EU, and the different foreign policy interests of the MSs, mean that the EU’s 
Mediterranean policy has had little impact on the democratisation and securitisation 
processes of the region. From time to time the EU has struggled to tackle challenges 
collectively (like in the case of Libya). Emerging crises posed serious security challenges to 
the EU. The lack of a new European security strategy hindered, until recently, the adoption 
of appropriate answers.
The Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy adopted in 
2016 represents a more pragmatic approach, focusing on the state and societal resilience of 
the region. According to Sven Biscop, the Global Strategy signals a return to Realpolitik, 
and a balance between “dreamy idealism and unprincipled pragmatism”. The GS speaks 
of “principled pragmatism”. Compared to the previous security strategy of the EU 
(2003), the GS takes into account its barriers, and it is less optimistic about the success of 
democracy transfer. (Biscop 2016) The priority placed on the state and societal resilience 
of the Southern neighbours clearly shows the turn away from the EU’s normative role.
Conclusions
Despite the ambitions of 2003, namely the creation of the Ring of Friends, today a ring of 
instability encompasses the EU. After the Arab Spring and the crisis in Ukraine, the security 
situation has deteriorated dramatically. Economic and financial problems remain, the mi-
gration crisis is unresolved, and growing Euroscepticism and the Brexit threaten to hinder 
any effective EU response. II is clear that the review of the neighbourhood policy, a key 
instrument of the EU’s common foreign and security policy, was accelerated by the Arab 
Spring. For a variety of reasons though, such as lower-than-expected available resources, 
the lack of a common will, and the lack of political engagement by the partner states, little 
substantive progress has been made.
Before the Arab Spring overturned the status quo within the MENA region, the pos-
sibility of dialogue between the partner states was considered the most important result of 
the Euro–Mediterranean Partnership. It strengthened the EU’s role in the region, as well. 
Enhancing economic and political relations and, in the long term, accelerating the economic 
development of the Southern Mediterranean partners were among the crucial aims of 
regional and bilateral forms of cooperation.
In recent years, demographic, economic, and social processes led to political in-
stability, social unrest, and increased security risks in the Southern Mediterranean 
region. Until the review of the ENP in 2011, the EU’s Mediterranean policy, despite 
the normative ambitions of the EU, essentially focused on the security aspects characterized 
by the  pragmatic-realistic approach of the capitals, and seemingly turned a blind eye 
to the pro-Western authoritarian systems. Thus, instead of bottom-up processes with 
an uncertain end, non-democratic governments regarded as guarantees of the political 
stability were supported. During the Arab Spring this kind of approach was discredited in 
the eyes of the people, despite tangible results; therefore, it could not give truly successful 
responses to the challenges. The effective implementation of this policy was hindered further 
by the limited level of regional economic integration between Southern Mediterranean 
countries. Irregular migration and refugee flows in the past few years have also pointed out 
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that the EU’s prosperity exporting efforts had not succeeded in the closest region to the EU, 
and the social and political problems continue to grow.
The difficulties of the multilateral Euro–Mediterranean policy have been recognized 
several times; when it was complemented by the European Neighbourhood Policy in 2004, it 
became obvious that instead of realising regional integration under the multilateral umbrella 
of the ENP–UfM, relations based on bilateral agreements were intensifying. After the Arab 
Spring, it became clear that the EU could not offer a new “Mediterranean Marshall Plan” 
to this region, despite the expectations of several stakeholders. The contradictory trends 
suggested that the EU’s relations with this region were not strengthened by these processes. 
Competition between global and regional powers was intensified by the absence of a real 
hegemon, and the regional dynamics turned increasingly chaotic.
In the new framework of the security system of the early nineties, when the insti-
tutionalised structure of the Euro–Mediterranean relations was built, U.S. hegemony 
clearly prevailed in the region. The EU’s evolving “soft-civilian power” was supposed to 
complement the hard power of the USA. During the last decades, the international system 
has changed dramatically, and new players with global strategic interests have emerged in 
the multipolar environment of the Mediterranean region.
It has become clear that the normative and soft power offered by the EU is insufficient. 
The EU had only a limited impact on the transition processes of the countries in the region 
(e.g. the strengthening of civil society). It is obvious that in the future, the EU must use both 
soft and hard foreign policy instruments in the framework of the comprehensive approach 
elaborated in 2013 and the integrated approach introduced by the Global Strategy. In 2016 
Jean-Claude Juncker noted in his State of the Union speech: “Soft power is no longer 
enough […] in the EU’s increasingly dangerous neighbourhood.” It is not coincidental 
that following the review of the ENP, supporting stabilisation became a top priority. (Joint 
Communication 2015)
The EU has a long history of ambitions but in reality provided unsuccessful and 
insufficient plans for the Mediterranean region. It is not surprising that the Global Strategy 
(GS) adopted in 2016 is trying to find a perfect balance between idealism and sometimes 
inconvenient reality has introduced the approach of “principled pragmatism”. (European 
External Action Service 2016)
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The EU’s Relations with the Western Balkans1 and Turkey
Tibor Ördögh
The European Community and the Historic Relations of Yugoslavia 
and Turkey
The political and economic relationship of Yugoslavia and the European Union began when 
Yugoslavia and the European Economic Community (EEC) signed a three-year trade deal 
in March 1970; another, five years, followed in 1973. Export trade with Yugoslavia added 
up to 2.84 billion European Currency Units in 1975; by 1989, it exceeded 7 billion ECUs. 
Except for 1988, the balance always favoured the EEC.
During the Cold War era, the importance of the development of relations grew due to 
the fact that Yugoslavia had already been facing financial difficulties, while the European 
Community was in need of a socialist state that could be set as an example for the countries 
of the Eastern bloc. The relations between the two sides up until the collapse of the Eastern 
bloc were merely economic and commercial in nature. The economic meetings of the system 
held at ministerial level constitute political relations. (Getter 1989)
Table 1.
Trade between the European Community and Yugoslavia (million ECU*)
1975 1978 1979 1980 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
EC import 1,062 1,706 1,966 2,172 2,762 3,530 4,310 4,783 4,893 5,251 5,891 7,000
EC export 2,840 3,755 4,411 4,199 4,277 4,555 5,048 5,834 5,853 5,398 5,713 7,034
Balance 1,778 2,049 2,445 2,027 1,515 1,025 738 1,051 960 147 –178 34
Note:* The value of one ECU in 1978 was $1.39; in 1982 it was $0.98; in 1983 it was $0.89; in 1984 it was $0.83; 
and in 1985 it was $0.75.
Source: EUROSTAT. Edited by the author.
The war that broke out at the beginning of the 1990s, however, put an end to the prosperous 
relationship. With the disintegration of Yugoslavia, the agreements were terminated, 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) consisting of Serbia and Montenegro became 
insulated from the international community, and relations with the European Union were 
restricted to the sanctions introduced against Serbia. In 1991, the European Community 
1 The Western Balkan region is a political term called into existence by the European Union to refer to 
the countries of the Balkan Peninsula participating in the European integration process. Its members are 
Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (hereinafter referred 
to as “Macedonia”), Kosovo, Montenegro, and Serbia.
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tried to bring the Yugoslav leaders to the negotiating table. In May, Jacques Delors, 
president of the European Commission offered $4 billion in support, with the intention 
of keeping Yugoslavia intact, and a reconciliation commission led by Robert Badinter 
was set up. In autumn, a peace conference led by Lord Peter Carrington was organized. 
(Lengyel 2009) The united action of the community was undermined by the independent 
action of Germany, which recognized Croatia’s and Slovenia’s independence. Afterwards, 
the EC called for sanctions and, on 8 November 1991, the trade agreement was suspended, 
the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) was cancelled, the import of several 
Yugoslav products was restricted, and Poland–Hungary Assistance for the Reconstruction 
of the Economy (PHARE) aid was withdrawn from the aggressors.
The European integration of Turkey can be traced back to the Cold War, when 
the country sought good relations with the West to stave off Soviet territorial claims. 
Following their accession to NATO in 1952, the Turks were the first to submit a request 
for associate membership in the European Economic Community. The domestic politics of 
Turkey, however, was characterized by military coups, a major hindrance to the development 
of relations. The association agreement (Ankara Agreement) and its additional protocol 
(Additional Protocol 1972) were concluded on 12 September 1963, but only took effect in 
1973. A transitional period of twenty-two years was prescribed for implementing the free 
movement of goods and services, and the harmonization of Turkish legislation with that 
of the EEC.
Under the terms of the agreement, the EC provided funds for the preparation period. 
According to the first financial protocol, which covered 1963–1970, the EEC provided 
Turkey with loans totalling 175 million ECUs. The trade concessions the EEC granted 
to Turkey in the form of tariff quotas, however, proved not as effective as expected. Yet 
the EEC’s share in Turkish imports rose from 29% in 1963 to 42% in 1972. (Ministry 2017)
The Demirel regime declared its intent to initiate the accession at the end of August 
1980, but the elite did not agree; because of this, the leadership was overthrown by yet 
another military coup. A new head of government, Turgut Özal, envisaged accession on 14 
April 1987, which was backed by the economic indicators; however, the criteria regarding 
the rule of law, democracy, and human rights had increased in significance. Turkey was not 
in compliance, according to a report of 1989 released by the European Commission, which 
declared Turkey ineligible for the accession procession. (CEC 1989/2290 final/2)
Despite the resulting disappointment, the Mautes Package was set up. This revised 
the necessary technical steps for inclusion in the customs union to take effect by 1995. 
Greece, however, vetoed the package. Turkey nonetheless proceeded with an intrinsically 
similar program towards the implementation of the customs union in 1992. (Aikan 2003) 
Turkey reluctantly fulfilled the expectations of the EU, and so the agreement entered into 
force in 1996.
The Creation of the Policy of the European Union and the Western Balkans
Formulating and following the Common Foreign and Security Policy proved to be a chal-
lenge for the member states of the European Union. The settlement following the first war 
in Yugoslavia, however, meant the member states needed to stabilize the Balkan region. 
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A French initiative projected practical steps; the first mention of regional cooperation to 
create stability in the Balkans came from the European Commission on 14 February 1996. 
(Lőrinczné 2013) In December 1996, the Southeast European Cooperative Initiative 
(SECI), which became known as the Royaumont Process, was launched. The participants 
were the four new states (Croatia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Macedonia and 
Bosnia and Herzegovina), the four neighbouring countries (Romania, Bulgaria, Slovenia 
and Turkey), the member states of the EU, Russia, the United States of America, the Council 
of Europe, and the OSCE. (Ehrhart 1998) Its main goal was to promote dialogue on every 
level of the civil society by funding human rights and cultural initiatives. Via regional 
cooperation, it would monitor the implementation of the Dayton Agreement.2
In 1997, the European Union established the so-called Regional Approach, attempting 
to stabilize the Western Balkan states through financial incentives instead of prospective 
membership. (Vincze 2008) The EU used bilateral relations with the states of the former 
Yugoslavia (with the exception of Slovenia), and Albania, granting trade preferences and 
monetary support (PHARE, OBNOVA) on identical terms. The fulfilment of ten political 
and economic criteria was a pre-condition for contractual relations with the EU. Some of 
these criteria include the readmission of refugees, adherence to the Dayton Agreement, 
respect for human rights, and also economic criteria such as promoting the reforms of 
the market economy and cooperation between the states of the region.
The war in Kosovo prompted the leaders of the EU to improve ties with the region. 
Following the settlement, the EU tried to position itself as a stabilizing factor; the member 
states played a part in the economic sector of civil administration (soft power), and in mil-
itary administration (hard power).3 On 10 June 1999, the Southeast European Stability Pact 
was adopted. This brought together some forty-five participants, including the participants 
of the Royaumont Process and new members such as Canada, Japan, the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development, NATO, and the International Monetary Fund. (1999/345/
CFSP) It established three “working tables” under the supervision of the special coordinator 
at the so-called Southeast European Regional Roundtable. The first working table addressed 
human rights and the democratization process, while the  second’s concerns included 
economic reconstruction and development; the third table was responsible for security 
issues. (Kemenszky 2008) The pact is intended to support the South-Eastern European 
states’ efforts to establish peace, democracy, respect for human rights, and economic welfare 
that will bring stability to the region. (1999/345/CFSP) The Council also guaranteed full 
membership in the European Union for those countries completing the tasks. The regional 
approach, however, was replaced by the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP).
“It is aimed at assisting the five Western Balkan states with complying with the criteria, 
as being conditions on the way towards joining the EU. To that effect, the SAP, in 
addition to having modified or extended the past instruments of the Regional Approach, 
2 The Dayton Agreement served to put an end to the Bosnian War (1992–1995) of three and a half years and to 
guarantee the political settlement in Bosnia and Herzegovina following the conflict. The negotiations were 
held in the town of Dayton in the USA, and it was signed in Paris on 14 December 1995.
3 Between 24 March and 9 June 1999, the NATO initiated air strikes in Yugoslavia justified by the need for 
humanitarian intervention, with the participation of the member states of the European Union. This, however, 
was an intervention by the international community, and not the EU.
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defined further areas of the cooperation, which are as follows: ongoing political dialogue, 
cooperation on justice and home affairs, and as part of its main innovation, the SAP offered 
a new kind of contractual partnership for the countries of the region, i.e. the Stabilization 
and Association Process (SAA).” (Pippan 2004)
On 24 November 2000, following the principle of progressive partnership, trade preferences 
and financial support, the Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) were launched. 
The process had two phases: entering free trade agreements, and allocating resources in 
support of democratic transition. The European Commission monitored the states and, 
when it determined they had achieved satisfactory economic and political development, 
recommended an agenda for the  second phase. A customized stabilization and association 
agreement was developed then for each country; its adoption marked the end of the process. 
The agreement has entered into force for all five Western Balkan states.
Table 2.
Stabilization and association agreements in the Western Balkans
Macedonia Albania Monte negro
Bosnia and 
Herzego­
vina
Serbia Kosovo
Negotiations 
started 15.04.2000 31.01.2003 10.10.2005 25.11.2005 10.10.2005 28.10.2013
Initiated 24.11.2000 28.02.2006 15.03.2007 04.12.2007 07.11.2007 25.07.2014
Signature 09.04.2001 12.06.2006 15.10.2007 16.06.2008 29.04.2008 27.10.2015
Entry into 
force 01.04.2004 01.05.2009 01.05.2010 01.06.2015 01.09.2013 01.04.2016
Source: European Commission. Edited by the author.
Contemporary Relations
The Santa Maria de Feira meeting of the European Council in June 2000 marked a milestone 
in the policy of the EU concerning the Balkan region. It made clear that democratic reforms 
were needed if the Western Balkan countries were to join the EU. At the Thessaloniki 
meeting of the European Council in June 2003, for instance, the states of the region were 
referred to as “potential candidates”. Since then, relations with the Balkan region and Turkey 
have been dominated by the question of their accession.
Montenegro
At the end of the 1990s, Montenegro saw its future as part of the European integration, 
and emphasized its independence from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The regime 
change in Serbia allowed reforms in the federation. Under pressure from the EU, the leaders 
of Serbia and Montenegro signed the Belgrade Convention on 14 March 2002, placing 
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the confederation on a new footing. Javier Solana, the EU’s High Representative for 
the Common Foreign and Security Policy, attended the signing ceremony, since the EU had 
assisted with negotiations. The novelty of the agreement is that it allowed for a referendum 
to be held in Montenegro about its independence.
Montenegro nonetheless declared independence in 2006. On 15 September 2006, 
therefore, the European Council initiated a political discussion with the Government of 
Montenegro; the first talks were held on 22 January 2007. The adoption of the stabilization 
and association agreement was a direct consequence of these discussions.
The accession period for the country thus dates to 2008, when a request was submitted 
by Montenegro. Between 22 July and 9 December 2009, the Government of Montenegro 
responded to questions; visa liberalization for Montenegrin citizens followed on 19 
December 2009. Candidate status was granted in December 2010. For genuine negotiations 
to take place, however, Montenegro had to fulfil seven tasks, which it did by 2012. So 
far thirty chapters4 have been opened, and three have been closed, at least provisionally. 
A Montenegrin mission has been operating in Brussels since 2006, while the EU has had 
a delegation in Podgorica since November 2007. (EU 2017a)
Serbia
The history of the EU delegation to Serbia dates to 1982 when, according to the agreement 
between the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the European Community, trade 
relations were initiated between the two parties. From 2009, the EU has had political 
representation in Belgrade. The European Partnership with Serbia was adopted in 2008. 
It outlined the rules to which the country must adhere to before applying for membership. 
Serbia managed to meet the criteria in 2009, which led to visa liberalization; Serbia also 
stated its intent to join the EU. The European Commission did not regard Serbia as ready, 
however, since it had not handed all accused war criminals over to the International Court 
Tribunal of Yugoslavia (ICTY), among other things. Later on, the pressure from the Union 
and the promise of being granted candidate status led Serbia to extradite all war criminals 
to the General Court, in return for which the European Commission finally granted Serbia 
candidate status in December 2011.
The development of relations between Serbia and the EU was affected by Serbia’s 
relationship with Kosovo. After the Brussels Agreement of 2013, nothing stood in the way 
for negotiating accession; this was agreed upon by the EU member states in December 2013. 
Negotiations started in 2014, and twelve chapters have been opened, while two have been 
closed provisionally. (EU 2017b)
4 The chapters of the acquis (presently 35) form the basis of the accession negotiations for each candidate 
country. They correspond to the different areas of the acquis for which reforms are needed in order to meet 
the accession conditions.
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Turkey
At the Helsinki Summit of 1999, Turkey was granted candidate status in the EU. In 2001, 
the European Union established the framework of the accession partnership, in response to 
which Ankara adopted the so-called National Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis 
(NPAA). On 17 December 2004, the European Council approved the opening of negotia-
tions. The first round was launched on 3 October 2005, after Turkey adopted the Additional 
Protocol of the Ankara Agreement regarding Cyprus; until that point, the member states 
had blocked the opening of eight of the chapters. (EU 2017c)
The negotiations ended in bitter disappointment. The EU had declared: 1. the negotia-
tions “open-ended”, 2. thereby including the Cyprus problem, 3. and opening the possibility 
of a special partnership with the leaders of certain member states (France, Austria and 
Germany) is necessary. (Yilmaz 2014) Some of the main concerns on the European side 
included Turkey’s underdeveloped economy, extensive corruption and the oppression of 
the Kurdish minority. Freedom of movement for Turkey’s 80 million people, especially given 
the cultural and religious differences with Europe, remain an unspoken concern. (Aydin-
Düzgit 2012) Only sixteen chapters have been opened, and only one has been closed.
The slowness of the process led the initially pro-European Justice and Development 
Party (AKP) to turn away from European integration. European-style democratization came 
to a halt, and the AKP turned to an authoritative political system that has been criticized 
by the EU on several occasions. Visa liberalization negotiations nonetheless commenced in 
December 2013. Turkey will have to fulfil 72 criteria for an agreement to happen. (European 
Commission 2016a)
Macedonia
The EU’s relations with Macedonia date back to 1996, when the country became eligible 
for PHARE funds. In accordance with the decision of the European Council, political and 
economic relations were at the forefront of negotiations. An EU delegation was set up in 
Skopje in 1998. In 2001, the EU sent humanitarian aid in the wake of ethnic tension, and in 
2003, the EU took over the role of providing a military presence.
Macedonia applied to join the European Union in March 2004. The European 
Commission recommended candidate status in November 2005; it was granted in December. 
The Commission proposed starting negotiations in October 2009, but the vetoes of Greece 
and later Bulgaria have prevented them. (EU 2017d) The conflict goes back to 1991, when 
Macedonia declared its independence; the name “Macedonian Republic” is unacceptable 
to Greece, since the Northern province of Greece is called Macedonia and the Greeks fear 
the new state might claim that territory. The country is referred to in international relations, 
therefore, as the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Although the International 
Court of Justice held that the action infringed the Interim Accord of 1995, the Greeks kept 
Macedonia from joining NATO in 2008. Numerous proposals for alternative names (New 
Macedonia, Slavic Macedonia, Upper Macedonia, the Republic of Skopje, the Republic of 
Vardar) have been rejected over the last decade, so the Greek veto remains. (Bajtay 2014)
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Albania
Relations with Albania started with its participation in the PHARE program in 1992. 
The European Union created its Tirana Delegation with the aim of setting up a permanent 
diplomatic body to strengthen political and economic cooperation and since 1997, there has 
been some development in bilateral relations. The focus during the 2000s was the stabili-
zation and association agreement. By 2006, visa liberalization became the dominant theme; 
it eventually entered into force in 2010.
Albania applied for EU membership in 2009; in 2010, the European Commission stated 
that Albania could be granted candidate status upon meeting twelve conditions relating to 
the rule of law and democracy. In 2012, the commission added the condition that a judicial 
and administrative reform be introduced. Albania was also required to modify the proce-
dural rules for parliamentary elections. These conditions were met in 2013, and the Council 
granted Albania candidate status. Two additional conditions were set by the European Union 
before accession negotiations could begin though: the parliamentary opposition could not 
be prevented from serving its function by modifications to the legislative framework, and 
additional reforms affecting public administration, the rule of law, corruption, organized 
crime, and human rights had to be made. The Albanian Government subsequently 
introduced several modifications and the European Commission proposed negotiations in 
November 2016. Germany vetoed the proposal, however, as it doubted the reforms were 
sustainable. A vote on the matter is due in 2018. (EU 2017e)
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Within the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Common 
Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), the EU Police Mission (EUPM) carried out a crisis 
management operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina between 2003 and 2012. The European 
Union took over the peacekeeping functions in the country in 2004, and the EUFOR Althea 
mission still plays an important role as a stabilizing force.
Bilateral relations have been marred by the war-torn past of the federation and its fragile 
statehood. The country is regarded a potential EU candidate nonetheless. The European 
Union set up its delegation in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1996 to facilitate political and 
economic reforms. In 2008, the Visa Facilitation and Readmission agreements entered 
into force along with the Interim Agreement, whose function was taken over in 2015 by 
the stabilization and association agreement. The citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina may 
travel in the Schengen countries without a visa.
In 2016, the head of the Bosnia and Herzegovina presidency submitted a formal request 
for accession. The European Committee transmitted the questionnaire to map the legal 
environment to Bosnia, which was to be returned in the autumn of 2017. The committee is 
not expected to propose candidate status for Bosnia though, because the country’s legislation 
is full of inconsistencies. (EU 2017f)
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Kosovo
The contested statehood of Kosovo makes it a controversial potential candidate for EU mem-
bership. The EU concluded a series of political and economic agreements with the leadership 
of the new state to promote stability. The EULEX Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo operates 
within the framework of the said agreements, and supports the efforts of the authorities to 
establish sustainable and accountable institutions governed by the rule of law. It improves 
multi-ethnic administration of justice, the police forces, and customs services. It also 
seeks to ensure that the said institutions become free of political influence and function in 
accordance with the European norms and practices. The activities of the European Union 
in Kosovo are coordinated by the European Union Special Representative (EUSR), which 
is directly responsible to the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. 
The EUSR promotes the European integration pursuits of the Government of Kosovo, and it 
assists in the country’s compliance with the basic liberties and human rights. (EULEX 2017)
The EU office was opened in Pristina in 1999, and the European Union has been 
involved in the crisis and post-crisis management since then. The relationship between 
the European Union and Kosovo is dominated by the issue of relations with Serbia, whose 
greatest achievement has been the Brussels Agreement in 2003. (EU 2017g)
Visa liberalization has yet to take effect in Kosovo. The last obstacle was the resolution 
of the border dispute with Montenegro, but the agreement signed by the Government of 
Kosovo in 2017 was not ratified by the parliament.
Table 3.
The accession process of the Western Balkan Region to the European Union
Type
Submission 
of Appli­
cation for 
Member­
ship Status
Candidate 
Status 
Granted
Initiation 
of Negotia­
tions
Number 
of Opened 
Chapters
Number of 
Provision­
ally Closed 
Chapters
Turkey Candidate 01.12.1964 14.04.1987 12.12.1999 16 1
Montenegro Candidate 15.12.2008 17.12.2010 29.06.2012 30 3
Serbia Candidate 22.12.2009 01.03.2012 21.01.2014 12 2
Macedonia Candidate 22.03.2004 17.12.2005 – – –
Albania Candidate 28.04.2009 24.06.2014 – – –
Bosnia–
Herzegovina
Potential 
Candidate
15.02.2016 – – – –
Kosovo Potential 
Candidate
– – – – –
Source: European Commission. Edited by the author.
Budgetary Backdrop and Forms of Financing
The European Union has changed the support schemes for the Balkan region several 
times. Edit Bencze differentiates three phases. (Lőrinczné 2013) The first phase took 
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place between 1991 and 1999, when the EU had to deal with the Yugoslav Wars and their 
aftermath. During this period the EU did not adopt a consistent approach. The available 
funds were granted to provide assistance with state building and to guarantee a democratic 
transition between regimes. The European Union introduced three sources of funding for 
this: the European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO), the Poland and Hungary 
Assistance for the Reconstruction of the Economy (PHARE), and the OBNOVA (the word 
means “renewal” in Bosnian) Programme.
The 1992 establishment of the ECHO fund was linked to the First Yugoslav War. It 
played a role not only in the region though, but worldwide. Until 1995, the organization 
spent 1.18 billion EUR to fund humanitarian causes: e.g. giving out medical equipment, 
medicine, food packages, sanitary items, clothing, and heating material to those in need; 
they also contributed to psychological assistance. As the war ended, the focus shifted 
towards the returning refugees, for whom a total of 469 million EUR was available between 
1996 and 1998. In 1999, during the Kosovo War, the organization gave out 450 million EUR 
in aid. The operation in the Western Balkans terminated in 2003.
The OBNOVA Programme, launched in 1996 (1628/96 Council Regulation) granted 
aids and development funds to Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, and the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia. The programme established eight objectives, some of which were 
aimed at humanitarian causes, but it was in place mainly to facilitate the democratic 
transition. The leaders of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia initially refused 
to fulfil the conditions, therefore funds only became available for these countries after 2000, 
when reforms to their political systems were introduced.
Table 4.
EU assistance to the Western Balkan countries, 1991–1999 (million EUR)
1991–1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Total
Albania 400.10 90.55 55.30 99.40 54.30 225.40 925.05
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 495.50 216.40 441.10 360.90 295.30 284.00 2,093.20
Croatia 205.70 38.70 33.60 27.00 24.10 18.60 347.70
Federal 
Republic of 
Yugoslavia
170.60 40.00 24.50 18.10 27.10 145.30 425.60
Kosovo – – – – 13.20 259.60 272.80
Macedonia 96.60 34.40 25.00 73.70 25.50 108.60 363.80
Total 1,368.50 420.05 579.40 579.10 439.40 1,041.50 4,427.95
Source: Szemlér 2008. Edited by the author.
The PHARE Programme, established in 1989 (European Commission 1999) assisted with 
the construction and consolidation of the democratic institutions; it was extended to Albania 
(347.71m EUR), Bosnia and Herzegovina (199.72m EUR) and Macedonia (110.29m EUR). 
The  second phase took place between 2000 and 2006, when the European Union folded its 
previously unclear and uncoordinated funding operations into a new, structured funding 
scheme in the region. The Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and 
Stabilization (CARDS) programme (2666/2000 Council Regulation) was introduced 
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within the confines of the stabilization and association process; it spent 4.6 billion EUR5 
in the Western Balkans on:
• reconstruction and solving the refugee issue
• creating efficient democratic structures, and strengthening the rule of law and re-
spect for human and minority rights
• fostering sustainable economic and social growth, and
• establishing regional, transnational, cross-border, and interregional cooperation 
between the countries of the region, the European Union, and the Central European 
countries applying for candidate status. (Rechnitzer 2007)
CARDS was intended to simplify the funding scheme of the Community, but several 
conflicting issues were still present, because the funding for the countries of the region 
came from different institutions. The European Agency for Reconstruction (EAR) provided 
funding for Serbia and Montenegro, Kosovo and Macedonia, while in other countries 
the scheme was controlled by independent commissions. (Szemlér 2008)
Table 5.
CARDS Programme allocation for 2000–2006 (million EUR)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Total
Albania 33.4 37.5 44.9 46.5 63.5 44.2 45.5 315.5
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 90.3 105.2 71.9 63.0 72.0 49.4 51.0 502.8
Croatia* 16.8 60.0 59.0 62.0 81.0 – – 278.8
Federal 
Republic of 
Yugoslavia**
650.5 385.5 351.6 324.3 307.9 282.5 245.5 2,547.8
Macedonia 13.0 56.2 41.5 43.5 59.0 45.0 40.0 298.2
Total 804.0 644.4 568.9 539.3 583.4 421.1 382 3,943.1
* Croatia was the beneficiary of pre-accession funds adding up to 105 million EUR, while in 2005 it received 
140 million EUR
** Serbia and Montenegro between 2003 and 2006
Source: Szemlér 2008. Edited by the author.
In the third phase, starting in 2007, the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance I (IPA I) 
was introduced. The budget for the period ending in 2013 amounted to 11.468 billion 
EUR, while for 2014–2020 it was 11.7 billion EUR for the candidate states and potential 
candidates. The money was to facilitate the fulfilment of the conditions of accession. 
The Accession Partnership of 2001, for example, had established the Turkey Pre-Accession 
Instrument (TPA), which was set up to promote the implementation of the Copenhagen 
Criteria within Turkey.
5 The difference was the result of the fact that the candidate states were not able to call up from all of the funding 
schemes.
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Table 6.
Turkey Pre-Accession Instrument (2002–2006) (million EUR)
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 TOTAL
Turkey 126 145 237 278 463 1,249
Source: European Court of Auditors 2009. Edited by the author.
There are five areas to which funds are allocated within the framework of IPA I, although 
countries holding a potential candidate status have access to only the first three pools: 
transition and institutional development; cross-border relations; regional development; 
human resources development; and rural development. (1085/2006 Council Regulation)
Table 7.
IPA I. Programme Allocation for 2007–2013 (million EUR)
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Total
Albania 61.0 73.8 81.2 94.2 95.0 96.2 98.1 599.1
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 62.1 74.8 89.1 106.0 108.1 110.2 118.1 668.4
Croatia 141.2 146.0 151.2 154.2 157.2 160.4 162.9 1,073.1
Kosovo 68.3 184.7 106.1 67.3 68.7 70.0 73.7 638.8
Macedonia 58.5 70.2 81.8 92.3 98.7 105.8 117.2 624.5
Montenegro 31.4 32.6 34.5 34.0 34.7 34.2 35.4 236.8
Serbia 189.7 190.9 194.8 198.0 201.9 205.9 214.7 1,395.9
Turkey 497.2 538.7 566.4 653.7 779.9 860.2 902.9 4,799
Total 1,109.4 1,311.7 1,305.1 1,399.7 1,544.2 1,642.9 1,723.0 10,036
Source: Szemlér 2008. Edited by the author.
The funds of IPA II are aimed at assisting the countries striving for European integration. 
These funds may be used for administration reforms, enhancing the rule of law, creating 
a sustainable economy, human capital development, and agriculture and rural development. 
(231/2014 EU Regulation)
Table 8.
IPA II. Programme Allocation for 2013–2020 (million EUR)
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018–2020 Total
Albania 83.7 86.9 89.7 92.9 296.3 649.5
Bosnia and Herzegovina 39.7 39.7 42.7 43.7 n.d. 165.8
Kosovo 83.8 85.9 88.7 91.9 295.2 645.5
Macedonia 85.7 88.9 91.6 94.9 303.1 664.2
Montenegro 39.6 35.6 37.4 39.5 118.4 270.5
Serbia 195.1 201.4 207.9 215.4 688.2 1,508
Turkey 620.4 626.4 630.7 636.4 1,940.0 4,453.9
Total 1,148.0 1,164.8 1,188.7 1,214.7 3,641.2 8,357.4
Source: IPA II. s. a. Edited by the author.
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Achievements and Challenges
In the past twenty years, the European Union achieved its objectives for stabilizing 
the Western Balkan region. Efficient funding schemes have made democratic values 
increasingly dominant among the political elite, and the countries have advanced along 
the path to European integration. In 2013, Croatia joined the European Union, increasing 
the number of countries in the “European Club” to twenty-eight. Montenegro and Serbia 
now are in negotiations. Macedonia must resolve its conflict with Greece before it can begin 
accession negotiations, but the starting date of negotiations with Albania is expected to be 
released soon. Bosnia and Herzegovina, along with Kosovo, have so far only managed to 
gain potential candidate status because of internal and international conflicts.
The leading member states seem to regret even mentioning the possibility of giving 
partner status to Turkey. The reaction from the Turkish Government though, has been to 
reinforce its dedication to receiving full membership. Since 2015, this kind of special rela-
tionship has taken shape. The refugee crisis of 2015–2016 generated a serious, Union-wide 
problem, and under heavy pressure from Germany, Turkey was included in its management. 
The EU concluded two agreements on the issue, one in December 2015 and another in 
March 2016, which have led to a radical drop in the number of illegal border crossings (from 
50–60,000 to 2–3,000 persons in 2016 January and February) under the 1 + 1 readmission 
scheme. (Egeresi 2017) In return, Ankara was promised to speed up the accession 
negotiations, a total of 3 + 3 billion EUR for improving the situation of refugees from Syria 
and, if Turkey can meet seventy-two criteria, exemption from visa requirement. (Consilium 
2016) The agreement caused a political storm in the European Parliament, and there were 
attempts to suspend it when, following an attempted coup in 2016, Turkish President Recep 
Tayyip Erdoğan moved to suppress political opposition.
Future Relations
In 2014, the newly elected President of the European Commission ruled out further 
enlargement during his term. As a counterbalance, Germany initiated the Berlin Process, 
which was to help the Western Balkans maintain the “European perspective”. Regional 
cooperation and better relations were encouraged. So far, the initiative has seen little 
progress, but Germany proposed that it continue with the so-called Berlin Plus agreement. 
(Orosz 2017)
On 28 June 2016, the European Council adopted the strategy presented by Federica 
Mogherini, High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. 
It describes enlargement as a means of the foreign policy of the European Union. 
The main principles it enumerates are unity, engagement, responsibility, and partnership. 
(Molnár 2016) The chapter entitled State and Societal Resilience to our East and South 
of the Global Strategy of the European Union, moreover, says that “Under the current EU 
enlargement policy, a credible accession process grounded in strict and fair conditionality 
is vital to enhance the resilience of countries in the Western Balkans and of Turkey”. (The 
EU Global Strategy 2016, 7.) The EU hopes that cooperation in the region will help with “the 
fight against terrorism, reforms introduced to the security sector, migration, infrastructure, 
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energy and climate policies”, and the reform of the assistance programmes. (The EU Global 
Strategy 2016, 19.)
The countries that wish to join the European Union, along with some member states, 
have called for a clear schedule for negotiations, which is also specified by the strategy. 
They envisage a stricter system of control that provides feedback from the member states, 
the candidate states, and the civil society. The EU is aware of the growing Euroscepticism 
in the region and is taking steps to combat this, in the form of financial assistance.
The wariness caused by the enlargement is evident within the European Union though, 
and it has affected the level of enthusiasm in the Western Balkan region, as demonstrated by 
the lengthy Macedonian government crisis in 2015. As the negotiations with Albania have 
lagged, moreover, its leaders have changed their rhetoric and started promoting the notion 
of a “Greater Albania”. The European Union has realized, however, that enlargement should 
not be taken off the agenda. (European Commission 2016b) The 2017 September speech 
of Jean-Claude Juncker, President of the European Commission, in fact, called for more 
rapid integration. A general sense of apprehension has set in within the European Union 
as Russia tries to regain its influence in the region and China’s economic presence grows.
The European Commission’s Enlargement Strategy called A credible enlargement per-
spective for and enhanced EU engagement with the Western Balkans (European Commission 
2018) was published on 6 February 2018. The strategy included a target date of 2025 as 
the accession of the Balkan states. President of the Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker and 
Commissioner for Enlargement, Johannes Hahn pointed out that the countries would be 
evaluated on the basis of their own achievements, and therefore the date of accession is only 
up to them. The document set out the necessary steps to be taken for the successful entry, 
with the intention to give a true European perspective for these countries. At the moment, 
Montenegro and Serbia are the two candidates that may be granted full member status 
in 2025. In the future, the European Union will strive for opening negotiations with 
Albania and Macedonia if the expected reforms are introduced, and the dispute between 
Greece and Macedonia over the name of the latter is resolved. To conclude, the European 
Union has the clear intention of integrating the Balkan states, allowing for the further 
unification of Europe.
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The EU and Africa
Mariann Vecsey
In recent years, media reports on the European Union (EU)‒Africa relations focused 
almost exclusively on the question of migration, neglecting other aspects of the relation 
between Europe and its Southern neighbour. Migration certainly made the EU more active 
in African affairs, but the roots of cooperation go much deeper than the crisis of the past 
years in the Mediterranean.
Europe and Africa have a long common history, not only because of geographic 
proximity; both the Roman Empire and the colonial system connected the two continents. 
The relationship continued after the collapse of the colonial empires, despite the reluctance 
of the former colonies in the beginning of the process. Cooperation between Europe and 
Africa started with the process of de-colonization, as many European countries sought 
continued inf luence in their former domains. The first European communities, like 
the European Economic Community (EEC), pursued similar aims, and cooperation with 
African countries continues with the EU.
This chapter aims to introduce the EU‒Africa relations from 1963. It presents 
the Yaoundé, Lomé and Cotonou agreements. These were the three main documents of 
the partnership. The chapter also discusses the different EU strategies regarding Africa, 
like the Sahel strategy or the Horn of Africa strategy. The strategies of the EU regarding 
Africa continue to evolve, of course, and examining the process makes it easier to identify 
both achievements and challenges in the EU–Africa relations. It also discusses how these 
strategies fit in the Global Strategy of the European Union. Besides these, the chapter 
introduces the institutional and financial background of the partnership.
Yaoundé, Lomé, and Cotonou
The de-colonization was important to start the European‒African relations. The EEC 
established contractual relations only with independent countries. As nearly all African 
countries were in colonial status, the process could have started after these territories gained 
their independence.
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Figure 1.
Countries of Africa
Source: Edited by the author.
The African countries became independent in more waves. In the first, eight states in Africa 
gained their independence before 1960. Another 33 established independent governments 
over the next decade. Until 1980 every European colony became independent. Namibia, 
and Eritrea became sovereign states in the 1990s, and South-Sudan declared its secession 
from Sudan in 2011. (Chronologie des indépendances africaines 2009)
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Table 1.
Colonial powers, colonies and their date of independence1
Colonial power Colony Date of independence
American Colonization 
Society
Liberia 26 July 1847
United Kingdom
South Africa2 (Union of South Africa) 31 May 1910
Egypt 28 February 1922
Libya3 (Emirate of Cyrenaica) 1 March 1949
Ghana 6 March 1957
Nigeria 1 October 1960
Sierra Leone 27 April 1961
Tanzania4 (Tanganyika) 9 December 1961
Uganda 9 October 1962
Tanzania (Sultanate of Zanzibar) 10 December 1963
Kenya 12 December 1963
Malawi 6 July 1964
Zambia 24 October 1964
The Gambia 18 February 1965
Botswana 30 September 1966
Lesotho 4 October 1966
Mauritius 12 March 1968
Swaziland 6 September 1968
Republic of Seychelles 29 June 1976
Zimbabwe5 18 April 1980
United Kingdom and Egypt Sudan 1 January 1956
United Kingdom and Italy Somalia 1 July 1960
France and the United 
Kingdom
Libya 24 December 1951
Cameroon 1 January 1960
1 Eritrea and South Sudan are not included in the table, because Eritrea gained its independence from Ethiopia in 
1993 (Eritrea s. a.), and South Sudan held a successful referendum in 2011 in favour of secession from Sudan. 
(South Sudan s. a.)
2 The modern state of South Africa came to existence on 31 May 1961, when it became a republic. Until 21 
March 1990, South Africa administered the territory of the current Namibia, which was occupied by South 
Africa during World War I. (Namibia s. a.)
3 The Eastern part of Libya, the Cyrenaica region, became independent in 1949, while Fezzan (under French 
rule) and Tripolitania (under the United Kingdom) remained colonies. The current state of Libya was formed 
by UN General Assembly Resolution 289, which urged the unification of the three separate regions not later 
than 1 January 1952. The three regions became one sovereign state on 24 December 1951. (United Nations 
General Assembly Resolution 289 [1949])
4 Modern Tanzania was formed on 24 April 1964, with the union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar. (Bryceson et al. s. a.)
5 Rhodesia’s first attempt at independence was the Unilateral Declaration of Independence on 11 November 
1965. (Ingham‒Sanger‒Bradley s. a.)
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Colonial power Colony Date of independence
France
Tunisia 20 March 1956
Guinea 2 October 1958
Togo 27 April 1960
Madagascar (Malagasy) 26 June 1960
Benin (Republic of Dahomey) 1 August 1960
Niger 3 August 1960
Burkina Faso (Upper Volta) 5 August 1960
Côte d’Ivoire 7 August 1960
Chad 11 August 1960
Central African Republic 13 August 1960
Republic of Congo 15 August 1960
Gabon 17 August 1960
Senegal 20 August 1960
Mali 22 September 1960
Mauritania 28 November 1960
Algeria 3 July 1962
Union of the Comoros 6 July 1975
Djibouti 27 June 1977
France and Spain Morocco 2 March 1956
Spain Equatorial Guinea 12 October 1968
Belgium
The Democratic Republic of the Congo 
(Zaire)
30 June 1960
Burundi 1 July 1962
Rwanda 1 July 1962
Portugal
Guinea-Bissau 20 September 1974
Mozambique 25 June 1975
Cape Verde 5 July 1975
São Tomé et Príncipe 12 July 1975
Angola 11 November 1975
Source: Edited by the author.
Quite logically, the European Economic Community (EEC) took its first steps toward 
economic cooperation with the continent during this time. The EEC’s areas of interest 
depended largely upon the members. Belgium, France, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands 
all had colonial connections to Africa; only Luxembourg had no direct interests. (Gabel 
s. a.) The first economic agreement, the Yoaundé Convention of 1963, was made with 
the Associated African States and Malagasy (AASM), an organisation founded in 
September 1961, just after Belgium and France decided to give their African territories 
independence. The founding states of AASM (Cameroon, the Central African Republic, 
Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Dahomey, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, 
Niger, Senegal and Upper Volta) comprise Francophone Africa and, as a block, welcomed 
close relations with the former colonisers. The Francophone countries which gained their 
independence later, joined the AASM, too. (Tall 1972)
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The Yaoundé Convention, which included Burundi, Mali, Mauritania, the Republic 
of Congo, Rwanda, Somalia, and Togo in addition to the EEC and AASM, was signed 
on 20 July 1963. It dealt with trade, ensured privileges to both the EEC and the African 
countries. It also abolished quantitative restrictions on import goods originating in the EEC 
and African states. The convention also listed the free of customs duty products (coffee, 
tea, cocoa, pineapple and spices). These products were allowed into the EEC countries free 
of charge. The agreement also granted financial aid to the African countries in need from 
the European Development Fund (EDF) with detailed amounts and country shares, and 
specific areas for investment. The contract appears unbalanced at first, despite the well de-
scribed aid for the African countries. It grants unlimited export quotas both to the European 
and African states, but gives duty-free status for only a few exotic products. It also includes 
that the agreement has no impact on earlier forged international contracts. The Yaoundé 
Convention also includes that any future agreements made with third countries, which set 
more favourable conditions will be extended to the convention, too. It does grant the same 
charges for products of African origin in the EEC countries as member states apply among 
themselves, however. The Yaoundé Convention also stipulated that after a five-year period 
from its entry into force, there could be a review and possible extension with a further 
period. (Convention of Association 1963) The same contracting parties accordingly signed 
a  second economic agreement on 29 July 1969. The new agreement expanded financial aid 
opportunities for the African countries, but otherwise confirmed and continued the former 
agreement for another five years. The Yaoundé II Convention also has a five years long 
timeframe, which expires not later than 31 January 1975. (Convention of Association 1969)
The accession of the United Kingdom to the EEC in 1973 required a review of economic 
agreements, as the country sought continued influence in its former domains. (Gabel s. a.) 
The EEC was open to include former British colonies in the Yaoundé Convention; however, 
Ghana and Nigeria not only refused to join but also criticized the Francophone countries 
for participating. Not every former British colony has the same attitude towards the EEC. 
In 1968 the EEC signed the Arusha Agreement with the former British colonies of East 
Africa, the East African States (EAS). The agreement with the EAS (Kenya Tanzania and 
Uganda), was renewed in 1969 and ran through on 31 January 1975. It essentially dupli-
cated the Yaoundé Convention of 1969. It made a stronger attempt to protect the interests 
of both the EEC and the African countries.
The first Lomé Convention was signed on 28 February 1975 between the nine members 
of the EEC and 46 African, Caribbean and Pacific states, the later African, Caribbean and 
Pacific Group of States (ACP). The EAS played an active role in the formation of this new 
international organisation, under the Georgetown Agreement of 6 June 1975. At the time of 
the formation, the ACP consisted of 46 countries comprising most of the former European 
colonial territories. (Taguaba s. a.)
The Lomé Convention broke with Yaoundé practices and established partnership 
principles and shared objectives. It also combined aid, trade and political aspects, which 
resulted in trade and financial benefits to the partaking countries. The Lomé Convention 
was also financed by the EDF. The guiding values of the convention included equality 
between partners and respect for sovereignty. It established non-reciprocal preferences for 
most exports from ACP countries to the EEC. It also recognises the mutual interests and 
interdependence between EEC and ACP. The Convention also states that every state has 
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the right to determine its own policies. It also guarantees the security of the established 
relations. The first Lomé Convention introduced a system to stabilize the earnings of 
the ACP countries from exports (STABEX), to compensate for the shortfall in their export 
incomes. The most important detail of the Convention was the so-called “sugar protocol” 
under which EEC countries agreed to import a fixed quantity of sugar from ACP countries 
annually at a fixed price. The Lomé I Convention had a timeframe of five years. (The Lomé 
Convention s. a.) In 1979, the two parties signed a  second five-year agreement, the Lomé II, 
that essentially extended the first. It introduced only one new instrument, the System 
of Stabilization of Export Earnings from Mining Products (SYSMIN), which provided 
help to the mining industry in ACP countries strongly dependent on it. This period was 
financed by the fifth EDF. (The Lomé Convention s. a.) A third Lomé agreement (1984) 
significantly altered the main goals of the convention form industrial development to focus 
on self-sufficiency for ACP states, and especially food security. The five years long period 
of the Lomé III Convention was funded by the sixth EDF. (The Lomé Convention s. a.)
The fourth Lomé convention covered ten years including two five-year funding 
packages, namely the seventh and the eighth EDFs. Signed in 1989, the Lomé IV called 
for a mid-term review, which took place during 1994 and 1995. At this time the agreement 
was signed between the EU and ACP. The agreement emphasized common values like 
the promotion of human rights (especially gender equality), democracy, the environment, 
and good governance. For the first time though, it held out the prospect of the withholding 
funds from countries that did not fulfil certain criteria: respect for human rights, democratic 
principles, and the rule of law. Other important goals included the diversification of ACP 
economies, the decentralization of the cooperation through the promotion of the private 
sector, and increasing regional cooperation. This was the first time when the EDF did not 
increase in real terms. (The Lomé Convention s. a.)
When the Lomé Conventions came to an end in 2000, they boasted only partial 
achievements, like the “sugar protocol” or placing the partnership on a foundation based 
on law. Beyond this, the Lomé Conventions met no success. The ACP countries’ share in 
the European markets declined from having 60% for ten products in 1974 to just 3% in 1998. 
The economic growth of Sub-Saharan Africa, moreover, remained relatively low compared 
to other ACP countries. The partners concluded, however, that they simply needed to adapt 
to the new geostrategic situation. Talks regarding a new agreement started in 1998. (The 
Lomé Convention s. a.)
When Portugal joined the EEC in 1986, (Gabel s. a.) its former colonies became part 
of the ACP, which thus comprised 79 states, 48 in Sub-Saharan Africa, 16 in the Caribbean, 
and 15 in the Pacific. All members save Cuba are signatories to the Cotonou Partnership 
Agreement (CPA). (The ACP Group s. a.) The CPA was signed on 23 June 2000 between 
the EU and the completed ACP. It is the continuation of the Lomé partnership principles 
and shared objectives. This pact rests on fundamental principles of equality, ownership of 
development strategies, and the participation of both governments and non-state actors. 
The agreement aims to increase the accountability of the aid receiving countries and 
harmonise the donor activity. The CPA introduces the differentiation, prioritising aids to 
countries on the lowest level of development, and regionalisation, which aims to promote 
the regional integration. (The Cotonou Agreement 2014) It runs for 20 years, with an 
obligatory review and new financial protocol every five years. (Overview of the Agreement 
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2000) It includes cooperative activities to increase social and human development, to 
increase economic development in the ACP countries, and to promote and expand trade 
in the framework of regional cooperation and integration. The CPA actually envisioned 
strengthening regional trade via Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA), but formation 
of these partnerships took too long. The partnership integrated Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs)6 (replaced in 2016 with Sustainable Development Goals [SDGs]7). (Cotonou 
Agreement s. a.) The CPA rests on three pillars, development cooperation, political 
cooperation, and economic and trade cooperation. The third pillar includes the development 
aid. Its new element is the “rewarded performance policy”, which means allocations are 
no longer automatic but depend upon effective use of funds released to date. (Overview of 
the Agreement 2000)
The first review of the Cotonou Agreement took place on 25 June 2005 in Luxembourg. 
After deciding the financial protocol for the next five-year period, the parties introduced 
an improved agenda in support of the MDGs, and outlined management procedures to 
make implementation more flexible and effective. The revision introduced a more formal 
and systematic dialogue on human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law. 
It also included a donor harmonisation initiative, and the “everything but arms” trade 
policy. The revision incorporated a framework on development cooperation, the European 
Consensus on Development. It also deepened the political dialogue, particularly regarding 
security issues. The ACP and EU agreed, for instance, on the non-proliferation of weapons 
of mass destruction (WMD). (Partnership Agreement ACP–EC 2006)
The  second review of the Cotonou Agreement came in 2010. It emphasized regional 
integration in the ACP and ACP–EU cooperation and highlighted the interdependence 
between security and development, focusing on conflict prevention and peace building. 
The EU and ACP agreed on a joint approach to both sustainable development and poverty 
reduction, but only recognised the challenge of the climate change. The revision also 
introduced a trade development package and simplified the donor coordination. (ACP ‒ 
The Cotonou Agreement s. a.) Despite the review the effectiveness of the CPA has not 
changed, and its significance started to decrease.
The third review of the CPA ended in 2016. It builds on the UN’s Sustainable 
Development Agenda 2030, and fits with the EU’s Global Strategy. It sets out six EU 
priorities:
• “promote peaceful and democratic societies, good governance, the rule of law and 
human rights for all
• spur inclusive sustainable growth and decent jobs for all
6 The Millennium Development Goals were set in 2000 with a 15-year timeframe by the United Nations (UN). 
These were the following: eradicate extreme poverty and hunger, achieve universal primary education, 
promote gender equality and empower women, reduce child mortality, improve maternal health, combat HIV/
AIDS, malaria and other diseases, ensure environmental sustainability, global partnership for development. 
(Millennium Development Goals s. a.)
7 On 25 September 2015, the UN adopted a new set of goals to reach the termination of poverty, to protect the planet 
and to ensure prosperity for all in the timeframe of 15 years. These were: no poverty, zero hunger, good health 
and well-being, quality education, gender equality, clean water and sanitation, affordable and clean energy, 
decent work and economic growth, industry, innovation and infrastructure, reduced inequalities, sustainable 
cities and communities, responsible consumption and production, climate action, life below water, life on land, 
peace, justice and strong institutions, partnerships for the goals. (Sustainable Development Goals s. a.)
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• turn mobility and migration into opportunities and address challenges together
• promote human development and dignity
• protect the environment and fight climate change
• join forces in the global arena on areas of common interests” (European Commis-
sion 2016)
These priorities are tailored to the different ACP regions, taking in account the heterogeneity 
of the organisation. The renewed CPA aims at a more targeted and flexible partnership. This 
meant reduced number of instruments, and an increase in the budget. (European Commission 
2016) With the CPA set to expire in 2020 though, negotiations to define the future of 
the partnership start in 2018 between the EU and the ACP. (Post-Cotonou 2017)
Development in EU‒Africa Relations
This part of the chapter will process all the EU strategies which have any connection with 
the African continent, except the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), which although 
includes North-African states, but it is a more integral part of the strategies regarding 
the Mediterranean area, which is a subject of another chapter, so in order to avoid duplication, 
this section will not deal with the ENP.
The EU’s strategic partnership with Africa started in 2000, at first with the EU‒Africa 
Summit in Cairo that launched a comprehensive framework for political dialogue. It dealt 
with the regional integration in Africa, the integration of Africa into the world economy. 
The summit also agreed on common values, such as human rights, democratic principles 
and institutions, good governance and the rule of law. It also discussed the main security 
related tasks of conflict prevention and peace-building and issues like poverty eradication and 
food security. Both the Europeans and Africans agreed on the principles, but the priorities 
of the continents remained different, as well as their view on the value of the partnership. 
Europeans prioritized peace and security issues, the Africans trade and economic aspects. 
Despite the disagreement on the priorities, the partnership continued and deepened. This 
difference is still a cause of frustration in their relationship.
The real boost in the partnership between the EU and Africa came in 2001 with 
the establishment of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) and the 2002 
transformation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) to the African Union (AU). These 
institutions provided the EU with a commitment to common values. They also provided clarity 
regarding African countries’ needs and desires, which made it easier to coordinate with donors. 
The importance of this was in the higher level of local ownership, which resulted in more 
effective programs. (The EU–Africa Partnership in Historical Perspective 2006)
This made possible the EU Strategy for Africa of 2005. The three principles of this 
strategy are equality, partnership and ownership. The equality principle is based on mutual 
 recognition, respect for institutions and the definition of mutual interest. The partnership 
 includes the development of political cooperation. Ownership in this case means the ownership 
of strategies and development policies. The goal of this strategy is to help Africa meet 
the MDGs. The strategy makes possible the differentiation of African countries, taking 
in consideration the very diverse economic, social and environmental circumstances of 
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them. It also recognises the challenges of the sustainable development. The EU also created 
a protocol for engaging whichever is the most effective level of government (national, 
regional, or continental) in any given case. The tenth EDF provides the financial framework 
for the programmes and actions established by the EU Strategy for Africa. (EU Strategy for 
Africa 2008)
The EU’s Counter-Terrorism Strategy, which came out also in 2005, clearly relates to 
the EU’s Strategy for Africa. It recognizes that EU cooperation with third-world countries is 
vital in the prevention of terrorism, and identifies North Africa as an area of particular interest. 
The four pillars of the counter-terrorism strategy mirror those of the global strategy: promoting 
good governance and democracy, resolving conflicts, and working to sustain peace. (The EU 
Counter-Terrorism Strategy 2005)
To support the objectives of both strategies, to reach the MDGs and promote good 
governance and democracy and resolve conflicts, in 2006 the EU introduced The European 
Consensus on Development. This document, despite its global commitment, is also connected 
to Africa. In certain programs it defines the Least Developed Countries (LDCs), low-income 
countries (LICs) and even some middle-income countries (MICs) as the only countries which 
are allowed to get development aid. (European Parliament‒Council‒Commission 2006) In 
June 2017, 33 of the 47 LDCs were from the African continent. (List of the Least Developed 
Countries 2017)
Table 1.
Comparison of the African states
Country Area
Population 
(million 
people)
GDP (per 
capita, current 
prices / in U.S. 
dollars, 2016)
PPP (per capita 
GDP / in current 
international 
dollar, 2016)
Algeria 2,381,741 km2 40.9 3,502.274 6,844.433
Angola 1,246,700 km2 29.3 3,502.274 6,844.433
Benin 112,622 km2 11.0 770.812 2,119.434
Botswana 581,730 km2 2.2 6,972.108 17,041.582
Burkina Faso 274,200 km2 20.1 645.789 1,782.150
Burundi 27,830 km2 11.4 324.782 813.713
Cameroon 475,440 km2 24.9 1,238.489 3,248.783
Cape Verde 4,033 km2 0.5 3,078.338 6,662.020
Central African 
Republic
622,984 km2 5.6 364.231 651.921
Chad 1,284,000 km2 12.0 852.159 2,445.184
Comoros 2,235 km2 0.8 753.495 1,529.156
The Democratic 
Republic of the Congo
2,344,858 km2 83.3 494.651 773.055
Republic of Congo 342,000 km2 4.9 1,783.529 6,676.102
Côte d’Ivoire 322,463 km2 24.1 1,458.825 3,609.029
Djibouti 23,200 km2 0.8 1,908.312 3,369.584
Egypt 1,001,450 km2 97.0 3,684.574 12,553.941
Equatorial Guinea 28,051 km2 0.7 14,174.129 38,639.066
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Country Area
Population 
(million 
people)
GDP (per 
capita, current 
prices / in U.S. 
dollars, 2016)
PPP (per capita 
GDP / in current 
international 
dollar, 2016)
Eritrea 117,600 km2 5.9 823.111 1,410.326
Ethiopia 1,104,300 km2 105.3 795.234 1,945.888
Gabon 267,667 km2 1.7 7,586.949 19,056.493
Gambia 11,300 km2 2.0 469.285 1,666.599
Ghana 238,533 km2 27.4 1,569.036 4,411.933
Guinea 245,857 km2 12.4 514.635 1,264.528
Guinea Bissau 36,125 km2 1.7 694.043 1,729.897
Kenya 580,367 km2 47.6 1,516.326 3,361.023
Lesotho 30,355 km2 1.9 1,170.214 3,601.409
Liberia 111,369 km2 4.6 479.813 855.118
Libya 1,759,540 km2 6.6 5,193.236 8,678.455
Madagascar 587,041 km2 25.0 390.907 1,504.735
Malawi 118,484 km2 19.1 294.763 1,134.496
Mali 1,240,192 km2 17.8 830.149 2,265.996
Mauritania 1,030,700 km2 3.7 1,242.575 4,327.955
Mauritius 2,040 km2 1.3 9,424.462 20,421.623
Morocco 446,550 km2 33.9 3,063.071 8,330.402
Mozambique 799,380 km2 26.5 392.447 1,215.322
Namibia 824,292 km2 2.4 4,629.529 11,289.733
Niger 1,267,000 km2 19.2 411.056 1,107.179
Nigeria 923,768 km2 190.6 2,210.638 5,942.352
Rwanda 26,338 km2 11.9 729.093 1,976.823
São Tomé and Príncipe 964 km2 0.2 1,687.313 3,071.841
Senegal 196,722 km2 14.6 959.714 2,576.594
Seychelles 455 km2 0.09 14,938.128 27,602.212
Sierra Leone 71,740 km2 6.1 618.184 1,671.644
Somalia 637,657 km2 11.0 no data no data
South Africa 1,219,090 km2 54.8 5,260.902 13,225.428
South Sudan 644,329 km2 13.0 233.145 1,657.077
Sudan 1,861,484 km2 37.3 2,384.451 4,446.757
Swaziland 17,364 km2 1.4 3,329.789 9,775.762
Tanzania 947,300 km2 53.9 970.205 3,080.321
Togo 56,785 km2 7.9 590.454 1,550.288
Tunisia 163,610 km2 11.4 3,730.416 11,634.072s
Uganda 241,038 km2 39.5 637.568 2,068.225
Western Sahara8 266,000 km2 0.6 no data no data
Zambia 752,618 km2 15.9 1,274.759 3,880.310
Zimbabwe 390,757 km2 13.8 977.444 1,970.258
Source: Data collected from cia.gov and imf.org
8 Disputed territory, annexed by Morocco in 1979. The current ceasefire with the Polisario Front, which is 
recruited from the Sahrawi population contesting Morocco’s sovereignty, was signed in 1991. Tensions are 
continuous in the area. (Western Sahara 2017)
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The first part of the European consensus defines its vision on development, outlining 
the common objectives, values, and principles, in line with previous EU documents. It 
describes a mechanism for more effective aid, and a desire to improve the coherence 
in development policy. The document recognises development as a global challenge. 
The  second part describes the new Development Policy is cohesion with the introduction, 
and how it will operate at the European Community level. It identifies priorities and sets 
out guidelines for the planning and implementation procedures of Community instruments 
and cooperation strategies. The main element of the document emphasizes the importance 
of coherence in development policy, and defines the European Consensus on Development 
as a fundamental document for every policy, which affect developing countries. (European 
Parliament‒Council‒Commission 2006)
In 2006 the EU thus created a source document for subsequent strategies. The first 
Africa-related document created under this umbrella was the EU‒South Africa Strategic 
Partnership of 2006, which set out the framework for long-term political cooperation 
between the EU and the Republic of South-Africa, at the national government level. It both 
continued and broadened the Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement (TDCA) 
reached between the two parties five years after the consolidation of the country in 1994. 
The strategic partnership with the Republic of South-Africa aims to establish a more 
coherent political cooperation regarding regional, continental and global issues. (Towards 
an EU–South Africa Strategic Partnership 2006)
After the implementation of this trade orientated strategic partnership, next, the EU 
created a Joint Africa–EU Strategy (JAES), in 2007. The document builds on the EU 
Strategy for Africa, using the African Union Constitutive Act and Strategic Framework of 
2004–2007. It is the first time, when an EU strategy is supported by both a European and 
African document, which makes a partnership even more fruitful than just a unilateral 
conception. Besides this, the strategy mentions not only the historical connections 
and the geographical closeness as a cause of creating a new partnership, but it also reflects 
the need of a new EU–Africa strategy due to the changes in the European organisation, 
which nearly doubled in size, and deepened the European integration. It also takes in 
account the integration process of the African continent, with the formation of the AU 
and launching of NEPAD. The idea of the JAES is to elevate cooperation to a strategic 
level, create a long-term framework for EU–Africa relations with short-term action plans 
to reach set goals, and to enhance political dialogue at all levels. The agreed principles of 
the strategy are the unity of Africa, the interdependence between the continent and the EU, 
and it also emphasises the usual mentioned values of such documents as the ownership and 
joint responsibility, respect for human rights, democratic principles, the rule of law, and 
the right to development. It also defines the governing principles of the partnership, from 
which the most important are mutual accountability, solidarity, equality, justice, common 
and human security, and gender equality. The strategy lists four main objectives, which 
are the following:
• To reinforce and elevate EU‒Africa political partnership to focus on common 
concerns, and challenges, like peace and security, development, clean environment 
and migration.
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• To strengthen and promote safe and secure environment, democratic values, devel-
opment, and integration processes in Africa, and to support African countries to 
reach the MDGs by 2015.
• To promote and sustain an effective multilateral system, with strong and legitimate 
institutions and international institutions and address global challenges and common 
concerns.
• To broaden and promote the partnership, including non-governmental actors as well, 
allowing them to play an active role in the first two objectives.
To meet these objectives, the strategy had to implement new approaches. It outlined ways 
to ensure bilateral relations aligned with the joint strategy and ways to integrate lessons 
learned. Recognising the contributions of non-governmental actors became a central 
feature. The strategic framework targeted four inter-related areas: peace and security, 
governance and human rights, trade and regional integration, and key development issues. 
Regarding peace and security, the strategy not only focuses on solving the problems on 
the African and the European continent, with drawing up the need of a holistic approach, 
but it also emphasises the importance of addressing global concerns in each of these 
areas. Recognising peace and security as the most important problem, the main focus of 
the strategy falls on the promotion of democratic governance and human rights. In order to 
achieve the set goals, the strategy encourages a comprehensive and intensive dialogue on 
governance between the EU and Africa.
Under trade and regional integration, the aim was to reach a state where donor support 
is no longer needed in Africa. To support this idea, the development of the local markets 
and regional integration were the key elements. In order to be less dependent, three more 
key objectives were determined: private sector development, strengthening physical 
infrastructure networks and services related to them, and trade integration. The main effort 
was to assist Africa reach the MDGs by 2015. The strategy also outlined its institutional 
architecture and implementation, identified the actors, created action plans for different 
areas, and designed follow-up mechanisms. (A Joint Africa–EU Strategy s. a.)
The strategic principles and general values remained the same through time, although 
the most important difference is the use of an AU document as a basis of the JAES. 
The document still focused on the MDGs, as all of the EU’s Africa-related strategies 
and agreements created after 2000 had. It provides a comprehensive framework for 
the EU‒Africa Partnership created in 2007 to reinforce the political relations between 
Africa and the EU, and encourage joint efforts to address global challenges like climate 
change, the protection of the environment and peace and security. The joint action resulted 
in greater impact on the global stage. It aimed to broaden Africa‒EU cooperation including 
areas like governance, human rights, trade and regional integration, migration, mobility 
and employment. The partnership also sought to encourage civil society and participation 
of the private sector. (What is the Partnership? s. a.)
In 2011, the European Union followed up by creating the Agenda for Change. It 
embraced the same principles and values as its predecessors, and likewise aimed for 
successful development policy and practices for the European organisation to be able to 
fit within the comprehensive international development agenda until and beyond 2015. 
The  second main objective of the agenda is to support partner countries in faster progress 
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to reach the MDGs. It introduced a more effective aid contribution process and proposed 
coordinated EU action to avoid fragmentation and increase efficiency with creating a joint 
programming document. It is not only to be created by the member states, but it also should 
be synchronised with the strategies of the partner countries. It also proposes an improved 
coherence among EU policies to evaluate the impact of them. All of these improvements 
are aiming the better aid contribution, to make sure, that the most vulnerable and fragile 
countries get the necessary assistance. (European Commission 2011)
In 2011 two EU strategies were made by the EU regarding Africa. The first one was 
created before the Agenda for Change. The EU’s Strategy for Security and Development in 
the Sahel appeared in 2011, as well; it did not include the achievements of the Agenda, but 
addressed concerns regarding the “Arab Spring”. The strategy dealt with North Africa, but 
the main focus fell on the countries in the Sahel region. The strategy dealt with Mauritania, 
Mali, Niger and, in a wider perspective, Burkina Faso, Chad, and further countries which 
could also feel the impact of the challenges, like Algeria, Libya, Morocco, and Nigeria. It 
declared that security and development could not be separated in the Sahel and called for 
a coordinated, holistic approach to the problems of the region. The constantly deteriorating 
situation in the Sahel region draw the attention of the EU to the region, mainly because of its 
geographical closeness, and the direct impacts on European citizens. The strategy defines 
the problems in the Sahel as the following: extreme poverty, climate change, food crisis, 
and rapidly growing population, fragile governance, corruption, internal tensions, violent 
extremism and radicalisation, illicit traffic and terrorism. The strategy emphasized, however, 
that al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) was the biggest threat.
The long list of problems is interdependent, and the EU is determined to find the root 
causes of the problems, to be able to help more effectively in the region. The Sahel Strategy 
identified four levels of challenges. The first was governance, development and conflict 
resolution, which included internal governance and development-related issues. The  second 
was coordination on regional level, as there were different threat perceptions in each country 
and the lack of intra-regional communication. The third level was security and rule of 
law, particularly the insufficient law enforcement and judicial sectors of the countries in 
the region. The fourth was fight against and prevention of violent extremism and radicali-
sation. The mutual interest of the strategy was to reduce insecurity and improve development 
in the Sahel. It also aims to prevent AQIM attacks in the region and in the EU, to reduce 
illicit trafficking and to strengthen and protect lawful trade in the region. The strategy 
formulated objectives in line with these challenges, and set out both a long-term (5–10 years) 
and short-term (3-year) prospectus. The Sahel Strategy is built on existing initiatives which 
are connected to the region in multiple levels, including ECOWAS, the Joint EU‒Africa 
Strategy, and existing EU engagements in the region. The lines of action in the strategy 
were to contribute to development, to encourage political dialogue in the region. In addition 
to this, it aimed to strengthen security in the Sahel with increasing the social resilience. 
The strategy is also defining its financial resource as the tenth EDF. (Strategy for Security 
and Development in the Sahel s. a.)
Following the Sahel Strategy, the EU created The Strategic Framework for the Horn 
of Africa in November 2011 to integrate the achievements of the Agenda for Change. 
The motives of the EU to create a strategy for the Horn of Africa were based on the historical 
relations with the region, the EU’s geo-strategic interests in the Horn, and the turbulent 
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political changes of the last 50 years in the region. These were the secession of South-Sudan 
from Sudan in 2011, and the decades long Somalian crisis. The EU resolved to use the same 
methods as in the Sahel Strategy, notably to exploit existing local, regional and international 
partnerships, particularly the Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD),9 to 
address challenges in the region. The challenges parallel those of the Sahel; however, IGAD, 
which comprises the countries in the Horn region, is much less effective than ECOWAS, 
which proved to be a useful partner of the Sahel Strategy. The challenges identified in 
the Strategic Framework parallel those of the Sahel: corruption, food insecurity, climate 
change, and terrorism, migration and illicit trafficking. As before, the EU wanted to address 
the whole region to solve the problems, since there is a large scale of interdependence in 
the Horn of Africa, and therefore the main objectives were similar: promote peace and 
stability, advocate security, prosperity and accountable government, and attain the MDGs. 
To achieve these the EU will make its current engagements in the Horn of Africa more 
effective, with using the instruments in a more consistent, coherent and complementary 
manner. These engagements are the formerly mentioned Cotonou Agreement, other bilateral 
trade relations between the IGAD countries and the EU, the political dialogue set by multiple 
EU strategies, policies and agreements, a humanitarian response, mainly focusing on 
internally displaced people (IDP), the EU’s crisis response and management system, which 
is conducted through the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), which even 
includes counter-piracy operations and counter-terrorism operations, the EU cooperation on 
climate change, migration and the support of African regional integration. The document 
also suggested a regular review of the strategy, with the first to be held one year after 
the implementation of the Strategic Framework. (Council of the European Union 2011)
The fourth EU‒Africa Summit took place in Brussels in 2014. It witnessed the creation 
of Roadmap 2014–2017 and the Pan-African Programme (PanAf), which is funded under 
the EU’s Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI). The Roadmap augmented the Joint 
Africa‒EU Strategy, with a timeframe of 2014–2017. It is focusing on five key priorities 
and areas for essential joint actions at inter-regional, continental and global level in which 
Africa and the EU have mutual interests. These key priorities are:
1. “peace and security
2. democracy, good governance and human rights
3. human development,
4. sustainable and inclusive development and growth and continental integration
5. global and emerging issues” (Roadmap 2014–2017, 2014)
The fifth priority is addressing issues such as climate change, non-proliferation of weapons, 
and the reform of the international governing system. (Roadmap 2014–2017, 2014)
PanAf is built on the Lisbon Treaty and connected to the Agenda for Change. It is 
a complementary element of current EU policies and instruments, adding a continental or 
trans-regional approach where needed. The programme also addressed the external dimen-
sions of the EU policies. The PanAf put into practice the Policy Coherence for Development 
which builds synergies between EU policies and development cooperation. It is implemented 
9 The member countries of the organisation are: Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, South 
Sudan and Uganda.
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by widening the range of the EU cooperation, and involving all concerned services for whole 
planning and implementation processes. The PanAf was one of the supporting instrument of 
the Joint Africa‒EU Strategy and was the first EU instrument that treated Africa as a whole. 
(Pan-African Programme 2014–2020 s. a.)
After the implementation of these Africa related strategies and strategic frameworks, 
the EU thus institutionalized cooperation with the continent on a strategic level, in which it 
addressed the most important local, regional and continental problems. Despite mentioning 
migration in nearly all of the Africa related documents, however, the EU did not have 
a comprehensive migration strategy before 2015, when it announced the European Agenda 
on Migration and the Valletta Action Plan. It took two more years to formulate the Malta 
Declaration, which addressed the Central Mediterranean migration route, which came to 
existence in 2017. All of the documents contain initiations which are related to Africa. 
The European Agenda on Migration proposed an increase in the strength of the border 
control, or coast guard component in the already operating EU missions in the North-
African countries, and the launch of a multi-purpose centre in Niger was also one of the EU’s 
immediate action proposals in the Agenda. Besides these it also stated, that the root causes 
of migration should be tracked and decreased in the countries of origin, in which action 
the EU planned to rely on the existing missions in the Sub-Saharan countries, like Mali and 
Niger. (European Commission 2015)
The Valletta Action Plan also focuses heavily on Africa, and dealt with both legal and 
illegal African migration. The Action Plan introduced 16 initiatives based on previously suc-
cessful programs in Africa regarding migration, which are to be monitored under the Joint 
EU‒Africa Strategy. (Valletta Action Plan 2015) The Malta Declaration strengthened 
the EU’s will on cooperation with other international organisations and besides, it is 
dedicated to stabilising Libya. The EU is also determined to deepen the relations with 
the Sub-Saharan neighbours of the country. (European Commission 2017)
The CSDP missions in Africa were mentioned in multiple documents as existing tools 
to rely on related to different reasons, like the reach of MDGs or later established SDGs in 
Africa. There are currently seven EU missions operating in the Sub-Saharan region, and 
all of them have mandates which directly or indirectly help to reach SDGs, to establish 
a liveable environment for the local population. These missions are the EUCAP Sahel Mali; 
EUCAP Somalia; EUCAP Sahel Niger (all civilian missions); EUTM Mali; EUTM RCA; 
EUTM Somalia (all military training missions); and EUNAVFOR Somalia, a military oper-
ation. All of these missions and operations are launched in the framework of the EU’s CSDP 
and they are an integral part of the comprehensive approach towards crisis management. 
They are also in line with the regional Africa strategies. EUCAP missions have mandates 
to train and advise local security forces (like the police, and the gendarmerie), but they also 
provide strategic support at the ministerial level to conduct the Security Sector Reform in 
the countries, and they are also providing support for capacity building. The EUTM military 
missions are involved with training, advising, and educating the local armed forces, and 
preparing them to the SSR. They promote local ownership and they are aiming to stabilise 
the security in the region. They are also aiming to develop sustainable and human rights 
based approach among the different security actors. The EUNAVFOR Somalia, as the only 
military operation in the region, has a slightly different mandate, since it has operational 
tasks, regarding sea security, like protecting vulnerable shipping vessels, deterring and 
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disrupting piracy, monitoring fishing activities, and support other missions in the region. As 
a whole, these missions and operations supposed to work together with the locally operating 
other missions and operations, to fulfil the framework of the comprehensive approach, and 
the most recently introduced integral approach, the EEAS. (Security and Defence s. a.)
Institutional Background
The different strategies require institutional foundations. There are EU Special 
Representatives (EUSR) in the different crisis areas, they are representing the EU in these 
troubled regions, where they are promoting EU policies, and interests. The main tasks of 
the EUSRs are to support the work of the High Representative/Vice President (HR/VP) 
regarding the mentioned regions and countries. They play an important role in developing 
and strengthening the CSDP and to make the EU a more effective, capable and coherent actor 
worldwide. There are two EUSRs in Africa, one for the Horn of Africa and one for the Sahel. 
Both EUSRs’ mandates are based on the strategies and policy objectives on the respected 
regions. They also have to contribute actively to the regional and international endeavour 
to reach lasting peace, security and development in the region. The EUSR for the Horn of 
Africa, was appointed in 2012, who’s task is to aim the development of the effectiveness of 
the EU’s multidimensional engagement in the area. The EUSR for the Sahel was appointed 
in 2015, has to coordinate the comprehensive approach addressing the crisis in the Sahel 
according to the EU’s related strategy. In addition to the two EUSRs, who are directly linked 
to Africa, there is a third EUSR for Human Rights, first appointed in 2012, with a thematic 
task: to work with the European External Action Service and promote the EU’s human rights 
policy across the world, including Africa. (EU Special Representatives 2016)
The EU is represented at the ambassadorial level by delegations. The EU is represented 
by these diplomatic bodies all over the world, and its presence is very significant in Africa. 
It has a multilateral delegation to the African Union and, via bilateral or regional delegations, 
it is represented in 53 countries on the continent. The tasks of these delegations are to 
represent the EU and its citizens, to serve the EU’s interests through presenting, explaining 
and implementing EU policies, maintain political dialogue, oversee EU aid programs, and 
conduct negotiations in accordance with their given mandate. (EU Delegations and Offices 
around the World 2015) The most important among these delegations is the EU Delegation 
to the AU, which started in 2008, in order to have a permanent connection with the AU. 
The delegation works with the 53 AU member states, the AU Commission and other AU 
bodies. These are the AU Peace and Security Council, EU countries, and other governmental 
and international partners of the AU. The delegation has to deal with different countries 
and thematic areas. Political dialogue on mutually concerning issues, and a long-term 
cooperation and institution building is among these thematic areas. The delegation is fol-
lowing the framework set by the Joint Africa‒EU Strategy and the consecutive EU‒Africa 
Summits’ achievements and additional EU documents related to Africa. (About the EU 
Delegation to the African Union 2016)
The Council of the EU has several preparatory bodies, including the Africa Working 
Party (COAFR), the African, Caribbean and Pacific Working Party (ACP), and the Mashreq/
Maghreb Working Party (MaMa). (EU–Africa relations 2017) The Africa Working Party 
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is responsible for the management of the EU external policy towards Sub-Saharan Africa, 
which is defined by various documents focusing on establishing a far-reaching partnership, 
which includes 46 countries, the AU, and other regional organisations. (COAFR 2015) 
The ACP working party is responsible for the EU‒ACP cooperation set by the Cotonou 
Agreement. It is the most complex and deepest partnership between the EU and the devel-
oping countries, which provides a framework for cooperation both in development, trade 
and political dimensions. (ACP 2015) The countries which fall under the Mashreq/Maghreb 
Working Party cover the countries included in the ENP.
There are also multiple committees responsible for the African issues. The Committee 
on Foreign Affairs, supported by a subcommittee on security and defence, is responsible for 
the promotion, implementation and monitoring of the CSFP and the CSDP. The committee is 
also responsible for promoting, implementing and monitoring the Instrument contributing to 
Stability and Peace, the Partnership Instrument and issues concerning democracy, the rule 
of law, and the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights, which is covered by 
a subcommittee on human rights. All these instruments are connected to Africa by providing 
aid, or establishing partnership, and in the framework of the CSDP multiple EU missions 
and operations are present on the continent. The Committee on Development is responsible 
for areas which have links to Africa, too. This committee is responsible for the promotion, 
implementation and monitoring of the development and cooperation policy of the EU, 
especially for maintaining political dialogue and cooperation with developing countries 
and monitoring aid. This committee is also responsible for the DCI, which covers the Pan-
African Programme, and the European Development Fund, which provides the finances 
for most of the distributed aid in Africa. Finally, it is responsible for the entire ACP‒EU 
Partnership Agreement. The Committee on International Trade monitors trade activity 
and agreements between the EU and third countries, including Africa. The Committee on 
Budgets has no direct connection to Africa but, along with the Committee on Budgetary 
Control, manages the EDFs that fund the EU’s African programs. (Rules of Procedure of 
the European Parliament 2017)
In addition to the Committees, a few of the European Commission’s Departments 
and services have connections to Africa, as well. The Directorate-General (DG) for 
International cooperation and Development (DEVCO) is dealing with the development 
of the cooperation policies of the EU. It has two geographical directorates that deal with 
Africa: Directorate D, responsible for the EU–Africa Relations, East and Southern Africa 
and Directorate E, covering West and Central Africa. They supervise assistance from EU 
Delegations in addition to controlling some programmes directly, such as the EU‒African 
Peace Facility, and bilateral cooperation with Ethiopia or Nigeria. (Organisational 
structure of DG DEVCO 2017) The Directorate-General of Migration and Home Affairs 
(HOME) develops EU migration policy, taking into consideration EU‒Africa strategies, 
since the migration flow through the Mediterranean mainly consists of African nationals. 
(About us s. a.) The Department of Service for Foreign Policy Instruments (FPI) works 
with the European External Action Service and is responsible for operational expenditures 
in the critical area of EU external action. The FPI reports directly to the HR/VP and has 
five units. The first is responsible for the budget, finance, relations with other institutions. 
The  second is covering the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP), while 
the third unit is in charge of Common Foreign and Security Policy operations. The fourth 
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is responsible for the Partnership Instrument, and the fifth unit is accountable for EU 
Foreign Policy Regulatory Instruments, and Election Observation. Nearly all of these areas 
connect to EU initiatives regarding Africa, or with operating EU missions and operations 
on the continent. (Service for Foreign Policy Instruments 2017)
The formal dialogues between the two continents are conducted on various levels, 
which institutional architecture was mainly set by the Joint Africa‒EU Strategy. According 
to this, the EU‒Africa Summits are the most important strategic-level forums for regular 
dialogue between the two parties. They occur every three years since the implementation 
of the Joint Strategy. This level is responsible to provide political guidance for further 
work, and this body approves the Action Plans. The first EU‒Africa Summit (Cairo, 2000) 
elucidated a comprehensive framework for the EU‒Africa strategic partnership. The  second 
(Lisbon, 2007) saw the formulation of the Joint EU‒Africa Strategy; the third (Tripoli, 2010) 
widened the scope of the Joint Strategy, to make it a more people-centred partnership, and 
it adopted the Second Action Plan and the Tripoli Declaration, which focused on achieving 
the MDGs. (3rd Africa–EU Summit 2010) The fourth summit, held in 2014 in Brussels, dis-
cussed the future of relations and the reinforcement of the existing partnership. The Summit 
adopted both Roadmap 2014–2017 and PanAf. (EU–Africa summit, Brussels 2014) The fifth 
will be in Abidjan in November 2017, a decade after the adoption of the Joint Strategy. 
The event is expected to be a defining year for the EU‒Africa relations. Seven topics head 
the agenda: investing in youth, peace and security, governance (including democracy), 
human rights, migration and mobility, investment and trade, skills development, and job 
creation. (5th African Union–EU Summit 2017)
These summits are prepared at ministerial level. In line with this, there is a bi-annual 
ministerial-level or “troika” meeting designed to balance representation of both unions. “On 
the EU side, the Troika consists of the current and incoming EU Presidency, the European 
Commission and the EU Council Secretariat, while on the African side the Troika consists 
of the current and outgoing Presidencies of the AU and the AU Commission, expanded to 
include chef de file countries at the expert and senior official levels.” (A Joint Africa–EU 
Strategy s. a., 21.) This meeting has the task to review and monitor the implementation 
of the Joint EU‒Africa Strategy and the Action Plans. The third level of the institutional 
system is the annual commission-to-commission level meeting, which is to strengthen 
the cooperation between the two bodies and advance the agenda of the strategic partnership. 
(A Joint Africa–EU Strategy s. a.)
Financial Background
The basis of the aid provided by the EU and its member states is regulated by treaties via 
the guiding principles of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s 
Development Assistance Committee (OECD DAC), which defines the countries and 
territories eligible to receive Official Development Assistance (ODA). The EU and its 
member states became the biggest aid provider in the world recently, with more than 50% of 
globally distributed official aid. The EU also committed to increase the recent contribution. 
(Molnár s. a.) The renewed Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) for 2014–2020 has 
nine development instruments; four is thematic, European Instrument for Democracy and 
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Human Rights (EIDHR), Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP), Partnership 
Instrument (PI) and the Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation (INSC) and five is geo-
graphical, Instrument for Development Cooperation (DCI), Instrument for Pre-Accession 
Assistance II (IPA), European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI), Instrument for Greenland 
(IfG) and the European Development Fund (EDF). (Funding instruments 2017)
Out of these nine development instruments only six provides funding to African 
countries and regional organisations, which are three of the geographical instruments (DCI, 
ENI and EDF), and three of the thematic instruments (EIDHR, IcSP and INSC). Since these 
are the most important instruments regarding Africa, only these six will be introduced here.
The European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) is a thematic 
funding instrument for EU external action, which is aiming to support projects in the area 
of human rights in non-EU countries. This instrument is unique in the EU’s toolbox as it 
complements other EU external assistance instruments. It can be used flexibly, which allows 
the EU to use it according to local conditions, and at either government or non-governmental 
level. The budget of the EIDHR for 2014–2020 is 1.3 billion EUR. (EIDHR 2017)
The Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP) is the main EU instrument 
financing security initiatives and peace-building activities. This instrument is to provide 
short-term and long-term support as well, where the short-term assistance helps countries 
with unfolding crises, and the long-term is to tackle global and trans-border threats. 
The IcSP also complements the EU’s geographical instruments. It has a 2.3 billion EUR 
budget for the 2014–2020 period. (IcSP 2017)
The Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation (INSC) promotes high standards of 
nuclear safety, including radiation protection, and applies efficient and effective safeguards 
for nuclear material in non-EU countries. The instrument entered its  second phase in 2014, 
working with African countries to address consequences of uranium mining in north Africa, 
and particularly in Egypt and Morocco. The INSC has a budget of 200 million EUR for 
2014–2020. (Building Nuclear Safety Together 2013)
The Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) was formulated in line with 
the Lisbon Treaty and the Agenda for Change. Its main objective is poverty reduction, 
but it contributes to other EU programmes, such as sustainable development in multiple 
areas, like economic, social and environmental, but it also provides assistance to promote 
democracy, the rule of law, good governance, and human rights. This instrument can be 
used in countries not entitled to IPA funds. The DCI consists of three elements. The first 
is geographic programmes, which support cooperation with developing countries, which 
includes the South-African region. The  second is thematic programmes, which cover all 
developing countries that fall under the ENPI or the EDF. These thematic programmes 
are complementary and coherent with the geographical programmes. The third is the new 
Pan-African Programme, which supports activities from the trans-regional to the global 
level. The DCI’s total budget of 19.6 billion EUR for 2014–2020 breaks down as follows: 
11.8 billion EUR for geographic programmes; 7 billion EUR for thematic programmes; and 
845 million EUR for PanAf. (DCI 2017)
The European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) supports the ENP, meaning: Africa, 
Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia. The instrument has a 15.4 billion EUR budget 
for 2014–2020. (European Neighbourhood Policy 2016)
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The European Development Fund (EDF) is the most important and largest EU aid 
package; it provides the financing for the CPA. The EDF, however, is outside the EU budget, 
financed by direct contributions from the EU member states. The first EDF came in 1957, 
with the Treaty of Rome. The treaty established a technical and financial development 
fund primarily for the African countries, which later transformed to support the ACP and 
the overseas countries and territories (OCTs). The tenth EDF ended at the end of 2013. 
Some minor modification was introduced with the eleventh EDF, including aligning the EU 
member states’ contribution rules to the MFF to the EU budget. The other was an effort to 
create more flexibility for faster reaction to unexpected events both on national and regional 
level. The EDF funds activities are related to economic development, social and human 
development, and regional cooperation and integration.
The current eleventh EDF budget is 30.5 billion EUR for 2014–2020. (EDF 2017) 
In 2015, the budget support program of the EU included all instruments, allocated 
1.59 billion EUR, 20% of the official development assistance disbursed by DEVCO and 
DG Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations. 47% of this financial support went to 
Sub-Saharan Africa, as the largest recipient. (Budget support 2016) Table 3 shows the total 
EU commitments to Africa for 2015 in million EUR, by instrument.
Table 3.
EU commitments to Africa, 2015 (EUR million)
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Source: 2016 Annual Report
To synchronise these instruments and pool the aid, the Africa Investment Facility (AfIF) 
was established in 2015. The purpose is to support sustainable growth in Africa, and 
improve coordination with donors. It provides support through investment grants, technical 
assistance, risk capital, and other risk-sharing instruments. The resources of the AfIF come 
from the EDF and DCI. (Africa Investment Facility 2017)
The EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF for Africa) is the EU’s newest tool 
for flexible response in emergency situations. The EUTF for Africa was established at 
the 2015 Valletta Summit on migration and made available 1.8 billion EUR immediately. 
Since then the resources increased to more than 3.2 billion EUR, thanks to the member 
states’ contributions and European Commission instruments, like the EDF. The EUTF for 
Africa is an implementing tool, which allows a rapid, flexible and effective response from 
the EU side in emergency situations. This tool uses various resources, from the EU to other 
donors. The main objectives of the EUTF for Africa are to address the migration crisis and 
the crisis around Lake Chad in a comprehensive manner. The EUTF for Africa participates 
in different projects in the Sahel and Lake Chad regions (Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, 
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Cote d’Ivoire, the Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal), 
in the Horn of Africa (Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, 
Tanzania and Uganda), and in North Africa (Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia). 
The EUTF for Africa, which is based on the EUGS and the EU’s development policy, 
addresses forced migration and its root causes, like security challenges, social issues, 
economic pressure and environmental stress. (2016 Annual report EUTF 2016) The total 
budget allocation is 3.2 billion EUR, although some donors have not yet confirmed their 
contribution; of the total, 1.6 billion EUR will go to the Sahel region and Lake Chad, 
1.2 billion EUR to the Horn of Africa, and 346.4 million EUR to North Africa. (The EU 
Emergency Trust Fund for Africa 2017)
Besides the above-mentioned instruments, the EU also provides loans to Sub-Saharan 
and South African countries through the European Investment Bank (EIB). It provides 
project loans, intermediated loans, venture capital facility, microfinance and equity and fund 
investments. The EIB provided 221 million EUR to African regional projects from 2016 
until 2017, and a total of 1.2 billion EUR to African projects in the same period. (Projects 
financed s. a.) From the ACP group, the African continent received the largest amount of 
financial support in 2016. 77% of EIB assistance goes to the different countries of the con-
tinent. The most-financed sectors in West-Africa and the Sahel region and the Central and 
East-African region were the energy sector, financial services, and health sector, although 
in the South African region urban development, water, sewerage, and transport sectors 
were the most funded. (2016 Annual Report on EIB Activity in Africa, the Caribbean and 
the Pacific, and the Overseas Countries and Territories 2016)
Achievements, Challenges
The Cotonou Agreement has been widely criticized. The most common reproaches are its 
massive length and its lack of concept. The agreement has also used the former conventions 
as a baseline, but the institutions remained unchanged, and ineffective in reaching its goals. 
(Türke 2015) Closer analysis on the three pillars of the CPA reveals the shortfalls of 
the agreement. The first pillar on political dialogue contained the definitions of the essential 
elements. These definitions were long, and ambiguous. The CPA was asymmetric, since 
any violation of the fundamental elements set out in Article 96 could only be sanctioned 
from the EU side; the CPA does not permit the ACP to institute sanctions, since it would 
mean the suspension of the EDF. Article 97 describes the sanctions on the violation of “good 
governance”. From the EU side, these sanctions can be invoked, but from the ACP side 
implementing sanctions on these two articles in case of any EU violation on the essential 
elements of the CPA would mean the suspension of the financial aid to the countries. 
The sanctions, regarding both Articles were also implemented by the EU with the use 
of double standards in favour of the former colonies. Former colonial powers were more 
indulgent with transgressions in their former colonies.
Regarding democracy and human rights questions, the CPA lost its preventive 
characteristics. It became reactive, since interventions and sanctions were only possible 
when the violation of the CPA was severe. Because of this, prevention became impossible, 
and the EU could only react when a crisis already unfolded. Besides this, the EU agenda’s 
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core values were too ambiguous to work with, which resulted in a selective application. 
The trade pillar of the CPA tried to renew the decades long non-reciprocal preferences 
with free trade agreements between the world’s most- and least-developed countries, but it 
remained partial. This initiation was based on the EPA within the ACP countries. The EU 
wanted to encourage the Regional Economic Communities and fuel sustainable development 
addressing whole regions instead of individual countries. This initiative made the trade 
cooperation too complex though, and a short timeframe for the formation of the EPAs 
made the process slow and incomplete. In addition to this, the EU insistence on including 
issues of promoting EU interests was viewed as harmful by the ACP and alienated multiple 
participants. The most immediate negative consequence of the reciprocal trade liberalisation 
caused the ACP countries to lose a significant amount of customs revenues from their 
budgets; this gap could not be filled with aid compensation. The EU signed EPAs with 
individual countries to keep their preferential status, which rendered the agreement less 
transparent. (Negre et al. 2013)
The CPA also lost its preventive characteristics and became reactive, since it only 
intervened after a situation deteriorated. Moreover, certain elements of the EU agenda’s 
core values were too ambiguous to work with, which resulted in selective application. 
Another aspect rendering the trade pillar unbalanced is the trade averages. While the share 
of the ACP countries in the EU’s exports and imports is about 5%, the European share of 
the ACP trade averages is around 20%; ECOWAS has the greatest share, while the exchange 
with the Pacific and the Caribbean is insignificant. The financial framework for development 
aid was divided by region and thematised, which made it difficult to estimate the results. 
Many contributions linked only poorly to country strategies, which weakened local 
ownership and led to shallow political dialogue. The strategies of the regional organisations 
did not account for the different socioeconomic conditions of individual countries, and 
regional and local policies often failed to embrace common values promoted by the EU, 
like gender equality. A lack of monitoring meant that experiences were not collected, and 
procedures could not be improved. (Negre et al. 2013)
Another problem with the Cotonou Agreement is the changing environment. EU en-
largement brought a shift in strategic direction from South to East. The ENP gained greater 
support and visibility. New EU policies and strategies appeared, and the ACP group slowly 
fell into oblivion as an EU partner. The only bilateral strategic partnership with the ACP 
group and the EU is with South Africa. Besides this the EU policies shifted to support 
continental and regional cooperative organisations like ECOWAS, IGAD and the AU. With 
supporting these organisations, the ACP constantly lost from its importance. (Laporte 2012) 
The ACP is aware that it is a heterogeneous group with a large variety of interests, since 
it has 79 members from different geographical regions, with different territorial extents. 
Besides the physical characteristics, even the level of the development varies. The historical 
characterisation of the group was African diaspora heritage and a post-colonial mindset, 
but not all ACP countries share these elements, for example the countries in the Pacific. 
The only common understanding within the group is about cooperation with the EU about 
aid. The EU had been also criticized for not deepening the cooperation with the ACP 
group, just widening it during the past decades. In 2013 the EU articulated a viewpoint 
which emphasised the importance of the ACP’s reinvention, but left it to the ACP to shape 
the future cooperation between the two parties. (Negre et al. 2013)
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The 2016 evaluation of the CPA listed the achievements of the agreement, but also 
admitted the CPA’s flaws. The review acknowledged the weaknesses of the EPA strategy, 
but also pointed out the improvements in regional integration to the world economy. 
The activities supporting good governance, especially supporting electoral processes, were 
partly successful. The conflict prevention, management and resolution were effectively 
addressed by the EU in the African region, with the capacity building of such regional 
organisations as the AU and the ECOWAS. The evaluation declared the support to fragile 
states effective in short- and medium-term approaches, with the mobilisation of non-state 
actors and the flexible use of different tools. The review highlighted budget support, regional 
integration and trade support, the neutral identity of the EU in case of peace and security 
issues. This neutral identity is the key element, which allows the EU to be the leader of 
stabilisation and peace building programmes in Africa. The evaluation also acknowledged 
the weaknesses of the EU, since the joint programmes with the EU member states are still 
exploited insufficiently. The biggest concerns of the EU were coherence, coordination, and 
complementarity in the implementation of the CPA. (Review of strategic evaluations 2016)
This negative view of the Cotonou Agreement and the weight-loss of the ACP group is 
just one side of the relations. The upcoming 5th Africa‒EU Summit, on the other hand, will 
focus on achievements of the partnership. In the peace and security dimension, the different 
EU missions trained almost 17,000 military staff and more than 10,000 police officers, and 
provided financial aid for projects like the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), 
peace support operations, and early response actions. (Toward the 5th Africa–EU Summit 
Peace and Security 2017) Regarding governance system strengthening, the EU has a regular 
dialogue on human rights with most African countries and regional organisations. The EU 
also sent multiple missions to support electoral process on the continent, and provided 
aid to strengthen this dimension, as well. (Toward the 5th Africa–EU Summit Strengthen 
Governance Systems 2017) Regarding migration, the EU launched multiple programmes 
which includes Africa. These were the Valletta Action Plan in 2016, which contained 16 
initiatives to address the root causes of migration, it also started the Khartoum and Rabat 
process on migration, and in 2017, with the Malta Declaration, the EU increased the efforts 
even more. (Toward the 5th Africa-EU Summit Manage Migration and Mobility 2017) 
Regarding trade, the EU became Africa’s number one foreign investor, with a 33% share, 
and remained Africa’s biggest trading partner, taking 44% of exports, and providing 33% 
of imports. The EU is also the most enthusiastic supporter of Africa, as it is the number one 
aid provider of the continent. With the formerly signed agreements, the EU could provide 
a favourable environment to the African export, being the most open market, and it also 
offers a duty and quota free access to all products from the vast majority of African coun-
tries. (Toward the 5th Africa–EU Summit Attract Responsible & Sustainable Investments 
2017) Regarding the agricultural sector, the EU also committed to support sustainable 
development, which is clearly visible in the Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreements, 
and provided substantial aid for actions related to food and nutrition security. (Toward the 5th 
Africa–EU Summit Transform African Agriculture 2017) The EU also supports the Africa 
Renewable Energy Initiative. (Toward the 5th Africa–EU Summit Energise Africa 2017)
To make the system self-sustainable the EU recognised that it had to invest in 
education, so it launched the European Training Foundation, allowed African students into 
the ERASMUS+ program, and intensified the EU‒Africa dialogue on research. In addition 
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to the intercontinental programs, the EU supports the capacity building and harmonisation 
in African universities, as well with the standardisation of the degree programmes and 
quality assurance. (Toward the 5th Africa–EU Summit Advance Knowledge & Skills 2017)
How the EU‒Africa Relations Fit in the EU’s Global Strategy
Faced with new, unprecedented global challenges and the need to re-invent itself after 
the shock of BREXIT, the EU developed a new global strategy in 2106. The number one 
priority of the new European Union Global Strategy (EUGS) is security. It emphasises 
building the defence capabilities of the EU, creating a security community, with strategic 
independence. To reach this objective, it sets out five areas: security and defence, coun-
terterrorism, cybersecurity, energy security, and strategic communication. The  secondary 
goal is to invest in state and social resilience to create stable states, which are resistant to 
crisis. It defines the most important characteristics of these states as democratic societies 
with trusted institutions and sustainable development. The third priority of the strategy 
is to create integrated approach, which elevates the comprehensive approach to a broad, 
multi-dimensional, unified approach of policies and conflicts, involving actors from every 
governmental level. The fourth priority supports the Cooperative Regional Orders, which 
aims to promote various forms of regional integration. The fifth is the vocation of the EU 
to the transformation of the 21st century global governance. The strategy also scheduled 
a yearly review. (Molnár s. a.)
The priorities of the EUGS appear in multiple EU documents regarding Africa. These 
documents discuss all five areas, from which the 2011 Strategy for Security and Development 
in the Sahel arose from the EU’s determination to fight terrorism in the region, while 
the strategic communication and partnership dates back to 2000 and the first EU‒Africa 
Summit. The introduction of social resiliency as part of the EUGS created the foundation for 
the earlier announced so called “more for more” policy. This policy appeared in the Cotonou 
Agreement, which was signed in 2000. It not only supports democratic states in Africa, but 
all states where the aid will bring positive results.
The EU has changed a lot on its approach to the policies, refined the definitions, but 
the essence remained the same: the democratic values and main principles. The different 
policies and strategies just clarified the definitions. The rewarded performance translated to 
the political dimension, instead of the economic dimension. The integrated approach is not 
entirely new to EU‒Africa relations, having been introduced in 2014 with PanAf. It intro-
duced a wider perspective to the existing strategies. Roadmap 2014–2017 also introduced 
a multi-level (regional, continental, and global) cooperation system. The Roadmap also 
introduced the mutual interest of the EU and African countries in the transformation of 
the 21st century global governance. This interest aims to make the UN a more capable global 
actor. This fits in the fifth priority of the EUGS, which aims to transform global governance.
The EPA program of the EU supports regional cooperation in the economic dimension. 
In addition to this program, there are more EU strategies, which aim to promote regional 
integration on the African continent. It fits under the support of Regional Cooperative 
Orders. Similar principles had been expressed by the Strategy for Security and Development 
in the Sahel and the Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa, both implemented in 2011, 
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and the EU‒South Africa Strategic Partnership signed in 2006. There are also regional 
strategies based on regional organisations like IGAD or ECOWAS or other African regional 
organisations.
With the upcoming EU‒Africa Summit in 2017, the opportunity remains open to 
the two sides to deepen the partnership and shape future relations between the continents. 
There is no doubt that the EU will aim to develop the partnership in line with the EUGS. 
The question remains the AU. It can simply accept and follow the European ideas and 
initiatives, or show its capability of creating policies and initiatives, like in the recent years.
Conclusion
A long success of conventions led to the creation of the Cotonou Partnership Agreement in 
2000. The signing parties of the CPA were the EU member states and the ACP countries, 
which mean 78 African, Caribbean and Pacific states. The large number of participating 
countries has made it impossible to satisfy all needs. The revisions of the agreement 
encouraged regionalisation, namely the Economic Partnership Agreements. The EPAs 
are still incomplete, and the Cotonou Agreement expires in 2020. The preparations to 
create the new framework document of the EU‒ACP cooperation started in 2018. It is not 
a question that an agreement like Yaoundé, Lomé or Cotonou will be forged. The frames 
of the partnership will remain the same, but the EU will have to emphasise the creation of 
the EPAs. With dividing the ACP to regions, the cooperation could be more successful and 
more satisfactory to all participants.
The European Union was expected to find the new frames of the cooperation 
with the African continent on the last EU‒AU Summit in 2017, but it did not happen. 
Instead, the summit corrected a long-standing problem in the EU‒Africa relations. In 
the various strategies, policies and agreements, the parties always agreed on the principles 
and priorities. But they never took into consideration that the number one priority of the EU 
was always the implementation of the democratic principles, and for the African countries it 
was the economic development. Because of this misunderstanding, the two continents could 
not work together with success. The recent Summit however showed us that, if a common 
priority is found, the common action is more likely to happen. In November 2017, the EU and 
AU representatives found this common priority: migration. The EU is facing a many years 
long migration crisis, and the African continent is struggling with internal migration flows. 
Action plans were made to counter the phenomenon, but migration, especially in Africa 
is a complex problem. The continent is struggling with demographic changes. The rapidly 
growing population is the hotbed of ethnic tensions, fuelling insurgencies and supporting 
radicalism. The economic problems and the climate change are also interconnected. The EU 
has to take countermeasures with the same complexity.
Despite the long-standing relations between the EU and Africa, the EU is not the only 
international actor on the continent. China is present in Africa since decades, and it is a more 
popular partner than Europe. China is not asking for democratic changes in the countries 
it invests in, the Asian country is just asking a long-term friendship. Other powers are 
also present, like the USA, and different countries are dusting their long-forgotten Africa 
policies, like Japan. As we can see, the EU has to compete with all of these actors for Africa. 
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In the new Global Strategy, the EU makes steps towards a more Africa friendly practice, 
pragmatism; which allows the EU to work with non-democratic countries. Whether these 
changes will be enough, or the EU will drop behind, we do not know yet. The competition 
is running.
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The Eastern Partnership of the EU
Ágnes Tuka
Introduction
The European Union is a developed model of regional integration and one of the dominant 
players in the globalizing world. Yet it is struggling to strengthen its position and potential 
by elaborating the concept of “global governance”. (Shared Vision 2016) This article 
examines how economic and political relations with the immediate neighbours of the current 
member states – Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine – and with the Caucasian states – Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Georgia – that are geographically part of Europe have been shaped. It analyses 
the difficulties that hamper cooperation, and whether the EU can match the expectations of 
the six countries belonging to the Eastern Partnership.
The study does not deal with Russia, or with EU relations with the Central Asian 
states that declared their independence from the Soviet Union. It does not attempt to cover 
the entire history of relations with each of the six countries, but focuses on the Eastern 
Partnership through the activities of the European Parliament (EP) since this is the political 
body of the European Union which aims to protect the interests of European citizens and to 
promote the integration process. At the same time, it also has a controlling function with 
which members of the EP monitor the development of both political and economic relations.
Historical Background
The Soviet regime lagged behind the West in the era of the Cold War. This led the General 
Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), 
Mikhail Gorbachev, to reform the great empire through a complex program announced after 
1986. Neither “perestroika” nor “glasnost” could strengthen the Soviet system, and in 1989 
the model disintegrated. Tensions between the ethnicities and the republics of the former 
Soviet Union escalated, fuelling bloody conflicts. Among the causes of hostilities were:
• the idea of ideological unification that suppressed the ethno-cultural sphere
• the injustices suffered during the Soviet period (resettlement of populations, aboli-
tion of the languages and print cultures of ethnic groups, etc.)
• of the more than 100 “nations” or ethnic groups, only fourteen received significant 
rights (Milov 2006, 800–801.)
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For local elites, therefore, nationalism became the main weapon in the fight against 
the central government. In most republics, a struggle for independence began for reasons 
and goals similar to the aforementioned factors:
• ecological problems of the previous industrialization
• recognition of the culture and (the mere) existence of the non-Russian population
• recognition of the Russian or Soviet power as a violent occupier
• repudiation of the economic colonization of the Russian centre
• contribution of independence to the rapid growth of social welfare
All these factors led to the dissolution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The first 
step in this process, in 1988, was the declaration of sovereignty of Estonia, followed 
by the separation of Lithuania. Free elections were held in February 1990 and the new 
Lithuanian parliament declared independence in March. On 4 May 1990, a similar decision 
was made by Latvia, but these declarations were not accepted by the Moscow leadership. 
At the Congress of the CPSU in July 1990, however, a new constitution was adopted that 
would have created the Confederation of Sovereign States. In January 1991, the Baltic 
States, Moldova, Georgia, and Armenia, i.e. the smaller countries belonging to the European 
continent, withdrew from the debate on the new economic and political system of the region. 
Although in the referendum held in other republics in March 1991, 76% of the population 
voted to preserve the renewed federation of the Soviet Union, the independence process 
was unstoppable.
On 8 December 1991, Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus announced that the Soviet Union 
had ceased to exist as a subject of international law (see Table 1), and established a loose 
cooperation named the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) with its headquarters 
in Minsk. On 21 December in Alma-Ata (Almaty), the already independent republics, with 
the exception of the Baltic States and Georgia, joined the confederation. The latter entered 
the CIS in 1993 but withdrew in 2009. There are currently nine permanent members and 
two observers, Ukraine and Tajikistan, but this is reflected neither in the official Russian 
documents nor in the articles on the Commonwealth of the Society and Economy (Общество 
и экономика).
Development of Relations between the EU and the New Eastern European 
Countries
Collaboration with the CIS countries
Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the European Union (EU) sought to establish 
a new system of relations with these states, which coincided with the ambitions of the in-
dependent countries. This is confirmed by the Ukrainian foreign policy concept adopted in 
1993, which stated unequivocally that Ukraine aimed at full membership in the European 
communities. (Postanova 1993) The EU did not promise membership; this was done only 
for the more-developed region of Eastern and Central Europe. Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreements (PCAs) nonetheless were signed with Russia, Ukraine, and Moldova in 1994, 
with Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan in 1995, and a year later a similar document was accepted 
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by Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Uzbekistan. As the process of transformation faced 
major difficulties in these countries though, ratification was delayed and relations were 
established only at the end of the 1990s. The PCA with the Republic of Tajikistan was signed 
only in 2004 and came into effect in 2009. Similar documents were signed with another two 
states, Belarus and Turkmenistan, but these have not yet come into force.
According to an EU definition, these PCAs are third-generation agreements and 
relatively complete. (PCA 1999) These partnerships aim to:
• provide a suitable framework for political dialogue
• support efforts to strengthen their democracies and develop their economies
• accompany their transition to a market economy, and
• encourage trade and investment
The partnerships also aim to provide a basis for cooperation in the legislative, eco-
nomic, social, financial, scientific, civil, technological, and cultural fields. Activity is 
coordinated annually by the Cooperation Council meetings at the ministerial level, while 
the Parliamentary Cooperation Committee, in which representatives of the partner country 
and the European Parliament participate, is also an important actor. They usually discuss 
political and economic relations every  second year, with the site alternating between 
Brussels and the state in question.
The PCAs formulated the expectations of the EU: a pluralist, multi-party system 
respecting human rights, and the creation of a market economy. (PCA 1999) To foster 
the transition to a market economy and establish new commercial ties, the EU asymmetri-
cally eliminated all quotas on most industrial goods imported from these countries (with 
the exception of coal, steel, and textiles); therefore, the CIS states were able to protect their 
own markets. (Gálik 2016) These agreements were effective for 10 years, but are renewed 
annually with the agreement of the partners. Once the agreements came into force, the EU 
adopted a specific strategic plan in line with the budget-planning period at that time. This 
included specific initiatives in certain policy areas, but the goals of the document lack 
concrete financial support.
New European Neighbourhood Policy: The opening to the East
The European Union started accession negotiations with the ten Central and Eastern 
European states in 1998 and 1999, which meant that the “new” Eastern European countries 
(Ukraine, Moldova, and Belarus) would be the neighbours of the EU. This demanded 
a re-evaluation of the neighbourhood policy established by the Barcelona Process in 1995 
with the EU and twelve Mediterranean states. The positions of the two regions differed 
considerably; nevertheless, the draft elaborated by the European Commission in 2003 
linked these areas to a common concept by launching a new European Neighbourhood 
Policy (ENP). “The Communication proposes that, over the coming decade, the EU should, 
therefore, aim to work in partnership to develop a zone of prosperity and a friendly neigh-
bourhood – a ‘ring of friends’ – with whom the EU enjoys close, peaceful and co-operative 
relations.” (Wider 2003, 4.) The implementation of the detailed plan began in 2004. (Balázs 
2016, 243.) The neighbourhood policy was extended to sixteen countries, although Russia 
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withdrew. The participating countries found the ENP presented by the European Council 
a useful tool to achieve economic cooperation.
The neighbourhood policy was based on the bilateral action plan prepared by 
the European Commission with each country and endorsed by the EU and the Cooperation 
Council of the country. This plan was built on the principles advocated by the EU, with 
an emphasis on political dialogue and reforms, the development of good governance, 
the move to the single market, and cooperation on justice and home affairs. Joint efforts were 
envisaged on environmental protection, energy supply, transport infrastructure, logistics, 
and research quality.
Although the similarity of priorities can be observed here, there are different coun-
try-specific elements in the documents. The Ukrainian action plan is the most significant 
one.
In autumn 2004, the political situation in Ukraine was turbulent. Following the “Orange 
Revolution” in the wake of the election scandals, the presidency went to Viktor Andriyovych 
Yushchenko, who confirmed his country’s commitment to the European integration. In its 
resolution adopted in January 2005, the European Parliament considered the elections of 
December unambiguously democratic and urged closer ties than those provided by the ENP. 
(European Parliament 2005) The European Commission’s Action Plan was launched on 9 
December 2004, and followed by a statement from the European Council on 17 December. 
The EU–Ukraine Cooperation Council approved the EU–Ukraine Action Plan in February 
2005. (Györkös–Kovács 2005)
The plan contained fourteen priorities (Bazhan 2015, 56.) and assigned seventy-one 
tasks, primarily to Ukraine, including: strengthening democratic institutions; building 
respect for the freedom of opinion and the press; improving investment environment; 
protecting human rights; implementing a tax reform; and promoting legal harmonization. 
The EU’s promises included: supporting Ukraine’s accession to the WTO; closer cooperation 
on security policy; negotiations on visa facilitation and abolition; dismantling customs duties 
in bilateral trade; dialogue on free movement of workers; and the possibility for Ukraine 
to participate in achieving the key goals of EU policies and programs. The problem of 
diversifying energy sources and reducing dependence on Russian imports was given high 
priority and the EU promised more financial resources. (Proposed Action 2005)
The action plan covered three years, but only a document issued at the end of the first 
year reported results. The Ukrainian leadership expressed dissatisfaction that the EU was 
not willing to offer full membership. In January 2007, the head of the Ukrainian mission in 
Brussels, Roman Shpek, stressed that Ukraine did not want to participate in the European 
Neighbourhood Policy because it contradicted the strategic goal, membership. (Bazhan 
2015, 58.) This did not mean the agreement was “void”, and the 2008 report emphasized that: 
“Over the three years of implementation of the EU Ukraine Action Plan, good progress has 
been made in numerous areas of cooperation.” (Joint Evaluation Report 2008)
Moldova, which also became a partner in the neighbourhood policy, has been striving 
for a full membership since 1999. This provided the opportunity to open a delegation of 
the European Union to the Republic of Moldova in the center of Chisinau in October 2005. 
The action plan elaborated for Moldova is similar to that of Ukraine, although some areas, 
such as the fight against drug trafficking, are listed separately.
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In March 2005, similar action plans were drafted for Armenia, Azerbaijan, and 
Georgia. These also covered in detail a period of three years and were agreed annually by 
the cooperation councils. They are, however, rather uniform, with few new elements in 
comparison to previous bilateral agreements, and the texts of the EU can be perceived as 
dictates. (Balázs 2016, 244.)
Eastern Partnership
In 2008, it became clear that the two regions covered by the ENP were very different. They 
often competed for development aid. (Gálik 2016, 10.) On 13 July 2008, the French EU 
presidency therefore proposed a reform of the Mediterranean policy. The Paris Summit 
put forward a new Mediterranean union for consideration. Poland proposed in May 
2008 that the union with the six Eastern and Caucasian countries (Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine) participating in the ENP should have closer ties. 
The Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs, Carl Bildt, stressed in March 2008 that “it is 
time to look to the East to see what we can do to strengthen democracy”, (BruxInfo 2008) 
after presenting the Eastern Partnership program with his Polish counterpart, Radoslaw 
Sikorski. Although all six countries were to be involved in the Eastern Partnership, Belarus 
was dependent on how the relationship with the EU was changing as its non-democratic 
system had been continuously criticized by the Union, which further fed the resentment 
of President Alexander Lukashenko. Nonetheless, at that time, it also seemed possible that 
Russia could join many projects of the program. At the June 2008 meeting of the Council 
of the European Union, the draft was approved.
The European Commission presented its proposal on 3 December 2008. The plan 
contained a greater role for the union, easier travelling for citizens of the participating 
countries, and more financial and technical support for projects. The commission’s statement 
was discussed at the plenary session of the European Parliament in March 2009. The Eastern 
Partnership would be one pillar of the EU’s foreign policy. Among the major goals, 
the possibility of concluding the Association Agreements emerged, which was interpreted 
by the European countries as the “anteroom” to full membership. Cooperation would create 
a multilateral framework and would rely on four platforms:
• democracy, good governance, and stability
• economic integration and convergence with EU policies
• energy security
• development of cooperation between people
The plenary session supported the initiative, but noted it would not be enough to give 
the neighbourhood policy a new name; the economic and political systems of these countries 
would have to be supported, so they could join the free trade zone. (European Parliament 
2009a)
Moldova has become the neighbour of the European Union after the enlargement 
of 2007 that has also brought a neighbouring Ukraine with a much longer border than 
previously, after Hungary’s accession in 2004. This meant that the frozen crisis in 
Transdniester and Moldova became a direct security challenge for the EU, while the ongoing 
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Russian–Ukrainian gas disputes raised problems of energy security. The EU also considered 
the conflicts in the Caucasus a threat to its security, but assumed these transit countries 
could play an important role in the diversification of the EU energy policy.
Economic relations between the EU and the six countries intensified from the 2000s 
onwards; exports and imports of these countries with the CIS have decreased, while those 
with the EU have grown. In 2009, the European Union had a 30.4%, 29.4%, and 42.8% share 
in the foreign trade of Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan, respectively. (Gerencsér 2015, 
109.) Although the 2008–2011 global crisis led to a serious economic downturn, the EU is 
(still) their main trading partner. Some 63% of Moldova’s exports go to the EU, and the EU 
is Ukraine’s largest trading partner, accounting for more than 40% of its trade in 2015. 
(Trade 2017) Belarus is the only country having Russia as its most important trading partner.
The official launch of the Eastern Partnership fell in the period of the Czech presi-
dency of the EU: in May 2009, leaders of the twenty-seven countries invited the heads of 
state of the six countries as a sign of their new cooperation. The President of Belarus still 
did not prefer Western relations and did not attend; however, the Deputy Prime Minister 
was present. The Joint Declaration aimed at a more ambitious partnership, stating that 
unlike the previous initiative the “Eastern Partnership builds on and is complementary to 
existing bilateral contractual relations. It will be developed without prejudice to individual 
partner countries’ aspirations for their future relationship with the European Union. It will 
be governed by the principles of differentiation and conditionality”. (Joint Declaration 2009) 
The document specified that partner countries could decide whether they would participate 
in the platforms.
The European Union has provided institutional support for partner countries for 
the development of their administrations, for promoting free trade, for their adaptation 
to the EU market, and for the liberalization of visas. The Eastern Partnership focuses on 
multilateral cooperation. The meetings of heads of state or government of the Eastern 
Partnership provide a forum every two years, while the ministers of foreign affairs meet 
every year. The European Commission is responsible for organizing these meetings and 
debates of the four thematic platforms mentioned above. These four areas indicate that little 
progress has been made in networking since the end of the 1990s though.
The program also called for strengthening the rule of law, improving public admin-
istration, building respect for human rights, reinforcing civil society organizations, and 
fighting against corruption, crime, and terrorism. Countries can count on the EU to help 
develop a market economy and to support trade relations. Social reforms supported by 
the EU include the fight against poverty, and the promotion of social inclusion. EU leaders 
pledged additional funding to support initiatives in these areas, and promised to lobby 
international financial institutions for better terms for these partners. Specifications for 
a continuous monitoring system were put in place.
This program disappointed Ukraine, but negotiations on the possibility of concluding 
an EU–Ukraine Association Agreement and a Free Trade Area started in March 2007. 
(Мironenko 2015, 59.) The Ukrainian leadership expected that Ukraine would be treated 
separately by the EU, but that did not happen. The EU–Ukraine Cooperation Council 
adopted the Association Agenda in June 2009, but stressed that it might take years for 
the agreement to come into effect.
101The Eastern Partnership of the EU
The Eastern Partnership in the focus of the European Parliament
The European Parliament (EP) helped establish an EU–Eastern neighbourhood par-
liamentary assembly (Euronest) that is supposed to foster cooperation via multilateral 
networking and community level activities. This decision was made in 2009, but because of 
protracted political debates, the body came into being only in May 2011. Belarus’s delegation 
does not take part for political reasons. Euronest currently has 120 members: sixty EP 
members (who also make up the current EP Delegation [DEPA] and are also members of 
one of the bilateral standing delegations of the EP to the countries) and ten members from 
each of the Eastern Partnership countries. (Euronest 2017)
Eight resolutions were adopted before the June 2009 European Parliament elections 
on the forms of cooperation with the partner countries. Some were a result of earlier ENP 
obligations; for example, the resolution of 2 April 2009 on biannual evaluation of the EU–
Belarus dialogue, in which “the Belarusian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Syarhei Martynau, 
has declared that ‘Belarus has a positive view on participation in the Eastern Partnership 
Initiative’, adding that Belarus intends to participate in that initiative.” The MEPs warned 
that the “intensification of the political dialogue between the EU and Belarus must be 
conditional on the lifting of restrictions on freedom and cessation of violence against 
participants in opposition protests and human rights activists.” (European Parliament 2009b)
From the autumn of 2009 to the autumn of 2014, sixty-nine resolutions were issued 
addressing the Eastern Partnership, while since the last EP elections in June 2014 only 
twenty-eight have been issued. Only some of these were accepted via the ordinary legislative 
and consent procedures or due to the obligations imposed by EU treaties. Others were 
individual or joint initiatives of MEPs and therefore concluded with a resolution adopted in 
a plenary session. These do not impose any obligation on either the Council of the European 
Union or the European Commission. They are, however, important for policy-making at 
European level, as they draw the attention of the political elites and the media to the topic.
The resolution adopted in February 2010 on Ukraine, for example, confirms that the EP 
aims to “keep up to date with” the happenings in the country and to decide on the elements of 
cooperation in this context. In February 2010, the  second round of the Ukrainian presidential 
elections was held. The conduct of the elections was considered appropriate by international 
observers, but the modification of the election law and the status of minorities were criticized 
by the EP’s resolution. The MEPs also expected the new Ukrainian leadership to strengthen 
energy cooperation, to establish a social market economy, and to commit to sustainable 
development. (The Situation in Ukraine 2010)
The European Union tried to treat the Caucasus countries as a single area. The illusory 
nature of this approach was made apparent in a 2010 resolution on the south Caucasus 
though. The Nagorno–Karabakh territorial dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan was 
“frozen”. (Gereben 2014; Gerencsér 2015) The document also commented on the Georgian 
situation: “retaining the status quo in the conflicts in the region is unacceptable and 
unsustainable since it bears the constant risk of an escalation of tensions and a resumption 
of armed hostilities.” (South Caucasus 2010) Though there were other country-specific 
references, the resolution was really a reiteration of previous tasks.
The resolution clearly shows why the EU incorporated this area into the Eastern 
Partnership. The European Parliament “notes the strategic geopolitical location of the South 
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Caucasus and its increasing importance as an energy, transport, and communications 
corridor connecting the Caspian region and Central Asia with Europe; considers it of 
the utmost importance therefore that EU cooperation with the South Caucasus be given high 
priority, not least in matters relating to energy; emphasizes the role of the three countries 
as essential for the transit of energy resources, as well as for the diversification of the EU’s 
energy supply and routes [… and therefore…] calls on the Commission to define a set of 
regional and cross-border projects and programmes for the three South Caucasus countries 
in fields such as transport, environment, culture and civil society”. (South Caucasus 2010)
The MEPs discussed proposals for the revision of the European Neighbourhood 
Policy each year up to July 2015. The April 2011 resolution reassessed the values set out 
in earlier documents and found that “since the ENP’s launch in 2004, mixed results have 
been recorded, with positive developments concerning human rights and democratisation 
in some partner countries, and some negative developments in others, particularly in 
Belarus”. Thus, the EP “stresses that in a number of countries the legal framework for 
and conduct of elections have not been consistent with international standards.” (Review 
2011) Consequently, the European Parliament “calls on the Council, the Commission and 
the EEAS to devise clear benchmarks for monitoring such reforms.” (Review 2011)
The EP considered the association agreements important incentives for these reforms; 
they would include concrete conditions, deadlines, and monitoring systems. The institution 
proposed increasing financial resources but with much tighter controls. (Review 2011) 
Although the European Commission and the European External Action Service set bench-
marks in their joint communication, these were criticized by the EP resolution examining 
the neighbourhood policy in December 2011; the EP wanted more precise, measurable, 
time-limited, and methodologically clearer criteria.
In 2012, a resolution was adopted on trade with the Eastern partner states. Members of 
the EP considered it important to accept this document as they felt that the Eastern partners 
had been relegated to the background by the Arab Spring. The Eastern Partnership’s goal 
was to create Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas (DCFTAs), and the EU led separate 
negotiations on this matter. The first agreement was completed with Ukraine in October 
2011, but it entered into force only after the ratification of the association agreement. The EP 
“considers the creation of DCFTAs to be one of the most ambitious tools of EU bilateral 
trade policy for achieving a stable, transparent and predictable economic environment which 
respects democracy, fundamental rights and the rule of law, providing not only for greater 
economic integration by a gradual dismantling of trade barriers but also for regulatory 
convergence in areas that have an impact on trade in goods and services, in particular by 
strengthening investment protection, streamlining customs and border procedures, reducing 
technical and other non-tariff barriers to trade, strengthening sanitary and phytosanitary 
rules, improving animal welfare, enhancing the legal frameworks for competition and public 
procurement and ensuring sustainable development.”(Trade Aspects 2012)
Under Point 6, it states further that the European Parliament “recognises that greater 
trade integration, with the profound changes in economic structures it requires, calls 
for significant short-term and medium-term efforts by our Eastern Partners, [and it] is 
convinced, however, that in the long run, the benefits of such integration will compensate 
for those efforts.” (Trade Aspects 2012)
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The document defines tasks for the six countries that not only focus on economic 
relations. The EP expressed regret, for instance, that the Nagorno–Karabakh conflict still 
resonated in Armenia’s closed borders with Azerbaijan and Turkey, and the institution was 
concerned about significant impediments for businesses in Armenia, including the opaque 
tax system and lack of protection for investments. Azerbaijan’s first task is to join the WTO.
Diversification of the economy was proposed as well, since 95% of exports was 
provided by the oil sector. The need for government intervention against social inequalities 
and corruption was also noted. Belarus, though an important economic partner and transit 
country for the EU, is drifting further and further from the EU. The EP nevertheless called 
for more financial support to improve the performance of administrative structures and to 
strengthen Belarusian civil society. The EP asked Moldova to pursue territorial reunification 
with the help of other integration institutions. Despite significant progress, it also has to 
move forward in services and investment protection. The MEPs expressed dissatisfaction 
that the association agreement with Ukraine had not yet been signed, so the DCFTA could 
not come into force either. It also noted as a problem that the governmental and economic 
reforms by the Ukrainian Government brought only mixed results; according to the EP, 
the development of these areas was hampered by the “administrative permits, the excessive 
number of administrative inspections, untransparent tax and customs systems and poor 
administration, the unstable and untransparent legal system and its poor functioning, weak 
and corrupt public administration and judiciary, weak contract enforcement and insufficient 
property rights protection, underdevelopment and monopolisation of infrastructure”. (Trade 
Aspects 2012) Despite the diplomatic formulations of the representatives, the problems 
identified continued to render cooperation even more complicated. At the same time, 
the financial assistance of the EU was regarded as inadequate and not internally motivated.
The next resolution on neighbourhood policy came on 23 October 2013, one month 
before the EU–Eastern Partnership Summit in Vilnius. The most important task there was 
to conclude association agreements with Moldova, Georgia, and Ukraine. The document 
clearly reflected the desire to have all six states in the European Union’s sphere of influence. 
A strong concern was expressed about Russian pressure, as it was apparent that the close 
military and political cooperation of the partner countries with the Western world had im-
pinged upon Russia’s interests. (European Neighbourhood 2013) The representatives clearly 
stated that joining the customs union spearheaded by Russia would exclude the possibility of 
signing an association agreement with the EU. Furthermore, the treatment of the six states 
as a single area was disrupted because Belarus and Armenia had been building military and 
economic relations primarily with Russia since the early 1990s. Their political system had 
increasingly shifted from Western pluralistic democracy, and in September 2013 Armenia 
decided not to sign the association agreement with the EU. Since January 2015, moreover, 
both states joined the Eurasian Economic Union created by Russia. This does not mean their 
exclusion from the Eastern Partnership though, as the EU hopes to strengthen its influence 
by empowering civil society organizations to challenge the leadership.
A solemn signing of the Ukraine–European Union association agreement would have 
taken place at the Eastern Partnership Summit in Vilnius on 28–29 November 2013, but on 
20 November the Ukrainian Government decided to withdraw. The EP faced this situation 
at its plenary session of December 2013 and adopted the resolution of 12 December 2013 on 
the outcome of the Vilnius Summit and the future of the Eastern Partnership. It expressed 
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“regret” over the Ukrainian decision as well as solidarity with the supporters of the “future 
of Europe”. Members clearly saw Russian pressure behind the decision to withdraw and 
sharply condemned it, asking EU institutions to take action. They called for a dialogue with 
Ukrainian authorities and urged the parties to discuss the prospect of future integration in 
the EU. (Vilnius Summit 2013) This statement seems to have been interpreted as a promise 
of full membership.
In March 2014, after months of political turmoil in Ukraine, cooperation was on 
the agenda again. The resolution adopted by the EP recognized that “the recent develop-
ments in some EaP countries have drawn attention to the fragility of the political, economic 
and social integration process.” To foster EU values, the MEPs pressed for prompt subsidies 
and a clear vision for the partner countries, but only visa facilitation was mentioned. In 
addition to general coordination, the “more for more” principle and the regular ministerial 
deliberations were promoted. (Priorities 2014)
In the next European Parliamentary term, it was clear that the neighbourhood policy 
had entered a transformative stage. A single general statement made in July 2015 explains 
the situation: “The neighborhood is currently in a state of flux due to the increasing number 
of long-standing and newly emerging security challenges, and is less stable, considerably 
less secure and facing a more profound economic crisis than when the ENP was launched.” 
(ENP 2015) A separate chapter is devoted to the security dimension. In funding, the “more 
for more” principle established that more emphasis should be placed on using technical 
assistance programs such as TAIEX and Twinning, and that the partners should be invited 
to participate in EU programs such as Erasmus and Horizon 2020. The statement also called 
for clearer terms of assessment and more transparency. (ENP 2015)
From 2016 onwards, resolutions on individual partner countries, distinctive policy 
areas (e.g. the objectives of the energy union, the evaluation of the activities of the European 
Foundation for Democracy, and women’s rights in the Eastern Partnership states), and 
the parliamentary adoption of budget documents have been published with respect to 
the Eastern Partnership. This clearly indicates that, although the Eastern Partnership 
program has officially remained in place since a new summit was held in November 2017, 
the application of standardized actions towards the partners is no longer a reality.
Association Agreements
The documents of the Eastern Partnership have outlined the possibility of association 
for the region from the beginning; however, the Council of the European Union adopted 
guidelines regarding the “anteroom” of the EU only in January 2007. The EU–Ukraine 
Cooperation Council in Luxembourg did not finalize the concept until June 2009, and nego-
tiations started only in November. In June 2009, a decision was reached on the association 
directives proposed for the Republic of Moldova, as well. In May 2010, the council approved 
the negotiating directives on Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia. These were announced 
as new objectives and supplemented with a comprehensive description of the common 
economic space.
Since spring 2012, EP representatives have accelerated negotiations for the Association 
Agreements. In November 2013, the President of Georgia and the Prime Minister of 
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Moldova initiated an association agreement. It includes the gradual introduction of a Deep 
and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) and was signed in June 2014. It entered 
into force on 1 July 2016. To monitor its implementation, an association council was 
established as the highest official body; it meets annually, and delegations are chaired by 
the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, 
and the Georgian Prime Minister. (Consilium 2016)
The association agreement concluded between the EU and Moldova on 30 August 
2014 was published in the official journal of the European Union. (Moldova AA 2014) It 
strengthened previous bilateral agreements, and its annexes included all the directives and 
regulations needed to ensure the smooth functioning of the DCFTA.
The Prime Minister of Ukraine, Arseniy Yatsenyuk, signed the political part of 
the association agreement on 21 March 2014 and the DCFTA, the economic pillar, on 27 
June. The agreement made most Ukrainian exports to the EU duty-free, but permitted 
only gradually decreasing rates for imports from the EU. The European Parliament and 
the Ukrainian Supreme Council confirmed the agreement in September. Since November 
2014, the Ukrainian Parliament has been harmonizing its legislation with European Union 
standards, which requires some 350 amendments to state laws and regulations. (Mironenko 
2015, 62.) By the end of November 2015, all EU member states had ratified the agreement.
On 25 November 2014, the Hungarian Parliament strengthened the association between 
the three states – Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine – in question and the EU by overwhelming 
majority. In the Netherlands a consultative referendum was held in April 2016 in which 
32% of the population participated; 61% rejected the association agreement. It was ratified 
nonetheless by the Dutch House of Representatives in February 2017 and by the senate 
in May. The council announced the signing of the agreement in July 2017 and the full 
implementation of the agreement on 1 September 2017. A number of sectoral measures 
have been applied in Ukraine since September 2014, and the provisions of the DCFTA 
were implemented in January 2016. Its impact is difficult to measure because of the short 
time passed.
In January 2016, the EP discussed the association agreements and the DCFTAs of 
the three countries. More than seventy-five members offered comments, and more than 
200 EP representatives submitted their views in writing. The resolution, along with former 
priorities, demanded that:
• Priority should be given to the implementation of the Association Agenda.
• The controversial territorial integrity of all three countries must be settled.
• Visa-free travel for the citizens of partner countries must be ensured.
• The DCFTAs should contribute to raising the standard of living of citizens.
The document assessed the strengthened security cooperation with these states as a sign of 
the revised Neighbourhood Policy. It also referred to specific problems regarding all three 
countries. The EP noted, for example, the lack of freedom of the press and the failure to 
implement the judicial reforms in Georgia. Moldova’s political instability and the serious 
scandals of corruption also represented a problem. The Russian intervention in Ukraine and 
the war in Eastern Ukraine created a catastrophic humanitarian situation, so the EP called 
for further financial support. It also expressed “its understanding that the war situation in 
the East of Ukraine is a serious impediment to the reform effort; [and made] clear, however, 
106 Regional and Bilateral Relations of the European Union
that the success and resilience of Ukraine vis-à-vis any external foe depends strictly on 
the health of its economy and legal framework, thriving democracy and growing prosperity”. 
(Association Agreements 2016)
Budgetary Background, Financing Forms
The Council of the European Union adopted a program called Technical Assistance to 
the Commonwealth of Independent States and Georgia (TACIS) for independent states of 
the former Soviet Union in 1991. Since 1993, this program has been extended to the six coun-
tries of the EaP, and it was implemented in the Eastern region after 1994 by the European 
Commission delegations in Kiev and Tbilisi. The council subsequently adopted new TACIS 
regulations for assistance to the newly independent states and Mongolia for 1996–1999; 
from 2000 to 2006, there was a new program. A total of EUR 3.1 billion was available for 
the region. The focus was on technical assistance related to the transition until 1999, but 
the economic downturn could not be repaired. The projects remained slow, fragmented, 
and inflexible. (TACIS 2003)
Table 1.
Sectoral allocation of TACIS funds between 1991 and 2006 (million EUR)
Armenia Azer­
baijan
Belarus Georgia Moldova Ukraine
National Program 98.9 116.5 75.5 129 137.6 891.6
Cross-Border 
Cooperation
46.2 22.7 40.2
Regional Program 68 26.15 50
Food Safety 
Program + 
EAGGF
102.3+
50.2
142.7 63 35.9
Macro-Financial 
Assistance
35.6 30 87 675
Humanitarian 
Assistance
68.79 90.09 11.5 102.2 5.5 20.5
Neighbourhood 
Programs
11.3
Nuclear Safety 
Program
29 5.5 621.2
Human Rights 9.5 5.95
Rehabilitation 18.37
Contribution To 
STCU
34
Source: World Report: Armenia (2005); Azerbaijan (2005); Belarus (2005); Georgia (2005); 
Moldova (2005); Ukraine (2005)
According to a survey on the effectiveness of the program, participants have experienced 
a significant improvement since 2002. (Frenz 2007) Certain issues nonetheless remain. This 
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was underlined by the European Court of Auditors’ report published in 2006, according to 
which a large part of the money was spent for poorly defined purposes. (European Court 
of Auditors 2006)
As partner countries joined the various programs of the European Union, they also 
have access to financial assistance from the following programs:
TRACECA – This program is aimed at breaking away from commercial and ener-
gy-transit systems under the control of Moscow by creating alternative routes. Its operation 
is hampered by the instability of the region and closed borders.
INOGATE – Interstate Oil and Gas Transport to Europe.
TWINNING and SIGMA – Support for Improvement in Governance and Management.
In 2007, TACIS was replaced by the ENPI (European Neighbourhood and Partnership 
Instrument) and seven years later the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) was 
adopted to adjust its provisions: in line with a new 7-year cycle, the name of the program 
and the internal support structure have changed.
Table 2.
Resources provided to the six states (million EUR)
ENPI/ENP Armenia Azerbaijan Belarus Georgia Moldova Ukraine
2007–2013 285 143.5 94 452 561 1,000
EaPIC 2012–13 40 49 63
2014–2020 252–308* 139–169 129–158 610–746 610–746 3,084–3,455
Umbrella 
Support
30 30 770
2014–2017 140–170 77–94 71–89 335–410 335–410 1,675–1,876
* Data show the minimum amount that can be obtained and the maximum payable amount.
Source: Single 2017. Edited by the author.
The European Commission granting additional funding to three countries in 2013 under 
the Eastern Partnership Integration and Cooperation (EaPIC) program, a clear manifestation 
of the “more for more” principle. (Priorities 2013, 11.) Since 2014, it is possible to get funding 
from these sources and from renewed or new programs like:
• HORIZON 2020 – the EU Framework Programme for Research and Innovation
• Erasmus+
• Marie Skłodowska-Curie Actions (MSCA)
• Creative Europe supporting culture and audio-visual sectors
• NIF – Neighbourhood Investment Facility
• COSME – Competitiveness of Enterprises and Small and Medium-sized Enterprises
• European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights
Results, Challenges
The most important events of the Eastern Partnership are biennial summits. These have 
always been organized in a semester when one of the Central and Eastern European 
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countries that joined the EU in 2004 holds the presidency of the Union. Following 
the opening meeting in Prague in 2009, the next one should have been organized in Budapest 
in 2011, but the Hungarian Government withdrew. (Balázs 2016, 297.) Thus Poland became 
a host on 28–29 September 2011; the final document from that meeting noted the need for 
differentiation and the involvement of partner countries in the new EU programs. Heads of 
states and government leaders expected a deepening of cooperation from institutions like 
Euronest, as well as in civil society and business forums. Although a lengthy statement was 
released at the Vilnius Summit in 2013, the failure of signing the EU–Ukraine Association 
Agreement pushed the positive elements of developing relations to the background.
The members of the European Council met with the leaders of partner countries for 
the fourth time in May 2015 in Riga. Donald Tusk, President of the European Council, 
indicated that the development of relations was stalled, and the participating six countries 
cooperated with the EU along different interests and values: “Our partnership, as well as 
the Riga Summit itself, is not about dramatic decisions or taking giant steps forward. No, 
our relationship is built on free will, respect and equality. And our partnership will go 
forward step-by-step, just as the European Union has been built.” (Tusk, 2015) The next 
Eastern Partnership summit was held in November 2017. (Although Estonia is in charge of 
the presidency, the meeting was held in Brussels.)
It has become clear after nearly a decade that the six partner countries cannot be 
managed under the same program, as their economic situation and their foreign and 
domestic priorities are extremely different. The EU has failed to solve the “frozen crises” 
in the Caucasus, Transdniester, and Eastern Ukraine despite launching several missions 
in the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). In 2005, they 
established the European Union Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine 
(EUBAM), which has been extended four times. Despite a nearly 200-strong inspection 
team and the EUR 14 million budget, they cannot stop smuggling or ensure compliance 
with trade standards. (EUBAM 2017) In September 2008, after the Russo–Georgian War, 
the European Union launched the European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM) to monitor 
the peace agreement. Its inefficiency is reflected in the fact that the authorities of Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia have so far denied the mission access to the territories under their control. 
The European Union Advisory Mission (EUAM) Ukraine operates as a non-executive 
mission in Kyiv since 1 December 2014. Its main task is to support Ukrainian authorities 
in reforming the civilian security sector through strategic advice and hands-on support.
It is now clear that the sanctions imposed on Russia for its intervention in Ukraine 
are ineffective. (The study on EU–Russia relations analyses this in more detail.) Russia 
will not hand back control of Crimea to Ukraine, and the Minsk II agreement of 2015 with 
French and German mediation cannot be enforced in the Luhansk and Donetsk regions. 
The heads of state and government of the Normandy Four – Germany, France, Russia, and 
Ukraine – discussed the crisis in Eastern Ukraine in 2016 and 2017 as well, but all that has 
been achieved is that the conflict remains limited. The democratic political system promoted 
by the European Union has failed to meet expectations in these countries. Presidential or 
semi-presidential systems have been established by the constitutions, but elections cannot 
be considered democratic; in many cases, the activity of the opposition is hindered or 
completely banned. This statement is also true for the civil society, although the European 
Union has provided significant financial and ideological support to NGOs.
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In three states (Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova) the commitment to a Western orien-
tation is sometimes noticeable, but it has shifted with various special interests. The President 
of Moldova, Igor Dodon, said in July 2017 that the association agreement was disappointing, 
as full membership would not be available in the next decade, and economic relations with 
the EU had not expanded as much as hoped. As a consequence of closer cooperation with 
the European Union, he argued, they had lost markets in Russia. He is currently developing 
closer relations with Russia, but would rather join the Eurasian Union. (Tanas 2017) Belarus 
and Armenia favour a Russian orientation and plan to integrate into the framework of 
the Eurasian Union. In September 2017, Ukraine adopted a law on education that, in the view 
of the Hungarian Government, is fundamentally in breach of both international treaties 
ratified by the Ukrainians. The question thus arises whether the neighbourhood policy and 
the Eastern Partnership are obsolete. (Blockmans 2017)
Appendix
Table 3.
The dissolution of the Soviet Union and membership in today’s cooperation networks
Country Declaration of independence
Adoption of the new 
constitution
Eurasian 
Econom­
ic Union 
(EEU) 
Member 
State
Eastern 
Part­
nership 
(EaP) 
Member 
State
European 
Union 
Association 
Agreement 
(AA) – Rat­
ification, 
entry into 
force
Armenia August 23, 1990 July 5, 1995 X
Azerbaijan August 30, 1991 November 12, 1995 X
Belarus July 27, 1990 March 15, 1994 X X
Estonia March 30, 1990 June 28, 1992 EU mem-
ber since 
2004
Georgia April 9, 1991 August 24, 1995
X
2014
2017
Kazakhstan December 16, 1991 August 30, 1995 X
Kyrgyzstan  August 31, 1991 June 27, 2010 X
Latvia May 4, 1990 July 6, 1993 EU mem-
ber since 
2004
Lithuania March 11, 1990 October 25, 1992 EU mem-
ber since 
2004
Moldova June 23, 1990 July 29, 1994
X
2014
2017
Russia June 12, 1990 December 12, 1993 X
110 Regional and Bilateral Relations of the European Union
Country Declaration of independence
Adoption of the new 
constitution
Eurasian 
Econom­
ic Union 
(EEU) 
Member 
State
Eastern 
Part­
nership 
(EaP) 
Member 
State
European 
Union 
Association 
Agreement 
(AA) – Rat­
ification, 
entry into 
force
Tajikistan September 9, 1991 November 6, 1994 X
Turkmenistan October 27, 1991 May 18, 1992
Ukraine August 24, 1991 June 28, 1996
X
2014
2017
Uzbekistan August 31, 1991 December 8, 1992 X
Source: Edited by the author.
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The European Union and Russia: From Strategic 
Partnership to Selective Engagement
Ágnes Tuka
Historical Background
Introduction
The disintegration of the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc in 1989–1990 fundamentally 
transformed the system of international relations that had emerged after 1945. The European 
Economic Community (EEC), a predecessor of the European Union (EU) encountered this 
unexpected event at the moment of its establishment. In keeping with the requirements of 
the Single European Act, the integration was deepened to establish a real common market 
and monetary union, thus, German reunification came at the cost of the common currency 
plan fostered by the French.
The speed of the changes in Central and Eastern Europe brought new challenges to 
the European Union (EU). How to respond to the need – the return to Europe – that Hungary 
put forward first in the name of the region, to become a member in the integration process? 
What should the relationship be with the post-Soviet states? Where are the borders of 
Europe? Last but not least, what links can be established with the Russian Federation (this is 
the official name, hereinafter referred to as Russia), one of the dominant states in the region, 
which, although economically weakened, has become the possessor of the entire arsenal of 
the Soviet Union’s nuclear weapons?
After the Maastricht Treaty came into force in November 1993, how integration would 
evolve and how far the organization could expand were much debated in the European 
Union. Maastricht and its amendments left the future form of the European Union open; 
options ranged from becoming a federal “super-state” to emulating a traditional empire, or 
morphing into an international organization run by the member states. Most analysts only 
imagined the Russian Federation as an important external economic partner, although they 
did not rule out the possibility of cooperation in certain areas; however, some advocates of 
loose cooperation did not future EU membership for Russia.
Whether Russia is part of Europe was a topic for debate. The answer is not simple, and 
not just because of its geography, which spans Europe and Asia and has a foothold in each. 
Russian culture has been closely linked to Europe for at least the last three centuries, but 
one has to agree with the argument of Huntington as well, who states that this Orthodox 
civilization is separate from Western Christianity; on the one hand, due to its Byzantine 
origin and its existence as a distinct religion, the two hundred years of Tatar rule, and 
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the bureaucratic tyranny, on the other hand, on account of the consequences of the limited 
impact of the Renaissance, the Enlightenment, and other prominent experiences of Western 
movements. (Huntington 2005, 58.) According to Aleksandr Panarin, “With regard 
to its structure, Russia is an Eastern country, in which it is not the individual-nominal 
but the community principle that dominates. However, its motives bind it to Western 
Prometheism. In the East, it is regarded as being the ‘messenger of the West’, and in 
the West, the bearer of Eastern principles.” (Panarin 2004, 380.) Some Russian scholars 
argue that Russia has qualities distinct from those of the West. (Szilágyi 2015) According 
to Aleksandr Dugin, one of Russia’s most prominent geopolitical specialists: “Russia is 
a separate territorial structure in which security and sovereignty are equal to the security 
and sovereignty of the entire Eurasian continent. […] the Russian people (≈Russia) represent 
a unique type of religion and culture that is sharply different from the Catholic–Protestant 
West and the post-Christian civilization developed there.” (Dugin 2004, 337–344.)
In November 2014, the declaration of the 18th Global Russian National Assembly, 
dedicated to the topic Unity of History, Unity of the People, Unity of Russia, stressed that 
Russians are those who call themselves Russians, who have no other ethnic attachments, 
who think in Russian, and who accept the Orthodox religion as the basis for the national 
spiritual culture. According to the document, people did not accept Russian identity as 
a consequence of assimilation but as a result of a free, personal decision. (Декларация 
2014) However, bearing in mind the history of these nationalities in Russia, one cannot 
regard this statement to be accurate as citizens have not always opted for the Russian 
identity voluntarily.
Plans for the restoration of the Russian–Soviet Empire have become noteworthy in 
recent years, emphasizing that a majority of the general public perceives that the West with 
the United States leading wants to destroy Russia. Leonid Ivanovich Shershnev, President 
of the “Russians” foundation, announced the need to reunify the former Soviet republics 
in order to be able to endure the fourth Cold War launched by the Westerners. (Шершнев 
2011) Evidently, these opinions do not help strengthen the relations between the European 
Union and Russia.
The paper presents only a few aspects of this nearly thirty-year process: primarily 
the legal, political, and economic features of the EU–Russia relations. The study presents 
the process of rapprochement of the two actors, the institutional and financial background 
of cooperation, and the nature of the sanctions after 2014.
Cooperation initiatives
During the Cold War, cooperation was not a real option. The Council for Mutual Economic 
Assistance (COMECON) was founded by the Soviet Union in January 1949, largely as 
a response to the European Assistance Program (aka “The Marshall Plan”) created by 
the United States to rebuild (Western) Europe. While the U.S. plan was theoretically open 
to all European states, it was designed to exclude the Soviet Union, which in turn pressured 
its so-called satellites (Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, and Romania) into 
joining COMECON. Under American aegis, the states of Western Europe soon founded 
organizations for regional cooperation: the European Coal and Steel Community (1951), 
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the European Economic Community (1957), the European Atomic Energy Commission 
(Euratom, 1957) and, eventually, the European Union (1993). Throughout the post-war 
period, these “economic blocs” competed in parallel with the “military blocs” of the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO, 1949) created by the United States and the Warsaw 
Treaty Organization (“Warsaw Pact” or WTO, 1955) founded by the Soviet Union.
There were small exceptions. In July 1968, for example, the EU Commission established 
regulations concerning the delivery of milk and milk products into the USSR. (Lazareva 
2014) At the beginning of the 1970s, the noticeable détente was marked by the speech of 
the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union, Leonid Brezhnev (the actual leader of the Soviet Union) in 1972: “The European 
Community must be recognized as an existing reality.” (Брежнев 1972, 490; Balázs 2016, 
285.) As a result, in 1973, COMECON initiated a dialogue with the European Community. 
In January 1975, a delegation of the European Commission visited Moscow, and each side 
elaborated a draft agreement. The main purpose of the negotiations was mutual recognition, 
and raising the economic and foreign trade relations to a new level. Formal negotiations 
started in 1978, but the process broke down during the “small Cold War” of 1981. (Kőrösi 
2005, 761.) In June 1984, COMECON insisted on signing a joint declaration with the EC 
that would allow EC member states to negotiate formal contacts. The parties agreed to 
establish a formal relationship between the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance and 
the European Communities. It recognized the two economic organizations and sought to 
find mutual trade opportunities, though at the time, the Soviet Union and the East Central 
European socialist countries remained in the category of the “worst commercial partner”.
The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the subsequent disintegration of the Soviet 
Union brought a significant re-evaluation of relations. In December 1989, the USSR and 
the EC signed an agreement on trade and economic cooperation. It was the first treaty 
between the Soviet Union and the EC. In the post-Cold War era (after 1991), the European 
Union’s Russia policy reflected a liberal-institutionalist approach, assuming economic 
positive relations during the transition to a market economy and democratization, and 
engaging in peaceful, cooperative foreign relations. The European Commission opened its 
representation in Moscow in February 1991. The European Community launched an aid 
program, TACIS (Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States) for 
the former Soviet republics that same year. The goals were to facilitate the transition to 
market economy and to promote democratic reforms.
The idea of a lucrative partnership, as the ultimate goal of the strengthening rela-
tionship with the country weakened territorially (Russia was smaller than in the middle 
of the 18th century, in the time of Catherine the Great) and economically but with a strong 
military power and large raw material deposits, (Кузик 2008) emerged as well. As it 
became clear that Central and Eastern European states were expected to join the European 
integration process though, it was also evident that this option would not be open to Russia.
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Key Dimensions of Relations
Partnership and cooperation agreements
Under the direction of Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev (in office from October 1991 
to January 1996), the objective of Russian foreign policy was equal political and foreign 
trade relations with Europe and the U.S. The Partnership and Cooperation Agreement 
(PCA) of 1994 marked a step in this direction, although ratification was delayed until 
December 1997 (Viczai 2003) because of the wars in Chechnya. (Gyóni 2005; Милова 
2006, 934–935.) The duties of the parties were set out in 112 chapters, 10 annexes, and 
several joint declarations; the agreement was valid for 10 years. It emphasized economic 
relations and the establishment of a free trade area, partly to enhance political dialogue. 
Implementation was overseen by the Permanent Partnership Council formed from 
members of the government of the Russian Federation, the Council of the European Union, 
and the European Commission. Preparatory tasks were carried out by the Cooperation 
Committee comprised of senior Russian and EU officials. The Parliamentary Cooperation 
Committee consisted of representatives of the Russian Duma (national parliament) and 
the European Parliament (hereafter referred to as the EP). There was a Hungarian EP 
member in the latter between 2004 and 2014. (Delegation 2016) The most significant event 
was the summit, held twice a year from 1998, where the President of the Russian Federation 
negotiated with the presidents of the European Council and the European Commission. 
These meetings were usually organized in a Russian city in May, and in the country holding 
the presidency of the EU in the autumn of that year.
This initial period, beginning with the  second presidential term of Boris Yeltsin, 
was characterized by political clashes. The EU expressed strong disapproval of the slow 
economic and political reforms in Russia, and of human rights violations. Russians sharply 
criticized the negotiations on the NATO membership of Central and Eastern Europe, 
especially the Baltic States, and the relatively small subsidies from the Western world. 
Since Vladimir Putin’s first presidential term, however, the two sides have constructed 
a more pragmatic relationship. (Lazareva 2014) This was reinforced by the new Russian 
foreign policy concept adopted in 2000, according to which the EU was the country’s 
key partner. (Koncepcia 2000) Negotiations on the Common European Economic Space 
concept began during this period, as did the so-called Energy Dialogue, which strengthened 
the predictability of commodity trading. (Deák 2015, 33.)
Work on a new, long-term agreement started in 2003. Russia was the EU’s third largest 
trading partner, and after 2004 it would have common borders with more than one member 
state. Russia was also the EU’s largest supplier of oil and natural gas. In November 2003, 
a new EU–Russia Permanent Partnership Council began operating at the ministerial level; 
despite its name, the council convened only when needed.
Road map for the common economic space
At the summits held in 2003, a road map was developed to guide cooperation and determine 
the priorities of the new agreement. The four major aspects of the program, the so-called 
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“common areas”, focused on policy areas with common interests and values: economic and 
environmental protection; the need to achieve a common area of freedom, security, and 
justice; external security, including crisis management; and research and education. In May 
2005, mid-term implementation plans were adopted in Moscow. The documents contained 
an objective, a direction, and detailed instruments and measures for each subfield, so these 
papers were much more specific than before. (Road Map 2005) Sectoral agreements were 
signed during the negotiations. Their main goals were the gradual convergence of legislation 
affecting the economy and the management of energy policy based on interdependence and 
mutual benefit. Russian President Vladimir Putin welcomed the agreement as the first step 
towards a large, united Europe. (Пресс-конференция 2005)
As a result of the summits, from 2007 onwards, researchers, academics, prominent 
personalities of the cultural life, as well as politicians and athletes, could receive a visa free 
of charge. (In spite of a formal university invitation, the Russian consul decides whether 
to pay for the visa or not.) Russia is a participant in Erasmus Mundus, which is primarily 
a joint higher education program for mobility, and also participates in the seventh scientific 
research program. It obtained €429 million in grants for the development of areas along 
the borders between EU member states and Russia for 2007–2013. (Progress Report 2007)
There were controversies during this period though, because of the Russian–Ukrainian 
gas dispute, for example, and the NATO membership of the Baltic States. The “common area 
of freedom” was also a bone of contention. The EU aimed at mutual sharing of information 
regarding cross-border terrorism, crime, and illegal migration, in addition to the facilitation 
of travel. While the issues of democracy, human rights, and civil society organizations were 
on the agenda of every meeting, they could not bring the views of the two sides together. 
The European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights, which has been functioning 
since 1994, was reformed and rebranded as the European Instrument for Democracy and 
Human Rights in 2006. It cooperated closely with the Council of Europe and with Russian 
NGOs; however, the Russian political elite has often considered its activity an intervention 
in domestic affairs. (Решения 2006)
The relations were strained further by the five-day Russian‒Georgian war in 
the summer of 2008, although French President Nicolas Sarkozy, then President of the EU, 
made a significant contribution by proposing a six-point peace plan. As an element of this, 
the European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia started its activities with 200 persons 
on 1 September 2008, but only in the territory of Georgia, as Russian military forces had 
not left Abkhazia and South Ossetia. (Russia recognized their independence.) (EUMM 
Georgia 2008)
More differences surfaced after the financial crisis of 2008–2009; nevertheless, 
in July 2008 the draft of a new general agreement was discussed. As the first step, in 
November 2009, the Partnership for Modernization was adopted by the Stockholm Summit; 
according to Vladimir Chizhov, Russia’s Ambassador to the EU, this would help overcome 
the financial crisis and make better use of the existing forms of cooperation. (Чижов 2010) 
Twelve rounds of consultations failed to produce a new agreement though, so the agreement 
of 1997 automatically extends annually.
From 1994, since the signing of the PCA, until the beginning of 2014, when the coop-
eration came to a halt due to the Ukrainian conflict, more than thirty summits were held, 
in which also the members of the Russian Government and the College of Commissioners 
120 Regional and Bilateral Relations of the European Union
participated five times. In the negotiations, the partners called each other strategic partners. 
Since the signing of the PCA, economic relations have grown stronger and deeper. Trade 
in goods increased ten-fold compared to the volume of 1994. In 2013, the EU’s share of 
Russian foreign trade was 49.4%, while the Russian Federation was the European Union’s 
third-largest foreign trading partner with 9.5%. Russia–EU trade that year amounted to 
€326 billion. (Чижов 2014)
Freezing relations between the EU and Russia
Summit declarations and joint press conferences reflected the fact that the EU and Russia 
had not advanced either in the assessment of the functioning of human rights within 
the established Russian political system, or in achieving a concordance of Russian policy 
and EU legislation. Russia did not want to apply e.g. the EU rules on energy policy and 
disapproved of the criticism of corruption, while the EU did not give sufficient support 
for Russia’s WTO membership. The main goal of the Russian political leadership has 
been to regain its status as a great power and an equal negotiating partner for both the EU 
and NATO. (Пажимес 2012) Not only the countries of Central and Eastern Europe but 
also the three Baltic States became members of the European Union and NATO, despite 
U.S. assurances that NATO would not expand there. The Western powers did not take 
into account the Russian position; the country was treated as a medium power. Russia’s 
response was to seek closer cooperation with states of the former Soviet Union, as well as 
new relationships with emerging states like the BRICS group (Brazil, Russia, India, China, 
and South Africa). Russia also became a member of “traditional” international economic 
organizations such as the World Bank, the IMF, and the WTO.
Russia has been involved in the fight against Islamic terrorism as well though, and 
the Russian economy strengthened, primarily because of increasing oil and gas prices. 
The Putin era has seen considerable economic centralization and nationalization; oligarchs 
who oppose official policies have been repressed, and state ownership has spread to some 
50% of the economy. (Gereben 2014, 52.) Proposals for a free trade area between the EU and 
Russia have been mooted, but as the Russian state gained strength, the idea came to be seen 
less as a necessity and more as being subordinated to Western rules. (Balázs 2016, 292.)
Since then, Russia has proposed its own initiative for Eurasian integration. In January 
2010, a customs union came into force between Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan; this was 
designed to create a single economic area beginning in January 2012. In January 2015, it was 
renamed the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU; official website: www.eaeunion.org); Armenia 
and Kyrgyzstan joined that year. Its main objective is to guarantee the free flow of goods, 
labour, and capital, although there are plans to create a common currency. (Máté 2015) 
Russia also signed a free trade agreement with Vietnam and, from this new position of 
perceived strength, it has sought a bilateral trade agreement between the EU and the “Single 
Economic Area” led by Russia. Several Russian politicians and analysts have emphasized 
that their cooperation initiative takes the EU as an example and that it would be beneficial to 
have a close relationship. (Евразивтский 2015) As the three countries (Russia, Kazakhstan, 
and Belarus) already form a customs union, but Kazakhstan and Belarus are not members 
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of the WTO (they only have an observer status), any formal agreement seems unlikely. 
(Molnár 2012)
The relationship between the EU and the Eurasian Economic Union is affected by 
the fact that hundreds of thousands of Russian-speaking citizens live outside the current 
borders; in Estonia, for instance, 25% of the population either speaks Russian or identifies 
themselves as Russians, and the number in Latvia is over 30%. More than 300,000 people 
are thus “stateless” because they have not passed the official language exam required for 
citizenship in those countries. Many of them believe that since they were born in what is 
now an EU country, and the EU protects human rights as fundamental rights, they deserve 
full citizenship. (Iván–Nyilas 2015) The NATO membership of the Baltic States has been 
even more problematic, since Moscow sees this as a bridgehead in a new Cold War being 
promulgated by the U.S., and that American politics wants to (re)place the whole world under 
U.S. control. (Энтин–Энтина 2015) These tensions contribute to a continuing deadlock; 
Russia and the EU have been unable to move forward even on a minor, technical topic like 
lifting the visa requirement.
The presidential election of 2012 resulted in an overwhelming victory for Putin, 
and a third presidential term in 2012. As in most of the post-Soviet states, a presidential 
or a semi-presidential political system has been built where the president of the republic 
is the head of the executive power and the parliament cannot exercise control over it; 
the balance of powers is only apparent. The results of that year and those of the previous 
parliamentary elections were questioned by the opposition in national protests, revealing 
electoral fraud. The Russian Parliament then:
• tightened the law on assembly
• obligated NGOs to register any foreign aid received with the state
• strengthened the predominance of public media
• started censoring the Internet, and
• significantly widened the ambit of the law of treason and libel (Legal Forum 2012)
The non-democratic nature of the system thus has become increasingly visible. The European 
Union has criticized such measures sharply, drawing attention to the importance of the rule 
of law and respect for human rights, while the European Parliament has expressed concern 
about the processes. (European Parliament 2012) The Russian political leadership considers 
such commentary interference in domestic affairs, and Russia therefore has turned away 
from the Western world, while the latter has been continuously calling for the preservation 
of a multi-party democracy in the Russian state.
Official summits between Russia and the EU are held nonetheless. At the meeting of 
June 2013 in Yekaterinburg, it seemed that Russia’s accession to the WTO the previous 
year might boost cooperation. Both sides reiterated that they were close partners, but they 
did not deliver real results on the new convention or on the energy agreement. Putin noted, 
however, that he could adopt a “roadmap” for 2050 to create a unified European “energy 
complex”. (Саммит 2013)
122 Regional and Bilateral Relations of the European Union
The question of energy
Energy policy is one area where both sides have acknowledged their interdependence and are 
interested in maintaining good relations. Roughly 83% of Russian exports to the EU are raw 
materials, mainly petroleum and natural gas, which is why trade with Russia is important 
for the member states. (Deák 2015, 41.) This covers m0ore than one-third of the oil and 
gas demand of the EU, and the Central and East European member states are dependent on 
these deliveries. This phenomenon also indicates significant problems of cooperation. In 
January 2009, Russia’s Gazprom shut down gas pipelines to Ukraine, claiming the country 
had not been paying for gas. This caused a serious problem for some of the Central and 
East European states. The EU subsequently encouraged Russia to implement the European 
Energy Charter, which would ensure the competitive position of producers, suppliers, 
and sellers. This also would have led to the liberalization of Russia’s energy policy and 
the abolition of state monopoly; however, and therefore it was rejected by the Russian 
leadership. Putin’s government opposes the liberalization of the gas and electricity market, 
one of the objectives the European Union promoted in its third energy package (2011).
The EU also aims at the broader use of renewable energy sources and a diversification 
of the energy mix. Negotiations to build more alternative gas pipelines (Nabucco, Caspian 
Sea, and AGRI) started, but proved fruitless. Nevertheless, a Russian military interaction 
was also foreseen, for example, in case of the establishment of the Caspian pipeline. 
(Gereben 2014, 100.) The fact that no concrete preparations have been made for this 
pipeline can be explained partly by the political uncertainties in the Central Asian regions, 
and to some extent by the drastic fall in the prices of crude oil and natural gas in recent 
years (Bartha 2015), and, last but not least, by the huge costs expected. The European 
Union still needs Russian gas though, so preparations for the construction of Nord Stream 2 
and the South Stream continue. The importance of energy trade and interdependence is 
well demonstrated by the fact that the sanctions imposed due to the Ukrainian crisis did 
not substantially affect this area.
Deteriorating relations: The consequences of the Ukrainian crisis
The European Union offered an association and free trade agreement to Ukraine, Moldova, 
and Georgia in the framework of its Eastern Partnership program. The document signed 
with Ukraine identified six objectives, including the expansion of trade, improving political 
dialogue, and maintaining peace in the region. The Ukrainian Government decided to 
withdraw from the process on 20 November 2013; the EU responded by pressing for 
an immediate signature. The signature process would have taken place at the Eastern 
Partnership Summit of November 28–29, 2013, in Vilnius, but the Ukrainian Government 
decided on November 20 to withdraw their participation in the contract.
Viktor Yanukovych won the presidential elections in 2010 as the leader of the Party 
of Regions established in the Russian-speaking East Ukrainian region. His political and 
value-based ties were much stronger toward Russia than to the Western world, which could 
justify the fact that at the last moment he withdrew from signing the treaty with the EU. 
Due to contextual constraints I do not have the opportunity to deal in detail with the public 
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actions that exploded in the wake of this decision and with the Ukrainian domestic political 
situation, but it must be seen that Russian leaders assessed the possibility of an association 
agreement as an attack on their state and on the country’s sphere of influence. I have to agree 
with the opinions expressed by several authors (Bay 2015) that regarding its autonomy and 
identity Ukraine is not comparable to the Baltic States. There is no doubt that an independent 
Ukrainian state never existed historically within such borders until 1991, and its population 
composition has never been homogeneous: according to the most recent 2001 census, 
the mother tongue of 67.5% of the population is Ukrainian and that of 29.5% is Russian. 
(Our Language Rights 2014) In addition, most of the population uses both languages.
Examining the economic relations between the two countries, we can state that they 
are closely linked: Ukraine is a participant of the Free Trade Agreement as a member of 
the Commonwealth of Independent States, Russia is the main raw material supplier (65% 
of exports), while Ukraine primarily supplies the Russian market with machinery products 
and food. In 2011, when the highest foreign trade turnover (USD 50.6 billion) occurred, 
the neighbouring country was Russia’s third-largest supplier of imports, while it was ranked 
No. 4 in exports. This trade network cannot be replaced easily, as András Deák points out, 
because Ukrainian products are difficult to sell in other markets because of their low quality. 
(Deák 2015, 44–46.)
The close linkage to the so-called “near abroad” (which term is used primarily by 
the Russians to define former Soviet territories) is proved by the fact that, by the end of 
the first decade of the 21st century, 68% of foreign investment came from Russian multina-
tional companies and about 1.1 million Ukrainians worked in Russia. Although Ukraine 
became able to provide 60% of its armaments to its armed forces by 2008, it remained highly 
vulnerable because of the Russian spare parts supply. (Szabó 2009, 45–63.)
Considering these facts improperly, the EU – perceiving the strong position of 
the people living in Kiev and West Ukraine – continued to urge the immediate signing 
of the Association Agreement, which was confirmed by the ratification of the European 
Parliament on September 16, 2014.
The EU–Russia summit of 28 January 2014 reflected the changing relations; it lasted 
three-and-a-half hours. At the joint press conference, the President of the European 
Council, Herman von Rompuy, thanked Putin for his productive deliberation and stressed 
that the Eastern Partnership was not directed against Russia. Putin emphasized that its 
immediate neighbours had to maintain close cooperative relations with Russia; he proposed 
the establishment of a free trade zone with the participation of the EU and the Eurasian 
Economic Union. (Саммит 2014)
The European Parliament, in a resolution, indicated that Putin’s policies were harmful 
not only to the chances for cooperation, but to the Russian people. According to the third 
paragraph of the text:
“The current deterioration of EU–Russia relations is the result of a long process during 
Vladimir Putin’s first two terms as President and his time as influential Prime Minister has 
continued under his current presidential term of office, and is a direct consequence of his 
domestic and foreign policy choices.”
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The EP, as the fourth point states:
“Regrets the fact that, so far, the EU has been unable to convince the Russian leadership of 
the merits of a fully-fledged democratic system, the rule of law and respect for fundamental 
rights and that a society where the state protects and serve its citizens is the best way to 
secure long-term prosperity and stability.”
While the sixth paragraph underlines that the European Parliament:
“Regrets the fact that the Russian leadership regards the EU’s Eastern Partnership 
as a threat to its own political and economic interests and has turned the common 
neighbourhood into an area of confrontation and competition; underlines the fact that, on 
the contrary…” (European Parliament 2014)
There have been no new summits held since January 2014. Russia declared the election of 
the new president in Ukraine an unconstitutional coup. (Пресс-конференция 2014) In March 
2014, Russia annexed the Crimean Peninsula. Although the Russians denied that their military 
forces had entered the peninsula, Ukrainian and Western observers confirmed that they 
had. The European Union responded with economic sanctions against Russia, which meant 
negotiations were suspended; no joint meetings have been held since. Several EU member 
states nonetheless have conducted bilateral negotiations with Russia. The Hungarian Prime 
Minister, Viktor Orbán, maintains the most active relationship with Putin; they consulted 
twice in 2017. Putin also met with the German Chancellor and the Italian Prime Minister three 
times each between 2014 and 2017 though. (Стенограммы 2017)
In April 2014, Russian-friendly groups in Luhansk and Donetsk launched a fight with 
the aim of breaking away from Ukraine and, similar to the referendum in the Crimea, unifying 
the regions with Russia by public vote. (Tálas 2014) Although Putin denied it until April 2015, 
it was clear that Russian soldiers joined the militants, and they regularly received Russian 
weapons, as well. (Rácz 2017) The escalating East Ukraine conflict was to be settled first in 
September 2014 during the EU–Ukraine–Russia negotiations. That came to fruition in Belarus 
in Minsk where a ceasefire was negotiated, which, however, was not respected. Five months 
later Minsk II was agreed but it proved to be a fragile truce. (Euronews 2016) As this  second 
agreement did not bring any reassuring results, the armed conflict occurred again and again 
in the region. Consequently, “the EU currently follows a double-track approach on Russia, 
which combines a policy of gradual sanctions with attempts to find a diplomatic solution to 
the conflict in the east of Ukraine.” (European Parliament 2017)
Sanctions are both political and economic. (The latter is dealt with in the next chapter.) 
Diplomatic sanctions also include that the Group of (again just) Seven summit was held in 
2014 in Sochi without Russia. (G7: the annual economic and political meetings of the seven 
most advanced countries, i.e. Germany, France, Italy, the U.S., the U.K., Japan, Canada, 
and the EU represented by the President of the European Commission.) As the Russian 
President has not been involved in these negotiations, we cannot talk about G8. (Russia 
was first invited to this increasingly important informal forum especially for the world 
economy in 1998, and negotiations were given the name G7/G8 since the Russian side does 
not participate in certain consultations on particular financial issues.)
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It can be considered a partly political act that 153 people and 40 entities from Russia 
are subject to an asset freeze and a travel ban because their actions undermined Ukraine’s 
territorial integrity, sovereignty, and independence. (Sanctions 2017)
Looking at the decisions taken by the EU, we can see that in 2014 EU institutions 
discussed the situation of the Ukrainian crisis and the related sanctions 18 times, in 2015 
13 times, in 2016 7 times, and 5 times in 2017 until September. The travel ban for 150 people 
to the EU and the freezing of their assets was valid until September 15, 2017, as in August, 
three more Russian citizens were also added to this list because of participating in 
the transportation of gas turbines made in the EU to Crimea. (Timeline 2017)
Apparently, the Russian side reacted similarly to these sanctions. The purpose of 
the presidential decrees, among which the first was issued by Putin in August 2014, 
has been to ensure the security of the Russian Federation. These have been released 
annually – the latest in June 2017 – and sanctions were extended until December 31, 2018. 
These are primarily commercial and economic measures. (Указ 2017)
In late May 2015, 89 politicians and military leaders from 17 European countries were 
forbidden to travel to Russia. As a response, the President of the European Parliament banned 
the Permanent Representative Ambassador of the Russian Federation to the European Union, 
Vladimir Chizhov from the building, (Mátyás 2015) even though that based on his articles, 
we can assume that he was committed to the increasingly good relations between Russia 
and the EU. In the spring of 2014, the European Parliament unilaterally suspended its 
participation in the Russia–EU Parliamentary Cooperation Committee. (Permanent Mission 
2017) In September 2015, the European Council extended travel restrictions for another six 
months and voted to continue sanctions until the end of 2016. The Council of the European 
Union has voted every six months since and continued the measures.
There was a significant decline in the Russian economy by January 2015. According 
to Russia’s Minister of Economic Development, Alexey Ulyukaev, GDP was down by 3%, 
inflation rose considerably, and $115 billion in capital left the country. (Zuhan 2015) These 
processes can be explained not only by the sanctions but also by the downward trend of oil 
prices on the world market. Russia’s GDP continued to decline in 2016, but only by 1.2%. 
On 15 June 2017, on the TV show Straight Line Putin announced that GDP had risen by 
nearly 1% over the previous four months because of higher industrial production, and that 
the country had become self-sufficient in the production of pork and poultry meat. He said 
that the sanctions had cost the Russian economy $50–55 billion and the EU $100 billion. 
(Прямая линия 2017) This led to a strengthening of the protectionist economic policy in 
Russia; by the end of November 2015, 570 import substitution projects were underway. 
This plan covers nineteen sectors for 2016–2020, with more than two thousand projects. 
(Weiner 2016, 32.)
The embargo on Russian agricultural products had a two-fold impact in 2015. Imports 
outside the CIS fell by almost 40%, and the Russian population experienced both serious 
shortages and persistent inflation. It affected European farmers as well, as exports to Russia 
fell by 42%. According to Russian authors, the European sanctions will be a major challenge 
for state-owned banks and the two energy companies, Gazprom and Posneft, which have 
more than 50% state ownership; therefore, it is not surprising that their leaders immediately 
turned to the government for financial assistance. Quantitative assessment of accurate data 
on sanctions is almost impossible though.
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The Russian political leadership expected the Western, primarily German, business 
circles to resist since these restrictions violated their economic interests. It did not happen 
this way. (Клинова–Сидорова 2014, 69.) The EU and its partners say they will end 
sanctions only after Russia withdraws its military units from the Eastern Ukrainian 
territories, discontinues its support for separatists, and re-establishes the territorial unity 
of Ukraine. Moreover, the European Parliament’s resolution of 10 June 2015 states that no 
resumption of cooperation can be expected until there is peace in Ukraine; Russia must also 
renounce the effort to reshape the borders of Europe by force, and end the persecution of 
opposition activists, human rights defenders, and minorities. (European Parliament 2015) 
Putin is inclined to end the embargo only after the lifting of the EU sanctions.
Nowadays, the relationship between the two actors is heavily burdened by the growing 
Russian financial and moral support given to extremist parties that have become increasingly 
strong due to the economic crisis that broke out in 2008. It can be easily assumed that 
the common ideological and political basis of these parties is an anti-EU stance. As 
the European Parliament resolution of June 2015 puts it, the institution:
“Is deeply concerned at the recent tendency of the Russian state-controlled media to 
rewrite and reinterpret historical events of the twentieth century, such as the signing 
of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and its secret protocols, as well as the selective use of 
historical narrative for current political propaganda;”
“Is deeply concerned at the ever more intensive contacts and cooperation, tolerated 
by the Russian leadership, between European populist, fascist and extreme right-wing 
parties on the one hand and nationalist groups in Russia on the other; recognises that 
this represents a danger to democratic values and the rule of law in the EU; calls in this 
connection on the EU institutions and Member States to take action against this threat 
of an emerging ‘Nationalist International’.” (European Parliament 2015; Dossier 2017)
From 2016 on, Russia has been alleged not only to have supported these parties but also to 
have tried to intervene in the election campaigns of Western countries by spreading false 
information on the Internet or by hacking certain internal correspondence. (Position Paper 
2017; Election Disinformation 2017) As it is to be expected, the Russian Foreign Minister 
rejects these accusations. (Свидерский 2017)
Financing
The EU has provided financial support to the Russian Federation since 1991. Initially, 
this was implemented under the TACIS program, with funding of 391 million European 
Currency Units in 1991, and a further 450 million ECU in 1992. The first technical 
assistance program focused on five sectors: energy (115 million ECU); training (103 million 
ECU); food distribution (74 million ECU); transport (45.8 million ECU); and financial 
services (37.5 million ECU). The Baltic States also received 15 million ECU. (TACIS 
1991) Russia received 100–150 million ECU per year by 1999, although this figure was 
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only €50 million by 2007. (Grigoriadis 2015, 14.) According to the European Union’s 
assessment, TACIS was an increasingly effective strategic instrument. “TACIS has 
contributed to fundamental change and visible development.” (Frenz 2007) In 2007, TACIS 
was replaced by the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI), and then, 
in 2014, by the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI). This financial source serves 
mainly cross-border cooperation; Russia is a partner in seven ENI programs (see Table 1).
Table 1.
ENI cross-border cooperation – indicative total allocations (ENI and ERDF) per program
Land border 
programs
(Figures in EUR)
Total  
2014–2017
Total  
2018–2020
Total 
 2014–2020
2018–2020 
Additional 
ERDF*
Kolarctic/Russia 16,451,819 8,266,271 24,718,090 10,355,241
Karelia/Russia 13,938,222 7,562,832 21,501,054 8,106,616
SE Finland/Russia 21,665,925 14,480,857 36,146,782 9,355,180
Estonia/Russia 9,030,972 7,776,552 16,807,524 1,826,238
Latvia/Russia 11,191,052 4,683,976 15,875,028 8,162,486
Lithuania/Russia 10,865,846 8,149,384 19,015,230 13,492,385
Poland/Russia 33,681,960 14,902,154 48,584,114 23,608,291
*Additional ERDF allocations 2018–2020, subject to the mid-term review of CBC and availability of matching 
ENI funds.
Source: http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/enp/pdf/financing-the-enp/cbc_2014-2020_programming_
document_en.pdf Annex 2.
In addition to these programs, the European Union considers only a few forms of financing 
acceptable since 2014. These include the Erasmus+, a primarily educational mobility 
program and the BILAT-RUS-Advanced project, which was implemented in 2012 in the field 
of scientific cooperation; 2014 was declared the EU–Russia Year of Science. ERA.Net RUS, 
with a total budget of €17 million in 2014–16, launched a call for new partners in 2017; 
organizations from ten EU member states, Russia, Moldova, Switzerland, and Turkey may 
apply as a consortium. ERA.Net RUS Plus will be the next step in linking Russia and its 
key research communities to the European Research Area. (ERA.Net RUS 2017) Two new 
calls were announced in 2017, and €25 million is available. (Horizon 2020)
Since the spring of 2014, after the annexation of the Crimea, the EU gradually adopted 
economic sanctions against the Russian Federation, though support programs covering 
areas such as science, innovation and education have been maintained. The sanctions are 
the following:
• The freezing of the assets of persons and legal entities who contributed to reducing 
Ukraine’s independence and sovereignty.
• Crimean and Sevastopol decisions: bans on export and import from this region, this 
was primarily related to EU persons and companies.
• Restricting certain Russian companies’ and banks’ access to capital markets, im-
posing an export and import ban on trade in arms and sensitive technologies and 
services that can be used for oil production and exploration. (Sanctions 2017)
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In response to this, President Putin, as previously indicated, decided on significant economic 
and trade restrictions. Accordingly, he prohibited the import of the following products from 
all countries that participate in sanctions against Russia: certain agricultural commodities 
(vegetables and fruit), cheese and food (dairy products, meat, and meat products), and 
products of national origin. (Указ 2014) As a result, it is clear that the volume of trade 
between the European Union and Russia fell below the 2006 level (see Table 2).
Table 2.
European Union, trade with Russia
Period ImportValue Mill. €
%  
Extra–EU*
Export
Value Mill €
%  
Extra–EU
2006 143.6 10.5 72.4 6.6
2007 147.73 10.2 89.2 7.2
2008 180.45 11.4 104.97 8
2009 119.57 9.7 65.7 6
2010 162.08 10.6 86.31 6.4
2011 201.33 11.6 108.59 7
2012 215.13 12 123.47 7.3
2013 206.97 12.3 119.45 6.9
2014 182.38 10.8 103.23 6.1
2015 136.39 7.9 73.75 4.1
2016 118.89 6.9 72.29 4.1
*% Extra–EU: imports/exports as % of all EU partners i.e. excluding trade between EU Member States.
Source: Trade 2017
Obviously, the 2008 crisis left a mark on the data, but a decline can only be seen in 2009, 
and a dynamic growth from 2010 is visible until 2015.
How can sanctions be assessed? There were serious discussions about this at the end 
of 2014. According to Russian authors, these European sanctions will be a major challenge 
for state-owned banks and the two energy companies, Gazprom and Posneft, which have 
more than 50% state ownership; therefore, it is not surprising that their leaders immediately 
turned to the government for financial assistance.
The embargo on Russian agricultural products also had a twofold impact in 2015. 
On the one hand, imports outside the CIS fell by almost 40%, which led to the Russian 
population experiencing serious supply problems due to the persistent inflation. On the other 
hand, it affected European farmers as well, as exports to Russia fell by 42%. This situation 
did not have an impact on the Member States equally; Finland, Poland, and Hungary, and 
regarding specialty food products, Italy and France suffered a loss of billions of Euros. 
(Embargo 2015) I can only partially agree with the opinion of Zoltán Gálik who emphasizes 
that EU sanctions are medium or long-term measures and less affect Russian citizens, while 
the effects of Russian embargoes are immediate and directly perceptible. (Gálik 2014) It 
should be noted, however, that the quantitative assessment of accurate data on sanctions is 
almost impossible, as the development of world trade is the result of many unpredictable 
global processes.
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Conclusion
The large-scale modernization project of Gorbachev launched in the  second half of 
the 1980s, on the one hand, opened up the possibility of better cooperation with the so-called 
Western world, and on the other hand, brought the collapse of the Soviet Union. Although 
in the 1990s the transformation of the economic and political system began in Russia, in 
the 21st century it has become clear that the country has not been developed into a liberal 
market economy and a multi-party democracy. However, the European Union considered 
the region a strategic partner, as reflected in the agreements concluded. This was justified 
partly by Russia’s strategic geopolitical situation and partly by its substantial raw material 
stock. Evidently, the fact that a new framework agreement has not been reached since 2004 
indicates the contradictions in the cooperation process. Partly the Russian empire-building 
efforts led to the crisis in 2014, but it must also be seen that the democratization project 
gaining also popularity in the European Union is deemed to be unsuccessful in areas where 
the population has developed as a result of socialization processes of a different political 
culture.
It is obvious that the regime of mutual sanctions has not brought peace to Ukraine, 
which signed the association agreement, or lead to negotiations. Russia has drifted into 
a deep, primarily economic crisis. The European Union continues to state that Russia is an 
important partner and everything needs to be done to normalize relations.
The European Union continues to emphasize that Russia is an important partner of 
the EU and everything needs to be done to normalize relations; for example, the European 
Parliament resolution of June 10, 2015, clearly states that no resumption of previous 
cooperation can be expected until there is peace in Ukraine, Russia renounces the effort to 
reshape the borders of Europe by force, hatred against opposition activists, human rights 
defenders, minorities, and neighboring countries decreases, and the situation of the rule of 
law improves. (European Parliament 2015)
This was confirmed by the European Council in September 2015 when it extended 
travel restrictions for another six months and sanctions for certain areas of trade until the end 
of 2016. Since then, the Council of the European Union has voted on these restrictions every 
six months, despite the fact that the heads of several Member States explained the negative 
impact of the measures on EU countries emphasizing the ineffectiveness of the sanctions. 
The last such decision was taken on June 28, 2017, which will be effective until 31 January 
2018.
The EU’s conditions for normalization are unacceptable to the Russians, however; 
conceding would bring into question the identity and legitimacy of the current political 
system. Political and economic pressure from the EU, therefore, will have little effect in 
the short term.
Russian involvement in the war against the Islamic State seemed to change the position 
of the European Union but it has not brought any progress in negotiations. Fruitful cooper-
ation with the EU is not Russia’s most important goal. According to many Russian scholars, 
the European Union is “an exhibition object” unable to undertake structural reforms; its 
rate of economic growth has declined, its population has turned away from integration, and 
the member states have not learned to speak with one voice. (Энтин–Энтина 2015) Both 
the institutions and the member states of the European Union have to answer the challenges 
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if they want to preserve or increase their influence. As the Global Strategy adopted by 
the EU in 2016 states: “Managing the relationship with Russia represents a key strategic 
challenge.” (Shared Vision 2016)
Appendix
Russia–EU relations 1989–2017
Date Agreement Summit Joint actions Negotiation Sanctions
Sanctions 
 of Russia
1989 18 Dec. 
1994 24 June PCA
1997 30 Oct. PCA enters
1998 15 May 
1999 22 Oct. 4 June 
Common 
strategy EU 
on Russia
2000 29 May
30 Oct.
2001 On cooperation in 
sciences
17 May
03 Oct.
2002 On trade in steel 
products
29 May
11 Nov.
2003 On cooperation in 
technology
31 May
06 Nov. 
2004 On steel agreement 21 May
25 Nov.
27 Apr. On 
EU enlarge-
ment
2005 10 May
04 Oct.
01 March 
Protocol to 
the PCA
2006 25 May
24 Nov.
2007 On the facilitation 
of visas
18 May
26 Oct.
Dec.: restart 
of talk for 
a new PCA
2008 26 June
14 Nov.
June–Nov.: 
Freezing of 
negotiations 
on a new 
agreement
2009 22 May
18 Nov. 
2010 On protection of 
classified informa-
tion
01 June
07 Dec.
Progress 
with visa ex-
emption
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Date Agreement Summit Joint actions Negotiation Sanctions
Sanctions 
 of Russia
2011 Memorandum of un-
derstanding to in-
crease cooperation
9–10 
June
2012 3–4 June
20 Dec.
2013 3–4 June On coop-
eration in 
the field of 
tourism
2014 24 Jan. On combat-
ting terror-
ism
March, Apr., 
July, Sept., 
Dec.
06 Aug.
2015 Extensions 
of sanction: 
March, Sept., 
Oct., Dec.
24 June 
Prolongation 
of special 
economic 
measures
2016 11 Febr. 
Lavrov–
Mogherini
Extensions 
March, June, 
Sept., Nov., 
Dec.
Prolongation: 
August
2017 18 Sept. 
Mogherini– 
Lavrov
Extensions 
March, June, 
Aug, Sept.,
Prolongation: 
June
Source: http://valdaiclub.com/a/reports/report-russia-and-the-european-union-three-questions/; www.
consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions/ukraine-crisis/history-ukraine-crisis/
Abbreviations
ENI: European Neighbourhood Instrument
ENPI: European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument
EP: European Parliament
ERDF: European Regional Development Fund
EU: European Union
PCA: Partnership and Cooperation Agreement
TACIS: Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States
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New Partners, Old Dilemmas: The EU and Central Asia
Dániel Harangozó
Introduction
Post-Soviet Central Asia is a region of great strategic importance, due to its location, 
its proximity to crisis spots in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and its substantial natural 
resource endowments, mostly hydrocarbons. Born into what may be termed “unexpected 
statehood” after the collapse and disintegration of the USSR at the end of 1991, the states 
of this region exhibit great political and socio-economic diversity. (Pirro 2013, 134.) 
Kazakhstan is the region’s biggest economy, responsible for most of the external trade and 
investment of Central Asia via its substantial oil reserves. Uzbekistan contains almost half 
of the population of the region, and it is the only country bordering all of the Central Asian 
states as well as Afghanistan. Turkmenistan, albeit holding one of the largest natural gas 
reserves of the world, is also among its most isolated and authoritarian countries. The two 
smallest and most underdeveloped states of Central Asia, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, rely 
to a large extent on migrant worker remittances; and are major recipients of international 
development aid. (Romanowski 2016, 4.) European strategy towards Central Asia was and 
is influenced by strategic designs of outside actors as well, namely Russia and China and, 
to an extent, the United States.
During their first decade of independence, the Central Asian states played little role 
in the EU’s external relations. They had limited trade relations with EU member states, 
their domestic situations were unstable, and historically, Russia was the dominant power 
in the region. (Efegil 2010, 76–78.) The EU–Central Asian relations only intensified from 
the 2000s, influenced by the 2004 enlargement of the Union and Western coalition opera-
tions in Afghanistan after 11 September 2001. Increasing European interest in the region 
can be explained by its proximity to Afghanistan and the security risks associated with 
a potential “spill over” of the Afghan conflict, as well as the substantial energy resources of 
several Central Asian states, particularly Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. Many 
of the more recent member states depend on Russian oil and gas, and the need to diversify 
their energy supply played a role, as well. (Bossuyt 2017; Efegil 2010, 78; Pirro 2013, 132.)
Three distinct strains can be identified in the European strategy towards this region: 
“1) the promotion of human rights, civil society, and the rule of law, which are fundamental 
to EU values as a basis for engagement; 2) energy interests that aim to link Turkmenistan 
to the Southern Corridor; and 3) fostering security in ‘Greater Central Asia,’ first through 
NATO’s military engagement in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2014, and since then by 
continuing to equip and train Afghan border posts.” (Peyrouse 2017, 2.) These interests do 
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from time to time contradict each other, and the EU lacks both the means and the will to 
resolve these contradictions.
The European Union faces particular challenges in promoting its values-based agenda, 
which emphasizes democracy, the rule of law, and human rights in a mostly authoritarian 
political environment such as Central Asia. Of the five Central Asian states, only Kyrgyzstan 
ever experienced a relatively democratic political setting. Chinese and Russian initiatives 
in the region usually come with fewer political conditions, particularly such uncomfortable 
ones for Central Asian autocratic rulers as democracy or human rights. (Hauff 2015, 5; 
International Crisis Group 2017, 2.) They are also better funded. The €1 billion budget for 
EU Central Asia-related projects during 2014–2020, for instance, pales in comparison with 
the $40 billion fund announced by Chinese President Xi Jinping for the Silk Road Economic 
Belt. (International Crisis Group 2017, 5–9; Bossuyt 2017; Peyrouse 2017, 3.)
Sebastien Peyrouse contends that Europe lacks a “grand narrative” on Central Asian 
security comparable to that of Russia, China, or the U.S. because of the multiplicity of 
European actors and the limitations of EU security mechanisms. (Peyrouse 2017, 2.)
Although the European Union prefers regional integration and “effective multilater-
alism” in its external relations, this approach encounters serious challenges in Central Asia, 
a region characterized by weak or “incomplete” statehood, low mutual trust between states, 
limited cooperation and weak or non-existent regional integration. (Renard 2013, 359.)
Figure 1.
Post-Soviet Central Asia and the neighbouring states
Source: http://d-maps.com/carte.php?&num_car=66540&lang=en
139New Partners, Old Dilemmas: The EU and Central Asia
One could thus argue that EU strategy towards Central Asia illustrate three fundamental 
dilemmas which are also present, to a certain extent, in the context of EU relations with other 
regions: the tension between security/stability and human rights, between “ambitions” and 
“conditions” (financial or otherwise), and between bilateral and multilateral cooperation. 
(See for example Warkotsch–Youngs 2011, 187–188; Gast 2014; Boonstra–Axyonova 
2013, 6.)
The present chapter is divided into three parts: first, we do a brief overview of EU–
Central Asian relations from 1991 to the present. In the  second part, we review the current 
state of institutionalized ties between the EU and the region, as well as the forms and extent 
of EU financial assistance provided to Central Asia. We conclude our chapter with a short 
assessment on the perspectives of the future of this relationship, with particular emphasis 
on the initiatives of competing regional players, that is, China and Russia.
Evolution of a Difficult Partnership
Formal ties between the EU and Central Asian nations were limited between 1991 and 2000. 
During this period and up to 2002, the European Commission policy was ambiguous on 
whether to treat Central Asia as a unified region or as five distinct countries. (International 
Crisis Group 2006, 11; Efegil 2010, 76–77.) Initially, relations with the successor states were 
governed by the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement signed in 1989 with the USSR; 
in 1991, the EU launched the Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent 
States (TACIS) program, modelled on PHARE, the assistance scheme for Central European 
countries. (International Crisis Group 2006, 11.) Tajikistan, which was embroiled in civil 
war (1992–1997), was the primary recipient of humanitarian aid in the region through 
the Commission’s Humanitarian Office (ECHO). (International Crisis Group 2006, 15.)
TACIS was designed to provide technical and financial assistance to the Soviet 
successor states in support of their transition to a market economy, democracy, and 
the rule of law. The initial priorities were training, energy (including nuclear safety), 
transport, and food production and distribution. These were revised several times during 
the lifetime of TACIS which ended in 2006 with the reorganization of the EU development 
assistance system. Assessments of the effectiveness of TACIS have been mixed. Critical 
observers and stakeholders, both local and international, pointed out the limited interest 
among Central Asian governments (owing partly to the limited funding arrangements), 
the “Byzantine Commission bureaucratic procedures”, the over-reliance on Western 
consulting firms and expatriate contractors – with attendant excessive personnel costs – in 
project implementation, and the overall lack of focus on long-term impact. (International 
Crisis Group 2006, 11–12.)
The concept of a “New Silk Road”, that is, a transport corridor between Europe and 
Central Asia, which now figures prominently in the Chinese policy, first was proposed by 
the European Union. The Transport Corridor Europe–Caucasus–Asia (TRACECA) was 
conceived at a 1993 Brussels conference and, in 1998, the EU and Azerbaijan co-hosted 
a meeting in Baku on the “Restoration of the Historical Silk Road”. An international 
Secretariat was established in the Azeri capital in 2001. (International Crisis Group 2016, 14; 
Starr–Cornell 2015)
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The ambitious goals of TRACECA and the fanfare with which it was announced 
belied its minuscule budget – €110 million between 1993 and 2002 – and the difficulties 
which accompanied its implementation, among others, the Turkmen and Uzbek reluctance 
to participate. (International Crisis Group 2006, 14–15.) The de facto failure of TRACECA 
marked also the end the EU ambitions to support major infrastructure projects in the region. 
(International Crisis Group 2006, 14; 2017, 23; Peyrouse 2017, 3.) One could argue that 
the fate of TRACECA constitutes another example of the discrepancy between ambitions 
and conditions, which several times came to characterize the EU policy towards Central 
Asia.
The security-related “flagship projects” designed or sponsored by the European Union, 
in particular BOMCA (Border Management Programme in Central Asia) and CADAP 
(Central Asia Drug Action Program), which were merged later in 2004, were somewhat 
more successful. BOMCA was launched in 2003 as a cooperative project of the European 
Union and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) to strengthen border 
management and to facilitate legal trade and transit. The program provided training and as-
sistance in a wide variety of areas, in particular the struggle against drug smuggling. Despite 
being popular with the stakeholders of the region, BOMCA had its fair share of unresolved 
challenges. One is the discrepancy between its ambitions and the modest funding available, 
which for the ninth and latest cycle (2015–2018) was only €5 million. More intractable are 
the enduring border tensions between Central Asian nations and the structural problems of 
border management of this region, particularly the endemic official corruption and its role 
in the drug trade. Implementation of BOMCA has recently been transferred from the UNDP 
to a group of EU member states (Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, and Portugal). (International 
Crisis Group 2006, 13–14; Boonstra–Tsertsvadze 2016, 9.)
The first steps to upgrade EU ties with Central Asia began with the adoption of 
a Regional Strategy Paper for Central Asia on TACIS programming in 2002, the estab-
lishment of a regular political dialogue in 2004, and the designation of a European Union 
Special Representative (EUSR) in 2005. (Efegil 2010, 79.) Two years later, at its meeting 
in Brussels on 21–22 of May 2007, the European Council adopted the strategy document 
The EU and Central Asia: Strategy for a new Partnership. (Council of the European Union 
2007b, 12.) The new Strategy envisioned an ambitious and multifaceted EU engagement 
with the region in areas ranging from human rights and the rule of law to energy and 
transport, from youth and education to environment and water, from security issues to 
“intercultural dialogue”. (Council of the European Union 2007a, 7–17.)
The strategy aimed at “a balanced bilateral and regional approach”, preferring to tackle 
issues like drug trafficking, water and energy, or environmental pollution on a regional 
basis. It proposed “regular and ad hoc contacts” with regional entities like the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization (SCO) or the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). 
(Council of the European Union 2007a, 6.) New institutional forms of cooperation were 
established, like the Rule of Law Initiative and the Human Rights Dialogue. (Council of 
the European Union 2007a, 3.) The Commission’s aid budget was increased significantly, 
as the EU offered €750 million in assistance in the period 2007–2013. It is worth noting that 
70% of that amount was designated for bilateral aid, “taking into account the policy agendas 
of individual Central Asian countries, and their distinct political and social realities”. 
(Council of the European Union 2007a, 19.)
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The strategy has since been reviewed five times (2008, 2010, 2012, 2015, and 2017, 
respectively). (European Parliament 2016) Responding to the planned withdrawal of 
international coalition forces from Afghanistan in 2014, the 2012 review introduced a new 
cooperation format, the High-Level Security Dialogue. (Boonstra–Tsertsvadze 2016, 5.) 
Both the 2015 and the 2017 reviews called for greater flexibility regarding the forms of 
cooperation and assistance (bilateral and regional), taking into account differences in 
socio-economic development, governance and ambition of the countries concerned. (Council 
of the European Union 2015, 3; Council of the European Union 2017, 2.) These two reviews 
identified education as a priority for European Union engagement with Central Asia, as 
well as the issue of radicalization and foreign fighters in the area of security. (Council of 
the European Union 2015, 6–7; Council of the European Union 2017, 3–4.) The conclusions 
of the latest review invited the European Commission and the High Representative to 
prepare a proposal for a new Central Asia strategy until 2019, in line with the EU Global 
Strategy, as well as soliciting the input from Central Asian partners in preparation of the new 
strategy. (Council of the European Union 2017, 6.)
Current Institutionalized Forms of Cooperation and Assistance
The formal ties between the EU and Central Asian states can be described as a combination 
of bilateral and regional arrangements. Trade and financial ties are governed by bilateral 
treaties, in most cases Partnership and Cooperation Agreements, an Enhanced Partnership 
and Cooperation Agreement with Kazakhstan and an Interim Trade Agreement with 
Turkmenistan. Assistance is provided both on a bilateral and on a regional basis. The only 
country without a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) in force is Turkmenistan, 
whose 1998 PCA has not been ratified because of serious deficiencies in its observance of 
human rights. (Pirro 2013, 133.) The European Union’s presence in four of the five Central 
Asian nations is achieved through a full-fledged EU Delegation stationed in the capitals; 
the capital of Turkmenistan, Ashgabat, hosts a Europe House. The establishment of an EU 
delegation in that capital is currently planned. (Boonstra–Tservtadze 2016, 7.)
Table 1.
Bilateral relations between the EU and post-Soviet Central Asia
Kazakhstan Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement signed 21 December 2015. 
Provisionally in force 1 May, 2016
Kyrgyzstan PCA in force 1 July 1999
Tajikistan PCA in force 1 January 2010
Uzbekistan PCA in force 1999, partial suspension between November 2005 and November 
2007
Turkmenistan PCA signed May 1998, ratification pending
Interim Trade Agreement in force November 1998
Source: Pirro 2013, 136; European External Action Service 2017
The Multiannual Indicative Programmes for Central Asia in the period 2014–2020, provide 
in total around €1 billion, including both a regional component and bilateral assistance 
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for Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan through, among others, 
the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI). Since its graduation to a middle-income 
country in 2014, Kazakhstan is no longer eligible for bilateral development assistance, 
although it is still included in funding schemes designed for the entire region. It is likely that 
bilateral aid to Turkmenistan will be phased out during this funding cycle, as that country 
will be graduated to middle-income status as well. (Boonstra–Tsertsvadze 2016, 9; EU 
Delegation to Kazakhstan 2016; European Commission 2014a.)
The system of bilateral funding was redesigned after the 2007–2013 budget cycle, 
learning the lessons of that period. The number of funding priorities was reduced for each 
country. (Boonstra–Tsertsvadze 2016, 9.) For Uzbekistan, €168 million is earmarked 
for rural development, while in case of Turkmenistan, €65 million is proposed for support 
of education. Of that, €28 million is conditional on the country retaining middle-income 
status for 2018–2020. (European Commission 2014e, 8; European Commission 2014d, 
8–9.) Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, the main bilateral aid recipients, have three funding 
priorities each: rule of law, education, and rural development for the Kyrgyz; and health, 
education, and rural development in the Tajik case. (Boonstra–Tsertsvadze 2016, 9.) 
About €184 million is earmarked for bilateral aid to Kyrgyzstan and €251 million for 
Tajikistan during 2014–2020. (European Commission 2014b; European Commission 2014c, 
9.) The budget for the regional component of EU assistance to Central Asia (with the sus-
tainable development, in particular, energy, environment/water and social development 
being the main priorities) totals €245 million in the current funding period. (European 
Commission 2014a, 6.) All five countries also benefit from cooperation in the area of higher 
education through the Erasmus+ scheme, for which €110 million has been earmarked in 
the Commission’s 2014–2020 regional indicative programme. (European Commission 
2014a, 6.)
The Investment Facility for Central Asia (IFCA) was set up as a blending instrument 
to combine EU financing with loans from European and international financial institutions 
(such as the Asian Development Bank, the World Bank, or the EBRD). According to 
Commission data, in the period 2010–2015, €119 million in EU grants was combined with 
loans totalling €553 million. (European Commission 2017a)
With regards to trade policy, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan are included 
in the Generalized Scheme of Preferences (GSP), a trade-facilitation scheme designed 
to provide access to the Single Market for low- and lower-middle-income countries. 
Kyrgyzstan participates in the broader GSP+ scheme, which removes tariffs for 66% of tariff 
lines in exchange for ratification and implementation of twenty-seven core international 
conventions on human and labour rights, environmental protection, and good governance. 
(European Commission 2017b) Trade relations with Kazakhstan are governed by the terms 
of the Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement that provisionally entered into 
force on 1 May 2016. (European External Action Service 2017)
143New Partners, Old Dilemmas: The EU and Central Asia
Assessment and Perspectives: Between the Chinese Hammer and the Russian 
Anvil?
While the EU’s presence and “visibility” have been enhanced in this region since the early 
2000s, the impact of EU engagement has been limited. Apart from trade and investment 
links with Kazakhstan, European trade with the region remains minimal. There has been 
little to no progress in democratization, and the human rights situation has seen significant 
backsliding. Corruption remains a serious impediment not only to economic development 
but also to effective use of development aid provided by international donors, and the pro-
posed new energy links to Europe did not materialize. (Boonstra–Tsertvadze 2016, 3–4.)
The institutionalized human rights dialogue and the High Level Security Dialogue, 
introduced in 2012, also fell short of expectations. (Boonstra–Tsertvadze 2016, 4–6.)
As it has been argued by Warkotsch and Youngs, the EU’s promotion of democracy 
in Central Asia is “high on rhetoric but relatively low on delivery”. Moreover, efforts for 
democracy promotion were also conditioned by geo-political, security and economic 
interests of member states in the region, both during and after the international coalition 
operations in Afghanistan. (Warkotsch–Youngs 2011, 192–195.)
Several factors contributed to the limited effectiveness of EU engagement to date, some 
of which are outside of the Union’s control.
While the region is not a priority for the EU, Russian and Chinese influence are 
unparalleled in Central Asia. Russia mostly exerts its influence in the field of security, both 
through multilateral (the Common Security Treaty Organization) and bilateral channels, 
in addition to informal links between military and intelligence services. Several countries 
of the region are members of the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), a Russian-led trade 
bloc.1 Despite the increasing clout of China, Russia still has substantial trade links with 
Central Asian nations, and the substantial number of migrant workers from the region 
provide additional leverage for Moscow. The effects of Russian soft power also cannot 
be underestimated: the Russian language still functions as a “lingua franca” throughout 
Central Asia; Kazakhstan has a significant Russian ethnic minority, and Russian mass 
media plays a significant role in shaping public opinion in most countries of the region, 
with the exception of Turkmenistan. (Romanowski 2016, 5–6.)
China’s presence in Central Asia, on the other hand, is concentrated in economics 
and trade. The Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB) initiative, which was unveiled in 2013 by 
President Xi Jinping, aims to develop transport and infrastructure links between China and 
Eurasia, passing through the Central Asian states. With a massive $40 billion initial budget, 
this scheme is unrivalled by other external actors. In addition to infrastructure development, 
trade between China and Central Asia is increasing steadily; for example, the Asian great 
power is now the principal export market for Turkmen gas. (Romanowski 2016, 8–9.) 
The institutional component of Chinese–Central Asian relations is based on Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization, a loose grouping that includes China, Russia, and four out of five 
Central Asian states (the exception is Turkmenistan). The security dimension of the SCO is 
1 The Treaty establishing the Eurasian Economic Union was signed on 29 May 2014, by the heads of state of 
Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan. Kyrgyzstan and Armenia joined the bloc later in the same year. The Treaty 
entered into force on 1 January 2015. See http://www.eaeunion.org/?lang=en#about-history (Accessed: 
30.01.2018)
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rather poorly institutionalized, and linked to the Chinese doctrine of “the struggle against 
the three evils”: terrorism, separatism, and extremism. (Renard 2013, 360–362.)
Massive Russian and Chinese involvement with Central Asia will influence and 
condition the relations with any outside actor, the EU included, with Central Asia in 
the foreseeable future, as the Union is neither able nor willing to compete with political and 
financial capabilities of these two powers in the region. (Boonstra–Tsertsvadze 2013, 10; 
International Crisis Group 2017, 25.)
Second, in addition to the lack of political or financial leverage, EU plans are limited 
and lack focus. They deploy limited resources in a multitude of areas, which works against 
the focused pursuit of achievable and measurable objectives. Instead, it has been argued 
that the Union should focus on a few areas where it can realistically make a difference, 
given the available resources and the prevailing political environment. (Peyrouse 2017, 3; 
Bossuyt 2017)
Support for healthcare and education in Central Asia could be one of the focus points 
of EU assistance. These two sectors are on the verge of collapse throughout the region, 
and the EU has a competitive edge in these areas, along with a commitment to reform 
in the target countries. (Bossuyt 2017) Any European education programme, however, 
will have to tackle the problems of brain drain, corruption, and unequal access to higher 
education, in order to benefit the whole population and not just the elites. Investment in 
education could offer an opportunity to counter Russian influence, as well. Little can be done 
to promote democratization by working with the authoritarian governments of the region; 
therefore, support for democracy should focus on the grassroots, providing assistance to 
civil society organizations where these are allowed to operate. (Boonstra–Tsertsvadze 
2016, 8, 11–12.)
Third, despite the increased focus on security after the 2012 review of the Strategy, 
the EU still lacks a hard security posture in Central Asia, which is unlikely to change in 
the foreseeable future. The only area where any contribution from the Union may have an 
impact is “soft” or human security, an area that may prove essential to the region’s stability 
and security. The issue of radicalization and foreign fighters has been identified as a key 
area for cooperation. (Hauff 2015, 3–5; Council of the European Union 2017, 3.) In addition, 
continuing support for border management is essential for EU security engagement, as 
the region faces serious challenges in this field and the EU has a unique expertise in dealing 
with border issues. The BOMCA scheme should be overhauled, however, to better align 
goals and objectives with available resources. (Bossuyt 2017; Boonstra–Tsertsvadze 
2016, 9.)
Fourth, while the EU generally prefers a regional approach to external relations, this 
approach is of limited utility in the Central Asian region. As Boonstra and Tsertsvadze 
argue, “as long as regional cooperation is not a home-grown phenomenon, the EU 
can do little to rally unwilling countries around subjects they either view differently 
or are not interested in”. (Boonstra–Tsertsvadze 2013, 10.) The European Union 
policy should be open to more flexible forms of cooperation, for example, by designing 
multi-country programs, or involving neighbouring states. A shift to bilateral and flexible 
forms of cooperation is evident in the last two reviews of the Strategy. (Bossuyt 2017; 
Boonstra–Tsertsvadze 2013, 8–10; Council of the European Union 2015, 3; Council of 
the European Union 2017, 2, 6.)
145New Partners, Old Dilemmas: The EU and Central Asia
The upcoming review of the Strategy in 2019, and an eventual preparation of a new 
strategy document may provide an excellent opportunity to redesign the EU’s engagement 
with Central Asia, learning the lessons of the last ten years and developing a more focused 
approach. Changes and improvements might be difficult to achieve, however, given “the 
different priorities of the EU member states and of all the institutional actors involved in 
drafting and adopting the strategy”. (Bossuyt 2017)
Conclusion
Despite an intensification of EU–Central Asian relations over the last fifteen years, 
the impact of the EU remains limited. Some of the factors which may explain these 
limitations are outside the Union’s control, like the Russian and Chinese dominance in 
Central Asia or the unwillingness of the countries of the region to engage in democratic 
reform or tackle endemic corruption. (Boonstra–Tsertsvadze 2013, 9.) These “structural” 
deficiencies are compounded by an unfocused political strategy that hampered the effective 
use of – already limited – assistance funds, or an insistence (at least at the beginning) 
on pursuing a regional approach towards Central Asia when local conditions were not 
appropriate.
At several points, both during and after coalition operations in Afghanistan, there was 
a marked tension between the promotion of the EU’s core values – human rights, democracy, 
and the rule of law – and geo-political, security, or economic interests. German–Uzbek 
military cooperation continued, for example, even after EU sanctions against Uzbekistan 
were adopted following the brutal crackdown on the opposition during the Andijon uprising 
in 2005. Both the EU and its member states tried to deepen trade links with Kazakhstan 
after 2011, even though human rights and democratic standards deteriorated significantly 
in the same period. (Efegil 2010, 79; Warkotsch–Young 2011, 193–195.)
Fragmentation and unrealistic objectives (in view of available funds or prevailing 
political conditions “on the ground”) hampered the effectiveness of several major EU 
initiatives in Central Asia. (Bossuyt 2017) The TRACECA project is such a case, as 
the funds budgeted were minuscule in comparison with the ambitious project goals and 
political conditions were not favourable to its implementation. (International Crisis Group 
2006, 14–15.)
Albeit the EU traditionally prefers a regional approach in its external relations, it can 
be effective only if the political environment of the given region favours inter-regional 
cooperation and “effective multilateralism”.
These conditions in Central Asia are largely absent, due to weak, “awkward” or 
“incomplete” statehood (Kavalski 2010, 12–14), low level of trust between the Central 
Asian states, and limited regional cooperation. Those multilateral cooperation initiatives that 
exist in Central Asia, such as the Eurasian Economic Union or the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization, are driven by outside actors (China and Russia) and largely incompatible with 
the value-based agenda of the EU. (Renard 2013, 359, 369–370.)
The European Union currently cannot compete in influence with the two major 
dominant international actors of the region, Russia and China, and probably will not be able 
to do so in the foreseeable future. In order to make an impact, the EU needs to acknowledge 
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its role and limitations in the region, and to align its ambitions both with the available 
resources and with the prevailing environment – although without giving up its commitment 
to human rights and the rule of law. (Boonstra–Tsertsvadze 2013, 1, 10; International 
Crisis Group 2017, 25.)
These deficiencies of the EU’s Central Asia policy to date should not mean, however, 
that a “withdrawal” is needed. The ambition of the Central Asian countries to conduct 
a multi-vector foreign policy, as well as their concerns over dependence on either Russia or 
China, may create an opening for EU engagement. In this context, Europe still might play 
an important role as an “alternative” or “complementary” partner. (International Crisis 
Group 2017, 25; Hauff 2015, 6.)
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The EU and East Asia
András Bartók
As one of the most dynamic regions of global developments, Asia, and particularly the Asia 
Pacific region, dominates forecasts on economic, societal, or security issues. The Pacific 
coastline of the continent has become the most dominant region of the globe for the fore-
seeable decades and will undoubtedly be in the center of attention of public interest and 
intellectual efforts to make sense of future developments for decades to come.
While recovery from the financial crisis of the early 2000s proved sluggish and lined 
with political debate in Europe and America, Asia shows prospects of robust growth. (IMF 
2016, 16.) The British referendum on EU membership and other political trends have forced 
the EU to look inward; meanwhile, steady economic growth of some Asian economies has 
led to an increasing global economic presence in China and India. Growth tendencies of 
regions such as East and South Asia follow not only the model of export-driven manufac-
turing economies of the last few decades, but seem to benefit from domestic demand, as 
well. (UN–ESA 2017a, 6.)
The significance of the continent is underlined by the fact that 60 percent of the world 
population now lives in Asia. (UN–ESA 2017b, 7.) While the UN’s forecast shows that 
the fastest-growing continent in terms of population between 2017 and 2050 is going to be 
Africa, Asia is expected to be the  second fastest, and it will still be the most populous region 
at the end of this century. (UN–ESA 2017b, 9.) But the different prospects in population 
growth will still only amount to Asia’s share of the world population which will drop only 
slightly by 2050, when it is projected to be home to 59% of the people living on Earth. 
(UN–ESA 2004, 18.)
In terms of security, the stark difference in trends of Europe and Asia highlight the shift 
of power from the West of Eurasia, to the East. While European defence spending in 
the last few years has increased slightly, the only region in the world with constant growth 
in terms of military budgets has been Asia, with roughly a 6% annual increase between 
2014 and 2016. (IISS 2017, 20.) In a time, when European militaries have experienced 
twenty-five years of reductions in military personnel; with key NATO members such as 
Germany, France, Italy, and the U.K. have seen their combined military manpower drop 
from 1.3 million in 1996 to 716,000 in 2016. (IISS 2017, 63.) East Asian militaries can count 
on some of the largest armed forces in terms of active personnel. While European power 
projection assets overall have been significantly reduced, some signs point to a modest 
increase in maritime power projection capabilities, such as the sea trials of the new British 
aircraft carrier HMS Queen Elizabeth in 2017. (IISS 2017, 170.) But while the military 
capabilities of EU member states have stagnated or had been reduced, East Asia, on the other 
hand, has seen a robust increase in defense assets, powered by steady economic growth, with 
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Asia Pacific militaries focusing on development of larger conventional warfare capabilities 
and maritime power projection capacity. (IISS 2017, 237.)
With such signs of a shift of power towards the Asia Pacific, the EU cannot avoid 
the question of how to accommodate Asia and particularly the Asia Pacific. The center 
of gravity in any overview of EU–East Asia relations would naturally revolve around 
the relevance of the People’s Republic of China, but as that particular bilateral relation 
justifies devoting an entire chapter of its own, the focus of this section shall be aimed at 
outlining relations from a regional perspective.
The geographic scope of the Asia Pacific encompasses two main regions, South Asia 
and East Asia, with the latter further divided into the sub-regions of Northeast Asia and 
Southeast Asia. While this distinction based on geographical terms might seem arbitrary, 
some aspects of cultural and historical characteristics help differentiate.
Figure 1.
Sub-Regions of the Asia Pacific
Source: Edited by the author.
South Asia is seen as an independent geopolitical region. (Cohen 2014, 11.) The area 
consists of the Indian subcontinent (India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, the Maldives, 
Nepal and Sri Lanka) and Afghanistan. The dynamics of this region are largely determined 
by the dominance of India, the luring presence of China, but also some intra-regional 
conflicts, such as tensions between the two nuclear powers of India and Pakistan, as well 
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as non-state originated issues such as terrorism. The relevance of the region in global 
geopolitical issues is underlined by its population size, and cultural singularity. (Cohen 
2014, 11.) While the region has the potential to become one of the most relevant areas of our 
future, social issues, traditional and non-traditional security threats looming might pose 
serious challenges for its future development. (Karim 2013, 7.) The problematic nature of 
the region is further underscored by the fact that unlike in East Asia, there is a lack of any 
kind of comprehensive security architecture in South Asia that would contribute to the long 
term stability of the region. (Wagner 2014, 5.)
East Asia can further be differentiated to Northeast and Southeast Asia. Northeast 
Asia is regarded as the region consisting of mainland China, Taiwan, Japan, the Republic of 
Korea (South Korea) and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea). While 
the inclusion of the Russian Far East and Mongolia might warrant arguments, this study 
excludes these from the geographical scope, on the one hand because of Russia’s relevance 
as a Eurasian/European power of its own accord – meriting attention beyond the boundaries 
of this chapter – and Mongolia because of its lack of access to the Asia Pacific and proximity 
to the dynamics of non-coastal Asia.
Southeast Asia is regarded here as the littoral region around the South China Sea 
consisting of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member states (Brunei 
Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR (Laos), Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, 
Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam) and the not yet member East Timor, with its membership 
request pending.
To give an overview of the EU’s relations and relevance in the region, this chapter 
will look at the development of interactions between the EU and East Asia in terms of 
both bilateral relations with specific countries, regional organizations, namely the ASEAN 
and the EU’s participation in one of the key platforms of security dialogue in the region, 
the ASEAN Regional Forum.
To give a basis for understanding the EU’s relationship with East Asia, the subsequent 
discussion will start with a look at the EU’s global strategy and the Guidelines on the EU’s 
Foreign and Security Policy in East Asia. Following an overview of strategic considerations 
and the development of relations with key players in the region, this chapter will attempt to 
outline some of the main challenges relevant to the region that might be relevant in terms 
of the EU’s bilateral and intra-organizational relations.
The EU’s Strategic Disposition Towards East Asia
The key characteristics of the EU’s relevance in East Asia is framed by the dual realities of 
the EU as a weak actor in the region and the fact that nevertheless, it is very much involved 
in many aspects of the dynamics that shape the Asia Pacific.
It seems only natural, if one looks at the development of a European Asia policy, that 
the distance of the region hampers priority considerations. This is reflected in the way of 
how even though in the 1990s, the emerging importance of Asia among European experts 
was evident, the transatlantic aspect of the EU’s foreign policy dominated priorities. Even 
today, when some member states and political actors in Europe are increasingly coming 
forth with their own policy corresponding to the rapid rise of Asian powers – mostly in terms 
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of economic considerations – some see that the EU has no real Asia strategy. As Bersick 
argues, this lack of strategic cohesion is a natural outcome of the EU not being a nation state, 
and still only an incomplete and evolving player in global affairs. (Bersick 2014, 115–119.) 
Even when the EU seems to have a more coherent disposition towards trade policy and has 
spent over 5 billion EUR on development cooperation with the region between 2007 and 
2013, the lacks of military capabilities limit its latitude. (Bersick 2014, 115–119.)
This is not to mean, however, that instances of the EU’s search for strategic relevance in 
East Asia are without trace. Even as early as the 2003 Security Strategy mentions aspects of 
Asia to some degree. Among threats, the risk of nuclear activities in South Asia and North 
Korea are named as concerns, as well as terrorist activities in Southeast Asia. However, 
other than mentions of distant but relevant threats, the document only concludes that some 
strategic bilateral partnerships should be strengthened, for example with Japan and China, 
and briefly mentions ASEAN as a regional organization that can contribute to strengthening 
global governance. (EEAS 2003, 6, 9, 14.)
In 2005, the EU did participate in the resolution of the ongoing conflict between 
the Free Aceh Movement in Aceh province, Indonesia and the government, which ended 
thirty years of clashes between government forces and the separatist movement. The EU’s 
Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) was established to monitor the implementation of 
the peace agreement between the two sides, signed on 15 August 2005. The EU contributed 
to AMM together with five ASEAN countries (Thailand, Malaysia, Brunei, Philippines and 
Singapore) and also with Norway and Switzerland. (EEAS 2006a, 1–2.) The AMM mission 
successfully completed its mandate on 15 December 2006. (EEAS 2006b, 1.) The AMM 
shows, that even when the EU is grappling with the task of formulating a coherent strategic 
stance towards the region, its capabilities as a normative power give it relevance, for instance 
in such cases as the monitoring mission in Aceh. But even with the AMM presence in 
the region, in 2006, we’re still a long way from seeing the path to an EU East Asia strategy.
Nevertheless, steady evolution in East Asia policy is discernible. One such milestone 
was the adoption of the Guidelines on the EU’s Foreign and Security Policy in East Asia 
in 2007.
The policy paper specifies that the focus of its subject is that of the North East Asian 
region in particular, although it does mention ASEAN in a number of instances. It specifies 
the EU’s main economic and security interests. The former mentions considerations such as:
• The region is home to some of the world’s fastest growing economies and some of 
the major trading partners of the EU. China and the East Asian economies have 
a significant influence on financial stability worldwide.
• Trade imbalance with China is a concern for the long term.
• The economic interdependence between the region and the EU are critical for both 
sides.
The document concludes that East Asian security and stability is a prerequisite for 
the region’s economic successes and therefore has bearings on EU interests. It names three 
major security risks in relation to regional stability:
• North Korea’s nuclear program poses a threat both for the stability of the Korean 
peninsula and nuclear non-proliferation.
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• The Taiwan Strait tensions, while deepening economic interdependence had blunted 
tensions to some degree, they still have the potential of destabilizing the region.
• Competitive nationalism, and the rise of Chinese power and a more active diplo-
macy, combined with historical and territorial disputes have the potential to create 
tensions in the region.
The 2007 policy guidelines call on the EU to deepen and intensify its exchanges with 
the region’s key players. It calls for a deepening of strategic dialogue with China, developing 
a strategic dialogue on East Asia with Japan and the U.S., develop exchanges with other 
actors in the region, such as India, Russia, Australia, New Zealand and members of ASEAN. 
It also mentions a need to deepen political dialogue on regional issues with the Republic of 
Korea. This approach shows, that China is considered an actor to be engaged in the most 
active way, on a bilateral level, while the regional approach focuses on some key partners, 
such as Japan and South Korea, while the intention to interact more actively with ASEAN 
as a regional organization is also emphasized. (EEAS 2007)
After the 2007 policy guidelines, we might have to look at another EU mission that 
has some connections to the EU’s relevance in East Asia, although the mission itself is not 
within the boundaries of the region. The European Union Naval Force ATALANTA (EU 
NAVFOR) is a maritime patrol and anti-piracy mission off the coast of Somalia, established 
in December 2008. The geographical scope covers the Southern Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden 
and a large part of the Indian Ocean, (EU NAVFOR 2008) which brings it in proximity 
with East Asian interests. This has provided opportunities of cooperation with East Asian 
counterparts in similar anti-piracy missions within the area of EU NAVFOR ATALANTA 
mandate, such as with China and Japan. On 8 November 2009, Chinese Rear Admiral 
Wang Zhiguo met with his counterpart, the Commander of the European Union Naval 
Force Somalia (EU NAVFOR), Commodore Pieter Bindt on board of a Chinese flagship 
in the Gulf of Aden, to discuss counter piracy operations and cooperation between EU 
NAVFOR ATALANTA and Chinese counter piracy forces. (EU NAVFOR 2009b) Japan 
also decided to join counter piracy operations in March 2009, and Japan Maritime Self 
Defense Force ships joined escorts in the Gulf of Aden in March 30, 2009. (Gaikō bōei iinkai 
chōsa-shitsu 2009, 12.) By August 2009, EU NAVFOR ATALANTA had reached a high 
level of cooperation with international maritime forces joined in counter piracy operations, 
including Japanese units. (EU NAVFOR 2009a) Such interactions, although still small in 
scale, help underline the fact that Asia Pacific powers can be regarded not only in terms 
of regional cooperation, but global partners as well. It is no surprise, then, that the EU’s 
strategic attention had increased towards the Asia Pacific in the following years, as reflected 
in the 2012 Guidelines on the EU’s Foreign and Security Policy in East Asia and also in 
the 2016 EU Global Strategy.
The 2012 Guidelines on the EU’s Foreign and Security Policy in East Asia shows 
the EU’s intention to be an influencing element in the region, mainly through the process 
of dialogue and negotiation. (Bersick 2014, 122.) A significant change in comparison with 
the 2007 version is in the description of security threats. While the 2007 document names 
the geographical scope as Northeast Asia and the mention of territorial disputes thus 
tacitly might refer to the Sino–Japanese dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, the 2012 
document names the South China Sea as the issue of potential competitive nationalism in 
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the region. (EEAS 2012, 5.) The 2012 East Asia strategy calls on the EU to be an active 
partner in discussions in order to help avoid deepening of tensions based on the risk of 
competitive nationalism.
The relevance of East Asia in the EU’s strategic thinking, as shown in key policy 
documents, has gone through a steady evolution from a region with key partners, but 
rather on the basis of bilateral relations, to increasingly become a regional complex with 
a broader importance in European interests. This is reflected in the EU global strategy 
document entitled Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe – A Global Strategy 
for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy (2016):
“We need a stronger Europe. This is what our citizens deserve; this is what the wider 
world expects. […] We live in times of existential crisis, within and beyond the European 
Union. […] security tensions in Asia are mounting… There is a direct connection between 
European prosperity and Asian security.” (EEAS 2016b)
As the document states, Europe’s main concern about Asian security is that based on 
the sheer size of Asian economies and their global relevance, regional peace and prosperity 
are necessary for not only the growth of Asia, but due to the economic inter-connectedness, 
Europe, as well. Since this is one of the major strategic concerns, the strategy calls on 
Europe to strengthen its security role in Asia. (EEAS 2016b, 37.) The EU will aim to expand 
its partnerships on security with key regional powers, such as Japan, the Republic of Korea 
and Indonesia. The EU aims to promote non-proliferation in the Korean peninsula, and 
uphold maritime freedom of navigation, respect for international law (including the Law 
of the Sea) and tries to encourage peaceful resolution of territorial disputes. It emphasizes 
the importance of regional organizations by aiming to support an ASEAN-led regional 
security architecture. (EEAS 2016b, 38.)
The evolution of the EU’s strategic thinking on East Asia shows that even though 
Europe is a distant power, it gradually gave more strategic attention to the Asia Pacific. 
While initially, the focus of relations were bilateral interactions with key players, such as 
China and Japan, over the last few years, the EU’s consideration had become increasingly 
regional and has given more importance to regional organizations like the ASEAN. 
The main interests of the EU are based on the economic interactions with the region, but 
these are explicitly mentioned as interconnected with regional security issues. The reason 
the EU is considered a weak actor in East Asia comes from the fact that it lacks any hard 
security capabilities in the region. The future question for the EU’s strategic disposition 
towards East Asia will most probably be how Europe will cope with this problem, either 
by building some form of security presence that can help stabilize the region, or by either 
accepting the risk that tensions pose, or trying to find other, soft power based ways to help 
avoid regional tensions destabilizing the prerequisites for prosperity.
The subsequent parts of this chapter will look at relationships with key regional 
partners, to give an overview of the EU’s bilateral relations with East Asia, namely 
the Republic of Korea, Japan, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
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EU–People’s Republic of China Relations
As we shall see in the subsequent parts of this chapter, any of the EU’s bilateral relationships 
with actors in the East Asian region is in some ways influenced by the proximity of 
the People’s Republic of China (PRC). While the dynamics between the PRC and the EU 
vastly outweigh the limitations of one such overview, a brief look at the overall structure 
of their relationship will help to comprehensively relate the rest of the EU East Asia issues 
to this key factor between the two poles of the Eurasian landmass.
The EU and the PRC started holding annual summits in 1997. Since then, the rela-
tionship has been galvanized by three main pillars of dialogues: a high level economic and 
trade dialogue since 2007, strategic dialogue since 2010 and a people-to-people dialogue 
since 2012. However, even with the institutional framework of their relationship getting 
more articulated gradually, the main problems and issues of the EU–China relations have 
remained the same since the beginning.
China and the EU are deeply intertwined by their trade relations. The EU in itself is 
China’s largest trading partner and China is the  second largest trading partner of Europe, 
following the United States. However, past issues still linger as matters of discontent on 
both sides.
While the interactions have come a long way, China still resents the EU’s disposition 
towards it in two key issues. One is the EU’s upholding of the arms embargo towards 
China since the massacre of Tiananmen square. While on a rhetorical level, it gives room 
for Chinese protest, the end to this policy is nowhere near realization. The other issue is 
the EU’s subsequent decisions to not allow the World Trade Organization to grant China 
market economy status. While of the two issues, the termination of the latter holds more 
probability, despite Chinese efforts, to this day, no real progress has been made.
The EU on the other hand is mainly concerned about the trade imbalance with China 
and about the issue that the opening of European markets will harm EU actors due to 
China’s unfair trade practices. Issues such as property rights and currency manipulation 
have been at the center of the EU’s concerns regarding the deepening of economic ties with 
the People’s Republic of China.
It is too early to tell, but much attention should be appropriated to the EU’s handling 
of Chinese economic presence widening through the Belt and Road Initiative, as the EU’s 
responses will likely give a good overview on the future of the bilateral relationship.
EU–Republic of Korea Relations
The EU’s relations with the Republic of Korea (South Korea, abbreviated further as RoK), 
are based on the importance of economic interaction between the two sides and the fact 
that the EU regards South Korea as one of the most advanced democracies in Asia, and 
such shared values make the RoK a “like minded partner” in the region. (EEAS 2012, 14.) 
The importance of economic and trade connections are highlighted by the fact that the first 
EU–Asian free trade agreement was created between the EU and South Korea.(EEAS 2016c)
Bilateral diplomatic relations date back as far as 1963 (CE 2006, 1–7.) and despite 
geographic and cultural distances, the EU sees South Korea as a partner that shares the same 
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commitment to democracy, human rights, the rule of law and a common economic system. 
By 2006, tentative mentions of intentions on a Free Trade Agreement were expressed 
following the third summit meeting between the EU and the Republic of Korea, in Helsinki 
2006. (CE 2006, 1–7.)
Table 1.
EU–Republic of Korea trade in goods 2007–2016 (billion EUR)
Eu–Republic of Korea trade in goods 2007–2016 (bn EUR)
Year Imports to EU Exports to RoK
2007 41.676 24.719
2008 39.74 25.495
2009 32.472 21.599
2010 39.534 27.961
2011 36.312 32.515
2012 38.014 37.815
2013 35.837 39.91
2014 38.772 43.188
2015 42.365 47.787
2016 41.435 44.504
Source: EC 2017c
Figure 2.
EU–Republic of Korea trade in goods 2007–2016 (billion EUR)
Source: EC 2017c
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Accordingly, the 2007 Guidelines for East Asia policy states how the EU has realized 
that the economic interdependence with East Asia has reached a critical level in terms of 
future growth prospects and as a reaction to this, the EU has entered into FTA negotiations 
with ASEAN and the Republic of Korea. (EEAS 2007, 2.) As a result, the EU had signed 
the FTA agreement in 2010 May and also a new Framework Agreement the same year, 
that came into effect in 2014. Also, in line with previous negotiations conducted in 2009 
during the fourth EU–RoK summit, the two sides had elevated the relation to a strategic 
partnership. (CE 2010, 1.)
This Strategic Partnership expressed the common intent to deepen cooperation 
in political, trade and security matters and the framework agreement gave legal and 
institutional framework for the deepening of cooperation in accordance with the Strategic 
Partnership. (Bersick 2014, 129.) The latest step in this cooperation had been the bilateral 
Crisis Management Participation Agreement, which came into force in 2016, and gave way 
to greater RoK participation in EU-led missions. (EEAS 2014, 1–2.)
The Free Trade Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Korea 
came into effect in 2011 July. (EC 2012) It has contributed to deepening economic relations 
and the expansion of bilateral trade. Within five years, EU exports to South Korea had 
increased by 55%, while imports from South Korea by 35%. Since the FTA has entered into 
force, the EU’s trade deficit with the RoK has turned into a trade surplus, but in comparison, 
South Korea has a less significant trade deficit than the EU had, before the agreement. 
The Republic of Korea is now the EU’s ninth largest export destination, while the EU is its 
third largest market. (EC 2017a)
The positive direction of EU–RoK relations shows that the economic potential for 
cooperation with East Asia holds merit for both the EU and regional countries involved in 
bilateral relations. Another important factor in the smoothness of interactions is that unlike 
many other countries in the region, South Korea has a much less strained relationship with 
China, especially in terms of unresolved territorial issues. While other countries might 
occasionally have felt the need to voice concerns over issues related to the EU–China 
bilateral relationship, such as the concerns voiced by Japan in times such as when the lifting 
of EU arms embargo on China had come up in discussions. (MoJEU 2006)
EU–Japan Relations
Similarly to South Korea, the EU regards Japan as a regional power that is also a “like 
minded” partner in terms of shared values and political system. Diplomatic relations date 
back several decades: the then European Communities had opened the first Delegation 
in Tokyo in 1974, and after the Lisbon Treaty in 2009 it has become the Delegation of 
the European Union in Japan. (EEAS 2017)
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Table 2.
EU–Japan trade in goods 2007–2016 (billion EUR)
Eu–Japan trade in goods 2007–2016 (bn EUR)
Year Imports to EU Exports to Japan
2007 79.259 43.742
2008 76.474 42.39
2009 58.44 35.978
2010 67.302 43.984
2011 70.583 49.075
2012 64.999 55.663
2013 56.62 54.016
2014 56.574 53.286
2015 59.874 56.533
2016 66.561 58.086
Source: EC 2017d
Figure 3.
EU–Japan trade in goods 2007–2016 (billion EUR)
Source: EC 2017d
Japan and the EU have significant trade relations and while the EU still accounts some 
amount of trade deficits to Japan, this has significantly decreased in the past ten years.
Japan also views the EU as a partner sharing fundamental values and principles. 
(MoFA 2016, 1–2.) The two sides have held bilateral summit meetings since 1991 and have 
established a strategic partnership in 2001. However, a binding “Strategic Partnership 
Agreement” is still under negotiation. The two sides have mutually expressed their intention 
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on such an agreement at the 20th Japan–EU summit, in May 2011. (MoFA 2017) Also, 
alongside a strategic partnership agreement, Japan and the EU had aimed at creating a Free 
Trade Agreement (referred to as Economic Partnership Agreement on the Japanese side) 
at the same meeting. In accordance with these conclusions, negotiations on the SPA and 
EPA/FTA had started in March 2013, and while the finalization of the agreements is yet to 
be realized, significant developments have taken place since 2013 in order to achieve these 
goals. As expressed by Jean-Claude Juncker after the 24th Japan–EU summit on 6 July 2017:
“Today we agreed in principle on a future Economic Partnership Agreement. The depth 
of this agreement goes beyond free trade. Its impact goes far beyond our shores. It makes 
a statement about the future of open and fair trade in today’s world. It sets the standard for 
others… Together we account for a third of the world’s GDP. The European Union already 
exports over EUR 80 billion of goods and services to Japan every year. One has to know, 
Europeans have to know, that more than 600,000 jobs in the European Union already now are 
linked to exports to Japan… More than 90% of the EU’s exports to Japan will be liberalized 
at entry into force of the Economic Partnership Agreement. And sectors that have been facing 
very serious challenges recently, like dairy, will now have new opportunities.” (EC 2017b)
While the proceedings of negotiations and positive remarks show the ongoing efforts 
to finalize the agreements, and as expressed at the 2017 July summit the two sides have 
reached agreement in principle on the SPA and EPA/FTA, it is not yet clear, when either of 
these will be put into effect. It seems that on a variety of issues, the two sides still need to 
reach consensus, Japan in particular is wary about proposed legal structures to settle trade 
disputes, as some argue, because such rulings might become templates for future deals that 
might end up creating favourable circumstances for Chinese or Korean companies. (The 
Economist 2017)
Besides economic incentives, Japan seems to welcome the EU’s presence in the region 
for its possible contributions to regional stability as a normative example for conflict 
resolution. During the last two decades, one of the major foreign policy and strategic 
concerns for Japan had been the growing power and increasingly assertive behaviour of 
China, particularly concerning the Sino–Japanese territorial dispute over the Senkaku/
Diaoyu islands. The uninhabited islands, currently under Japanese sovereignty, are claimed 
by both the People’s Republic of China as well as Taiwan, based on historical terms. (Vutz 
2013, 1.) From the tone of Japan–EU summit press statements, it seems that Japan welcomes 
the EU’s presence in the region as a promoter of the rule of law. As stated in the press release 
after the 23rd Japan–EU Summit in Tokyo, 2015 May, both sides condemned all violations 
of international law and of principles of territorial integrity. (MoFA 2015, 3.) While not 
naming specifically the issue of the Senkaku islands, or China for that matter, the document 
does mention that “both sides observe the situation in the East and South China Sea” and 
the major territorial issue in the East China Sea is the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute. Critical 
voices from the European side on Chinese actions are not without precedent, as a 2014 
Policy Paper has defined the PRC’s activities in territorial disputes as a serious challenge to 
the structure of the international legal system. (EP 2014, 20.) Nevertheless, the record of EU 
positions on the issue show a cautious attempt not to get involved in a way that would cause 
serious problems for EU–China relations. This is shown in the 25 September 2012 declaration 
by High Representative Catherine Ashton on developments in East Asia’s maritime areas, 
where the EU calls on all parties to take steps to calm the situation. (CE 2012)
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EU–ASEAN Relations
The significance of EU–ASEAN ties are underlined by the fact that the European Economic 
Community was one of the first entities to establish informal relations with ASEAN in 
1972 (EEAS 2016a), and the organization had set up an ASEAN Brussels Committee to 
engage in discussion on commercial issues with the EEC. (Lim 2012, 47.) Relations were 
formalized in 1977 and institutionalized with the signing of the ASEAN–EEC Cooperation 
Agreement in 1980. (EEAS 2016a)
While deepening of ties had continued, the 1990s presented a problematic phase for 
the relationship, due to the European side’s disapproving of human rights issues in certain 
ASEAN states, such as Burma (Myanmar). (Lim 2014, 49.)
Nevertheless, the disagreeing tones were overcome by the post-9/11 developments of 
common efforts to counter global terrorism. (Lim 2014, 49.) The early 2000s increasingly 
gave way to initiations towards a Free Trade Agreement between the two organizations, 
as shown by a joint commission created in 2005 to investigate the possibilities of such an 
agreement. (Lim 2014, 51.)
Relations were given a new dynamic by the 2007 ASEAN–EU ministerial meeting in 
Nuremberg, Germany, where the participants showed consensus in their desire to develop 
a more intense cooperation. The EU–ASEAN agenda was broadened beyond economic and 
trade issues, to include cooperation in climate policy, energy security and the fight against 
terrorism. (Bersick 2014, 123.) In 2012, the EU joined the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation 
in Southeast Asia – TAC, (EEAS 2016a) an agreement between ASEAN member states and 
other signatories to promote peace and prosperity in the region, by adhering to the following 
principles: (ASEAN 1976)
a) mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity and 
national identity of all nations,
b) the right of every State to lead its national existence free from external interference, 
subversion or coercion,
c) non-interference in the internal affairs of one another,
d) settlement of differences or disputes by peaceful means,
e) renunciation of the threat or use of force, and
f) effective co-operation among signatory states.
The EU has established a diplomatic Mission to ASEAN on 8 August 2015 with a dedicated 
Ambassador, with 25 member states also accrediting Ambassadors to ASEAN. (EEAS 
2016a)
While on the political level, relations have seen a positive progress since the prob-
lematic period of the 1990s, the realization of an EU–ASEAN FTA is yet to be finalized. In 
2009, the focus shifted from an inter-organizational FTA to bilateral agreements between 
the EU and individual ASEAN member states, such as Singapore, Malaysia and Vietnam. 
(Lim 2014, 51.) The EU is ASEAN’s  second largest trade partner and ASEAN as a whole is 
the third largest trade partner of the EU outside Europe. (EEAS 2016a)
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Table 3.
EU–ASEAN trade in goods 2007–2016 (billion EUR)
EU–ASEAN trade in goods 2007–2016 (bn EUR)
Year Imports to EU Exports to ASEAN
2007 81.184 53.207
2008 80.306 56.349
2009 68.379 50.206
2010 85.828 61.829
2011 94.157 69.176
2012 99.111 81.599
2013 96.802 81.697
2014 101.079 78.583
2015 118.612 82.946
2016 122.126 85.833
Source: EC 2017e
Figure 4.
EU–ASEAN trade in goods 2007–2016 (billion EUR)
Source: EC 2017e
On security related issues, cooperation between the two organizations is strengthened 
by the EU becoming one of the founding members, along with ASEAN, of the ASEAN 
Regional Forum (ARF), an organization aimed at fostering stability in the Asia Pacific 
region by confidence building and preventive diplomacy. The EU and ASEAN work 
together in multiple non-traditional security related issues, such as maritime security, 
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conflict prevention, mediation and reconciliation, crisis management, transnational crime, 
counter-terrorism, cyber security and non-proliferation. (EEAS 2016a)
EU–ASEAN relations certainly show both promising aspects of the EU’s presence 
in the region and the challenges to inter-regional integration in the form seen by some 
experts as “bilateralization”, where regionalization aimed efforts are shelved in order to 
pursue bilateral progress with specific countries. While Europe’s engagement with Asia 
and especially with ASEAN has reached historic levels, some believe that the increasing 
economic and political influence of China might slow down broader regional integration 
efforts. (Bersick 2014, 137–138.)
Since the tensions in the South China Sea involve many ASEAN member states in 
disputes with China, the future development of ASEAN–EU relations are surely going to 
be influenced by the handling of such territorial issues by both organizations.
The EU in East Asia – Challenges and Opportunities
Despite the geographical and socio-cultural distances, the post-Cold War era had seen 
the ever increasing economic and political involvement of Europe in East Asian affairs. 
While the rise of the region as a global economic and geopolitical hub of our time had caught 
the EU in times of introverted periods after the global economic crisis and the European debt 
crisis, strategic thinking had gradually accommodated the growing importance of the Asia 
Pacific not only as home to important partners but as a complex, integrated region, as well.
Table 4.
EU–China trade in goods 2007–2016 (billion EUR)
EU–China trade in goods 2007–2016 (bn EUR)
Year Imports to EU Exports to China
2007 233.863 71.823
2008 249.102 78.301
2009 215.274 82.421
2010 283.931 113.454
2011 295.055 136.415
2012 292.122 144.227
2013 280.15 148.115
2014 302.149 164.623
2015 350.64 170.357
2016 344.468 170.083
Source: EC 2017f
Evolution seen in the Guidelines on the EU’s Foreign and Security Policy in East Asia 
(2007), Guidelines on the EU’s Foreign and Security Policy in East Asia (2012), and 
the region’s relevance in the EU’s Global Strategy (2016) show that the EU has recognized 
the importance of the Asia Pacific. While the key incentive articulated is the continuation of 
“prosperity”, signifying the EU’s priorities as being dominated by economic considerations, 
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this does not mean that the EU looks at East Asia merely in terms of trade opportunities. 
As the Global Strategy emphasizes, regional peace and stability are necessary prerequisites 
for the growth of the region and with the current level of economic interconnectedness, to 
the prosperity of Europe, as well.
Nevertheless, one cannot ignore the fact that security issues are dominated by 
confrontation between the People’s Republic of China and regional actors in territorial 
disputes, underscored by the increasing rivalry for dominance between China and the United 
States. While the EU’s East Asia policy is not exclusively China centered, by mere factors 
of trade and economic interactions, China does dominate considerations.
Figure 5.
EU–China trade in goods 2007–2016 (billion EUR)
Source: EC 2017f
While the EU had seen significant progress in optimizing trade with South Korea, Japan 
and ASEAN, growing interactions and reducing trade balances during the last ten years, 
when compared with that of the EU–China trade, the gravity of the bilateral relation is clear.
Table 5.
EU–China, ASEAN, Japan, South Korea trade balance 2007–2016 (billion EUR)
EU Trade balance South Korea Japan ASEAN China
2007 –16.957 –35.517 –27.977 –162.04
2008 –14.245 –34.084 –23.957 –170.801
2009 –10.873 –22.462 –18.173 –132.853
2010 –11.573 –23.318 –23.999 –170.477
2011 –3.797 –21.508 –24.981 –158.64
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EU Trade balance South Korea Japan ASEAN China
2012 –0.199 –9.336 –17.512 –147.895
2013 4.073 –2.604 –15.105 –132.035
2014 4.416 –3.288 –22.496 –137.526
2015 5.422 –3.341 –35.666 –180.283
2016 3.069 –8.475 –36.293 –174.385
Source: EC 2017 c–f
Figure 6.
EU–China, ASEAN, Japan, South Korea trade balance 2007–2016 (billion EUR)
Source: EC 2017 c–f
Table 6.
EU–China, ASEAN, Japan, South Korea trade in goods (total) 2007–2016 (billion EUR)
EU trade in goods (total) with China, ASEAN, Japan, South Korea
Year South Korea Japan ASEAN China
2007 66.395 123.001 134.391 305.686
2008 65.235 118.864 136.655 327.403
2009 54.071 94.418 118.585 297.695
2010 67.495 111.286 147.657 397.385
2011 68.827 119.658 163.333 431.47
2012 75.829 120.662 180.71 436.349
2013 75.747 110.636 178.499 428.265
2014 81.96 109.86 179.662 466.772
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EU trade in goods (total) with China, ASEAN, Japan, South Korea
Year South Korea Japan ASEAN China
2015 90.152 116.407 201.558 520.997
2016 85.939 124.647 207.959 514.551
Source: EC 2017 c–f
Figure 7.
EU–China, ASEAN, Japan, South Korea trade in goods (total) 2007–2016 (billion EUR)
Source: EC 2017 c–f
With tensions over territorial disputes rinsing in an increasingly militarized region, 
the future of the EU’s relevance will surely be tested by its ability to act as a stabilizing actor, 
if it is to contribute to the prosperity of East Asia. Without any hard security assets, however, 
this will only be based on the EU’s normative, “soft power” tools, as an organizational 
example for peaceful regional integration and rules-based-interactions. With internal 
scepticism recurring more and more, the EU’s credibility in East Asia will most probably 
be tested by the aftermath of such changes as Brexit.
But rising tensions can also mean increased regional cooperation, even if only to 
counter the sheer weight of China and avoid it having the leverage of size in strictly bilateral 
interactions. It is not unlikely that a more integrated and a more regionalized East Asia 
will turn to the EU as a “like-minded” partner the same way as the EU described regional 
powers with similar values as “like-minded”. In this way, East Asian regionalism might 
mean greater welcome for the EU’s participation in the region.
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Bilateral and Regional Relations of the EU with Mexico, 
Central America and the Caribbean
Mónika Szente-Varga
“Latin America” is an expression of French origin from the 19th century. It designates coun-
tries on the American continent that belonged to mother states with neo-Latin languages in 
the colonial era; that is, they were either Spanish, Portuguese, or French colonies. Where 
Hungarian terminology considers the Caribbean a part of Latin America, the Anglo–Saxon 
usage tends to separate the West Indies from the mainland and thus employs the term “Latin 
America and the Caribbean” (LAC). The latter will be applied here.
EU–LAC relations are divided into two chapters in this book. One deals with 
the EU–South America nexus, while this chapter focuses on links between the European 
Union and states situated south of the United States and north of Colombia. These cover 
an area of approximately 2.7 million km2 and contain more than 200 million people. In 
everyday speech, especially in Hungary, Mexico is commonly referred to as part of Central 
America. Geographically speaking, however, Mexico is a country in North America. 
It has a population of 123 million people (2016), distributed over a territory of almost 
2 million km.2 Mexico is four times larger than Central America, and its population is 
approximately three times bigger than that of the isthmus.
The concept of Central America is used in this text to refer to six states: Guatemala, 
Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and Panama. The territory of these countries 
used to belong to the Spanish crown during the colonial era; they are situated on the narrow 
strip of land that connects North America with South America (“the Isthmus”). The ex-
pression Caribbean will be used to refer to the islands, excluding the sea. The Caribbean 
thus is the smallest of the areas considered here at less than 240,000 km,2 but it is the most 
densely populated and culturally diverse area.
This essay examines the development and the recent state of relations between 
the EU and Mexico, between the EU and Central America, and the EU–Caribbean nexus. 
It embraces channels of bilateral communication, the most important institutions and 
declarations, details on the financial background of the partnership and the results achieved, 
and challenges.
A Decade of Change: The 1980s
In order to draw the historic context of EC–Latin America links, we should go back to 
the 1980s, when links tended to grow stronger. The reasons included democratic opening 
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and import liberalizations in several Latin American countries as well as the southern 
enlargement of the European Community.
Economic crises, in particular the 1982 general crisis, hit the continent hard and 
had a significant role in bringing down Latin American dictatorships. Civilian presidents 
took the place of military leaders in Bolivia (1982), Argentina (1983), and Brazil (1985). 
The nascent process of democratization helped bring Latin America and Europe closer.
Import substitution (IS) policies dominating the 1950s and 1960s and still in use in 
the ’80s, were proven outdated by the economic and financial hardships. Latin American 
countries were forced to shift to more liberal economic policies. Many opened their markets. 
This meant an opportunity for foreign, including European firms, and provided both a basis 
and a further reason for intensifying European–Latin American ties.
The accession of Spain and Portugal to the EC also weighed heavily in bilateral rela-
tions. These countries, the former colonizing powers in Latin America, brought their foreign 
policy priorities to the Community and lobbied for more attention towards the Americas.
In 1976, the European Community put into effect its first cooperation program with 
the developing countries of Latin America and Asia (known in Spanish Países en Vías de 
Desarrollo en América Latina y Asia, or PVD–ALA) to aid rural development and food 
production. Nonetheless, it was owing to Spanish efforts that in 1989 a specific portion of 
the budget of this program was reserved for Latin America. This would eventually lead 
to an increase in funds specially earmarked for Latin American countries – first 25% of 
the total, and since then, 35%. (Roy–Galinsoga 1997, 110–111.)
Altogether, a more open Europe towards the Americas and a politically and econom-
ically transforming Latin America formed a favourable context for improving bilateral 
relations.
Central America
Central American countries became a focus of European attention in the 1980s. The reasons 
were not related to the general tendencies in Latin America, as the Isthmus formed an 
exception. Thus, it was not democratic transition or trade opportunities that drew European 
attention. On the contrary, it was instability and civil strife that “put the Isthmus on the map” 
for both the European Community and the Socialist Bloc.
In 1979, the Sandinista National Liberation Front1 overthrew the Somoza dictatorship 
in Nicaragua. This did not bring stability and prosperity to the country though. Nicaragua 
was torn by civil war between the Sandinistas (supported by the Socialist world) and 
the Contras, financed by the U.S.
Neighbouring Salvadorians, seeing it was possible for a national liberation movement 
to attain power, formed their own organization, Farabundo Martí,2 in 1980. A violent civil 
war broke out which left more than 70,000 dead, and ended only in 1992.
1 Named after Agusto César Sandino (1895–1934), the “General of Free Men” one of the national heroes of 
Nicaragua.
2 (1893–1932) – a revolutionary and Communist activist from El Salvador.
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Civil strife was destroying Guatemala as well. It witnessed the most protracted 
conflict, a civil war lasting from 1960 to 1996. It resulted in approximately 200,000 dead 
and an additional 45,000 people “disappeared” while some 100,000 were forced to leave 
their homes. More than 80% of the affected were indigenous Mayas. (BBC Mundo 2015) 
The violence and length of the civil war, and especially its ethnic implications, directed 
international attention towards Guatemala in the 1980s.
Thus three of the six countries in Central America were severely affected by civil war. 
Several efforts were launched to restore peace and stability in the area. One important initi-
ative was the Contadora Group formed by Mexico, Venezuela and Panama; it later expanded 
and turned into the Rio Group, an important partner of the European Community. Latin 
American countries took an active role in negotiations in Central America; the European 
Community had its share. The latter can be seen surprising for the Isthmus is considered 
a U.S. strategic interest, therefore European presence might not be welcome. It was in fact 
the San José Dialogue that the first links were formed between the region and the EC. In 
1984 the president of Costa Rica called for a meeting among Central American countries, EC 
member states, plus Spain and Portugal, as well as the Contadora Group. The first summit 
organized in the Costa Rican capital, San José in September 1984, was the beginning of 
the so-called San José Dialogue, launched to advance the peace process on the Isthmus. 
A  second meeting in Luxemburg in 1985 (San José II), already institutionalized political 
dialogue by creating annual ministerial meetings among the Parties.3 This proved to be 
a long-lived forum, as it continued to function even after the end of the Cold War and 
the civil strife in Central America.
“The EC’s Central America policy was predominantly politically inspired and 
economic considerations were minimal.” (Smith 1995, xv.) Yet besides the above-mentioned 
very important political line, we can find the roots of economic cooperation in the 1980s, 
formalized by the Central American Cooperation Framework Agreement in 1986. Its 
objectives included “too broaden and consolidate economic-, trade and development 
cooperation relation” between the EC and the Isthmus, “to help revitalize, restructure and 
strengthen the process of economic integration of the Central American countries” as well as 
“to promote financial assistance and scientific and technical cooperation likely to contribute 
to the development of the Central American Isthmus, particular emphasis being placed on 
rural and social development”. (Cooperation Agreement 1986) The document also stated 
that the Contracting Parties would grant each other, with regard to imported or exported 
goods, most-favoured-nation treatment. No political goals or fields were mentioned. As it 
can be noted, political and economic interests appear in different documents, implying that 
they were treated as separate issues in the decade. Later this approach would be modified.
Mexico
Diplomatic ties between Mexico and the European Economic Community (EEC) go back 
to 1960. This means the nexus is almost as old as the European community. This long 
3 For more on the declarations adopted at the different annual meetings, see Oficina de la Delegación de Comisión 
Europea en Costa Rica 2003: Las Conferencias Ministeriales del Diálogo de San José (1984–2002). San José.
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relationship is not exceptional, as other Latin American countries established official ties 
with the EEC at the beginning of the 1960s. Yet these early contacts hardly affected bilateral 
cooperation. First-generation framework agreements were signed in the 1970s, starting with 
Uruguay in 1973. Mexico signed this kind of agreement in 1975. (Arrieta Munguía 1999, 
16.) The ’80s were rather uneventful in EU–Mexican relations; no new agreement was signed 
in the decade. The EC’s attention was drawn more to Central America. No democratic 
opening took place in Mexico in the 1980s, and there was an electoral fraud in 1988 that 
brought Carlos Salinas to the presidency, yet these were not the real reasons for the lack of 
attention. The EC was more interested in economic opportunities than in Mexican politics; 
it opened a representation in Mexico City in 1989, just after the elections. This elevation 
of bilateral relations was motivated by and connected to the pending North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and European worries related to it.
After the Cold War: The 1990s
The end of the Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Socialist Bloc, and fading 
ideological concerns brought a decrease in U.S. attention towards Latin America and more 
freedom of action for its countries. The example of Spain (peaceful democratic transition, 
economic growth, and accession to the EC) was attractive. In 1991, the Ibero–American 
Community of Nations was founded in Guadalajara, Mexico, with the participation of 
nineteen Latin American states, Spain, and Portugal. “The idea of holding Ibero–American 
Summits was a joint initiative of Spain, Mexico and Brazil in the context of the 5th Centenary 
of the Discovery of America, in order to give a new boost to Ibero–American relations.” 
(Marca España 2015) The intensification of the Spanish–Latin American nexus had 
a positive influence on EU–Latin American relations. Bi-regional links also intensified 
during the decade and reached an important milestone in 1999 with the birth of a strategic 
partnership.
Central America
By the time the Second Central American Cooperation Framework Agreement was signed 
between the EC and the Central American countries in 1993, peace efforts had been 
successful everywhere except Guatemala. In Nicaragua, the Sandinistas handed over 
power to the anti-Sandinista coalition led by Violeta Chamorro after the general elections 
of 1990. In El Salvador, the fighting parties signed the Chapultepec Peace Accords in 1992.4 
The ex-guerrillas formed a political party to represent their demands. The Second Central 
American Cooperation Framework Agreement had a much wider scope than the first one. 
It covered more fields including transport, telecommunications, tourism, environmental 
protection, biological diversity, health, social development, anti-drugs measures, refugees 
and naturally, economic cooperation – with the mining and the energetic sectors being 
4 The Chapultepec Palace in Mexico City used to be the residence of Maximilian of Habsburg, emperor of 
Mexico between 1864 and 1867.
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highlighted. (Acuerdo-marco de cooperación 1993) One of the 39 articles even dealt with 
political issues (Article 27: cooperation on strengthening democratic processes in Central 
America), a step towards having future agreements in which political and economic fields 
are intertwined.5
Mexico
In 1991, Mexico and the EC signed a new framework agreement, which Mexico sup-
plemented by bilateral treaties made with Spain (1990), France (1992), Italy (1994), and 
Germany (1996). The impetus was the coming of the NAFTA. The Mexican Government 
wanted the agreement, yet worried it might result in increased dependency on the U.S.6 
The EC hoped to prevent falling into a disadvantageous position vis-a-vis the North 
American market.
In 1993, just before Mexico joined NAFTA (1 January 1994), Jacques Delors, President 
of the European Commission, made an official visit to Mexico and proposed a special 
relationship with the country the same year. Right after NAFTA came into being, Mexico 
and the EU issued a joint communication expressing their will to strengthen relations. 
The Mexican Government, hit hard by the 1994 peso crisis, was eager to conclude a new 
agreement. Mexican GDP growth turned negative in 1995 (more than 6%), inflation soared, 
and approximately 2 million work places disappeared. The country’s leaders turned to 
the U.S. for a loan. At the same time, they tried to secure support in Europe, both to soften 
the effects of the economic crisis and to speed up the negotiations for a new EU–Mexican 
agreement. (Szente-Varga 2009, 5–6.)
President Ernesto Zedillo travelled to the continent in 1996 and visited Italy (then 
heading the rotating presidency of the Council of the European Union) and two traditional 
partners of Mexico: the United Kingdom and Spain. A document called the Global 
Agreement was signed in 1997. It covered the following areas: political dialogue (Title II), 
trade (Title III), capital movements and payments (Title IV), public procurement, compe-
tition, intellectual property and other trade-related provisions (Title V), and cooperation 
(Title VI). The latter is the most detailed; thirty-one of the sixty articles in the Global 
Agreement are dedicated to ways of cooperation. (European Communities 2000) A joint 
council made up of the members of the Council of the European Union, of the European 
Commission, and of the Mexican Government was set up to supervise the implementation 
of the treaty.
Recent Ties: The 21st Century
Although Latin America was declared a strategic partner of the EU in 1999, another process 
drew the attention of the EU to the east: the transformation of the ex-Socialist countries and 
5 The agreement came into force in 1999.
6 President Salinas was promoting it as a step of the 3rd world Mexico into the exclusive group of 1st world 
countries.
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their possible incorporation. The Eastern Enlargement contributed to a temporary decrease 
of European interest in Latin America, with the possible exception of the Caribbean.
After the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. “neglected” Latin America as well, and this fostered 
trying political alternatives that were not possible during the Cold War. There was a renais-
sance of initiatives from the left in the 21st century. This “pink tide” started in Venezuela in 
1999, when Hugo Chávez rose to power, and continued with Néstor Kirchner in Argentina 
and Lula in Brazil (2003). It continued with the ascension of Michelle Bachelet in Chile 
(2006), Evo Morales in Bolivia (2006), Rafael Correa in Ecuador (2007), and Fernando 
Lugo in Paraguay (2008). These atypical leaders could complicate negotiations with Europe. 
As cooperation efforts failed, the EU turned to a more differentiated approach, seeking to 
strengthen relations with certain countries and regions.
Central America
A Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement was signed between the EU and the six 
Central American states in 2003. Only a few years later, the pink tide reached Central 
America with the emergence of Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua, 2007, Álvaro Colón in 
Guatemala, 2008 and Mauricio Funes in El Salvador, 2009. Whereas the tide has been 
receding in South America recently, it is still vigorous on the Isthmus: in 2017 El Salvador 
was led by the ex-guerillero Salvador Sánchez Cerén, and Nicaragua by Ortega, the former 
Sandinista. The most recent association agreement was thus concluded between the EU 
and the Central American countries at a time (2012) when two of these states were run by 
political organizations born from guerrilla movements.
Since 2014, the EU has differentiated within the region and treated Panama and Costa 
Rica apart from the other Central American countries. They have a more balanced political 
and economic background, a GDP per capita ($22,800 and $16,100 respectively, 2016) two or 
three times more than in the other states, and a higher standard of living that is reflected in 
an elevated life expectancy of 78.6 years. (CIA 2016) Not surprisingly, these two countries 
can no longer apply for EU bi-regional assistance. Yet they can still benefit from regional 
programmes for Latin America and from sub-regional programmes for Central America.
Most countries on the Isthmus have a territory of approximately 100,000 km,2 the most 
important exception being tiny El Salvador, with only 21,000 km.2 Yet the population of 
El Salvador (6.1 million, 2016) is higher than that of Panama (3.7 million, 2016) and Costa 
Rica (4.8 million, 2016). Guatemala is the most populous country in Central America 
(15.2 million, 2016) but it is also the place where the highest proportion of citizens live 
below the poverty line (59.3%, 2014) and is characterized by the worst Gini index (53, 2014). 
Distribution of household income is uneven in all Central American countries, with a strong 
concentration in the upper layers. The highest 10% of the population enjoys at least 30% 
of all household income or consumption, the figure exceeds 38% in Guatemala, Honduras, 
Panama, and Nicaragua.
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The Caribbean
Cooperation goes back to the Lomé agreement signed in 1975 by African, Caribbean, and 
Pacific Group of States (ACP) and the European Economic Community. It was renegotiated, 
modified and renewed three times, the latest being Lomé IV, signed in 1989 for ten years. 
At the turn of the millennium a new framework for cooperation came into being between 
the EU and the ACP: the Cotonou Agreement signed between 79 states and the European 
Union in 2000. It entered into force in 2003. It is characterized as “the most comprehensive 
partnership agreement between developing countries and the EU” by the European 
Commission. According to Article 4, “specific measures and provisions have been made 
to support island ACP States in their efforts to overcome the natural and geographical 
difficulties and the other obstacles hampering their development so as to enable them to 
speed up their respective rates of growth”. (EEAS 2010) This includes all of the Caribbean 
except Cuba, which did not sign the Cotonou Agreement.
The document establishes three pillars: development cooperation, political cooperation, 
and economic and trade cooperation. The agreement was revised in 2005 and 2010. 
The latest changes included new priorities, such as “mainstreaming into all areas of 
cooperation the following thematic or cross-cutting themes: human rights, [gender issues], 
democracy, good governance, environmental sustainability, climate change, communicable 
and non-communicable diseases and [institutional development and capacity building]”.7 
(EEAS 2010, 34.) Many of these, such as climate change, are among the main issues of 
EU–LAC cooperation in general.
The Cotonou Agreement was complemented by the Economic Partnership 
Agreement between the EU and CARIFORUM, a sub-group of ACP. The trade relationship 
is asymmetric between the EU and the Caribbean islands. For the islands, the EU is 
the  second-largest trading partner after the U.S., whereas the Caribbean accounts for only 
0.3% of EU trade (2016). There has been no growth in the volume of trade in the last ten years; 
it totalled 11,337 million Euros in 2006, and 10,576 million Euros in 2016. (EC 2017a, 2–3.)
In 2012, a Joint Caribbean–EU Partnership Strategy was launched. (EEAS 2012) It 
identifies five core themes: regional integration and cooperation in the wider Caribbean; 
climate change and natural disasters; crime and security; joint action in bi-regional and 
multilateral fora and on global issues, and reconstruction and institutional support to Latin 
America’s poorest and least-developed country, Haiti, hit by a catastrophic earthquake in 
2010.8
Haiti’s neighbouring island, Cuba, has been a huge gap in the EU–Caribbean 
relations. A change is about to happen, as a Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement 
provisionally applies from 1 November 2017. This is the first-ever agreement between 
Cuba and the EU. (EEAS 2017) The European motivation is the coming end of 86-year-old 
Raúl Castro’s leadership and with it a change in the Cuban political and economic system 
that could benefit the EU. The Cuban goals include the diversification of contacts and 
the lessening of U.S. influence.
7 The old priorities are in brackets, the newly included ones appear without brackets.
8 Life expectancy in Haiti was 64.2 years, and the GDP/capita reached only 1,800 USD in 2016. Social differences 
are huge; the latest available Gini index is 60.8 (2012). Source: CIA 2017.
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Mexico
The Global Agreement signed in 1997 came into force in 2000.9 That year the Free Trade 
Agreement between the two parties was signed, and the Institutional Revolutionary Party 
(PRI) lost a presidential election after ruling Mexico for more than 70 years. The optimism 
dwindled with the years, however, as the country fell short of a system change. The dis-
enchantment of large segments of population made radical political alternatives more 
attractive, and the candidate of the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) had a real 
chance to win the presidency in the 2006 elections. According to the official results, he lost 
by 0.5%; many Mexicans are still convinced there was an electoral fraud. Felipe Calderón 
became president with questionable legitimacy that he tried to mend by introducing a new 
drug policy. The solutions offered, however, did not match the complexity of the problem, 
and instead of reducing the drug trade and making cartels disappear, they contributed 
to the spread of violence. By 2011, 69.5% of Mexicans said that they did not find their 
environment safe. (INEGI 2013) In these circumstances, European attention and aid were 
most welcome.
Mexico became a strategic partner of the EU in 2008. The core argument, expressed 
in Towards an EU–Mexico Strategic Partnership is that:
“Mexico truly forms a cultural, political and physical ‘bridge’ between North America 
and Latin America and, to a certain extent, between industrialized countries and emerging 
ones. Mexico’s ‘bridging’ position is one of its main assets in the context of a progressive 
multilateral and multicultural international community.” (EC 2008)
In 2016, negotiations began to update the Global Agreement signed in 1997. The last round 
took place in April 2017. The EU emphasized positive developments: the growth of the EU 
(thirteen new states since 1997), the launching of the Euro, and Mexico becoming “one of 
the world’s most dynamic emerging economies”. (EC 2017b)10 The Mexican weekly Proceso, 
on the other hand, has been rather critical.
“Mexican trade and economy continue to depend excessively on the United States. 
The agreement with Europe – a region which was overtaken by China as the  second 
most important trade partner of Mexico – did not change this strong dependency simply 
because it was not able to diversify our commercial exchanges with that prosperous part of 
the world […] It did not generate the promised places of work and socioeconomic impacts, 
either.” (Appel 2017)
The Mexican Government would like to finish the negotiations for the new agreement soon, 
because the six-year term of President Enrique Peña Nieto ends in 2018. The plan is to finish 
the work on the political and cooperation part by the end of 2017, with the commercial 
portion to be completed by the end of 2018. The victory of Donald Trump in the U.S. 
9 For more on EU–Mexican relations at the turn of the milenium, see Pólyi 2003.
10 This statement seems to be overoptimistic, as GDP growth rate in Mexico averaged 0.61% between 1993 and 
2017. (Trading Economics 2017)
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presidential election, however, puts extra pressure on Mexican negotiators, since he has 
threatened to renegotiate NAFTA or withdraw from it. A stable and effective relationship 
with the EU is crucial now for Mexico. Yet the journalist of Proceso is pessimistic, in his 
vision Europe is more like the unscrupulous old colonizer under a modern disguise: “Mexico 
is in serious trouble and Europe can take advantage of this.” (Appel 2017)
Channels of Communication, Institutionalized Relations
The institutionalized relations between the EU and Mexico, Central America, the Caribbean 
as well as South America (for the latter see the EU–South America chapter of this book) 
form a part of the framework of EU–Latin American connections. One top-level channel 
of dialogue is the bi-regional Summit of Heads of State and Government of the European 
Union and Latin America and the Caribbean (EU–LAC), the first of which took place in 
Rio de Janeiro in 1999. Similar events have been organized every two years since 2002: in 
Madrid (2002), in Guadalajara, Mexico (2004), in Vienna (2006), and in Lima, Peru (2010). 
Important forums and instruments, such as the European–Latin American Parliamentary 
Assembly and the EU–LAC Foundation, were set up on these occasions.
The European–Latin American Parliamentary Assembly (EuroLat) was established 
at the summit in Vienna to support preparatory work for future summits. The assembly 
consists of 150 members: 75 from Europe and 75 from Latin America and the Caribbean. 
EuroLat consists of a plenary session, an executive bureau, standing committees, working 
groups, and a secretariat. The assembly is headed by two co-presidents, one European and 
one Latin American. The four standing committees are: “(1) Political Affairs, Security and 
Human Rights; (2) Economic, Financial and Commercial Affairs; (3) Social Affairs, Youth 
and Children, Human Exchanges, Education and Culture, and (4) Sustainable Development, 
the Environment, Energy Policy, Research, Innovation and Technology.” (EuroLat 2014)
The EU–LAC Foundation was set up at the summit held in Madrid. The organization 
has its headquarters in Hamburg and started working in 2011. It has more than sixty member 
countries: approximately half of them from Latin America and the Caribbean, and the rest 
from Europe. The EU is also a member.
The 2013 EU–LAC summit in Santiago de Chile ran at the same time as the first 
EU–CELAC Summit. “The Community of Latin American and Caribbean States embraces 
the legacy of the Rio Group and the Summit of Latin America and the Caribbean on 
Integration and Development (CALC)” (Declaration 2010) and includes all states from 
the regions. It was founded at the so-called Mayan Riviera in 2010, on the bicentennial 
of Latin American independence and centennial of the Mexican Revolution, by the Latin 
American and Caribbean Unity Summit. It began work in Caracas in 2011. Since 2013, there 
have been EU–CELAC summits every two years. After the first one in Santiago, summits 
were held in Brussels (2015) and in San Salvador (2017). The meetings of foreign ministers, 
which used to take place every odd year in the framework of EU–Rio Group summits, have 
been transformed into EU–CELAC ministerial meetings scheduled for even years. The first 
was organized in Santo Domingo in 2016.
There are specific channels for dialogue and action, both for Mexico and for Central 
America. There are specialized councils working under the Council of the European 
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Union: the EU–Mexico Joint Council, and the EU–Central America Association Council. 
The EU maintains a delegation in Mexico and, with the exception of Panama, in all Central 
American countries. Latin American countries make their EU connections via their 
embassies in Belgium.
Documents on Bilateral Relations
At the end of the 1990s, EU–Latin American relations reached a landmark with the decla-
ration of strategic partnership:
“We, the Heads of State and Government of the European Union, Latin America and 
the Caribbean, have decided to promote and develop our relations towards a strategic 
biregional partnership, based upon the profound cultural heritage that unites us, and 
on the wealth and diversity of our respective cultural expressions. These have endowed 
us with strong multi-faceted identities, as well as the will to create an international 
environment which allows us to raise the level of the well-being of our societies and 
meet the principle of sustainable development, seizing the opportunities offered by an 
increasingly globalised world, in a spirit of equality, respect, alliance and co-operation 
between our regions.” – begins the Rio Declaration, made at the first Summit among 
EU–Latin America–Caribbean leaders in Rio de Janeiro in 1999. (Summit 1999)
55 priorities of action were identified, pertaining to a) political, b) economic and /or 
c) cultural, educational, scientific, technological, social and human fields. This is probably 
too many, which contributed to the lack of success of the agreement, yet it is still the basis 
of bilateral connections.11
Just after the biggest enlargement of the EU in 2004, when 10 new countries joined, 
and Latin Americans felt neglected; the European Commission subsequently issued 
a communication in 2005, entitled A Stronger Partnership between the European Union and 
Latin America, in which it denied paying less attention to the region. It attributed the lack 
of progress in bilateral matters to insufficient mutual efforts:
The Commission wishes to send a positive signal indicating that Europe is interested 
in the region. There would appear to be an erroneous perception that the EU is too 
absorbed by its own enlargement, its immediate neighbours or problems elsewhere in 
the world. This perception also raises the issue of the visibility of the EU on the ground, 
given the complexity of its structures and its means of action. The Commission wishes to 
reaffirm that the association with Latin America is not merely a matter of fact but is also 
vital for the interests of both regions, for both the present and the future. However, if Europe 
is ready to commit itself further to Latin America, it also expects a firm commitment in 
return. (EC 2005, 5.)
Ten years after the Rio Declaration, the European Commission released EU–Latin 
America: Global Players in Partnership. Ten Years of Strategic Partnership EU–Latin 
America, which offers an analysis of the development of bi-regional relations. It states that 
11 For more on strategic relations, see Szilágyi 2008 and 2014.
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the basic goals of the partnership (strengthening of political dialogue, regional cooperation 
and social cohesion) have not changed, but the way to reach them needs to be adjusted to 
the (new) global context. The document ends with the main policy priorities of the part-
nership, defined in the following 10 points: “promoting regional integration”, “promoting 
social cohesion”, “reinforcing human rights and democracy building”, “EU election 
observation missions”, “drugs”, “migration”, “climate change and energy”, “research and 
development”, “trade and investment” and “intervention under the instrument for security”. 
(EC 2009, 2, 8–14.)
In 2016 the document Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global 
Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy divided the world into 
five basic regions: EU neighbouring countries, MENA, Africa, the Atlantic, and Asia. 
(Molnár 2016, 78–79.) Latin America appears as part of the wider Atlantic space. It is 
mentioned twice in the 57-page text, in one paragraph. The key issues include “cooperation 
on migration, maritime security and ocean life protection, climate change and energy, 
disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control, and countering organised crime and 
terrorism”. (EEAS 2016, 37.) Due to the transnational character of these challenges, and 
the interest of the EU to cooperate with regional organizations and promote Latin American 
regional integration, as well as possibly due to a lessening of European interest, only two 
Latin American countries are mentioned in particular: Cuba and Colombia. (EEAS 2016) 
No strategic partner countries, such as Mexico, appear in the document. Latin America, 
which has been a strategic partner since 1999, somehow is relegated to the periphery of 
Europe’s vision.
Financial Background
“EU development cooperation instruments [DCI] have been – alongside political en-
gagement, trade and investment, and sectoral dialogues – a crucial building block of [the] 
relationship over the years. During the period 2002–2013, the EU has committed over 
€4 billion for programmable development cooperation in Latin America.” (EEAS 2014) 
“For the period 2014–20, €2.5 billion are allocated to Latin America,” (EC 2015, 8) which 
is 12.8% of the total DCI (€19.6 billion).
Some €925 million were set aside for the 2014–2020 regional programme, about 
60% more than in the 2007–2013 period. (EC 2017c) The regional programme consists of 
two components: the continental program, and the sub-regional programme for Central 
America. Almost 90% of the money is destined to cover the continental programme. This 
covers eighteen Latin American countries,12 an area of approximately 19 million km2 with 
more than 600 million inhabitants. The continental programme focuses on the following 
major areas, which are listed in order of funding allocated, from largest to smallest: 
1. environmental sustainability and climate change (37% of overall allocation, €300 million); 
2. inclusive and sustainable growth for human development (27%, €215 million); 3. higher 
12 The Caribbean is not included with the exception of Cuba. Countries eligible: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, 
Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela and 
the states on the Central American isthmus excluding Belize.
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education (20%, €163 million); 4. security–development nexus (7%, €70 million); and 
5. good governance, accountability, and social equity (5%, €42 million).
The Central American sub-regional programme has three foci with approximately 
the same allocations, each amounting to about €40 million: 1. regional economic integration; 
2. security and rule of law, and 3. climate change and disaster management. (EC 2017c) 
The sub-region consists of Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and 
Panama (c. 0.5 million km,2 45 million people). Central American countries actually can 
participate in both programmes (continental and sub-regional).
The priorities are similar in the continental and the sub-regional programme, with 
one notable difference. The most important declared aim of the EU in Central America 
is to foster the integration of the region. Regional economic integration is, therefore, atop 
the sub-regional list, while it does not figure in the continental objectives. The reasons 
for this could be intriguing. Is it because it does not suit European goals, and/or because 
it is against U.S. interests? Or simply because the EU does not find it feasible to integrate 
the subcontinent, so it is a project that is doomed to failure?
The economic integration of a relatively small part, Central America, might seem 
much easier, but it is far from simple. The territory in question never formed one unit, either 
in pre-Hispanic or in colonial times. There was the United Provinces of Central America 
between 1823 and 1840, but it was short-lived and Panama, which belonged to Colombia 
until 1903, was not included. The Isthmus also did not fight the Spanish crown to become 
independent, but achieved it as part of a more general process. Central American identity 
therefore, has been weak.
Integration efforts started with the Organization of Central American States, founded 
in 1951, and renewed in 1962. The Central American Common Market (CACM) was 
established in 1960 by the Treaty of Managua, signed by Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, 
and Nicaragua. Later Costa Rica joined, but Panama remained absent. The goals included 
the formation of a free trade area and infrastructure development. The civil wars that 
shook the Isthmus in the 1980s (Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Guatemala) made the effective 
functioning of the organization impossible.
The Tegucigalpa Protocol of 1991 reformed the existing structures and established 
the Central American Integration System (SICA), which started to function in 1993. All 
six Central American countries are founding members of this multi-function regional 
organization, whose activities cover economic, social, cultural, political, and ecological 
fields. EU–SICA political meetings occur regularly.
More than €775 million were allocated for EU–Central America bilateral cooperation 
in the period 2014–2020. (EC 2017c) Of that, €149 million (c. 30%) was destined for 
Honduras, characterized by extreme violence; €204 million (26%) for Nicaragua, the poorest 
country in Central America; €186.6 million (24%) for Guatemala, the most populous state; 
and €149 million (20%) for El Salvador, the most densely populated country on the Isthmus. 
Costa Rica and Panama have not been eligible for bilateral cooperation funds since 2014.
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Challenges
Recently adopted bilateral projects reveal the priorities of the relationship. These include: 
the EU–LAC Structured and Comprehensive Dialogue on Migration, launched in 2009; 
the EU–CELAC Project on Migration (2010–2015); the EU–Mexico security dialogue 
established within the framework of the EU–Mexico Joint Executive Plan (JEP) and 
launched in 2010; the Cooperation Programme on Drugs Policies (COPOLAD I, 2010–2015, 
and COPOLAD II, 2016–2019); Euroclima (2010–2017) and the Euroclima+ programme 
(2017–). The main issues are therefore migration, security, drugs and climate change.
There are many challenges ahead for Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean 
in relations with the European Union. Euroscepticism is growing, and the U.K. is leaving 
the EU. It is likely the EU will be busy negotiating Brexit and restructuring. Latin America, 
in general, is also in trouble. The region is a periphery, a supplier of raw materials in 
the world market, and therefore dependent on the demand for these goods. If demand slows, 
a lack of funds would put social programmes at risk and increase poverty.
Mexico and Central America are likely to need foreign support. It has often been 
said that the EU and Latin American countries are natural partners based on history and 
culture. If help is not coming from Europe though, the region, particularly those countries 
with ports on the Pacific Ocean, will turn to an old/new partner already on the doorstep: 
China. (Lehoczki 2008)
China entertains strong political interests in the region, as various countries (Guatemala, 
El Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua) still recognize and maintain diplomatic relations with 
Taiwan. By increasing its economic presence as a trade partner and investor, the Chinese 
leadership would like to push the above-mentioned countries to change. Export to China 
from Central America and Mexico is insignificant and did not exceed 2% of the respective 
national exports in 2016. Chinese imports on the other hand are considerable: 9% in case of 
El Salvador and Honduras, 11% in Guatemala, 14% in Costa Rica and Nicaragua, and 32% 
in Panama. (OEC 2016) In fact, the two most developed states on the Isthmus have already 
switched sides: Costa Rica in 2007 and Panama in 2017. Due to its political interests, China 
is likely to play an active and pro-active role in Central America whereas the EU is more 
likely to re-act to developments instead of setting trends.
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The European Union and South America
István Szilágyi
This essay focuses on the relationship between the European Union and South America, 
a region of more than 400 million inhabitants, stretching out to 17.8 million km2 which used 
to be colonized by European powers, principally the Spanish and the Portuguese Crown. 
Therefore, this chapter together with the one on EU–Mexico and EU–Central America 
relations, forms a part of the investigations on the systems of relations connecting the EU 
and Latin America.
First the historical background of the nexus outlined in the essay, and then the foun-
dation and the development of the bilateral EU–Latin America strategic partnership is 
analysed, with a special emphasis on its institutionalization. The last chapter of the essay 
focuses on a very special inter-regional actor: the Ibero–American Community of Nations. 
The main sources of the investigation are declarations and other communications of 
the European Union, complemented with academic texts elaborated by Hungarian and 
Latin American scholars.
Historical Background: The International System and Globalisation
The European Union (EU), as a sui generis political system, is a multi-faceted entity. It is 
a macro-region linking several regions, areas, systems, and countries to the notion that is 
Europe, within which there are significant political, economic, social, cultural, linguistic, 
and foreign policy tradition differences manifesting themselves in various priorities. It is 
inter-governmentality that fundamentally characterises the Union’s foreign and security 
policy, its ties to other parts of the world, as well as its activities to resolve international 
conflicts. The creation of the President of the European Council and “Foreign Ministerial” 
post, and in the long term the careful shift towards a federal system, among other things, 
the difficulties concerning the rapid reaction force, the experiences gained by Javier Solana 
as High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy, and the practice of holding 
summits for heads of state and prime ministers call attention to demonstrate the need for 
a common foreign policy.
The formation of this foreign policy system is highly influenced by the Eastern 
enlargement of integration, (Szilágyi 2004, 7–22; Szilágyi 2007a) the Barcelona Process 
launched in November 1995, (A Barcelona-folyamat 2001; Szilágyi 2008a; Szilágyi 2012, 
3–21.) and by the European Neighbourhood Policy introduced in 2003. (Communication 
from the Commission 2007) Links between the EU’s Mediterranean countries and the so-
called Third World date back half a millennium; however, when examining the relationship 
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of the European Union with Latin America and the Caribbean (América Latina y el 
Caribe – ALC), we must consider the changes that occurred after the end of the bipolar 
world (c. 1991); the emergence of a multi-player, global political system have also brought 
significant changes.
In the final third of the 20th century the termination of organised East–West conflicts 
combined with the significant shift of focus in international relations resulted in the fact that 
the foreign policies, political actions and scopes of movement for states, intergovernmental 
organisations and regional integrations are now increasingly dominated by non-traditional 
forms and means of international relations.
Within the extended framework of a “transnational foreign policy”, the role of “civi-
lisations” is enhanced, and the network of relations, virtual or real, between regional and 
subregional entities is extended. The importance of non-national, non-governmental, social 
actors, institutions, organizations and movements in the field of foreign policy is growing.
Globalization and the influence of civilisations on foreign policy is not new. Joaquím 
Aguiar, in line with Immanuel Wallerstein’s concept, links the first wave of globalization 
to the great European expansion of the 16th–17th centuries. (Aguiar 2000; Wallerstein 
1983) The trade of various products transcended national and European borders early on 
in this world system; internationalisation and global contact as a process linked regions 
with the sphere of cultures and civilisations. The  second wave of globalization, covering 
the  second half of the 19th century and the first half of the 20th witnessed the circulation 
of capital and the emergence of American hegemony. “The present type of globalisation”, 
according to Aguiar, “leading up to the 21st century from the 20th nevertheless manifests 
itself as a higher-level synthesis of the previous two: as a network of eternal changes and 
movements, a never-ending and uninterrupted cycle of products and capitals”. (Aguiar 
2000, 60.)
In this era of post national globalisation, post national politics and foreign policy, 
the territorial fundaments of power are largely replaced by a web of processes, networks, 
currents, as well as control over cyberspace. In spite of global movements of a transnational 
nature, collective existence in the 21st century has a number of divergent modes and forms. 
Geographical factors, borders symbolising territoriality and the classic nation-state, ethnic 
and cultural and civilizational differences behind integration and disintegration tendencies, 
strategic cooperations representing the new regionalism of continental-integrational 
cooperations are all present at the same time in the network of international relations, and 
all are tightly linked to one another.
The European Union and Latin America: The Foundations of a Strategic 
Partnership
Relations between the European Union, in its various forms, and Latin America with 
the Caribbean have become quite intensive over the last quarter of the century. Dialogue 
between the Parlatino, the Latin American Parliament, and the European Assembly 
(functioning as the European Parliament from 1986) started as early as the 1960s. In 
the 1980s, the European Parliament initiated formal cooperation with the South American 
continent. (Szilágyi 2014, 317–331.) After Spain and Portugal’s accession to the European 
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Communities, European attention to Latin America grew. There was an attempt to create 
a special joint status with the Latin American region, a tightening of economic, political, 
and cultural links, primarily negotiated via Spanish mediation.
From the moment of the European Economic Community’s (EEC) birth in 1957, it 
established contact with economic formations that included Latin America; the signing of 
the so-called first-generation trade pacts took place in the ’60s. This led to the acceptance 
by the EEC of the Lomé I and Lomé II treaties (1975 and 1979, respectively) that regulated 
the economic cooperation of African, Latin American, and Asian countries with Europe. 
A part of the  second-generation agreements in the ’80s was linked to the Lomé III (1984) 
and Lomé IV (1984) treaties (see the chapter on EU–Africa relations). Another part is 
specifically tied to Latin America and its integration organizations (the Andean Community, 
Mercosur). (Racs 2015) The third generation of treaties was signed in the ’90s, after the era 
of the bipolar world. The decisive steps towards a strategic alliance and a new type of 
regionalism in the form of partnership agreements and bilateral contracts dates to the 1999 
Rio de Janeiro summit of the respective head of state and government. (Szilágyi 2008c, 
5–34.) This meeting and subsequent talks, conducted at the highest level of states, as well 
as experts discussed the challenges of a changing international system.
The turn of the millennium did not mark the end of major geopolitical shifts in 
Europe. From the  second half of the ’90s the European Union struggled with widening and 
deepening; it launched a series of institutional reforms pointing towards federalism. After 
the failure of the European Constitutional Treaty though, these impulses were channelled 
into defining foreign policy priorities and a circle of allies, widening the scope of movement, 
and strengthening its strategic positions. Counter-impulses presented themselves via Brexit 
and the renewed national narratives in a number of member states.
Between 1999 and 2017, Latin America underwent political and economic changes on 
a historic scale. (Szilágyi 2010, 139–165.) The 1980s and ’90s saw the toppling of dictatorial 
régimes in the “exceptional states” formed by military coups in the ’60s and ’70s. The birth 
of new democratic systems coincided with the growth of existing continental integrations 
(the Andean Community, CA) and the creation of new ones, e.g. Mercosur – 1991, Unión 
de Naciones Suramericanas – 2007. (Lehoczki 2007, 97–114; Lehoczki 2010b, 249–264; 
Racs 2010; Soltész 2011, 124–143.) The organization of the Ibero–American Community 
of Nations (Comunidad Iberoamericana de Nacioneás – CIN, 1991) linked the region to 
Spain and Portugal. (Szilágyi 2006a, 155–167; Szilágyi 2008b, 141–153.) Latin America 
increasingly sought to define an inter-regional and integrational model that would expand 
its field of play and terminate centuries-old dependencies. One manifestation of this is 
the creation of the above mentioned CIN.
At the beginning of the 21st century a couple of possible scenarios seem to present 
themselves from a Latin American perspective. Next to the option of closer contact with 
the USA, a strong influence in the thinking of the southern hemisphere is continental 
cooperation. The idea of a strategic alliance and partnership between the EU and Latin 
America has been developing since the mid-1990s; it had become the dominant integration 
paradigm for both parties by the 2000s. This has common historical, linguistic, value-based, 
political, and civilizational roots, as stressed in the introductory lines of the European 
Commission document dated spring 2008 and entitled The strategic partnership between 
the European Union, Latin America and the Caribbean: a joint commitment: “The European 
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Union (EU), and Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) are natural allies linked by strong 
historical, cultural and economic ties, as well as by their ever increasing convergence of 
basic values and principles. They share a common commitment to human rights, democracy, 
good governance, multilateralism and social cohesion, and they cooperate to achieve these 
objectives. This makes them well-matched partners to address global challenges together.” 
(The Strategic Partnership 2008) The document declares the validity of the European 
Commission’s 2005 analysis of the strengthening of the EU–LAC partnership. (A Stronger 
Partnership 2006) According to the European Commission’s 2005 analysis, strategic 
partnership between the EU and Latin America comprises eight elements: political dialogue; 
economic and commercial ties promoting regional integration; a stable framework to help 
Latin American countries attract more European investment; effective sectoral dialogues 
(e.g. on social cohesion or the environment) with a view to the sustainable reduction of 
inequalities and promoting sustainable development; mitigating inequality and tailoring 
development targets to suit the needs of Latin America; strengthening the democratic 
government; increasing understanding through education; and supporting Latin American 
countries, and maintaining commitment to support Latin American countries in their fight 
against drug trafficking and corruption. (A Stronger Partnership 2006)
To promote cooperation, the EU launched The Development Cooperation Instrument 
(DCI) for the 2007–2013 programming period. It comprises five geographic areas (Latin 
America, Asia, Central Asia, the Middle East, and South Africa) and five thematic 
programs: investment in human resources; the sustainable management of natural resources 
and energy; support for non-governmental actors and local authorities; food safety; and 
migration and asylum. The European Community allocated €2.7 million to Latin America, 
and €760,000 to the Caribbean. The program priorities are in line with the UN’s Millenium 
Development Goals passed in 2000. (Barbé 2013, 312.)
Commercial relations between the EU and Latin America have widened in scope 
over the past two decades. Trade has increased by an average annual rate of 15%, but to an 
uneven rhythm and faster than economic capacity. According to IMF data, Latin American 
countries and integration organizations together were the  second-largest trading partner of 
the European Union in 2006. EU imports from Latin America reached €70 billion, while 
exports amounted to €66 billion. (The Strategic Partnership 2008) A quarter of the EU 
area’s agrarian imports come from Latin America, but more than half of Latin American 
imports consists of high added-value and technical goods. (Martín Arribas 2006, 243–248; 
Freres–Sanahuja 2006, 25–26.) The EU also became the largest investor in the region. 
Spain, which traditionally maintains strong ties with Latin America, played a major role. 
(Racs 2009, 76–84.) By the end of the 1990s, it was democratic Spain that provided 52% 
of operating foreign investment, with several major Spanish companies from Spain (e.g. 
Telefónica, YBERDROLA, Repsol YFP, Banco Santander, Banco Bilbao Vizcaya, Banco 
Central Hispano, Banco Popular Español, Iberia Airlines, Sol Melia, Tryp Hotels, Compania 
Valencia de Cementos, etc.) gaining a leading role in the crucial sectors of the continent’s 
countries – such as banking, hospitality and tourism, energy, and telecommunication. 
(Szilágyi 2005, 255–289; Szilágyi 2006b, 210–243; Szilágyi 2015c) Still, the scale of 
the exchange does not reflect a magnitude expected of strategic allies. “If Latin America 
were one country, the EU would be its sixth-biggest commercial partner, although Latin 
America has a mere 5.2% of the foreign trade aggregate of the EU.
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Despite Latin American criticism of European protectionism, the fact remains 
that a quarter of the Community’s agrarian import still comes from Latin America.” 
(Freres–Sanahuja 2006, 25–26.) Examining the same issue from the other side we may 
state the following: “If the EU were considered a single country […] then it would be 
the  second-biggest commercial partner to Latin America, holding  second place with respect 
to immediate capital investments and first place with respect to providing financial aid.” 
(Freres–Sanahuja 2006, 25; The EU–Latin American Strategic Partnership 2017)
The relations of the European Union and Latin America are characterised by economic 
asymmetry and imbalance. In 2003, Latin America’s share in the world exports was 5%, in 
imports, 4.7%. The EU accounted for 38.7% of the world’s imports and exports. (Martín 
Arribas 2006, 240.) The EU, comprising 400m inhabitants (calculated with the effect of 
Brexit), produces 21.4% of the world’s aggregate GDP. The GDP for Latin America, with 
530m inhabitants, accounts for 7.5%. The two regions, considered strategic partners, thus 
share one-third of the world’s GDP in total between them. Latin America is rich in human 
resources and raw materials, and it represents a significant market for the Union. The EU is 
a key partner in the economic, industrial and technological development of Latin America. 
Cooperation between the two, despite the current asymmetry, may create a more balanced 
state of international relations. This gives this integration considerable weight, provided 
cooperation is effective. (EuroLat 2007, 4.)
The EU and Latin America are not merely strategic allies; considering commercial 
ties, they are also each other’s competitors. Each party strives to hold a positive balance and 
quite naturally enhance its own competitivity. For the discussion of the economic relations 
of the two regions from this perspective, four notions have been introduced. Using phrases 
from literature, for certain sectors the falling star (estrella menguante) name is used, while 
for others, the emerging star (estrella nasciente) designation. They write of the sectors of 
lost opportunities (oportunidades perdidas) and those of regressive (retroceso) industries. 
In summary it may be said that most of the economies of Latin America are behind in 
the race with the European Union.
The EU is one of the main actors of economic life on the global stage, while Latin 
America and the Caribbean have an insignificant role. From a Latin American perspective, 
trade with Europe is of great importance. Although the number-one trade partner for Latin 
America is the United States, the products and goods from Chile, Mercosur, and the Andean 
Community mainly go to the EU. Europe is losing its hold on Latin American markets, 
however, because its products do not belong to the most dynamic types of goods preferred 
in international trade. The United States is the winner in this “area”. (Martín Arribas 
2006, 26; The EU–Latin American Strategic Partnership 2017)
Scholars contend that to reverse these tendencies, established practices should be 
extended. The number of bilateral preferential treaties and customs preferments should 
be increased; efforts must be made to create frameworks for quality cooperation and 
partnership agreements. The EU should pay more attention to the strategic alliance; 
cooperation rests on the five pillars of solidarity, autonomy, interests, shared values, and 
partnership. (Freres–Sanahuja 2006, 32; The EU–Latin American Strategic Partnership 
2017) In addition, five criteria must be fulfilled. The EU must contribute to the strength-
ening of Latin America’s social cohesion. It must promote the international autonomy of 
the southern hemisphere. It must give a stronger character to its foreign policy activities 
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with Latin America, including crisis prevention mechanisms and solidarity acts. The two 
regions must act in coordination to promote the formation of the multilateral international 
system and global governance.
According to the Euro–Latin American Parliamentary Assembly (EuroLat), the po-
litical and security relations between the regions must also be deepened. The assembly has 
stated the importance of transcending ad hoc actions of common support, and therefore 
created the Euro–Latin American Global Interregional Partnership Area (ELAGIPA). It also 
called for a Euro–Latin American Permanent Secretariat to manage administrative tasks. 
(EuroLat 2007, 6.) EuroLat decided, therefore, to create offices that would address concrete 
tasks and provide advice, including a bi-regional social foundation. The assembly stressed 
that “partnership agreements contain three major elements: the political and institutional 
chapter serves to strengthen democratic dialogue; the goal of the cooperation chapter is 
the promotion of sustainable economic and social development; the economic chapter 
comprises programmes to terminate asymmetric relations between the regions and boost 
the economy.” (EuroLat 2007, 13.)
This document passed by the EuroLat Parliamentary Assembly projects an image of 
the future of historical dimensions, based on the achievements of the past, in the process of 
strategic partnership between the Eu and the Latin American continent.
Strategic Partnership on the Road of Institutionalisation: The Summits
The first European Union–Latin America Summit was held in Rio de Janeiro in June 1999, 
with forty-eight heads of state and prime ministers. (Martín Arribas 2006, 331–332.) 
The Declaration issued stresses in its Preamble: “We, the Heads of State and Government 
of the European Union, Latin America and the Caribbean, at the Summit held in the city of 
Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, on the 28th and 29th of June 1999, have decided to promote and develop 
our relations towards a strategic biregional partnership, based upon the profound cultural 
heritage that unites us, and on the wealth and diversity of our respective cultural expressions. 
These have endowed us with strong multi-faceted identities, as well as the will to create an 
international environment which allows us to raise the level of the well-being of our societies 
and meet the principle of sustainable development, seizing the opportunities offered by an 
increasingly globalised world, in a spirit of equality, respect, alliance and co-operation 
between our regions.” (Declaration of Rio de Janeiro 1999) “This historic Summit was 
convened as a result of the political will to enhance the already excellent biregional 
relations based upon shared values inherited from a common history. The objective was to 
strengthen the links between the two regions to develop a strategic partnership.” (Martín 
Arribas 2006, 314.) The resulting declaration charts a 25-year program with fifty-five 
priorities across all fields and fifty-five short-term action programmes designed to provide 
common political and cultural foundations in politics, society, the economy, culture and 
science. The most important of the latter is a free trade agreement between the two regions 
in accordance with the demands of the World Trade Organization, followed by the signing 
of bi- and multi-lateral agreements. The hardest part, from the Union’s side is the practical 
implementation of the passage granting free entry to the EU market for crops and farm 
stock produced by Latin American farmers.
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The action programme regulates the financing of joint investments through 
the European Investment Bank, and the introduction of the Euro in mutual relations.
The long-term goals of the partnership included the consolidation of institutional 
dialogue between the EU and Latin America, as well as securing democracy and fundamental 
human rights. It seeks to promote a system of multilateral economic ties, the effective 
management of economic relations based on open regionalism, and to combat destabilising 
financial movements. In the cultural, scientific, social and human sectors it advocates 
the preservation and enlivening of the huge body of shared knowledge based on common cul-
tural heritage and grounded in history, the promotion of education for all, and the protection 
and preservation of cultural diversity. The long-term programs  include@Lis, a so-called 
horizontal program for the creation of an information-based society, ALFA and Erasmus 
Mundus for higher education, and URB-AL for the development of local communities and 
cities, AL-Invest for trade and investments, and ECIP for joint financing. A complement to 
these is the Alßan postgraduate and doctoral studies project accepted at the 2002 Madrid 
Summit.
That  second meeting in Madrid focused on cultural cooperation, but the agenda also 
included the creation of the mechanisms for concrete economic cooperation and financial 
support. The four countries of the Andean Pact (Bolivia, Ecuador, Columbia and Peru) and 
the states of the Central American region were dissatisfied with the economic results of 
the summit though. The EU was not in the position to sign multiple partnership agreements 
because it was in the midst of its so-called Eastern Enlargement. One of the exceptions 
was Chile, which signed an agreement on 18 May 2002. The other was Mexico, which had 
concluded related talks as early as 2000. (Martín Arribas 2006, 332–337; Szente-Varga 
2009, 1–14; Szente-Varga 2011, 251–269.)
The Madrid Commitment of 17 May 2002 adopted the formal solutions of the Rio de 
Janeiro Declaration; however, the number of priorities shrank to thirty-three. It also set in 
motion talks on prospective economic partnerships of the EU with African, Pacific, and 
Caribbean states within the framework of the Cotonou Agreement of September 2002. 
The remaining points largely reiterated the Millennial Goals. (Martín Arribas 2006, 
337–363.)
The third summit which took place during May 2004 in Guadalajara with the partic-
ipation of thirty-three countries of Latin America and the Caribbean on the one hand, and 
the twenty-five-member European Union on the other, marked a further retreat. The aim 
was still a partnership agreement incorporating free trade pacts. The task, however, was 
delegated to the new European Parliament and European Commission of July 2004. Talks 
between the EU and the sub-regional economic integration organizations of Latin America, 
moreover, came to an end.
The Declaration of the Guadalajara Summit consists of 104 points and includes 
several novel elements. It advocates the creation of a multilateral international system and 
the practice of the social cohesion principle in the relations of the two regions – as compatible 
with the Millennial Goals. It highlights the importance of coordinated developments based on 
the cooperation of the European Investment Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, 
the Caribbean Development Bank, the Andean Development Corporation, and the Central 
American Economic Integration Bank. Beyond that, however, it merely repeated the phrases 
and intent of the previous summit declarations. (Declaration of Guadalajara 2004)
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The fourth summit, held in Vienna in May 2006, issued a declaration consisting of 
fifty-nine points. It reiterated the importance of democracy and human rights, and expressed 
a continuing interest in the creation of the EuroLat Parliamentary Assembly. It also noted 
the activities of the Europe–Latin America and Caribbean Civil Society Forum, and reaf-
firmed the commitment of previous summits to the formation of a multilateral international 
system and rule of law. Issues of terrorism, drug trafficking, organised crime, environmental 
protection, and energy supply were discussed. Special stress was given to partnership 
agreements between the EU and Latin American countries (Chile, Mexico), their integration 
organisations (Mecosur, Andean Community, the Caribbean Forum – CARIFORUM, 
the Central American Common Market – CARICOM), and the activities of the European 
Investment Bank in the Caribbean were also highly appreciated. Fight against poverty, 
inequality and segregation was announced. (Declaration of Vienna 2006) Even as the doc-
ument called for social cohesion, however, the summit saw the emergence of an opposition 
formed of countries following the “Bolivar alternative” and dissatisfied with the economic 
policy of the EU in Latin America. The ringleader of the group, which included Bolivian 
President Evo Morales and the Cuban delegate, was Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez. 
Their appearance clearly speaks of the fact that there is no simple and easy way leading to 
a strategic partnership of the two regions.
The declaration issued by the fifth summit, which was held in Lima during May 2008, 
was entitled Addressing our Peoples’ Priorities Together. (Maihold 2008) Although 
the preamble mentions a new phase in relations, the summit only partially succeeded 
in resolving earlier controversies. The Latin American representatives expected the EU 
to terminate the asymmetry of relations, but were disappointed. The central topics of 
the meeting were strengthening the strategic partnership, sustainable development and 
social cohesion. Despite agreements on priorities, opinions diverged with respect to their 
content. The European Union concentrated on the environment protection and climate-re-
lated aspects of sustainable development, and on energy resources. The Latin Americans 
focused on the social cohesion aspects of sustainable development, the fight against poverty, 
inequality, and segregation.
There was a consensus, however, that new cooperation schemes were needed. The most 
important political tools identified were bi- and multi-lateral partnership agreements, 
including economic associated partnerships with African, Caribbean, and Asian countries. 
A decision was taken to set up the EU–LAC Foundation, which would tackle issues 
of the strategic partnership, and the integration mechanism proposed by the EuroLat 
Parliamentary Assembly was adopted. Decision was made that the next Summit would be 
held in Spain in the first half of 2010, during the Spanish EU presidency. It became clear 
though at the Lima summit that the EU saw the method of structured political dialogue 
and the option of individual treatment applicable in case of Latin America’s countries and 
integration organisations as well as in interregional relations; it was also evident that there 
was no agreement even among countries of the southern hemisphere on the role of the new 
type integration organizations (Mercosur, UNASUR, Banco del Sur, PetroAmérica, CIN). 
The summits nonetheless have continued: in January 2013 at Santiago de Chile; in June 
2015 in Brussels; and in San Salvador during October 2017.
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Strategic Alliance and (Sub) Regional Community Integrations
The 1960s saw the emergence of the first economic integration organizations in Latin 
America. First in line was the Latin American Free Trade Association (Asociación 
Latinoamericana de Libre Comercio, or ALALC) in 1960. Later that year the Central 
American Common Market (Mercado Común Centroamericano, or MCC) was launched. 
The Andean Pact (Pacto Andino, PA) between Bolivia, Ecuador, Columbia, and Peru was 
signed in 1969; it eventually became the Andean Community (Comunidad Andina, or CAN). 
The Latin American Free Trade Association changed its name to Latin American Integration 
Association in 1980. To promote a united continental economic development strategy, 
the Latin American Economic System (Sistema Económico Latinoamericano, SELA) was 
born in the 1960s, followed by the organization of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM).
The  second wave of integration organizations was linked to changes in international 
relations. With the end of the Cold War in 1990–91, East–West opposition in its old form 
had ceased with the disappearing bipolar world’s fault lines. Parallel to this – as already 
discussed – major changes occurred in the political relations of the Latin American 
continent. Civil governments took the place of military-civil dictatorships. Regional and 
sub-regional cooperation appetites and commitments surfaced again. One after the other, 
official and unofficial integration-cooperation organizations were formed. The Organization 
of American States (OAS) was renewed. In 1991, with the signing of the Asuncion Treaty, 
the most significant sub-regional organization of Latin America, Mercosur, was formed with 
the participation of Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay. In 1992, the United States, 
Canada and Mexico signed the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA, or Tratado 
de Libre Comercio de América del Norte, TLAN). In December 2004, twelve countries 
founded the Community of South American Nations; in 2007, it became the Union of South 
American Nations (Unión de Naciones Suramericanas, UNASUR). This organisation is 
the direct successor of the Community of South American Nations founded in December 
2004 by twelve Latin American countries, and has very promising prospects in politics and 
economics. The present paper discusses the three most significant integration organisations 
of the South American continent: Mercosur, UNASUR and CIN.
Mercosur is the fourth-largest economic alliance in the world. Partnership agreements 
were signed with Chile and Bolivia in 1996, with Peru in 2003, and with Ecuador and 
Columbia in 2004. Venezuela joined in 2006. It produces some $1 billion in GDP annually 
and encompasses 240 million people. Nearly 80% of its GDP is produced by Brazil, with 
18% coming from Argentina, 2% from Uruguay, and 1% from Paraguay. It covers an area 
of over 11 million square kilometres, which amounts to 58% of the continent. Mercosur 
defines itself as a development-oriented organization with core values of social justice 
and respect for the dignity of nations. Its aim is the promotion of commercial negotiation 
positions; in this sense it is a rival to not only the United States and the European Union, but 
to the Andean Community and other continental integration organizations. The organization 
also tries to soften the rivalry between the two big countries of the southern cone: Brazil 
and Argentina. Its institutional and decision-making structure was settled in the 1994 Ouro 
Preto Protocol. Several of its arrangements reflect the influence of the European Union. 
(Dani 2010, 109–124; Molnár 2010)
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Mercosur has been connected to the EU since the signing of the 1995 Framework 
Cooperation Agreement. (Balkay-Erdey 2012, 68–82; Balkay 2015; Domonkos 2014, 
93–102.) One-quarter of its exports go to the European Union, and the EU is the number-one 
trade partner for Mercosur, with the latter holding a continuously increasing positive balance 
since 2001. The European Union provides further support to Mercosur through the so-called 
Regional Indicative Programmes (RIPs). The first RIP was effective for the 2007–2010 
period, the  second for 2010–2013. The European Union assigns €50 million for three targets 
in the designated years, with 10% going to Mercosur’s building process. 70% is earmarked 
for the financing of the EU–Mercosur Partnership Agreement, and 20% may be turned to 
the benefit of the civil society. Mercosur member states also get a share of programmes 
launched under the system of strategic partnership. (Mercosur 2007, 4–5.)
The Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) was created to transform the South 
American Community of Nations into a union with a permanent secretariat at the 1st South 
American Energetics Summit held on 16–17th April on Isla de Margarita, Venezuela. 
According to the Cusco Declaration, it follows in the tradition of Bolivar, Sucre, and San 
Martín “who built the great American Nation without any borders, interpreting the aspi-
rations and hopes of their people for integration, unity and the construction of a common 
future”. (Declaración del Cusco sobre la Comunidad Sudamericana de Naciones 2004)
UNASUR was founded by twelve countries. Its total population is 361,000,000 and 
its territory covers 45% of South America. GDP per capita is $5,900. External public debt 
amounts to $315 billion. To further continental integration, the Union of South American 
Nations, like the EU, has introduced associate membership next to full membership. Bolivia, 
Ecuador, Columbia, and Peru are full members of UNASUR and the Andean Community, 
and associate members of Mercosur. Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Venezuela 
are full members of UNASUR and associate members of the Andean Community. Chile 
is an associate member of the Andean Community and of Mercosur. Mexico (a member 
of the North American Free Trade Agreement) and Panama take part in UNASUR as 
observers.
Referring to the shared history, historical heritage, mutual solidarity, common 
internal and external challenges, political, economic, social, cultural and security interests, 
the exigencies of economic development and the combat against poverty and segregation, 
the foundation charter stresses: “Their determination to develop a politically, socially, 
economically, environmentally and infrastructurally integrated South American area that 
will contribute toward strengthening the unique South American identity and, from a sub-
regional standpoint and in coordination with other regional integration experiences, that of 
Latin America and the Caribbean and will give it a greater weight and representativeness 
in international forums.” (Declaración del Cusco sobre la Comunidad Sudamericana de 
Naciones 2004)
UNASUR considers its main goal and historic mission the creation of continental 
integration and cooperation. The organisation will probably be of crucial importance in 
the future of the EU–Latin America strategic alliance and the outcomes of prospective 
dialogues. It is no coincidence that it follows the European integration model in its name and 
structural characteristics. The chief governing body of UNASUR is the annual presidential 
summits. These are followed by a conference of foreign ministers every six months attended 
as well by the president of the Commission of Permanent Representatives, the head of 
195The European Union and South America
Mercosur’s secretariat, the secretary general of the Andean Community, the secretary 
general of ALADI, and invited representatives of regional integrations. The meetings 
of foreign ministers are complemented by sectoral ministerial sessions. UNASUR has 
a “troika”, a triple presidency, which consists of representatives of the summit host country, 
and the previous and the subsequent host’s delegates. The work of the organization is aided 
by an interim committee. Its members rotate annually. There is also a Commission of High 
Representatives.
The Declaration of the Union of South American Nations defines six basic goals. 
The first is the consensus-based coordination of diplomatic and political action in 
the region. The  second is the creation of a free trade zone between Mercosur, the Andean 
Community, and Chile. The third is the unification of South America’s physical, energetic 
and communication system. The fourth is the harmonisation of agricultural development 
and alimentary economic policy. The fifth promotes the transfer of technologies and 
horizontal cooperation in science, culture, and education. The final goal is the integration 
of corporations and the civil society.
These goals drive the integration work of the Union of South American Nations. To 
foster the united economic system of the sub-continent, construction of the Ocean-to-
Ocean Motorway (Carretera Interoceánica) commenced in September 2005. According 
to the plans, Brazil and Peru were to be connected by 2009; Bolivia would gain access to 
the sea, Brazil a connection to the Pacific, and Peru would be linked to the Atlantic. In 2006 
construction began on the South American Energy Ring (Anillo Energético Sudamericano) 
gas pipeline designed to supply Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay. At 
the beginning of the 21st century, the Gasoducto Binacional gas pipeline between Columbia 
and Venezuela became operational. Construction of the Poliducto Binacional has also 
started; it facilitates Venezuela’s oil exports to the Far East, and leads through Columbia. 
As seen in the light of goals and concrete programmes already started, the Union of South 
American Nations may shortly become an important factor in subregional integration, as 
well as an EU–Latin America strategic partnership and the system of international relations.
An Inter­regional Actor: The Ibero–American Community of Nations
The Ibero–American Community of Nations (Comunidad Iberoamericana de Naciones, 
CIN) was created in Guadlajara, Mexico on 19 July 1991. It joined Spain, Portugal, and 
nineteen Latin American countries in a bi-regional strategic alliance. The Guadalajara 
Declaration proposed united political action to promote cooperation while respecting 
the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention. The Ibero–American heads of state 
and governments emphasised respect for peace, social welfare and justice. They mentioned 
disarmament as their primary duty under international law, and acknowledged the immense 
contribution of the Indian peoples (the indigenous nations of South America) to the devel-
opment of mankind. (Arenal del–Najera 1992, 529–531.)
These goals are listed in three chapters. The first concerns the validity of international 
law. The  second discusses the action program for promoting economic and social devel-
opment. The biggest novelty is a proposal to create a space called the common market of 
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knowledge via regular exchanges of experts and the creation of a library network. (Arenal 
del–Najera 1992, 539.)
With the signing of the Guadalajara document, a new public actor of historic 
perspective emerged within the network of international relations and the strategic alliance 
between the EU and Latin America. Democratic Spain played the crucial role; its Latin 
America policies were a clear break away from the methods and concepts of the Franco 
era. It hoped to deepen the “traditional and customary” political ties, but emphasized 
the cultural and economic spheres. To do this, Spain had to overcome the suspicions of Latin 
American nations, which meant distancing itself from the Francoist ideals of Hispanity and 
abandoning the Community of Hispanic Nations (Communidad Hispanica de Naciones, 
CHN) of that era.
It would be hard to over-estimate the merits of King Juan Carlos I in the development 
of this strategy. The monarch undertakes the highest-level representation of foreign policy, 
and it was he who set course toward the CIN. In his inauguration speech at the San Marcos 
University of Lima in 1978, for instance, the monarch called for a cultural approach to 
the nation when addressing the Ibero–American nations. As he put it, Spain and Latin 
America shared a historically construed and evolved special civilisation, a virtual region 
of intellectual and moral values. (Garcia de Cortazar 1996, 373.)
Even if there have been shifts in emphasis in the Latin American policies since 1976, 
the direction was similar. Adolfo Suárez González (1976–1981) showed greater affinity 
towards the Third World while Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo (1981–1982) foregrounded security 
issues and NATO accession. Felipe González (1982–1996), the pro-solidarity Social 
Democrat, closed the foreign policy transition and gained EU membership; José María 
Aznar (1996–2004), the conservative People’s Party technocrat, followed a pragmatic South 
American foreign policy. José Luis Zapatero Rodríguez (2004–2012) followed the social 
democratic “third route” and a common leadership and responsibility strategy for CIN, 
while for Mariano Rajoy’s (2012–) conservative government, “common interests are 
a crucial means and a solid political foundation to the joint undertaking of Latin American 
countries”. (Arenal del 2005, 261.)
Following Spain’s EU accession, this dimension was directed at the creation of an 
economic, political, and cultural cooperation between the Latin American region and the EU 
with Spanish mediation and action, a tightening of ties and the attainment of a special 
associate membership status. In the course of pre-accession talks, the Madrid Government 
had attached two declarations on the importance of cooperation between Latin America and 
the European Community to its accession treaty. One of these was entitled Joint declaration 
of Intention on the Development and Deepening of Relations with the Countries of Latin 
America (Declaración Común de Intenciones relativa al desarrollo y la intensificación de 
las relaciones con los paises de America Latina). The document stressed the need to deepen 
ties with the Latin American region, given the exceptional role of the region with respect 
to Europe. The other document entitled Declaration by the Kingdom of Spain on Latin 
America (Declaración del Reino España sobre América Latina) contained the promise that 
Spain would view cooperation with Latin America as a priority of foreign policy and seek to 
expand ties between the European Union and Latin America. The Spanish foreign policy has 
remained unchanged ever since: this is clearly seen in the text of the press conference held 
at the America House in Madrid by acting Foreign Minister Josep Piqué in May 2001. What 
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the former leader of the Spanish diplomacy said of the relations with Latin America remains 
generally valid to the present day: this relationship is “part of our domestic, social, and 
economic life. I think that differences between Spain and a Latin American country are no 
greater than those between the countries of the region.” He continued declaring that “there 
are two unchangeable axes for Spain’s foreign policy: coming closer to Latin America and 
to Europe. In Goethe’s words we might say that we Spaniards have two souls. The two souls 
of Spain are Europe and Latin America. We need both”. (Iberamerica y España 2001, 6.)
“Spain’s belonging to the EU and the Ibero–American Community simultaneously – to 
once again quote the words of acting Foreign Minister Josep Piqué from 2001 – is a fact that 
is based on the essence of history. […] It seems the role of Spain as a bridge between two 
continents has taken on a new shape.” (Iberamerica y España 2001, 16.) This circumstance 
and statement means the redefinition of a concept that was valid in a previous historical 
period – from a formal aspect, it designates the continuity and upholding of certain foreign 
policy priorities. (Domonkos 2009, 111–128; Lehoczki 2010a, 176–188; Soltész 2008)
Quite naturally, there are fundamental differences in the content of the Ibero–American 
Community of Nations and the Francoist Community of Hispanic Nations. This among 
other things is manifest in the fact that the great family of Ibero–American Nations has 
twenty-one members. Boundaries of a shared language, history, culture, and religion 
have been extended to the great Portuguese-speaking country of the region, Brazil, and 
the smaller country of the Iberian Peninsula, Portugal.
Spain generally takes the lead in integrating Europe with Latin America, but its po-
sition is not based on pressure or intervention. The successful democratic transition of Spain 
and its consolidation within Europe provide the example to Latin America. The emerging 
democracies of Latin America, in fact, adopted a number of solutions from their “mother 
country” in the codification of their constitutions. (Valdés 1998; Las Constituciones de 
Iberoamerica 1992)
If we ask the question that has defined Spain’s cultural foreign policy for almost 
three decades: namely, what we understand as the democratic rule of law, respect for 
human, civil, and political rights, the observance of basic principles of international law, 
the acknowledgement of realities, and the Ibero–American community that is based 
on a peculiar historical, cultural, linguistic and religious relatedness or brotherhood of 
twenty-one countries. This concept differs from those of the British Commonwealth and 
the French Community. It is not even a sui generis political system similar to the European 
Union. This is a world; as Juan Carlos I put it, a historically construed and evolved special 
civilisation, a virtual region of intellectual and moral values. “However great differences 
may there be among us, – the text reads – we are together. We are neither a nation, nor an 
alliance or coalition, or a system based on economic cooperation; to an even lesser extent 
are we one race ethnically: we are one world. (My emphasis – I. Sz.) We are the world of 
a language and a culture created over centuries… This is a treasure (my emphasis – I. Sz.) 
and responsibility at the same time. As King of Spain I feel responsible for my people; but 
this way of life and cultural heritage does not stop at our national borders, but expands as far 
as my words are understood, as far as they reach nations that dream in the same language. I 
would not be a true King of Spain if I did not think of brotherly nations, because we are all 
part of something that is not exclusively the heritage of one or the other, but is our common 
possession.” (Garcia de Cortazar 1996, 373.)
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These ceremonial and elevated words were followed by everyday work of small 
steps. It was far from being an easy element of Spanish foreign policy, as the continent 
showed a highly differentiated picture when the strategy and the concept were declared. 
The conflicting needs of aging dictatorships (Argentina, Chile, Brazil), civil rule (Mexico, 
Venezuela, Peru), and guerilla-ridden civil war-torn regions (Central America), among 
themselves and the democratically minded Spanish foreign policy, had to be satisfied and 
harmonised. In 1982 it was the Falklands crisis that created turmoil. From the  second half of 
the 1980s and the beginning of the ’90s the picture became politically more homogeneous. 
Right-wing military dictatorships in Latin America were toppled and in the majority of 
the countries, civil governments representing democratic values gained power.
Concrete steps were taken for the institutionalisation of the Ibero–American 
Community of Nations, too. The first meeting of the heads of states and prime ministers 
of twenty-one involved countries was held in Guadalajara in 1991. On Spain’s accession 
to the European Community (European Union), not only its cultural but also economic 
influence grew in the region. This was the start for the closing of the gap that former Foreign 
Minister Fernando Morán phrased as: “The reality is, there is a great difference between 
our capacity to act in Latin America and our capacity to influence.” (Morán 1990, 86.)
The most important tool for the realization of Spanish policy and the construction 
of a strategic partnership between the EU and Latin America is the Summit for Ibero–
American Heads of State and Prime Ministers, first held in 1991.
Ibero–American Summits
 I.  Summit – Guadalajara (Mexico), 1991
 II.  Summit – Madrid (Spain), 1992
 III.  Summit – Salvador – Bahia (Brazil), 1993
 IV.  Summit – Cartagena de Indias (Columbia), 1994
 V.  Summit – San Carlos de Bariloche (Argentina), 1995
 VI.  Summit – Viña del Mar (Chile), 1996
 VII.  Summit – Isla Margarita (Venezuela), 1997
 VIII. Summit – Oporto (Portugal), 1998
 IX.  Summit – Havanna (Cuba), 1999
 X.  Summit – Panama (Panama), 2000
 XI.  Summit – Lima (Peru), 2001
 XII. Summit – Bávaro (Dominica), 2002
 XIII.  Summit – Santa Cruz de la Sierra (Bolivia), 2003
 XIV.  Summit – San José (Costa Rica), 2004
 XV.  Summit – Salamanca (Spain), 2005
 XVI.  Summit – Montevideo (Uruguay), 2006
 XVII.  Summit – Santiago de Chile (Chile), 2007
 XVIII.  Summit – Mar del Plata (Argentina), 2010
 XIX.  Summit – Asunción (Paraguay), 2011
 XX.  Summit – Cádiz (Spain), 2012
 XXI.  Summit – Panama (Panama), 2013
 XXII.  Summit – Veracruz (Mexico), 2014
 XXIII.  Summit – Cartagena de Indias (Columbia), 2015
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For Madrid, the institutionalisation of top-level meetings was driven by a wish to promote 
national interests. “Spain will become even more important to Europe if Spain is viewed as 
a participant of a great joint project with South America.” (March 1996, 26.) This evoked 
criticism from some South American political analysts. These opinions are indeed grounded 
in reality. Within the general goals of cultural foreign policy, the heads of Spanish diplomacy 
put special emphasis on the devotedness of the country to Latin America, stressing common 
interests in the dissemination of shared culture and the spread of the common language.
Certain Latin American analysts however consider the Spanish initiative an external 
effort, mainly in the field of rhetoric, in which the often-cited special Latin America is 
nowhere visible. As late as 1999, after the Ninth Ibero–American Summit, critics noted that 
despite the multilateral character of relations, it was ties of a bi-lateral nature that prevailed 
in the community promoted by Spain, and in these relations, elements of colonialist versus 
colony were still dominant.
The decisions of the Ibero–American Community of Nations were difficult to institu-
tionalise in national policies. Until mid-2008 only one country, Brazil, implemented the 1995 
resolution on spreading the Spanish and Portuguese languages. In Brazil, the teaching of 
the Castellano language became mandatory at primary level. The driving force behind this 
decision was the aspiration for regional hegemony.
The Ibero–American initiative needs to be harmonized with the expectations and rules of 
various regional and sub-regional blocks. As a result of the Schengen agreement on borders, 
for instance, citizens of Ibero–American Community nations must have a visa to visit Europe, 
and their free movement within the European Union is not guaranteed. The Ibero–American 
Community of Nations needs to emerge as a driving force in the EU–Latin America dialogue, 
or Ibero–Americanism could become a matter of “politeness”.
The continent received much from Spain, but after the Latin American states gained 
independence in the 19th and 20th centuries, Great Britain, France, Germany, and Italy also 
served as cultural references. A different orientation was taken in the period of state formation. 
“As a result, next to Spanish influence one may observe significant French, Italian, German, 
and British political, economic, social, and cultural inspiration.” (Sanhueza 1999, 69.) Europe 
means something different, and in a certain sense, something more, for Latin America than 
Spain. Madrid must fulfil the role of a bridge between the two worlds. These expectations fall 
in line with the goals of Spain’s (cultural) foreign policy. According to Sanhueza however, 
agreement, settlement, or “concertación” would be words closer to reality to characterise 
cooperation between countries of the Ibero–American Community of Nations. Signs of 
this are noticeable in the outcome document of the 1992 Second Summit held in Madrid. In 
the discussion of changes in the international situation the Declaration stresses: “In this context 
the Ibero–American Conference appears as our political sphere, our consensual forum (my 
emphasis – I. Sz.) of special character. By virtue of its transcontinental character it points 
beyond political and economic oppositions, and may thus positively contribute to avoiding 
protectionist development of regional economic blocks.” (Sanhueza 1999, 63.)
The Ibero–American Summits are a special mechanism of political dialogue that is 
being consolidated. They might serve as forums to exchange experiences and hammer out 
agreements. Many programs that strengthen the identities of member nations and promote 
their growth have been introduced there. Agreement formulas increasingly shift towards 
integrational forms and content.
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The CIN nonetheless is institutionalized. The ninth summit, held in Havana during 1999, 
established an Ibero–American Cooperation Secretariat (SECIB) to enhance the effectiveness 
of agreement-based cooperation; 80% of the SECIB budget is contributed by Spain, which 
spearheaded its creation.
At the 24th Summit in Veracruz (Mexico) in 2014, the renewal process which started at 
the Cadiz Summit of the Ibero–American Conference was concluded with the approval of 
the Veracruz Resolution on the Ibero–American Conference. This document contained several 
important changes concerning institutional structure and new priority areas of cooperation.
Portugal and Spain are full members, and Belgium, France, Italy and the Netherlands 
have associate observer status in these conferences. These Ibero–American summits helped 
to strengthen relations between the EU and its partners in Latin America. (Ramírez 2015)
New Themes
The EU and the Community of Latin America and the Caribbean States (CELAC) are natural 
allies, linked by strong historical, cultural and economic ties that led to the establishment 
in 1999, at the first-ever bi-regional summit in Rio de Janeiro, of a strategic partnership. 
Cooperation on migration, mobility and climate change, which is a key element of the EU–
CELAC action plan, has followed. The priorities and instruments of the EU’s external 
migration policy, for instance, were defined in 2005 by the Global Approach to Migration 
and Mobility (GAMM). Regional, sub-regional and bilateral migration dialogues are key tools 
for implementing the GAMM. Cooperation on migration takes place in the framework of 
the EU–CELAC Structured and Comprehensive Dialogue on Migration launched in June 2009. 
The objective is to identify common challenges and areas for cooperation as well as to build 
a stronger evidence base to understand the realities of EU–LAC migration. It is supported by 
the project Strengthening the dialogue and cooperation between the EU and LAC to establish 
management models on migration and development policies, founded by the EU.
The implementation period of this program started in January 2011 with an initial 
duration of 48 months. The operational phase ended in July 2015. The program was financed 
fully by the EU (budget of €3 million). It was realised by IOM (International Organization for 
Migration) in strong cooperation with FIIAPP (Fundación Internacional y para Iberoamérica 
de Administración y Políticas Públicas). The project contained three main components: 
strengthening data collection on migration to promote better knowledge of migration flows via 
collecting, processing and exchange of data for countries with significant migration towards 
the EU, including training and capacity building of national administrations to produce 
and update data and analyses; building capacity for sound migration management and 
reintegration policies for migrants wishing to return; and promoting the productive investment 
of remittances by improving capacities of the recipient communities and including diaspora 
organizations in the elaboration process of local development strategies.
The project trained 350 civil servants representing 150 institutions from 30 countries 
in the CELAC and EU region. Several migratory profiles, studies, analyses, handbooks, 
and a manual were elaborated. “In Guatemala, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay, and the Dominican 
Republic, institutional mechanisms were developed to facilitate (re)integration to the labour 
market of migrants. In Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Haiti, and the Organization of Eastern 
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Caribbean States (OECS), six public-private and civil society partnerships were formed for 
maximizing the use of remittances as a development tool. Public administrations in Peru, 
Bolivia, and Ecuador were offered technical support to manage migration data. Among 
the results of the programme is also the creation of a technical theoretical framework to build 
alliances to strengthen impact of remittances, utilizing synergies between migrations pro-
files and increased transparency on national migration data (Nicaragua, Ecuador, Jamaica), 
and promoting collaboration between public administrations from CELAC countries leading 
to good practices sharing on labour migration.” (European Commission 2017a)
The sixth EU–LAC summit in May 2010 also adopted several initiatives in the area 
of migration. The Madrid Action Plan (2010–2012), for instance, called for the exchange 
of information on migration flows, as well as policies linking migration and development. 
The Santiago Declaration adopted in January 2013 called for more robust dialog on 
migration, and the ninth High-Level Meeting of the Structured and Comprehensive 
EU–CELAC Dialogue on Migration held in 2014 reiterated the importance of addressing 
migration issues for both regions. In addition, the EU has concluded strategic partnerships 
with Mexico and Brazil that foresee cooperation on security and migration related issues 
both in multilateral fora and at the bilateral level.
The Bilateral Map of Brazil–European Union Investment was initiated in September 
at the premises of the Brazilian Agency for the Promotion of Exports and Investments 
(Apex–Brasil). (European Commission 2017b) The project charts the history of investments 
between Brazil and the EU “to demonstrate the strength of the economic relationship 
between the two and to support policymakers and investors with information for bilateral 
investment strategies. Analysis of the investments made between 2006 and 2015 show that 
Brazil and the European Union have not only a long business relationship, but also a strong 
economic interdependence with robust investments dispersed across a wide range of sectors, 
from mining to agro-business and services with high added-value. Brazil is the third main 
destination of current EU worldwide FDI flows, and the EU is the leading foreign investor 
in Brazil. Many European companies are managing large investments in Brazil and vice 
versa, creating new opportunities for market diversification, technology transfer, access to 
talent and global value chains for business, greater offer of job opportunities for European 
and Brazilian citizens as well as safer and more affordable products and services. It is 
estimated that FDI from the EU companies created more than 278,000 jobs in the Brazilian 
economy during 2006–2015”, (European Commission 2017b) including 6,405 in greenfield 
investment projects. The remaining jobs are highly diversified; the automotive, metals, and 
communications sectors accounted for 36%, and investors came from fifteen EU countries.
The Multiannual Indicative Regional Programme (MIP) organized by the EU for Latin 
America during 2014–2020 is designed to increase the ability of states to ensure security 
conditions conducive to inclusive development. The program’s specific objectives include 
delivering effective and accountable security and justice services, and strengthening the rule 
of law. It also is designed to “develop integrated, balanced and human rights-based national 
drug policies, covering both drug demand and supply reduction efforts – in line with 
the principle of co-responsibility [and to] promote sound migration management”. (European 
Commission 2018) The basic tools will be “support for regional reform efforts, mutual 
learning and regional benchmarking in the field of integrated and Justice and Security Sector 
Reform (JSSR), respecting human rights principles; support for regional reform efforts, 
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mutual learning and regional benchmarking in the field of drugs policies, particularly with 
respect to their coherence, balance and impact, including statistical information on crime 
and criminal justice; and support for regional reform efforts, mutual learning and regional 
coordination and cooperation in the field of migration and border management”. (European 
Commission 2018) Specific programs include COPOLAD (Cooperation Programme on 
Drugs Policies) and the EU–CELAC Project on Migration (2010–2015).
In 2017, the European Commission signed five contracts totalling €37 million for 
the implementation of the new regional program of environmental sustainability and climate 
change mitigation in Latin America. Five agencies from EU member states with experience 
in Latin America were selected to develop strategies for disaster risk reduction, forest 
management, biodiversity, and resource efficiency in urban development.
The EUROCLIMA+ program, which has a budget of €80 million, will help eighteen 
Latin American countries implement commitments on climate change made at the 2015 
United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP 21). The program promotes environ-
mentally sustainable and climate-resilient development. (European Commission 2017c)
It is important to highlight one of the recent happenings in bilateral relations. Federica 
Mogherini, the European Union’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security 
Policy visited Chile in May 2017 in order to intensify ties, discussing among other issues 
the future updating of the EU–Chile Association Agreement, signed in 2002. In her speech 
delivered at the Foreign Ministry of Chile she emphasized multilateralism, sustainable 
development, inclusive growth, democracy as well as the preservation and the necessity of 
reforming the existing international institutions as the common interests of the European 
Union and Latin America. She offered help to Venezuela, stressing that the initiative should 
come from Latin America. (The EU and Latin America: Partners in a Global Word 2017)
Summary
Relations between the European Union and Latin America and the Caribbean have inten-
sified over the last quarter of the century. In the 1980s the European Parliament recognized 
the strategic importance of cooperation with the Third World, especially the South American 
continent. Following the accession of Spain and Portugal to the European Community, 
the EU focused on creating closer ties to the region via Spanish mediation. This led to 
the first summit of heads of state and government, held in Rio de Janeiro in 1999. Regular 
meetings and joint sessions of Latin American parliaments and European parliamentary 
representatives, along with the development of sub-regional integration organizations and 
inter-regional actors led to the institutionalization of a strategic alliance. The foundation 
of this partnership lies in a common historical past and a wish to create a multipolar 
international system. The desire to end the asymmetrical economic relationship prevalent 
to the present day between the parties plays a major role in shaping the partnership. 
The strengthening of partnership between the two regions has a significant influence on 
changes within the system of international relations.
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The EU and International Organisations
Zoltán Gálik
States establish international institutions to achieve their particular objectives that they 
can exercise more efficiently through the organisations than governments alone. States 
are the natural building blocks of international organisations; they typically represent 
their interests through the decision making system. The organisations provide a place for 
communication, they help disputing parties reach an agreement and they establish norms 
that are acceptable to the parties. It is widely believed that the international organisations 
are responsible for the maintenance of international stability and peace.
The European Community and the European Union cannot be considered to be 
the typical example of an international organisation, rather a sui generis actor which carries 
both the characteristics of a state and an international organisation. During the existence of 
the European integration not only the roles of the international organisations changed but 
also the nature and general characteristics of the relations between them.
In this chapter we consider how the European Union and its predecessors related 
to some of the major global and regional institutions, the United Nations, International 
Monetary Fund and the World Bank, the World Trade Organisation, the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, and 
the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe.
The Legal Personality of the European Union
Formal representation of the EU (and its predecessors) in international organisations relates 
primarily to the establishment and the existence of legal personality. The founding treaty 
of an international organisation provides the legal personality and the competence to act in 
international relations. Although the European Coal and Steel Community, the EURATOM 
and the European Economic Community had legal personality, the European Union was 
established as an intergovernmental organisation without a legal personality in 1993. Some 
member states were in favour of giving the European Union international legal personality 
to enable it to conclude international agreements in the areas of the issues belonging to 
the  second (Common Foreign and Security Policy) and to the third pillars (Justice and 
Home Affairs). According to their argument the EU “has no existence as a legal entity to 
be a source of confusion in the outside world which diminishes its external profile” while 
others emphasized that “international legal personality for the Union could give rise to 
confusion with the legal prerogatives of the Member State”. (Eip 1995) Despite the explicit 
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reference to a legal personality in international public law it has been accepted that a legal 
personality can also be implicitly conferred to an international organisation.
The common representation of the integration remained at the European Community 
until 2009. Article 47 of the Lisbon Treaty explicitly recognised the legal personality of 
the European Union eliminating the three pillar structure of the integration and giving 
the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (TFEU) an equal role.
The EU is now an independent entity in its own right, which makes possible to:
• become a member of international organisations
• negotiate and to conclude international agreements (jus tractatuum)
• join international conventions
• send and receive diplomatic envoys (jus legationis)
• present claims based on international responsibility
• use armed force
While the EU member states keep their external sovereignty and the freedom of action 
on certain foreign policy areas making the EU’s external competences limited. The EU 
has an exclusive competence in the area of common commercial policy, customs union, 
competition and monetary policy for the Eurozone (Article 3.1 TFEU) while economic 
policy is a complementary competence. The EU has the right to conclude international 
agreements under certain conditions. Explicit legal competencies of the EU in international 
organisations are not mentioned in the Treaties but Article 211 of the TFEU states “within 
their respective spheres of competence, the Union and the Member States shall cooperate 
with third countries and with the competent international organisations”, and in most cases 
external competence is implicit and derives from internal competence.
It is important to emphasise that a legal personality is not exclusively the characteristic 
of a federal entity. Many intergovernmental international institutions, like the IMF, 
the World Bank, and specialised agencies of the UN (WHO, UNESCO) have international 
legal personality through which they can interact with others in the international community.
Participation in International Organisations
The participation in international organisations allows the EU to attend the meetings of 
the particular organisation, exercising interest representation by voting, being elected 
for specific functions, exercising speaking rights, creating and amending international 
agreements. Membership in international organisations means political influence over many 
important economic, security and cultural areas.
In the majority of the international organisations where the EU has a presence, the EU 
member states participate on their own right. In these organisations the EU representation 
could be formal or complementary (UN, IMF, NATO). A membership criterion varies in 
different organisations. Some accept only states as their members, some allow observer 
status for entities and some accept international organisations as a full member. In addition 
to a visible presence and a common voice, the EU can also contribute by financial means 
to the success of organisations. The financial share of the contribution by the EU is 
211The EU and International Organisations
expected to be translated into meaningful political influence over the institutions’ common 
policies. The treaty making process also includes the procedural and legal requirements of 
the signature, the ratification, the acceptance, the approval and the exchange of instruments.
The basic rules of the external representation of the EU lay in the Treaties, the Treaty 
amendments and the EU’s case law.
• The Treaty provisions do not explicitly regulate the EU membership in international 
institutions.
• Article 111(3) EC is a general provision on the conclusion of agreements concerning 
monetary or foreign exchange matters.
• Article 133 TEC grants the EC competence to conclude international agreements 
in the fields of trade policy.
• Article 177 TEC grants the EC competence to development cooperation.
• According the ECJ ruling (ERTA case, 1971) external competence can in addition 
be derived implicitly from internal competence.
There are four types of external competences envisioned in the Treaties: exclusive and 
shared (Article 5, Article 2, Article 3 in the TFEU), supporting (Article 6) and coordination. 
The EU can enjoy exclusive competence or shared with the member states in the different 
international institutions. Besides participating in these institutions, the EU has also 
the right to create new international organisations. (Martenczuk 2001) The representation 
of the EU is achieved by the Commission where the EU has exclusive competence, and 
involves the member states on shared competence areas. In the funding Treaties there is 
no explicit competence for international institution membership; representation is based 
primarily on implied powers the EU has in the different policy fields.
Table 1.
Membership of the European Union in international organisations
Full member: World Trade Organisation (WTO), Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) 
Full participant: International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO), UN world summits, UN 
Commission on Sustainable Development
Observer: United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), United Nations Economic and Social 
Council (ECOSOC), Economic Commission for Europe (UN ECE), International Labour 
Organisation (ILO), World Health Organisation (WHO), World Intellectual Property Organisation 
(WIPO), International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), International Maritime Organisation 
(IMO), United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO), United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), United Nations Environment 
Programme (UNEP), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund 
(UNICEF), the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East 
(UNRWA), World Food Programme (WFP)
Source: Edited by the author.
The establishment of the European External Action Service and the post of the High 
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR) in the Lisbon 
Treaty harmonised the Union’s external representation: (the HR) “shall conduct political 
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dialogue with third parties on the Union’s behalf and shall express the Union’s position in 
international organisations and at international conferences.” (Article 27 TEU) Article 221 
of the TFEU provides that the EU will be represented by its delegations in third countries 
and at international organisations. In cases where the EU is member of the international 
institution and the issue lies within its exclusive competence the EU acts through 
the European Commission assisted by a committee of representatives of the member states. 
In shared competence areas the High Representative of the EU usually represents the EU 
on the basis of a position coordinated within a committee composed of the member states 
and the Commission.
Article 32 and 34 of the Treaty of the European Union (TEU) requires the member 
states to coordinate their action in international organisations and at international confer-
ences, and to articulate the Union’s positions. In case not all member states participate, 
the others are responsible for upholding the Union’s positions. As for the harmonised work 
of the diplomatic missions “Member States and the Union delegations in third countries 
and at international organisations shall cooperate and shall contribute to formulating and 
implementing the common approach”.
Article 35 of the TEU sets the framework for the diplomatic and consular missions of 
the member states regarding the common work in international organisations: “they shall 
cooperate in ensuring that decisions defining Union positions and actions are complied 
with and implemented”, and “they shall step up cooperation by exchanging information 
and carrying out joint assessments”.
Despite the establishment of the European External Action Service and the harmonised 
Common Foreign and Security Policy in the Lisbon Treaty, member states explicitly 
declared their reservations regarding their own foreign policy: “[the EEAS] do not affect 
the responsibilities of the Member States, as they currently exist, for the formulation and 
conduct of their foreign policy nor of their national representation in third countries and 
international organisations.” (TEU 13th Declaration) and “will not affect the existing legal 
basis, responsibilities, and powers of each Member State in relation to the formulation and 
conduct of its foreign policy, its national diplomatic service, relations with third countries 
and participation in international organisations, including a Member State’s membership 
of the Security Council of the United Nations”. (TEU 14th Declaration)
Table 2.
Models of EU and member state participation in multilateral organisations
• All member states as full members, the EU as observer (Council of Europe and the interna-
tional financial institutions)
• All member states plus the EU as full members (WTO, FAO)
• Some member states plus the EU as full participants (G7/G8/G20)
• EU as full member/contracting party, with no member states (highly specialised international 
agreements, e.g. individual agricultural commodities or metals)
• Some member states as full members; the EU with no status (UN SC)
• Constituency arrangements and voting weights (IMF, IBRD, EBRD)
Source: Emerson–Kaczyński 2010, 2.
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Article 220 of the TFEU foresees that “the Union shall establish all appropriate forms of 
cooperation with the organs of the UN and its specialised agencies, the Council of Europe, 
the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development.”
Impact of the EU in international organisations can be measured on different 
dimensions. According to Jørgensen the following factors influence the representation: 
the institutional design, the policymaking processes within the organisation, the activities 
of specific international organisations, the impact on institutional reforms, the impact on 
agenda setting, and the financial contribution to the budget of the organisation. (Jørgensen 
2009, 5.)
The European Union and the United Nations
The EU has a very close and special partnership with the United Nations. The EU is 
the largest financial contributor to the UN with 38% of the total UN’s regular budget and 
a contribution of over EUR 1 billion in support of external assistance programmes. It has 
also entered into strategic partnerships with seven UN institutions (UNDP, WHO, ILO 
and FAO in 2004, WFP in 2005, UN Women in 2012, UNESCO in 2012) which helped 
them to engage in common programmes in international crisis situations, aid delivery or 
election assistance. The EU member states command more than one eighth of the votes 
of the General Assembly, and have two permanent seat members, France and the United 
Kingdom in the Security Council, and the EU also dominates many regional groups in 
the UN.
The decision to admit a new member into the United Nations (UN) is made by 
the General Assembly on the recommendation of the Security Council. Membership is open 
to all “peace-loving states” which makes full membership of the EU impossible without prior 
recognition of the EU as a state. The new member must accept the obligations contained 
in the Charter of the UN. In addition to these conditions each of the UN’s 16 specialised 
agencies has its membership criteria and rule from which 111 accept new members without 
requiring the admission to be approved by the members, 22 requires voting for admission. 
Since the establishment of the UN, member states have developed the practice of inviting 
states3 and other actors of the international community as observers. Observers are 
entitled to speak but not to vote, propose amendments or preside over meetings, and their 
interactions could happen only after those of the member states.
The EU has been a permanent observer at the United Nations since 1974, as well as 
at most of the United Nations’ specialised agencies without a voting right. In the Food and 
Agriculture Organisation and in the World Trade Organisation it has full voting rights. 
(EUCOUNCIL 2017)
After the Lisbon Treaty entered into force, the EU established the External Action 
Service and applied for enhanced status in the UN General Assembly. Resolution 65/275 
1 ICAO, IFAD, ILO, IMO, ITU, UNIDO, UPU, WHO, WIPO, WMO, UNESCO
2 FAO, UNWTO
3 Vatican permanent observer from 1964, Palestine observer entity from 1964, observer state from 2012.
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adopted by the GA in May 2011 gave the EU many new opportunities regarding the work 
in the GA, but not in other UN bodies:
• the ability to speak early among other major groups, when speaking on behalf of 
the EU states
• invited the EU to intervene in the general debate at the opening of the General 
Assembly
• the EU has obtained the right to orally present proposals and amendments
• the EU has obtained the right to reply once to a speech regarding EU positions
• the positions of the EU and its member states will be represented by the President 
of the European Council, the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security 
Policy, the European Commission and the EU delegation
• the changes still did not allow the EU to obtain the same rights of a UN member state
• the EU does not have the right to vote on resolutions or decisions
• the EU does not have the right to co-sponsor draft resolutions or decisions in writing
Since 2009 the EU has one sole representation body at the UN: the EU Delegation in New 
York that combined the EC delegation and the EU Council liaison office into one. There 
are delegations accredited to UN bodies in Geneva, Paris, Nairobi, New York, Rome, and 
Vienna.
Delegations operate under the authority of the High Representative for Foreign Affairs 
and Security Policy who is also the Vice President of the Commission. In 2011 Catherine 
Ashton was elected to this post, later in 2015 Federica Mogherini was chosen to lead 
the EU’s foreign policy for the next five years.
The delegations are coordinating the work of the EU member states, they are reporting 
back to the EEAS and they are working with the member states on burden sharing.
As the Global Strategy on the EU’s Foreign and Security Policy (2016) states, the EU 
committed to “effective multilateralism”, and “the key EU priority will be to uphold, 
strengthen and reform the UN and the rules based global order”. Among the main objectives, 
the EU focus on “a stronger global governance, on peace and conflict prevention and on an 
enduring agenda for transformation while gender equality and women’s empowerment as 
well as peace and security”.
In the Security Council the EU can bring significant influence on particular issues 
since France and the United Kingdom have permanent seats in the Council and they have 
veto power.4 Article 34 of the TEU stipulates that “Member States which are also members 
of the United Nations Security Council will concert and keep the other Member States and 
the High Representative fully informed. Member States which are members of the Security 
Council will, in the execution of their functions, defend the positions and the interests of 
the Union, without prejudice to their responsibilities under the provisions of the United 
Nations Charter. When the Union has defined a position on a subject which is on the United 
Nations Security Council agenda, those Member States which sit on the Security Council 
shall request that the High Representative be invited to present the Union’s position.”
4 Although they have not vetoed any resolutions since 1989.
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The coordinated EU foreign policy gave an unambiguous result. Since the signing of 
the Maastricht Treaty the EU displayed a more and more unified voting pattern and now 
about 97% of the member states votes are unanimous.
The member states of the EU and the EU itself are the biggest financial contributors 
to the general UN budget and many of the UN’s specialized agencies. The translation of 
this capacity into political power is limited, however the impact of the EU on the general 
functioning of the EU is unquestionable. Multilateralism is one of the core principles of 
the EU, which can be achieved only by effective participation and financial contribution. 
According to the EEAS statistics the EU and its member states contribute 30.38% of the UN 
regular budget and 33.17% of the UN peacekeeping budget and they also provide about half 
of the voluntary contributions to UN funds and programmes. (EEAS 2018)
The EU commitment to UN peacekeeping operations increased significantly during 
the last decades. The nature of peacekeeping has considerably changed since the end of 
the Cold War; it became more diverse and multidimensional. The EU capabilities especially 
at the civilian crisis management area were widened under the European Security and 
Defence Policy (ESDP). The ESDP missions are mandated by the United Nations through 
the Security Council decisions. In 2004 the EU defined itself as a global actor “ready to 
share in the responsibility for global security” and “it affirmed the role it wants to play 
in the world, supporting an international order based on effective multilateralism within 
the UN” in the “Headline Goal 2010” paper. (HG 2004) In such way the EU contributes to 
the UN to develop its operational capacities, and to enforce the rules of the international 
community at the global stage. The number of EU lead operations increased since 2003 
mainly at the territory of the West Balkan (CONCORDIA/FYROM, PROXIMA/FYROM, 
EUPM/Bosnia, EULEX/Kosovo), Africa (EUSEC, EUPOL EUFOR, ARTEMIS/RD 
CONGO, EUFOR/Tchad, EUAVSEC/South Sudan, EUSSR/Guinea-Bissau, EUNAVFOR/
Somalia, EUTM/Mali and Somalia, EUBAM/Libya, EUCAP/Sahel Mali, Sahel Niger) and 
Asia (EUPOL/Afghanistan, EUJUST LEX/Iraq, EUAM/Iraq, EUJUST THEMIS/Georgia, 
EUMM/Georgia EUPOL COPPS/Palestinian Territories, EUBAM Rafah, Aceh Monitoring 
Mission/Indonesia).
The European Union and the IMF, World Bank Group
The IMF was the central actor of the system of fixed exchange based on the U.S. dollar 
and gold. It also serves as a forum for consultation and cooperation and a provider of 
short-term financial assistance to countries experiencing temporary deficits in their balance 
of payments. A membership criterion in the IMF requires the vote of the current members. 
Each member of the IMF is assigned a quota which determines the financial commitment 
to the organisation, the access to the financing programmes and the voting power. Each new 
membership requires the share of the old members to be recalculated.
The European Union has no direct representation in the international financial insti-
tutions. Instead the 19 Eurozone members are represented on the board of the International 
Monetary Fund via different country groups. Germany and France has a constituency on 
their own. Ten other Eurozone members are part of four other constituencies headed by 
Italy, Spain, the Netherlands and Belgium (these constituencies also contain more than 
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20 other countries). The common voice of the Eurozone is missing from IMF and although 
they jointly hold 23% of the shares they are slightly underrepresented in the institution due 
to the unfortunate institutional configuration. As for the total representativeness of the EU 
the Eurozone together with the U.K. and Scandinavian constituencies, has 8 representatives 
from the possible 20 on the IMF’s executive board, which makes 40% of the directors 
coming from the European Union.
The general impact of the EU on the IMF and World Bank Group is unequal. While 
the EU member states contribute financially about double the amount of the U.S., they 
control collectively about more than one third of the votes.
For the future, the EU Commission proposes a different representation system: 
at ministerial level in the IMF the euro area should be represented by the President 
of the Eurogroup, and at the Executive Board the euro area would be represented by 
the Executive Director of a euro area constituency, following the establishment of one or 
several constituencies composed only by euro area Member States. (EUCOM 2015) This 
composition would better reflect the economic and financial weight of the euro area and 
would allow the euro area to play a more active role in the IMF. The total quota assigned 
to a common Eurozone representation would represent a larger quota than that of the U.S. 
and it would allow the EU a much larger influence on the IMF’s policies.
With the creation of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), the EU set up an 
international financial institution in 2012 by the Eurozone member states to help euro 
area countries in severe financial distress. The ESM could evolve into a European debt 
management agency, or even into a European Monetary Fund (EMF) to give the Eurozone 
more autonomy in solving financial stability problems. In this scenario the interest 
representation of the member states would be more harmonised in the IMF. The Commission 
helps the governments of the member states to maximise their influence, to adopt common 
positions on economic and development areas.
Representation of the EU could be possible in international organisations via 
the European Central Bank, as well. Article 23 of the TEU stipulates that “the ECB and 
national central banks may: establish relations with central banks and financial institutions 
in other countries and, where appropriate, with international organisations” and “conduct 
all types of banking transactions in relations with third countries and international 
organisations, including borrowing and lending operations.”
The IMF played a crucially important role in the member states of the European 
Union during the sovereign debt crisis. The IMF made a significant contribution to 
stabilise the economy of Greece, Cyprus, Ireland, Spain and Portugal with providing 
Stand-By Arrangement (SBA)-supported programme in Greece, Extended Fund Facility 
(EFF)-supported programme in Ireland, Cyprus and Portugal, and Financial Sector 
Assessment Programme (FSAP) in Spain. The IMF had arrangement with countries outside 
the Eurozone including Hungary, Poland, Latvia and Romania, and worked together with 
the European Union on IMF supported programs in non EU countries including Kosovo 
and Serbia (Stand-By Arrangements), Albania and Ukraine (Extended Fund Facility). (IMF 
2017) On the other hand member states of the EU can agree to lend to another member state 
in the capacity of their IMF quota, a total of EUR 49 billion.
Membership in the World Bank Group (WBG) also requires a membership in 
the IMF. Within the WBG, members can join the International Bank for Reconstruction 
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and Development (IBRD), the International Development Association (IDA) and 
the International Finance Corporation (IFC). The EU is one of the largest contributors to 
the World Bank’s trust programs, a major donor to the International Agriculture Research 
Group, the Global Fund to Fight Aids, Tuberculosis and Malaria. In 2015 the contribution 
was a total of EUR 318.2 million – 195.6 from the EC budget, 122.6 from the European 
Development Fund. (EUCOM 2016) The EU widely shares the goals of the World Bank 
Group: end extreme poverty by decreasing the percentage of people living on less than $1.90 
a day to no more than 3% and to promote shared prosperity by fostering the income growth 
of the bottom 40% for every country.
The European Union and the World Trade Organisation
After the Second World War, the United States and the allied states established the rules 
for the post-war international economy. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade was 
established in 1947, and it was designed to implement the agreed tariff cuts and to serve 
as the codification of the rules governing commercial relations among the signatories. 
The EEC customs union was criticised by the GATT member states with regard to 
the external customs tariffs, the subsidy mechanism of the Common Agricultural Policy 
and the association agreements which provided special status for third countries. The EEC 
created the single customs union, a single trade policy and tariff, which was reduced by 
20% until the end of the 1960s. During the rest of the Cold War years GATT member states 
successfully reduced the customs and non-tariff barriers to trade. The EC was a signatory 
to the number of GATT agreements, and the EC member states were the contracting parties 
to the GATT. The EC accepted all basic principles of the GATT: the most favoured nation 
provisions, transparency on market access and of national treatment.
Table 3.
The role of the European Union in the World Trade Organisation
• supporting the work of the WTO on multilateral rule-making, trade liberalisation and 
sustainable development
• administration of various WTO agreements with monitoring their implementation
• trade policy reviews as a central part of the surveillance of WTO members’ trade policies
• monitoring trade and trade-related measures in the wake of the recent global financial and 
economic crisis
• regional trade agreements between two or more partners – these include free trade agreements 
and customs unions
• WTO accession for any state or customs territory having full autonomy over its trade policies
Source: EEAS 2017 
The World Trade Organisation was established in 1995 replacing the GATT. The European 
Community became a full member of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 1995, and 
the European Union inherited the membership in 2009. All member states of the EU are 
also WTO members in their own right. The EU’s number of votes is equal to the number 
of EU member states in the WTO. The European Commission, authorised by the Council 
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and the EU External Action Service (the EU Mission to the WTO) represents the member 
states in the executive bodies (Councils and Committees) of the WTO. The Commission 
regularly informs the European Parliament of the key issues. EU member states may attend 
WTO meetings but the Commission is entitled to speak with “one voice”.
The last round of the trade negotiations started in 2001 as the Doha Development 
Agenda. The EU participates in talks with the aim to further liberalise trade and help 
the least developed countries to integrate into the global trading system. Among the main 
issues, member states try to reform agricultural subsidies, improve developing countries’ 
access to global markets, while ensuring that the achievements respects the need for 
sustainable economic growth in the developing countries.
Member states of the European Union are participating in the WTO schedule of 
concessions through the EU; it means that they do not have their own schedule. In case of 
Brexit, Britain will transition from participating in the WTO through the EU to participating 
in its own capacity. It will need to establish its own schedules of commitments under 
the GATT and the GATS.
The European Union Council of Europe
The Council of Europe (CoE) was established in 1948 and currently comprises  47  countries of 
Europe. All of the member states of the EU are full members in the CoE. Membership of 
the EU almost requires membership in the Council of Europe. The Council was set up to 
promote democracy and protect human right and the rule of law.
Article 303 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community declares that “the 
Community shall establish all appropriate forms of cooperation with the Council of 
Europe”. The European Union participates in Council of Europe bodies as the representative 
of the Commission, or other agencies and bodies: the European Data Protection Supervisor, 
the European Environment Agency, the European Food Safety Authority, the European 
Institute for Gender Equality, the European Monitoring Centre on Drugs and Drug 
Addiction, the European Union Law Enforcement Agency, the European Union Agency for 
Fundamental Rights, the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation 
at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union, the European 
Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, the European Union’s 
Judicial Cooperation Unit. The EU also participates in the Committee of Ministers and in 
the Rapporteur Groups, in the Parliamentary Assembly, in the Steering Committees and 
in the ad hoc Committees.
The common areas of interest include the rule of law, human rights, democracy, good 
governance and education. The two organisations work together via the exchange of letters, 
a Joint Declaration on Cooperation and Partnership between the Council of Europe and 
the Commission and Memorandum of Understanding. As Gstöhl points out “an increasing 
number of Council of Europe conventions is also open to accession by the European 
Community, and the Lisbon Treaty contains the legal basis for the accession of the EU to 
the European Convention on Human Rights”. (Gstöhl 2008)
Although the EU has no formal observer status in the organisation, they have 
quadripartite meetings between the Commission, the EU presidency, the Council of Europe 
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chairmanship and the Secretary General, officials from the Commission and the Council 
Secretariat.
There is a big debate whether the EU should not join the CoE itself, but to accede to 
the Council of Europe’s Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (ECHR). Although the EU Court of Justice treats the ECHR as part of the EU’s 
legal system, the accession to the ECHR divides the member states and the institutions 
of the EU. The accession would allow the EU to become a party in cases concerned with 
Community law before the Strasbourg Court. On the other hand, “the accession will subject 
the EU institutions to that external monitoring of compliance with fundamental rights which 
already applies to institutions in the Council’s member states”. (Juncker 2006, 4.)
The European Union and the OECD
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) is an international 
economic organisation which also serves as a global “forum in which member states can 
work together to share experiences and seek solutions to common problems”. The OECD 
was established in 1961 to stimulate economic progress and world trade after the United 
States and Canada joined the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), 
which was established in 1947 to coordinate the reconstruction of the European economies 
under the Marshall Plan. Later many non-European countries joined the OECD and today 
35 countries are members in the organisation.
The OECD rejected the EEC participation in 1961 to avoid a precedence for other 
international organisations but it offered a privileged observer status without voting rights. 
Currently the EU represents itself in the OECD Ministerials (held at the level of Finance 
Ministers), it can attend several Committee meetings (Policies for the Promotion of Better 
International Payments Equilibrium, Macro-economic and Structural Policy, Economic 
Policy Committee).
The EU has a Permanent Delegation at the OECD with diplomats and an ambassador. 
Members of the EU Delegation participate in the specialised committees without a voting 
right. The EU representatives are entitled to be nominated to the posts of the OECD, to make 
proposals, to modify or amend the draft documents. The budget of the OECD is supported 
by the member states of the Union; the EU does not contribute directly to common expenses.
The OECD makes annual reports on the EU and its member states economic prospects 
and performance. That is extremely useful for the EU, since from the beginning of the eco-
nomic crisis in 2008 it struggled to put the necessary efforts in the analysis of the member 
states’ economic outlook. As the OECD states:
“The EU can thus draw on the OECD’s unique reservoir of expertise, including peer 
reviews, and can access all of the research and analysis conducted by the Secretariat. […] 
The OECD is above all a forum within which countries can discuss and share national 
experience, identify best practices and find solutions to common problems. The OECD 
having working relationships with over 100 non-member economies, the European Union 
benefits from dialogue and consultations with all players on the world scene, in a context 
of increased interdependence that demands global rules of the game.” (OECD 2017)
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Since 2007 the OECD introduced reviews of the EU economy on demand of the APEC 
countries. During the preparatory phase the EU and the OECD are engaged in consultations 
(planning phase, consultation phase, secretariat’s draft phase, peer-review phase in EDRC, 
draft amending period) and finally the OECD publish the economic survey.
The European Union and the G20
The Group of Twenty (G20) was founded in 1999 by the governments and central bank gov-
ernors from Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, 
Italy, Japan, Mexico, the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, South 
Africa, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States and the European Union. The G20 is 
not an international organisation, rather it is an international regime which provides a forum 
for the participating states on the promotion of international financial stability.
The EU membership is unique among the member states since it is the only non-state 
member, represented by the European Commission and by the European Central Bank. 
The impact of the two organisations is reciprocal. On the one hand, the EU adds to the voice 
of its member states that are individually members of the G20 (France, Germany, Italy, 
the United Kingdom) and on the other hand, the G20 discussions and recommendations could 
have a major impact on the EU decision making regarding the regulatory issues discussed at 
the G20 level. (Wouters et al. 2013) The EU uses its authority at the G20 to protect and extend 
the rules-based international trading system, while making globalization more inclusive.
The EU set out the priorities regarding the G20 cooperation in 2017. (Juncker 2017) 
According to it, the EU and the G20 have a “key role making the global economy work 
for all” with “strong, sustainable, balanced and inclusive growth that relies on multilateral 
cooperation and rules-based order”. The EU and the G20 are also cooperating on an open 
and fair rules-based multilateral trading system; they work together in the climate regime 
with support of the G20 Joint Action Plan on Climate and Energy for Growth; they are 
engaged to develop common standards for fifth generation of mobile communication 
networks, uphold fair competition in the digital environment, tackle cyber threats, prepare 
for the impact of digitalisation and automation on labour. An important area of cooperation 
is the global fight against tax avoidance and evasion; that is why they support the creation 
of a list of non-cooperative jurisdictions with regard to tax transparency. Other areas include 
a more resilient international monetary and financial system, the sharing of responsibility 
for refugees and migrants and the partnering with Africa for investment, growth and jobs.
The European Union and the NATO
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization was established in 1949 as the transatlantic pillar 
of the European Security and Defence. There is a complex relationship between the two 
international organisations which became more and more multidimensional since the EU 
has begun to build up its own Foreign and Security Policy. Both organisations have 
a common interest in the field of political, security and defence cooperation. As the EU 
developed its own European Security and Defence Policy after the Nice Treaty entered 
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into force, the NATO and the EU shared many common functions and assets with each 
other via the Berlin and the Berlin Plus processes, and they declared their relationship 
as a strategic partnership in 2002. The EU has direct access to the planning capacities of 
the NATO, the NATO provides availability of its assets and capabilities for EU-led crisis 
management operations, arrangements for coherent and mutually reinforcing capability 
requirements, and they share common procedures for release, monitoring, return and 
recall of NATO assets and capabilities. They share a “comprehensive approach” to crisis 
management and operations.
The EU is not a party to the NATO and the NATO has no associated membership 
status to the EU. EU and NATO officials regularly meet to discuss common security and 
defence issues at foreign minister, ambassador and military representative levels. The two 
organisations share other common arrangements:
• a NATO Permanent Liaison Team at the EU Military Staff since 2005
• an EU Cell at the NATO’s strategic command for operations (SHAPE) since 2006
• a permanent military liaison arrangement to facilitate cooperation at the operational 
level
The Lisbon Treaty created the European External Action Service and a harmonised 
Common Foreign and Security Policy which helped to deepen the relationship. The coop-
eration intensified in the areas of capability development and capability shortfalls (medical 
support, countering improvised explosive devices), and the NATO “Smart Defence” and 
the EU’s “Pooling and Sharing” initiatives were also harmonised.
The European Union and the Organization for Security and Co­operation in 
Europe
The history of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) dates 
back to 1973, when the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (the Helsinki 
Conference) began on security, economic and human rights areas between the western 
democracies and the countries of the Soviet bloc. The OSCE was established in Budapest, 
1 January 1995 and it continued the decades long work on arms control, promotion of human 
rights, freedom of the press, and election observation while all of the EU member states 
are parties to the OSCE.
The EU has official relations with the OSCE since 2006 when the OSCE’s Organization’s 
Rules of Procedure granted it a seat next to the participating State holding the rotating EU 
Presidency. The establishment of the EU Common Security and Defence Policy made it 
possible to the two organisations to work closely together on a range of issues like election 
observation, promoting the rule of law, monitoring war crimes justice, guaranteeing 
the rights of minorities and observing the freedom of the media.
As the OSCE points out, the EU contributed to the judicial and police reform, public 
administration, anti-corruption measures, democratization, institution-building and human 
rights, media development, small and medium-sized enterprise development, border 
management and combating human trafficking, elections observation in the OSCE’s Special 
Monitoring Mission to Ukraine. (OSCE 2017)
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Table 4.
Competences of the European Union according to the Lisbon Treaty, and Participation of EU 
Institutions in Related International Organizations and Conventions
Competences Organisations, Conventions Status of the  Eu & Member States
Foreign, security 
and defence policies 
(including general
political affairs)
UN General Assembly EU observer; MS as members
UN Security Council 2 permanent MS + a rotating system
OSCE EU observer, MS as members
NATO 24 MS as members
Non-Proliferation Treaty EAEC signatory & MS
Council of Europe EU observer, MS as members
G7/G8/G20 EU participant, some MS
 
1. Exclusive (Article 3)
A. Customs union World Customs Org. (WCO) Member
B. Competition pol-
icy
World Intellectual Property 
Organisation (WIPO)
Observer
C. Monetary policy
(for Eurozone)
IMF ECB observer, MS as members
Bank for International Settlements 
(BIS)
ECB on Board, some MS
OECD EU observer, 21 MS as members
D. Fisheries & ma-
rine
biological policies
Convention on Fishing and 
Conservation of the Living Resources 
of the High Seas
EU & MS as members
UN Conference on Highly Migratory 
Fish
EU & MS as members
Multiple regional fisheries organiza-
tions: Mediterranean, NE Atlantic, 
NW Atlantic, SE Atlantic, Antarctic, 
Western and Central Pacific
EU Member & some MS
Organizations for species: tuna, 
salmon
EU signatory & some MS
E. Trade policy
WTO EU & MS as members
UN Commission on International 
Trade Law (UNCITRAL)
EU observer, some MS as members
 
2. Shared (Article 4)
A. Internal market
International Standards Organization 
(ISO)
EU cooperation, MS as members
Codex Alimentarius Commission EU & MS as members
B. Social policy
International Labour Organization 
(ILO)
EU observer, MS as members
C. Cohesion (re-
gional)
– –
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D. Agriculture and 
forestry
FAO EU & MS as members
International Fund for Agricultural 
Development
EU observer, MS as members
Multiple product organizations: 
Olive oil, Sugar, Cocoa, Coffee, Jute, 
Tropical timber, Rubber, Grains, New 
varieties of plants
EU & some MS as members
E. Environment
UN Environmental Program EU observer, some MS as members
UN FCCC (climate change) EU & MS as members
Kyoto Protocol EU & MS as members
UN Conference on Environment and 
Development
EU & MS as full participants
Convention on Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS)
EU & MS as members
International Tribunal of the Law of 
the Sea
EU & MS as members
International Seabed Authority EU & MS as members
Protection of the Marine Environment 
of the North-East Atlantic (OSPAR)
EU & 12 MS as members
Protection of the Danube River EU & 6 MS as members
F. Consumer pro-
tection
– –
G. Transport
International Civil Aviation 
Organization (ICAO)
EU observer, MS as members
International Maritime Organization 
(IMO)
EU observer, MS as members
Eurocontrol EU & 21 MS as members
H. Trans-Eur. 
Networks
– –
I. Energy
International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA)
EU observer, MS as members
International Energy Agency (IEA) EU participates, 17 MS as members
Energy Charter Treaty EU and MS as members
J. Freedom, security
and justice
International Court of Justice (ICJ) –
International Criminal Court (ICC) EU cooperation agreement
European Convention of Human 
Rights
EU & all MS as acceding parties
UN High Commission for Refugees EU observer, MS as members
World Conference against Racism, 
Racial Discrimination
EU & MS as full participants
Fourth World Conference on Women EU & MS as full participants
UN Convention Against Illicit Traffic 
of Drugs
EU & MS as full members
UN Convention Against Transnational 
Crime
EU & MS as full members
K. Public health, 
safety
– –
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L. Research, tech-
nology, space
International Telecommunications 
Union (ITU)
EU sector members, MS as members
Outer Space Treaty EU observer, most MS as members
World Summit on the Information 
Society
EU & MS as full participants
International Fusion Energy 
Organisation (IETR)
EAEC member, no MS
Science and Technical Center in 
Ukraine
EAEC & EU member, no MS
M. Development 
and humanitar-
ian aid
World Bank –
World Food Programme (WFP) EU & many MS as donors
UNDP EU observer, MS as members
UNCTAD EU observer & partial member
World Summit on Sustainable 
Development
EU & most MS as full participants
UN Conference on Least Developed 
Countries
EU & most MS as full participants
World Food Summit EU & most MS as members
 
3. Coordination (Article 5)
A. Economic pol-
icies
EBRD EEC & MS as shareholders
OECD EU observer, 21 MS as members
B. Employment pol-
icies
ILO EU observer, MS as members
C. Social policies ILO EU observer, MS as members
 
4. Supplementary (Article 6)
A. Human health
World Health Organization (WHO) EU observer, MS as members
UN Population Fund (UNFPA) EU observer, MS as members
B. Industry
UN Industrial Development 
Organisation (UNIDO)
Partnership; most MS as members
Multiple Organizations for commodi-
ties: Nickel, Copper, Lead and Zinc
EU & some MS as members
C. Culture UNESCO EU observer, MS as members
D. Tourism UN World Tourism Organization Most MS as members
E. Education, train-
ing, youth, sport
UNESCO EU observer, MS as members
UNICEF EU observer, MS as members
Source: Emerson–Kaczyński 2010, 5–6.
Conclusion
The European Union and its predecessor the European Community have a long history 
regarding the participation in international organisations. During the last half a century not 
only the EU has transferred fundamentally but the international organisations have changed. 
The Lisbon Treaty gave the EU full legal personality; throughout the EU obtains the ability 
to sign international agreements and to join an international organisation.
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But not only the EU itself extended its relations and representation in the international 
organisations but also the EU’s autonomous or semi-autonomous agencies like the European 
Agency for Safety and Health at Work, the European Medicines Agency, the European 
Maritime Safety Agency or the European Food Safety Agency worked hard to represent 
the stakeholders’ interests internationally. The scientific cooperation between the U.S. 
and the EU helped the member states to play an important role in the global technological 
landscape via the European Space Agency or the European Synchrotron Radiation Facility.
The membership of the EU and the EU member states vary from institution to 
institution. The EU can represent fully its member states but exclusive competence is very 
limited. On the other hand, in many international organisations the EU does not have a seat 
like in the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) or the IMF.
The EU is a sui generis political and legal entity. Member states remained independent 
but at the same time they have pooled their sovereignty in order to function more efficiently 
and to gain more influence at the world scene. Membership in international organisations 
helps the EU to enforce the rules of the international legal order and bridge the “enforcement 
gap” which states that international rules cannot be enforced in the same way as domestic 
laws. Relations with the UN, NATO and OSCE contributed to the promotion of stability 
and democracy, while the role of the EU in international financial organisations is helpful 
to gain more influence over the global monetary and financial sphere.
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The Relationship between the European Union  
and the United Nations
Tamás Hoffmann
Introduction
The United Nations (UN) is the only truly universal international organization – universal 
both in terms of membership, as all internationally recognized states are affiliated with 
it, and also universal in terms of activities, which cover all issues of international affairs. 
This organization, with its specialist agencies, funds and support programmes, is viewed as 
the international politics entity with the broadest legitimization to act upon the threats and 
problems occurring on the international scene. As aptly pointed out by Fassbender, since 
both the European Union (EU) and the UN are “based on the same idea of ‘integration 
through law’ and, more fundamentally, the same belief in rational and enlightened human 
beings able to design and organize their societal life in a reasonable way, a failure of 
multilateralism on a global level would necessarily have repercussions on the European 
project. Intellectually and conceptually, the European Union and the United Nations are 
built on the same foundations. If this ground becomes shaky, both structures are in danger”. 
(Fassbender 2004, 884.)
Indeed, this interdependence seems to have been noticed by average Europe citizens 
as well, who tend to have more trust in the UN than in the European Union itself. 
(Brantner–Gowan 2009, 40.)
Unsurprisingly, the Treaty on the European Union (TEU – Lisbon Treaty) is replete 
with confirmation of the fact that a close relationship between the European Union and 
the United Nations must be in the focus of European foreign policy. Most importantly, 
Article 21(1) of the TEU provides that:
1. The Union’s action on the international scene shall be guided by the principles which 
have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, and which it seeks to advance 
in the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and 
solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international 
law. The Union shall seek to develop relations and build partnerships with third countries, 
and international, regional or global organisations which share the principles referred to 
in the first subparagraph. It shall promote multilateral solutions to common problems, in 
particular in the framework of the United Nations.
The EU’s support for the UN has been repeatedly evinced in its foreign policy 
documents as well. The 2003 European Security Strategy was based on the idea of 
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“an international order based on effective multilateralism”, which could be realized by 
“strengthening the United Nations, equipping it to fulfil its responsibilities and to act 
effectively”. (A Secure Europe 2012, 9; The European Union and the United Nations 2003) 
Even though the concept of “effective multilateralism” has been recently substituted for 
“principled pragmatism” in the 2016 Global Strategy, even the new foreign policy manifesto 
of the European Union reaffirms the importance of the United Nations in the global order. 
The document emphasizes that:
“The EU will promote a rules-based global order with multilateralism as its key 
principle and the United Nations at its core. As a Union of medium-to-small sized 
countries, we have a shared European interest in facing the world together. Through our 
combined weight, we can promote agreed rules to contain power politics and contribute 
to a peaceful, fair and prosperous world. The Iranian nuclear agreement is a clear 
illustration of this fact. A multilateral order grounded in international law, including 
the principles of the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, is 
the only guarantee for peace and security at home and abroad. A rules-based global order 
unlocks the full potential of a prosperous Union with open economies and deep global 
connections, and embeds democratic values within the international system.” (Shared 
Vision, Common Action 2016, 2.)
It can be concluded that the foreign policy of the European Union is predicated on 
the assumption that the United Nations is the bedrock of the global system. (Blavoukos–
Bourantonis 2017, 6.) The EU is present in almost all major UN bodies, agencies, 
programmes and conferences. The Union is party to more than fifty international UN 
agreements and conventions as the only non-state participant. It has also been a full 
participant at certain UN summits, such as the Rio and Kyoto summits on climate change.
This chapter will first introduce the institutional aspects of this relationship, analysing 
the representation of the European Union in the main UN organs, focusing on the General 
Assembly and the Security Council. Then it will zero on in the specific fields of cooperation 
between the European Union and the United Nations, with special regard to the maintenance 
of international peace and security.
Representation of the European Union in the United Nations
Article 4(1) of the UN Charter prescribes that “membership in the United Nations is open to 
all other peace-loving states”. This condition obviously limits the potential candidates to UN 
membership to states, thus excluding non-state entities such as the EU. Even though Article 
47 of the Lisbon Treaty has eventually bestowed legal personality on the European Union, 
legal personality is not tantamount to statehood.
This does not, however, mean that the European Union cannot become a member of an-
other international organization. Conditions of membership in an international organization 
is determined by the foundational document (usually Charter or Treaty) and depending on 
its provisions the Union might become a founding member of an international organization 
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or might seek to join an already existing international organization. With respect to the first 
situation, the European Community became a founding member of the WTO in 1994.
However, as regards the  second situation, many international organizations dating from 
before the establishment of the European Communities have no provision in their consti-
tutions to accommodate other international organizations wishing to become members. 
The UN is perhaps the paradigmatic example. The only way for the European Union to join 
such an international organization would be to persuade the existing members to amend 
the constitution of the organization in order to enable other international organizations to 
become members. Should that be successful, the Union and the Member States can become 
members of the relevant international organizations alongside each other. (Kuijper et al. 
2013, 175.)
An example of an organization subsequently amending its founding treaty to enable 
the accession of the European Communities is the Food and Agricultural Organization of 
the United Nations (FAO). The FAO admitted the then EEC as a “member organization”, 
alongside its Member States, by a decision of 26 November 1991, taken under Article II(3) 
and (5) FAO Constitution. As with the FAO, any international organization of which both 
the Union and the Member States are parties will have to determine whether both the Union 
and the Member States get voting rights and how these are to be exercised.
Since the EU cannot become a member of the UN itself, in a number of UN bodies 
the EU has no formal status at all, forcing it to rely entirely on representation through its 
member states. Article 220(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU) however, provides that the “Union shall establish all appropriate forms of 
cooperation with the organs of the United Nations and its specialised agencies”, thus clearly 
signalling the desire of the Union to create an institutional framework for representation.
The EEC have been working on strengthening the cooperation with the United Nations 
since the 1970s. The United Nations Working Party (better known by its acronym CONUN) 
was established by the Political Committee on 23 January 1975. (Rasch 2008, 175.) Its 
mandate is to develop the European Union’s UN policy, with a focus on strengthening and 
reforming the UN system, and maintaining international peace and security. Other Council 
working parties have regional and thematic portfolios. (Chané–Wouters 2017, 550.)
Coordination between the EU and the EU Member States is a complex process, from 
strategy development in Brussels, to the fine-tuning on the ground in New York, Geneva, 
Rome and other UN venues. In Brussels, the Commission and several working parties 
of the Council prepare the Union’s positions at the UN, depending on the subject matter 
and the forum. However, as it is demonstrated below, the lack of EU membership status 
in the main UN bodies lead to problems of representation. With full participation out of 
reach, in 2012 the then European Commission President Barroso and Vice-President Ashton 
proposed a more modest Strategy for the Progressive Improvement of the EU Status in 
International Organisations and Other Fora in Line with the Objectives of the Treaty of 
Lisbon. Though still calling for an “improvement of the EU status and its alignment with 
the objectives of the EU Treaties”, it avoided any reference to concrete negotiation goals. 
Ever since, the European Union is slowly trying to improve its position in each of the major 
UN bodies without actually specifying the desired status it intends to achieve.
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Representation of the European Union in the United Nations General Assembly 
(UNGA)
The General Assembly is one of the principal organs of the United Nations. All 193 member 
states of the Organization have a seat and a vote in the Assembly, which is the main 
representative, policymaking and deliberative organ of the United Nations and according 
to Article 10 of the UN Charter it has a general competence “to discuss any questions or 
any matters within the scope of the present Charter or relating to the powers and functions 
of any organs provided for in the present Charter”. Every member has the right to have five 
representatives but has only a single vote. Among others, the UNGA passes resolutions 
related to economic affairs, development, security and disarmament, human rights and 
administrative and budgetary matters. While these resolutions are not legally binding, but 
are nevertheless important as they express the political views of the international community 
and may contribute to the development of international law.
In the UN General Assembly, EU foreign policy aspirations have become increasingly 
more ambitious. The Commission received observer status in 1974 and while the Maastricht 
Treaty only called on to coordinate member state policies through the EU, with the adoption 
of the Lisbon Treaty, the newly integrated EU delegation took over representation responsi-
bilities, supported by a European diplomatic service, the European External Action Service 
(EEAS). (Laatikainen 2015, 708.)
Previously, the EU member state holding the presidency had been responsible for 
coordination and representation functions in the United Nations. The new regulation thus 
attempted to redefine the balance between member states and EU institutional actors in 
the UN context. However, in the United Nations EU member states are dispersed across 
three electoral groupings – the fifteen “old” member states belong to the Western Europe 
and Others Group (WEOG), the new member states to the Eastern Europe Group (EEG), 
except for Cyprus which belongs to the Asian Group. Member states that represent regional 
groups have prerogatives that observers, such as the EU (which inherited the Commission’s 
observer status), do not possess.
In 2011, the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution A/65/276 upgrading the observer 
status to allow the EU to present common positions, make interventions, present proposals 
and circulate communications and participate in the general debate each September (United 
Nations General Assembly Resolution A/65/PV.88 of 3 May 2011). Since then, it is also 
the President of the European Council who delivers the EU statement in the General debate, 
and no longer the rotating Presidency, bringing EU representation in New York in line with 
the Lisbon Treaty provisions. Besides the President of the European Council, other EU 
external representatives – the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security 
Policy, the European Commission and the EU delegation – can also present the positions 
of the EU and its member states at the UN. However, the representatives of the European 
Union still only have seating among the observers and do not have the right to vote, to co-
sponsor draft resolutions or decisions, or to put forward candidates. Consequently, a Union 
representative can only take the floor when the representatives of all the countries belonging 
to the UN have already done so, which significantly reduces the direct influence of the EU.
This missing “actorness” of the European integration organization before the 1990s 
often resulted in low voting cohesion among the members of the EEC, especially in 
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politically contentious issues. For example, in 1979, the resolution on the Assistance to 
the oppressed people of South Africa and their national liberation movement (United 
Nations General Assembly Resolution A/RES/34/93[I] of 12 December 1979) was passed 
in the UNGA with 134 ‘yes’ votes, three ‘no’ votes and seven abstentions. The three 
‘no’ votes were cast by the U.S., France and the United Kingdom, and three of the seven 
abstentions were recorded by EU member states (Germany, Luxembourg and Belgium), 
while four EEC states voted with ‘yes’ (Ireland, Denmark, the Netherlands and Italy). 
(Burmester–Jankowski 2014, 1504.) Moreover, the EEC’s voting cohesion decreased 
sharply when the U.S. opposed a resolution during this period. However, in contrast to 
the 1970s, the disagreement variable is significant. However, on votes where the UNGA 
was evenly split, the EEC was likely to vote with almost perfect cohesion.
According to Burmeister and Jankowski, the voting behaviour of the EU can still be 
regarded as rational. When a cohesive vote by the EU is unlikely to change the outcome of 
a resolution, the EU seems to put little effort in its co-ordination process. In such instances, 
member states can differ from the EU’s majority position. In other words, if a nearly 
unanimous vote is expected, EU member states are more likely to follow their specific 
national interest, even if this is in contrast to the majority position of the EU. This might 
be especially true for the major powers in the EU, namely France, Germany and the U.K. 
(Burmester–Jankowski 2014, 1505.)
To increase voting cohesion, the EU coordinates its voting within the General 
Assembly’s six main committees and other bodies and agencies such as the Economic and 
Social Council. To this end, more than 1300 internal EU coordination meetings are held at 
the UN in New York alone to develop a common EU stance and the ability to speak with 
one voice. Still, EU coordination only seems to be genuinely successful in case of less 
politicised UN resolution. (Panke 2014, 40.) For instance, in the 64th session (2009/2010) 
of the UNGA, the EU failed to develop common voting positions on 23 of the 87 issues 
on which a vote was taken and was consequently not voting as one block 26.43% of 
the time. These issues included a resolution on global efforts for the total elimination of 
racism, a draft resolution on the dissemination of information on decolonisation, a draft 
resolution on the inadmissibility of certain practices that fuel racism, a draft resolution on 
the Syrian Golan, a draft resolution on the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of 
Peace, a draft resolution on promotion of multilateralism in the area of disarmament and 
non-proliferation and a draft decision on adoption of the outcome document of the Durban 
Review Conference as well as others. (Panke 2014, 30.) Overall, it might be concluded that 
even though the European Union has made considerable progress in the last few decades 
in developing a common voice in the UN General Assembly, its lack of full membership 
prevents it from representing a single position in all cases.
Representation of the European Union in the United Nations Security Council 
(UNSC)
According to Article 23 of the UN Charter, the Security Council is composed of five per-
manent members – China, France, Great Britain, France and Russia – and ten non- permanent 
members, elected periodically for two years by the General Assembly pending the approval 
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of their respective regional groupings. Under Article 24 of the UN Charter, the Security 
Council has primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security 
and can even pass resolutions binding on all member states. The permanent members of 
the Security Council have the right to veto any proposed resolutions, so unsurprisingly 
the two EU permanent UNSC members, Great Britain and France, have fought hard to 
preserve the acknowledgement of their special status as enshrined in the EU treaties from 
Maastricht onwards.
Article 34(2) of the Treaty of Lisbon signals that there is no EU coordination provision 
for the UNSC, merely the obligation to engage in consultations. It provides that:
“Member states which are members of the Security Council will, in the execution of their 
functions, defend the positions and the interests of the Union, without prejudice to their 
responsibilities under the provisions of the United Nations Charter.
When the Union has defined a position on a subject which is on the United Nations Security 
Council agenda, those member states which sit on the Security Council shall request that 
the High Representative be invited to present the Union’s position.”
According to Declarations 13 and 14 concerning the common foreign and security policy, 
added to the Treaty of Lisbon, even though EU member countries ought to undertake 
coordinated actions in the arena of the UN with reference to the common EU standpoint, 
in the event of a conflict of interest, individual countries put priority on the obligations 
resulting directly from the terms of the United Nations Charter over the interest of the EU.
In the absence of a strong collective EU presence, special emphasis has been laid 
upon intra-EU coordination to ensure that EU member states that are also UNSC members 
raise EU views and positions. Still, information-sharing in the UNSC has lagged behind 
in comparison to the other UN main and subsidiary organs and coordination has remained 
problematic. Even though already Article J.9 of the Maastricht Treaty stipulated that “the 
Commission shall be fully associated with the work carried out in the common foreign and 
security policy field”, little formal or informal coordination among member states on UNSC 
affairs was taking place in the 1990s. Despite sporadic attempts by some member states 
to enhance information exchange and repeated pressure on the two EU permanent UNSC 
members to improve coordination with the other EU partners, no regular coordination 
mechanism was formally established. Only recently, pragmatic arrangements have 
increased the flow of information, prospective coordination, and EU visibility in the UNSC 
in conformity with the Treaty of Lisbon obligation of member states in the UNSC to keep 
the other EU member states and the High Representative fully informed. (Marchesi 2010, 
101–103.)
Consequently, the issue of coordination emerges as a key parameter of EU performance 
in the UNSC. Such coordination aims at fine-tuning the positions of EU member states and 
avoiding split votes in the UNSC decision-making process that would stress the intra-EU 
heterogeneity and thus distort the implicit or explicit projection of individual member 
states’ positions as those of the EU. (Blavoukos–Bourantonis 2011, 733.) The gradual 
transformation of the duty of information into practice on UNSC affairs reflects broader 
concerns that the EU is not an actor per se in the UNSC, in contrast to other UN bodies. 
(Rasch 2008, 78–86.)
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This strategy seems to be successful in helping to establish an EU presence within 
the Security Council. The UNSC officially endorsed the relationship with the EU in 2014 
when it adopted a presidential statement on cooperation between the EU (Statement by 
the President of the Security Council of 14 February 2014) and ever since holds annual 
meetings on strengthening the partnership with the EU, under its agenda item on cooperation 
between the UN and regional and subregional organisations. Moreover, EU representatives 
regularly deliver statements in the Security Council. Only in 2016, the EU delivered 
32 statements in the UN Security Council.
Representation of the European Union in other United Nations organs
Full membership of the EU, such as in the Food and Agricultural Organization is still 
the exception. In most bodies, the EU holds observer status, for example in the Economic 
and Social Council (ECOSOC) and its subsidiary bodies, as well as in the UN Conference 
on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), which is a subsidiary organ of the UN General 
Assembly. Finally, there remains a number of organs within the UN framework, where 
the EU has no formal status, such as the World Bank, although its member states may be 
members.
Unlike the FAO, the ECOSOC is an organ with limited membership. Its 54 members 
are elected by the UN General Assembly for a term of three years, taking into account 
geographical representation. To coordinate the membership bids of EU member states, 
the EU has developed a complex system which determines the election intervals for each EU 
member state. In 1983, the ECOSOC extended a standing invitation to the EEC, granting it 
the “right to participate, with the approval of the Council and without the right to vote, in 
the Council’s debates on questions of concern”. The EEC’s ad hoc participation, subject to 
invitation, was consequently turned into a permanent observer status.
In practice, however, the EU’s limited participation rights in most UN bodies still force 
it to rely on representation through the Member States, usually the one holding the Council 
Presidency. The EU’s external representation at the UN is, therefore, still spread on many 
shoulders. Depending on the subject-matter and on the level of the meeting, the EU will be 
represented by the Commission (in matters that do not fall under the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy [CFSP]), the President of the European Council and the High Representative 
(in CFSP matters) and/or the EU Delegation. The Member States continue to speak on their 
own behalf and will speak “on behalf of the EU” whenever the Union’s lack of participation 
rights so requires. If a matter falls within an area of both EU and national competence, 
the EU’s representative will be determined on the basis of whether the “thrust” of the issue 
falls under EU or national competence. (Chané–Wouters 2017, 551.)
Fields of Cooperation Between the European Union and the United Nations
As seen above, the European Union is dedicated to a rules-based global order and that is 
predicated on a close cooperation with the United Nations. In Federica Mogherini’s words: 
“The European way is also the United Nations’ way. This explains why all our actions, 
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all our initiatives are always taken in full coordination and partnership with the UN. We 
believe in the UN, because we believe in the same principles, in the same values, and our 
communities are built upon the same fundamental ideals”. (High Representative/Vice-
President Federica Mogherini at the UN Security Council, 9 May 2017) But cooperation is 
not simply seen as a moral duty but also as a political necessity. As the EU Global Strategy 
for Foreign and Security Policy emphasizes: “Without global norms and the means to 
enforce them, peace and security, prosperity and democracy – our vital interests – are at 
risk. Guided by the values on which it is founded, the EU is committed to a global order 
based on international law, including the principles of the UN Charter”. (Shared Vision, 
Common Action 2016)
This commitment to multilateralism within the framework of the UN system demands 
marshalling a wide range of instruments to realize a comprehensive approach that is “direct 
involvement in international negotiations, including mediation, on behalf of the international 
community; and […] close work with international and regional partners, where only 
collective efforts can deliver results. A particular strength of the European Union is its ability 
to respond to a crisis with a wide range of tools and instruments — short- and long-term, 
humanitarian and development, security and political”. (Ashton 2013)
The political aspect of the cooperation between European Union member countries 
within the UN, however, can cause ambiguities. As previously emphasized, the countries 
lead their own foreign policy, fulfil their own obligations resulting from the United Nations 
Charter, and thus are guided by the best realization of their own national interests. They are 
therefore not obliged to observe common arrangements concerning the Common Foreign 
and Security Policy. (Willa 2016, 341.)
International peace and security
The utmost importance of the maintenance of international peace and security is repeatedly 
affirmed in the Treaty of Lisbon as the Union to define its potential contribution as a player 
on the international stage. (Dashwood 2008, 74.) Art. 21(2) of the TEU provides that:
“The Union shall define and pursue common policies and actions, and shall work for a high 
degree of cooperation in all fields of international relations, in order to:
(c) preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security, in accordance 
with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter.”
Moreover, Declaration 13 added to the Treaty of Lisbon on common foreign and security 
policy stresses that: “the European Union and its Member States will remain bound by 
the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and, in particular, by the primary re-
sponsibility of the Security Council and of its Members for the maintenance of international 
peace and security.”
The EU has a wide range of tools available to prevent and solve crises in close coop-
eration with international and regional partners. For this reason, the High Representative 
provides regular updates to the Security Council and the EU is often invited to address 
issues of common concern, such as the fight against terrorism. Regular UN Security 
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Council meetings on UN–EU cooperation in maintaining international peace and security 
are testimony to the importance both place on it.
Peacekeeping
Peacekeeping is one among a range of activities undertaken by the United Nations to 
maintain peace and security throughout the world, and the area is clearly aligned with some 
of the ambitions of the EU as an international actor. The UNSC establishes a peacekeeping 
operation by adopting a Security Council Resolution. The resolution sets out that mission’s 
mandate and size. Once agreed upon, the Security Council also monitors the work of UN 
peacekeeping operations continuously, among other things through periodic reports from 
the Secretary-General and by holding dedicated Security Council sessions to discuss 
the work of specific operations.
While usually not directly involved in political decisions on establishing or terminating 
UN peacekeeping operations, the General Assembly (UNGA) plays a key role in the fi-
nancing of peacekeeping missions. As all UN member states (have to) share the costs of 
UN-led peacekeeping operations, the UNGA apportions these expenses based on a special 
scale of assessment, taking the relative economic wealth of member states into account. Yet 
the permanent members of the Security Council are required to pay a larger share due to 
their special responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.
Given their shared values, strongly convergent objectives and the EU’s stated interest in 
promoting “effective multilateralism”, the European Union and the United Nations are often 
considered to be “natural partners” in global peacekeeping and the EU considers the UN 
a key entity responsible for undertaking actions in order to prevent international conflicts. 
Yet, the cooperation between the EU and the UN in this particular area only goes back two 
decades. The Franco–British Saint-Malo Summit (1998) and the 1999 European Council 
of Cologne not only initiated a shared European Security and Defence Policy, but also 
EU–UN cooperation in the area of peacekeeping missions and peacebuilding operations. 
(Hosli et al. 2017, 90.)
At the 2000 EU summit in Nice, the EU acknowledged the necessity of a strong 
relationship with the UN that “allows Europeans to answer in an efficient and coherent 
manner to the requests of leading organisations such as the UN and the OSCE” and that 
the Council’s Presidency had to “identify possible areas and modalities of cooperation 
between the EU and the UN in the field of crisis management”. (European Council 2000) 
Later that year, the Gothenburg summit stipulated that the EU should “develop mutually 
reinforcing approaches to conflict prevention” and “ensure that the EU’s evolving military 
and civilian capacities would provide real added value for UN crisis management”. 
(European Council 2001)
The EU eventually drafted two internal crisis management guidelines, determining 
the modalities and principles of peacekeeping cooperation with the UN and other interna-
tional organisations. The Joint Declaration on UN–EU Cooperation in Crisis Management, 
adopted on 19 September 2003, emphasized the benefits of cooperation for both sides. It 
expressed a commitment to intensify common actions and established a special mechanism 
of bilateral consultations, aiming to facilitate planning, training and communication. 
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This approach was further developed in the EU–UN Cooperation in Military Crisis 
Management Operations: Elements of Implementation of the EU–UN Joint Declaration, 
adopted by the EU Council on 17 June 2004. (General Secretariat of the European Council 
2004) This document outlined two possible models for performing EU operations according 
to the UN mandate. The “bridge model” applied to quick and brief EU interventions 
allowing the UN to gather more forces and resources, while the “readiness model” can be 
implemented in support for operations led directly by the UN. (Willa 2016, 344.)
These documents have established basic principles for peacekeeping that have ever 
since remained the same. According to these the EU will at all times retain the political 
control and strategic direction of all of its operations, such cooperation will take place on 
a case-by-case basis only and will not necessarily participate in a peace support mission, 
even in case of specific request by the UN. Moreover, the EU does not constitute a pool of 
forces, but will only intervene by conducting specific missions or operations. (Hosli et al. 
2017, 92.)
While in the early 2000s the EU was often regarded as “just a regional peacekeeper”, 
(Missiroli 2003, 493.) by today European Union military and civil missions and operations 
have been conducted in three continents, not only in Europe but also in Africa, such 
as the EU Military Training Mission in Somalia (EUTM–Somalia) and the EU Border 
Assistance Mission in Libya (EUBAM), and in Asia, for instance the EU Co-ordinating 
Office for Palestinian Police Support (EUPOL COPPS). (EU Peacekeeping Operations 2017) 
These crisis management operations have a wide variety, such as police missions, rule of law 
missions, border assistance missions, monitoring missions and military missions. In sum, 
during the last two decades the European Union has successfully developed its peacekeeping 
capabilities and become a genuine partner of the UN in this field.
Implementation of UN sanctions
Under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Security Council has the competence to pass 
binding resolutions imposing sanctions on states, non-governmental organizations or even 
single individuals to protect international peace and security. The Charter specifies that 
these sanctions are created obligations that take precedence over any other state obligations. 
Article 103 stipulates that: “In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members 
of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other 
international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail.” In 
the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice this obligation was originally interpreted 
as applicable in the EU context, as well.
In the Bosphorus case, a Turkish company contested the execution of UN sanctions 
against Yugoslavia in EU law. Bosphorus Airways was a Turkish company operating 
principally as an air charterer and travel organizer that leased for a period of four years 
two aircraft owned by the Yugoslav national airline JAT. The agreement provided for 
the leasing of the aircraft only and excluded cabin and flight crew, who were provided 
by Bosphorus Airways. The latter company thus had complete control of the day-to-day 
management of the aircraft for that period. Yet, the leased aircraft was still confiscated by 
the Irish authorities in compliance with Council Regulation (EEC) 990/93 that implemented 
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UNSC Resolution 820 (1993). (Wenzel 2008) In that context, the Court of Justice held 
that if an EU act intends to implement a UN obligation, the act ought to be interpreted in 
the light of the UN rule in question (Judgment in Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm ve Ticaret 
AS v Minister for Transport, Energy and Communications and Others.)
This approach, however, was substantially changed following the implementation 
of the sanctions regime established by the UN Security Council Resolution 1267 (1999). 
This regime is directed against al-Qaeda and the Taliban, and associated individuals and 
entities, obliging all UN Member States to implement an asset freeze, travel ban and arms 
embargo on them. It revolves around the function of a Sanctions Committee created to 
oversee the implementation of these sanctions. On the basis of information from the UN 
Member States the 1267 Sanctions Committee establishes and amends a list of persons 
related to al-Qaeda, on whom sanctions are to be imposed by the UN Member States. 
The Union adopted Common Position 2002/402/CFSP9 in accordance with Resolution 1267 
and implemented it with Council Regulation (EC) No 881/2002. The centralized nature of 
the 1267 regime has raised issues within the EU with regard to the adequate protection of 
human rights of listed individuals. (Kuijper et al. 2013, 217–8.)
This has been particularly illustrated by the Kadi case before the EU Courts. 
(De Búrca 2010) The applicant, a Saudi Arabian national with substantial assets in the EU 
had been listed in the annex to an EC Regulation as a person suspected of supporting 
terrorism and in consequence all his funds and financial assets in the EU were frozen. 
Even though the Court of First Instance decided that the regulation was in conformity 
with the Security Council’s binding resolution, on appeal, the Court of Justice overturned 
the Court of First Instance’s judgment. The Court took the view that the respect for the UN 
Charter does not reach so far as to affect the protection of fundamental rights within the EU 
legal order. Thus, the primacy of international agreements has one clear limitation: it does 
not extend to primary Union law, including general principles of EU law, and in particular 
fundamental rights based on the autonomy of the Community legal system (Judgment in 
Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v. Council and Commission). This reasoning 
was also reaffirmed in a  second judgment (Commission and Others v. Kadi).
Ultimately, the European Union still closely cooperates with the United Nations in 
the implementation of sanctions to maintain international peace and security. However, these 
sanctions cannot be implemented in the EU legal order if they are deemed to be incompatible 
with fundamental human rights norms.
Conclusion
The cooperation of the European Union and the United Nations is riddled with difficulties 
arising from often clashing national interests and the lack of adequate representation 
in many UN bodies. As Hoffmeister and Kuijper aptly remarked: “Painting a picture 
on the status of the European Union at the United Nations may not result in a beautiful 
Rembrandt with a golden undertone of good old State sovereignty. Rather an artist would 
possibly have to recourse to some abstract modern techniques, where colours are constantly 
changing.” (Hoffmeister– Kuijper 2006, 34.)
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The impending exit of the United Kingdom from the European Union (Brexit) 
ironically might even forge a greater unity among the remaining EU member states which 
could result in an improved representation in the United Nations. Even though the U.K. is 
a permanent member in the Security Council and therefore a major influence within the UN, 
in the past it had repeatedly obstructed unified EU representation within the United Nations. 
In 2011, for instance, it blocked the issuing of more than 70 EU statements since it did not 
agree that the EU could automatically speak on behalf of the member states in certain issues 
such as finance, economics, disarmament, terrorism and human rights. (Borger 2011)
Nevertheless, despite all the current uncertainties, the EU will continue to be a dedi-
cated supporter of the United Nations. In Federica Mogherini’s words: “The European vision 
is the United Nations vision”. (Security Council 2017) Both organizations share a belief that 
a rules-based global order where states are closely cooperating to maintain international 
peace and security presents the only viable future for humankind. Consequently, it might be 
expected that the cooperation of the two organizations will continue to flourish and deepen.
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The NATO–EU Relations
András István Türke
Historical and Legal Background
At the beginning of the integration process, (Western) Europe concluded the following 
deal, which has had serious consequences. With the renunciation of a pillar of sovereignty 
(territorial defence, e.g. NATO), the member states of the EU accepted de facto the primacy 
of the USA over policies at the international level. In return most European countries 
spend much less on collective defence. They thus profit from the unexploited capital for 
defence. Some countries (France, the U.K.) still develop a military capability to manage 
their preserve. At the European level, the real political will to create a common European 
defence is lacking. Thus, there remains only the common defence policy for Europeans, 
that is to say the fields outside the common, territorial defence that falls under NATO. After 
WWII, European defence started to be reorganized on the basis of bilateral treaties (like 
the Treaty of Dunkirk, 1947). The mutual defence base for Europe was concluded for the first 
time in the Brussels Treaty, but the European initiatives were destined to fail, because fear 
and distrust of the Germans persisted. Weakened and impoverished, the European states 
did not have the capacity to counter the USSR with conventional or nuclear weapons. Until 
recently, the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty (NAT, 4 April 19491) has been interpreted 
differently by the most powerful states in Europe. For France, especially since the presidency 
of Charles de Gaulle, the integrated structure (i.e. the “Organization”) with its military 
logic of a military doctrine, non-autonomous nuclear weapons, was for a long time refused 
or criticized. However, the automatic triggering of the mutual defence treaty (i.e. NAT, an 
international treaty), Article 5, has never been questioned, as for example during the Berlin 
Wall (1961) and Cuban Missile Crises (1962). Since 1949, Europe’s territorial defence is 
based on Article 5 of the NAT and this article is the basis of the collective defence in 
the transatlantic area. The treaty limits the territory of its application in Article 6 (amended 
at the time of the Turkish and Greek accession, 22 October 1951):
“For the purpose of Article 5, an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to 
include an armed attack: on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, 
on the Algerian Departments of France, on the territory of Turkey or on the islands 
under the jurisdiction of any of the Parties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic 
of Cancer; on the forces, vessels, or aircraft of any of the Parties, when in or over these 
1 12 founding members: the USA, Canada, Belgium, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
the Netherland,, Norway, Portugal, the U.K.
242 Regional and Bilateral Relations of the European Union
territories or any area in Europe in which occupation forces of any of the Parties were 
stationed on the date when the Treaty entered into force or the Mediterranean Sea or 
the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer.” (Türke 2008, 22–23.)
By contrast, Article IV of the Brussels Treaty of 17 March 1948, (Article V in the modified 
Brussels Treaty, the so-called WEU2-Treaty, Paris, 23 October 1954), has no geographical 
limitation and, in case of an attack, the aid provided is wider (and other aid: political, 
economic, etc.) than the purely military aid of Article 5 of NATO:
“If any of the High Contracting Parties should be the object of an armed attack in Europe, 
the other High Contracting Parties will, in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of 
the Charter of the United Nations, afford the Party so attacked all the military and other 
aid and assistance in their power.” (Türke 2008, 59.)
(A)WEU, which was put to sleep by the Marseille Declaration (in 2000), has not completely 
disappeared and, until its dissolution in June 2011, retained its role, notably in the imple-
mentation of Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty concerning an “armed aggression in 
Europe” against one of the contracting parties. The Treaty on European Union (Maastricht 
and its amendments) did not incorporate it until the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon 
(1 December 2009). According to its Article 28A Paragraph 7:
“If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member 
States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their 
power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. This shall not 
prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member 
States.” (Türke 2013, 112–120.)
That is to say, the implications of Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty were perceived 
but the military means to realize them, which fall within the competence of NATO, were 
not. U.S. policy was not ab ovo against a strong European pillar of NATO. American 
objectives, strengthening Europe by German rearmament against the USSR, were more 
real and reasonable than the European fears of hereditary enemies. Because the Americans 
favoured the Brussels and the EDC3 treaties for the simple logic of costs and duty sharing, 
and because until the mid-1950s the military structure of the NAT was in development. Once 
the structure was finalized, the Americans closed “definitively” the door to the establishment 
of a European pillar.4 The United States, therefore, having seen the failure of the EDC and 
the irrelevant debates among the Europeans that followed, finalized NATO as an American 
structure, with American leadership, and were already against the WEU Treaty (1954). 
(Türke 2012, 13–30; 193–198.) The  second phase of cooperation between Europe and 
America on common defence in the transatlantic area can be characterized by the policy 
of France: “with the Alliance but without the Organization” and thus the special duplicity 
2 WEU: Western European Union; AWEU: Assembly of the WEU.
3 EDC: European Defence Community (27 May 1952, never came into force).
4 That is to say, a more or less cooperation between the “equals”.
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of nuclear deterrence in Europe. The conclusion was that France remained in the Atlantic 
alliance, but resigned from NATO’s military organization in 1966. (Cooperation under 
the “14 + 1” formula between 1966–1978.) The three institutions in which France no 
longer participated were: the Defence Planning Committee, the Nuclear Planning Group 
(NPG) and the Military Committee. The gradual reintegration of France into the military 
structure of NATO at the level of troops in the fields began under the presidency of Jacques 
Chirac (1995–2007). Now, however, the partial French participation in the North Atlantic 
Council, as well as in the Military Committee, has become full. Since 2009, the process has 
accelerated with the reintegration to the International Military Staff and to the International 
Secretariat, as well as with integration to the Allied Command Transformation (2003–), 
and Allied Command Operation (2003–). Integration is not complete, however, especially 
in the nuclear field. France has laid down several conditions (France Diplomatie 2017) for 
this return to the military structure:
• maintaining full discretion for France’s contribution to NATO operations
• the maintenance of nuclear independence: France has decided not to join the NPG 
which defines the alliance’s nuclear policy
• no French force is permanently under NATO command in peacetime
• non-participation in the common funding of certain expenditure decided prior to 
France’s return to the command structures
As a result, since 2009, France occupies approximately 750 additional officer positions within 
the NATO Integrated Command, in particular the post of Supreme Allied Commander 
Transformation (Norfolk 2002–). The Headquarters Rapid Reaction Corps-France in Lille, 
created on 1 July 2005, is a NATO certified headquarters, able to command a national or 
multinational land component between 5,000 and 60,000 personnel.
The Most Important Political Steps of EU–NATO Cooperation (1990–2016)
At the creation of the EU, due to the English opposition, the incorporation of the institutional 
structure of the WEU, the armed wing of the European integration (reactivated in 1984 by 
the Rome Declaration) in the Maastricht Treaty could not be realized. So developments in 
the field of European defence, including crisis management, slowed in favour of NATO. 
The only way out of this impasse remained the strengthening and development the opera-
tional capabilities of the WEU through the so-called “Petersberg tasks”. On 19 June 1992, at 
the Council of Ministers in Petersberg, the WEU defined a framework for future European 
humanitarian, peacekeeping, and peace-making interventions. The Petersberg missions 
provided a hard instrument of crisis management for Europeans well before than NATO got 
it by the MC 14/5 strategy in 1999. The German president of the WEU interpreted the notion 
of peace making (based on Chapter VI of the UN Charter, theoretically without combat 
forces) as peace enforcement (based on Chapter VII, with combat forces). It is also the WEU 
that has begun opening and expanding to other states, but different memberships resulted 
in a very complicated structure, and internal debates considerably slowed down the process 
in favour of NATO: At the Petersberg Summit, the WEU created the status of observer 
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countries (members of the EU, but not of NATO: Ireland, Denmark5) and associate member 
countries (members of NATO but not of the EU: Iceland, Norway, Turkey). The countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe have been integrated first through the organization of a WEU 
Consultation Forum (“consulting partners”). But the same year, in November 1992, because 
of the contribution of these new countries to the management of the conflict in the former 
Yugoslavia, a Franco–German–Polish initiative has already proposed the establishment of 
the status of associate partners for these states. As for the realization, once again, NATO 
has been faster: After being proposed as an American initiative at the NATO meeting in 
Travemünde, Germany, on 20–21 October 1993, on 10–11 January 1994 in Brussels, NATO 
launched its PfP (Partnership for Peace) program for the same countries.6 The WEU could 
not institute that in its Kirchberg Declaration of 9 May 1994, i.e. the status of WEU associate 
partner countries. At NATO, favoured by the British, the European Security and Defence 
Identity (ESDI) – the European pillar of NATO intended to discourage European initiatives 
for an autonomous defence – has been developed since the Brussels (1994) and Berlin (1996) 
summits. The goals of ESDI were to allow European countries to act militarily where NATO 
did not wish to, and to alleviate the United States’ financial burden of maintaining military 
bases in Europe. (Türke 2012, 63–130.) The Treaty of Amsterdam (1 May 1999) specified 
that ESDP included the “Petersberg tasks”, thus laying down the premises for a defence 
policy. The alliance’s heads-of-state-and-government meeting in Washington in April 1999 
laid down the basic principles of the relationship between EU and NATO:
• NATO and the EU establish a relationship of “consultation, cooperation, and effec-
tive transparency”
• European states shall take the necessary measures to strengthen their defence ca-
pabilities for new missions “by avoiding unnecessary duplication”
• European allies not members of the EU may be involved in crisis response opera-
tions led by the EU
• The increased role of the EU in defence will be in line with the decisions of 
the Berlin Summit of 1996, within the framework of NATO’s concept of separable 
but non-separated European military capabilities
Until 2000, relations between the EU and NATO were virtually non-existent, although, 
in line with the decisions taken at the Helsinki Council, the Secretary-General/High 
Representative (SG/HR) and the Secretary General of NATO had informal contacts. 
The partners proposed an even-closer contact, which France refused, fearing that more 
transparency would jeopardize the sovereignty of European initiatives. (Rapport 2000, 
38–40.) The Santa Maria da Feira Summit (19–20 June 2000) defined the principles to 
enable non-EU European NATO members to contribute to the military management of 
the EU. Institutionalised relations between NATO and the EU started only in 2001 though. 
The conclusions of the Nice European Council (7–9 December 2000) stated that in case of 
an EU operation using NATO assets and capabilities:
5 Denmark was an exception, being member of both.
6 And also launched CJTF (Combined Joint Task Forces) concept, which has competed with the Forces 
Answerable to the WEU (FAWEU).
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1. The PSC (EU Political and Security Committee) addresses the strategic guidelines 
through the Military Committee to the Designated Operations Commander, ena-
bling it to prepare the planning documents necessary for the operation (CONOPS, 
OPLAN), using guaranteed access to planning capabilities of NATO.
2. NATO and EU experts shall meet to specify NATO pre-identified assets and ca-
pabilities, in liaison with DSACEUR, and then the EU sends a request to NATO.
3. The PSC/NAC meetings identify the means, capacities, and modalities of the provi-
sion. NATO will remain informed about their uses throughout the operation.
4. OpCom (Operational Command) will be invited to meetings of the EUMC (EU 
Military Committee) to report on the progress of the operation.
5. The PSC proposes that the council terminate the operation and inform the NAC in 
advance.
Cyprus and Malta, which do not have security agreements with NATO, are not involved in 
Berlin-plus operations, or in EU–NATO meetings dealing with NATO-classified matters. 
(Türke 2012, 172–179.) Within NATO, the first Turkish blockage of EDSP in the Berlin-plus 
process dates back to April 1999. Turkey wanted assurances that its rights to WEU were 
maintained through its associate membership. On 11 December 1999, Turkish Prime 
Minister Bulent Ecevit, perhaps influenced by the Americans, stated that “it would be unfair 
to expect from these countries, that they receive orders from a Council of the European 
Union concerning military deployments using NATO assets. We will continue to oppose 
it within the NATO Council”. As the Turkish press has written: “Turkey will not be able to 
accept anything other than what has been affirmed in Washington.” (Rapport 2000, 41–43.)
In addition to disagreements on case-by-case access, this time the Turkish counter- 
argument was that third countries had the opportunity to offer their capabilities to the HG 
Plus (catalogue of additional forces). All this makes possible a Cypriot proposal to engage 
the EU rapid-reaction forces as a peacekeeping force on the island (with the Turkish Republic 
of Northern Cyprus, recognised only by Turkey.) In 2002, after three years of difficult 
negotiations, relations between the EU and NATO were normalized. The pro-European 
U-turn was marked by the victory of Recep Tayyip Erdogan and the Islamist Justice and 
Development Party (AKP) in Turkish elections on 3 November 2002. At the Prague summit 
of 21–22 November 2002, NATO member states declared their willingness to give the EU 
access to NATO assets and capabilities for operations in which the alliance would not 
be engaged militarily. The Copenhagen negotiations of 12–13 December 2002 allowed 
the unlocking of the Berlin-plus arrangements. The Copenhagen Final Document (see 
Appendix 1) is the manifestation of Turkish success: “As things stand at present, the “Berlin 
plus” arrangements and the implementation thereof will apply only to those EU Member 
States which are also either NATO members or parties to the “Partnership for Peace”, 
(PfP, Malta and Cyprus being excluded – A.I.T.), and which have consequently concluded 
bilateral security agreements with NATO.” Due to this agreement the path has been opened 
up for the first ESDP operations in the Balkans and in Africa. The disagreement between 
Greece and Turkey continues to poison EU–NATO relations in the field of operations and 
capacity development though. Regular sessions within the NATO–EU Capability Group (see 
below) are only pro forma; real cooperation is excluded. Due to Turkey’s veto, Cyprus is not 
part of this group and it cannot conclude a PfP Agreement with NATO. In return, Cyprus 
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(and Greece) block cooperation between Turkey and the EDA (European Defence Agency). 
International staff-to-staff and in-field cooperation between the EU and NATO is excellent, 
however, proving that the problem is purely political. (Horváth 2016, 75.) So in December 
2002, the NATO–EU Declaration on European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) 
paved the way for closer political and military cooperation between the two organizations 
(Berlin Plus agreement). It set out the political principles underlying the relationship and 
reaffirmed EU access to NATO’s planning capabilities for the EU’s military operations. 
These arrangements include:
• a NATO–EU security agreement (covering the exchange of classified information 
under reciprocal protection rules)
• guaranteed EU access to NATO planning capabilities for effective use in the military 
planning of EU-led crisis management operations
• the availability of NATO common assets and capabilities (communication units, 
headquarters, etc.) for EU-led crisis management operations
• a mandate for a European Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (DSACEUR) 
who will command the EU-led operation
• integration with the NATO defence planning system for military needs and capa-
bilities required for EU-led operations to ensure the availability of well-equipped 
and trained forces for NATO- or EU-led operations
The “common planning capacity” of the EU and the question of its possible duplication 
within NATO structures is regulated by the decision to create two new structures at 
the Brussels European Council of 12–13 December 2003:
• A “permanent unit for planning and conducting EU civil and military operations 
without recourse to NATO assets” will be placed at the EU headquarters, as an 
autonomous and separate “cell” of NATO structures.
• A EU unit is established within NATO Headquarters, SHAPE, to improve the prepa-
ration of EU operations carried out with NATO under the Berlin Plus arrangements.
In May 2003, the NATO–EU Capability Group was established; experts from the EDA and 
NATO addressed common capability shortfalls, such as countering improvised explosive 
devices and medical support. Staff also ensure transparency and the complementary nature 
of NATO’s work on “Smart Defence” and the EU’s Pooling and Sharing initiative. On 12–13 
December 2003, the EU adopted the European Security Strategy (SES) at the Brussels 
European council. NATO’s and the EU’s assessments of the threat are similar; both SES 
and the NATO Strategic Concept place terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD) and “failing” states at the top of the list of security challenges, and 
both organizations consider it essential to involve a non-military dimension. Political 
problems have slowed considerably the development of the CSDP (Common Security and 
Defence Policy, 2009) in Europe since 2008. At the Lisbon Summit in 2010, the allies 
underlined their determination to improve the NATO–EU strategic partnership; the 2010 
Strategic Concept committed the alliance to working more closely with other international 
organisations to prevent crises, manage conflicts, and stabilise post-conflict situations. 
Currently NATO and the EU have in common twenty-two member countries; they cooperate 
on issues of common interest and work side-by-side on crisis management and capability 
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development. On 5 September 2014, the heads of state and government of NATO issued 
a declaration following the summit in Newport, Wales. It included a pledge by NATO’s 
member states to spend 2% of their respective gross domestic product (GDP) on defence 
within a decade. While the number of European countries in NATO has nearly doubled 
since 1990, defence spending by Europeans has gone down by 28%. In 1990, the fourteen 
European members spent around $314 billion on defence collectively; in 2015, the alliance’s 
twenty-five European members are expected to spend around $227 billion. In 1995, U.S. 
defence expenditure accounted for 59% of overall NATO defence spending; in 2015, it is 
expected to be above 70%. As a percentage of GDP, defence spending by European allies fell 
from an average of 2% in 1995–1999 to 1.5% in 2014, while that of the United States went 
up from 3.1% to 3.4% in the same period. (Techau 2015) On 10 February 2016, the EU and 
NATO concluded a technical agreement on cyber defence that provided a framework for 
enhanced information exchange between the EU’s Computer Emergency Response Team 
(CERT–EU) and NATO’s Computer Incident Response Capability (NCIRC). Consultations 
between NATO and the EU have expanded considerably over the past two years; they cover 
the Western Balkans, Ukraine, Libya, and the Middle East. According to the new EU Global 
Strategy (June 2016) and the Joint Declaration signed during the NATO Warsaw Summit 
(8 July 2016), the EU and NATO should work together on countering hybrid threats, strategic 
communication, intelligence sharing, operational cooperation (mainly at sea), cyber security, 
interoperability, defence industry, exercises, and enhancing the resilience of partners in 
the east and south. (Türke 2016, 6–14.) On the basis of this Joint Declaration, the Council 
Conclusions 15283/16 of 6 December 2016 detail forty-two concrete proposals in seven 
specific areas: (Implementation 2016)
1. Countering hybrid threats ranging from disinformation campaigns to acute crises.
2. Operational cooperation, including maritime issues, i.e. enhanced cooperation 
between NATO’s Operation Sea Guardian and the EUNAVFOR Operation Sophia 
in the Mediterranean.
3. Cyber security and defence, including the exchange of information on cyber threats 
and the sharing of best practices on cyber security.
4. Ensuring the coherence and complementarity of each other’s defence planning 
processes.
5. Defence industry and research.
6. Parallel and coordinated exercises, starting with a pilot project in 2017.
7. Defence and security capacity building.
Cooperation and Rivalry in the Field
With the end of the Cold War, in the early 1990s great changes came to the international 
security environment. NATO, with its new, reduced-forward-defence doctrine (MC 14/4, 
1991–1999), assumed an increasingly proactive role within the international community 
and conducted several missions and operations. Since 1992, NATO, the EEC (European 
Economic Community) and later the EU, and the WEU have long cooperated on crisis 
management and operations, in particular in the Western Balkans and Afghanistan. A race 
began between the new European security and defence policy seeking an identity and 
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NATO, also seeking feverishly a new identity to avoid downsizing after the dissolution 
of the USSR. A French-led European axis fought an Anglo–American axis. According 
to French opinions, the British forbade on several occasions European operations and 
missions, stigmatizing the German army (the Nazis). This applied to a joint European 
operation in the Balkans after the collapse of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia; 
this finally took place within the UN framework by UNPROFOR (1992–1995), albeit 
with several restrictions and errors. The British several times obstructed for days the joint 
decision-making within the European institutions, perhaps under American influence, 
to gain time for NATO to create its own mission (e.g. Sharp/Maritime missions).7 With 
its greater military potential, NATO thus has “discredited” the “exclusively” European 
joint missions at the WEU level. With its allies in Europe, the U.K. transmitted many of 
the projects developed by the WEU to help NATO survive and to prove its importance 
after President Mitterrand of France publicly challenged the raison d’être of NATO. 
(Türke/WEU 2008) The truly relevant change in ESDP military capabilities, however, 
was adopted at the Helsinki European Council on 10–11 December 1999. The decision to 
establish within sixty days a military force of up to 60,000 people (the so-called Helsinki 
Headline Goal, HHG) capable of carrying out Petersberg missions with support for at least 
one year. The HHG must be accompanied by a reserve of more than 100,000 people, and 
about 400 combat aircraft and 100 vessels defined by the “Force Catalog”. This objective 
seemed reasonable because the Europeans had 2 million soldiers and 3,000 warplanes at 
the time, a volume of forces far greater than the United States. UNPROFOR, IFOR/SFOR, 
and KFOR each mobilized 20–40,000 European troops. It was therefore a political will 
rather than the military capacity that was lacking, and NATO has not been too enthusiastic 
about these ambitious European projects that lie beyond its control. (Türke 2012, 254–257, 
261; Andréani 2002, 990.) HHG was not achieved, but in 2004 it was superseded by 
Headline Goal 2010, based on the battle groups (BG) concept. These forces, comprised of 
about 1,500 troops, are deployable in fifteen days (decisions within five days) for a period of 
thirty days, which can be extended up to 120 days. The deployment of the NATO Response 
Force is still beyond the BG deadline though, at between fifteen and sixty days. The rapid 
deployment of the BGs, however, makes it impossible to carry out a mission under the Berlin 
Plus Agreements, although theoretically the possibility of choosing between SHAPE 
and the EU Operations Center is not excluded. The biggest difference between the two 
forces is that the EU makes two battle groups available “immediately”, with a “warning” 
capacity of six months. Recourse to the NRF is subject to the decision of a conference that 
generates an available force for a given period. (AUEO 2007) The EU, and especially its 
newer members, have made double offers, making the same force available for both NATO 
and EU. But the offer to the EU is most likely an “afterthought”. Defence planning is based 
on that of NATO, and there is no problem until the use of this force is requested by both 
parties at the same time. If that happens, because most of the European countries prefer 
NATO (hard security) over the EU (soft security), there is no question for whom these 
forces will be available. That can threaten the reliability and availability of (rapid) reaction 
forces, especially since decision-making is particularly slow in the EU. Even if the first 
7 Sharp Vigilance (WEU) – Maritime Monitor (OTAN): 16 and 10/07/1992–22/11/1992, embargo-monitoring 
missions in the Adriatic.
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come, first served principle is in force, in case of the BG and NRF forces, the commitment 
schedule for either EU or NATO is pre-set. (Horváth 2016, 66–68.) The EU conducted 
its first, full-fledged military crisis management operations under the auspices of ESDP 
in Macedonia on 17 March 2003. EU Operation “Concordia” took over responsibility for 
the NATO Allied Harmony mission. This operation, which was completed in December 
2003, was the first under the Berlin Plus agreements. NATO assets were made available to 
the EU. NATO maintained a Senior Civilian Representative (SCR) and a Senior Military 
Representative (SMR) in Skopje. The commander of the operation was the D-SACEUR. As 
SG/HR Javier Solana pointed out, cooperation between NATO and the EU on the ground, 
rather than EU in and NATO out, is important. In 2003, during the first independent EU 
military operation (Operation ARTEMIS), NATO (and more precisely, the United States, 
and their main ally, the United Kingdom) criticized this European Petersberg operation 
without recourse to NATO collective assets and capabilities (i.e. Berlin Plus arrangements) 
because the administration of the EU and in particular the framework nation, France, 
completely ignored the formal application of the principle of first refusal. The principle of 
first refusal, however, indirectly violates the “common European sovereignty”. The objective 
of the Petersberg process had been to find domains (crisis management, evacuation, etc.) 
that do not affect the “reserved areas” of NATO, including European defence “in its original 
meaning”. That is, when Europeans engage in a Petersberg mission and use the special rapid 
response forces, they do not affect NATO activity. The problem is that the Atlantic alliance 
has expanded its scope and “swallowed” such European initiatives as the CJTFs. The right 
of refusal is proof that NATO claims the right to authorize a European Petersberg operation/
mission, far from the intent of Article V of the Washington Treaty. There are three types 
of intervention concerning NATO and the EU:
1. An intervention carried out under the sole responsibility of NATO.
2. An intervention led by the European Union with the use of NATO assets.
3. An intervention carried out under the direction of the European Union with its 
own resources.
The position of the United States is clear: it wants to see NATO given the prerogative to 
decide whether it intends to take the lead in military intervention. According to them, it 
is only after NATO’s refusal (“first refusal”) that the European Union is “authorized” to 
consider the matter. NATO’s first decision thus can block a European operation. The im-
mediate consequence of ignoring “first refusal” may be the blocking of the Berlin Plus 
process. The use of NATO capabilities is unimaginable without the agreement of the United 
States. Following the conclusion of the NATO-led SFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina on 
2 December 2004, the EU deployed Operation EUFOR Althea, drawing on NATO planning 
expertise and other alliance assets. The initial IFOR and SFOR missions were reduced 
from 60,000 people to 12,000. With the first two phases of crisis management (peace 
enforcement, peace-making) finished, the EU took over to refine the third phase, the peace 
building. The NATO DSACEUR, the Commander of Operation Althea and the EU OHQ 
(Operation Headquarters), is located at SHAPE. This European Union Force also operates 
under the Berlin Plus arrangements, taking advantage of NATO planning expertise and 
other capabilities. The long-term political commitment of NATO in this country remains 
unchanged, however, and a new NATO MLM (Military Liaison Mission) and the NATO 
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Headquarters in Sarajevo has been established. The NHQSa is responsible for specific 
military tasks such as supporting defence reform and preparing the country’s membership 
in the PfP. In the Balkans though, it is easy to see to what extent Europeans have applied 
these American capabilities as part of the Berlin Plus missions. The coordination and 
consultation scheme makes rapid reaction impossible, and the United Kingdom blocked 
the transfer of control during Operation ALTHEA for six months. The mission was deployed 
two years after the EU first proposed it. ATLHEA was launched before the accession of 
Cyprus, that is to say before Turkish anxieties about Berlin Plus arrangements. Moreover, it 
is clear now why the EU no longer launches Berlin Plus missions and does not envisage it in 
the future. In the field of European capacity building, the perceptions of NATO and the EU 
are profoundly different. From the economic point of view, in the opinion of the United 
States, and from the political point of view, the so-called “French” position is right. This 
equates to the famous “Three Ds” of Albright: no decoupling (no loosening of transatlantic 
links); no duplication (no European structures or duplication with those of NATO); and no 
discrimination (no more favourable position for EU members compared to non-EU NATO 
members). Reducing European dependence was “worrying”, so the only possible solution 
would be the development of their military capabilities and the command structure of 
the European Union. Especially two out of the Three Ds therefore target: (Albright 1998) 
1. The no duplication became a concept established in Saint-Malo in 1998 (the date of 
the ESDP’s birth) through the budget. Some EU member states (Belgium, the Netherlands 
and the United Kingdom) insist on avoiding duplication of resources within the alliance. 
Others (Germany, France and Italy) emphasize the indispensable autonomy of the European 
force. This way the EU could have powerful multi-national resources and proven assets 
to plan and conduct an operation. Strategic-level operational and HQ functions could be 
fulfilled by NATO bodies (SHAPE or DSACEUR). But in this case, where one partner 
already has all the essential means of an operation and the other’s shortcomings put it in 
a dependent situation, the principle of non-duplication, beyond of its budgetary aspect, 
is decisive. This is reflected in the non-development of European capacities. Duplication 
between European countries is numerous and costly though; a single integrated air defence 
would be sufficient, but the Europeans considered it a loss and not a sharing of sovereignty. 
(Horváth 2016, 77.)
2. The no discrimination principle opened the “Pandora’s Box” of European cooperation in 
ESDP. At first glance, in the framework of Berlin Plus agreements, the use of the military 
capabilities of non-EU European NATO countries seems to be an attractive solution. This 
is ambiguous though, because it confuses the autonomy of decision and the autonomy of 
conducting of an operation. To avoid this trap, the Helsinki European Council also adopted 
the principles of no duplication and no discrimination with regard to the six European 
non-EU member countries of NATO at the time. These include Turkey, Norway, Iceland 
(1992–) and Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic (1999–), associated countries of 
the WEU. (Türke 2012, 176–177.)
In Kosovo, the NATO peacekeeping force KFOR (since 1999) works closely in the field 
with the EU’s Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX), deployed in December 2008. 
The EU has made civilian resources available to the United Nations Mission in Kosovo 
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(UNMIK) for several years and has agreed to take over the police component of the UN 
mission. EULEX–Kosovo is the largest civilian mission ever launched under the ESDP; its 
fundamental objective is assisting and supporting the Kosovo authorities and the rule of 
law, especially in the police, judicial and customs sectors. NATO and EU experts worked 
on the same team in support of UN Secretary-General Martti Ahtisaari’s special envoy, 
who was in charge of negotiations on the future status of Kosovo. Kosovo proclaimed 
its independence on 17 February 2008. In Afghanistan, NATO and the European Union 
play a key role in bringing peace and stability to Afghanistan, and are part of the broader 
international efforts to implement a comprehensive approach for aid to that country. 
The current NATO-led Resolute Support Mission and its predecessor, the International 
Security Assistance Force (ISAF, 2001–2014), have cooperated with the EU’s Rule of 
Law Mission (EUPOL Afghanistan), since June 2007. EUPOL Afghanistan was preceded 
by the establishment of the GPPO (German Police Project Office, 2002–), whose main 
role was police training. The increased role of the United States, however, with its own 
program and a much higher annual budget ($224 million) has meant Germany has only 
been able to play a  secondary role (with an annual budget of 14 million EUR). The reason 
for launching this mission was purely political, so that Germany could put its initial mission 
under European flag, despite the warning of the EU delegation in Kabul that conditions on 
site are poor. The initial strength of the mission was only ten people and the first (German) 
commander resigned after six months. Several EU member states have kept their own 
police contingent under their national flag, and the mission fought basic logistical problems 
(inadequate materials and accommodation). (Wagner 2016, 259–264.) The European Union 
planned to deploy troops outside the capital under the protection of the PRTs as well, “yet 
the specter of Berlin Plus reared its head” Turkey vetoed the idea. The EU was unable 
to conclude agreements with Turkey (heading two Provincial Reconstruction Teams) and 
the United States (heading ten PRTs). As Lagadec writes “the breakdown of EU–NATO 
relations was instrumental in restricting EUPOL’s mandate to Kabul. Yet in truth the EU 
struggled even to staff its headquarters in the capital: this augured poorly of its capacity to 
be effective in the provinces, whether or not PRTs were authorized to underwrite EUPOL’s 
security beyond Kabul. In other words, the EU’s civilian ambitions in Afghanistan did not 
fail primarily because of NATO, Turkey, or Berlin Plus: but because the Union’s disunity 
condemned it to irrelevance.” (Lagadec 2012, 138–145.) NATO-led ISAF helped create 
a secure and stable environment in which the Afghan Government and other international 
actors can build democratic institutions, expand the rule of law, and rebuild the country. 
The EU has funded civilian projects managed by NATO-run PRTs led by an EU member 
country. In view of the inadequacies of the EU mission, to create a simultaneous mission 
(no duplication, once again) NATO created its own training mission in 2009 (NATO 
Training Mission–Afghanistan, NTAM-A), incorporating the American mission CSTC-A 
(Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan). To coordinate the missions, 
the IPCB (International Police Coordination Board) was set up; this resulted in total chaos, 
because IPCB and EUPOL were systematically confused. (Wagner 2016, 259–264.) EU 
and NATO also conducted separate training missions in Iraq. The aim of NTM-I (NATO 
Training Mission–Iraq, 2004–2011) was to assist in the development of Iraqi security 
forces training structures and institutions. EUJUST LEX–Iraq (2005–2013) was the first 
integrated rule of law mission of the EU. EUJUST LEX trained nearly 6,000 Iraqi officials 
252 Regional and Bilateral Relations of the European Union
out of Iraq up until 2009, and the total cost of the mission was around €118 million. Due 
to the mission, the traditional, witness-based practice of judgment has been led towards 
evidence-based practice. (Wagner 2016, 259–264.) Both NATO and the EU supported 
the African Union’s mission in Darfur Sudan, (UNAMID, 2007–), particularly with 
regard to airlift rotations that enabled strategic airlift capacity, but they lost several weeks 
because of the debate over sharing of skills. The European Union’s logistical assistance was 
achieved with minimal cooperation from NATO. The two assistance operations remained 
independent and outside the Berlin Plus framework. Although officially the EU and NATO 
administration denies any disagreements and emphasizes that the Berlin Plus agreements 
would not have been adoptable (because it is “simply” technical and logistical support to 
the African Union, and not an operation) the transatlantic organization’s first operation 
on the African continent provoked strong opposition from France and Belgium. France 
opposed NATO’s contribution because the EU already was helping the AMIS African 
Union Mission in Sudan (Darfur). The slightest interest of NATO in Africa is seen by 
the French as an offense, a violation of their chasse gardée. Negotiations between the EU 
and NATO for a common chain of command and a joint action plan failed. Under the general 
direction of the African Union, the EU and NATO planned and carried out their missions 
quite separately, with two different chains of command. To ensure the minimum necessary 
relationship within the framework of “flexible coordination” a unit has been established in 
Addis Ababa (DITF) to which both parties have sent delegates. Cooperation was without 
problems. The DITF was in charge of air movements and controlled the movements of troops 
arriving on the ground. Since September 2008, NATO and EU naval forces have deployed 
alongside other actors off the coast of Somalia in Operation Atalanta to carry out anti-piracy 
missions. NATO’s Operation Ocean Shield and EUNAVFOR Atalanta cooperated for eight 
years, until the conclusion of Ocean Shield in December 2016. In February 2016, NATO 
defence ministers decided NATO should assist with the growing refugee and migrant crisis 
in Europe. On 11 February, NATO deployed a maritime force to the Aegean Sea to conduct 
reconnaissance, monitoring, and surveillance of illegal crossings, supporting Turkish and 
Greek authorities, along with the EU’s FRONTEX agency in Greece, as part of Poseidon 
Rapid Intervention. Enhanced cooperation was launched between NATO’s Operation 
Sea Guardian (9 November 2016) and the EUNAVFOR Operation Sophia (since 2015) 
in the Mediterranean. This support is on-going, with ships and maritime patrol aircraft 
providing information and logistics. This recalls the duplication of the Sharp/Maritime 
missions in the 1990s, and France has already doubted the importance of the NATO mission 
escorting EUFOR ATALANTA. CSDP and FRONTEX cannot fulfil their role of defender 
of the immediate borders of the European Union with the European units of the maritime 
border guard alone. Such a project was developed in the 2000s but the realization is still 
blocked by lack of political will.
Conclusion
The European Union, given the realities of BREXIT and the military reforms in France 
and Germany that provide for a significant reduction in the forces, is further away from 
setting up an “autonomous” European force for the defence of the continent than it was in 
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the 1990s or 2000s. Relations between allied parties have been characterized by mutual 
distrust. Even in 2009 the entente cordiale between France and the United Kingdom was 
not enough to harmonize the patrol of their SSBN or to avoid, for example the collision of 
the submarines Le Triomphant and HMS Vanguard, which patrolled in secret.8 After the fall 
of the Berlin Wall and until the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, Europe was a pacified space, 
so the development of traditional forces for territorial defence in the EU was seen as a waste 
of money. With the incredible weakening and the loss of political weight of France since 
the Sarkozy era and German reluctance in military matters, it seems France must abandon 
the project of an autonomous defensive capability for the Union for some time; this will 
lead to the development of NATO’s defensive role in Europe. Over the past three years, 
the range of subjects discussed between NATO and the EU has expanded considerably. 
Since the crisis in Ukraine, both organisations have regularly exchanged views on their 
decisions, especially with regard to Russia, and consultations have covered the Western 
Balkans, Libya, and the Middle East. NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence posture in 
Eastern Europe, adopted at the 2016 summit in Warsaw, is designed to protect and reassure 
Eastern member states of their security with the deployment of four multi-national battalion 
battle groups. Today, NATO is both the inter-governmental and political-military means 
of mutual defence in the transatlantic space, as well as the means of counter-terrorism 
and out-of-area peacekeeping. But it is also a tool of United States’ power politics. With 
the reintegration of France and the considerable military decline of Europe, there are few left 
that could question the role of NATO in Europe. With BREXIT, the creation of a powerful 
and projectable European army will be much more difficult. So with a NATO policy led by 
the United States that appreciably affects Russia’s cordon sanitaire, the European Union is 
obliged to take more immediate risks close to its border. This decision is taken far “above 
his head”. Georgia (in May 2013) and Ukraine (in July 2017) stated that their goal is to get 
a Membership Action Plan (MAP) from NATO. The crisis in Ukraine since 2013 reinforced 
the primacy of NATO in Europe. From the beginning, NATO’s enlargement policy in Europe 
(Eastern Europe, Balkans) preceded that of the EU. This resulted in the predominance of 
the U.S. and put pressure on the union. Some European countries will be integrated earlier 
and more deeply in a transatlantic framework under U.S. domination than in a European 
framework. This can disrupt the integration and sovereignty of the EU.
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The EU’s International Development Policy
Balázs Szent-Iványi
Introduction
Poverty in developing countries can cause a number of challenges for developed coun-
tries. Poverty and the lack of opportunities in developing societies can lead to violent 
conflict; poverty can provide fertile breeding grounds for extremist ideologies; poverty 
is a significant push factor for migration; poor living and sanitary conditions associated 
with poverty can lead to epidemics; and poverty can cause accelerated environmental 
degradation. Rich countries cannot isolate themselves from the effects of these challenges. 
Most recently, the European refugee and migrant crisis of 2015 has shown how Europe can 
be affected directly by the consequences of poverty, regional conflict, and climate change. 
Developed countries need to react to counter these effects, ideally by addressing their root 
cause: poverty. Developed countries have a number of tools to reduce global poverty and 
its consequences, including trade preferences given to developing countries, investments, 
transfer of technology, and foreign aid – the focus of this contribution.
The European Union (EU) has played an important role in supporting global poverty 
reduction efforts. The EU is the world’s largest donor of foreign aid. The European 
Commission (EC) and the member states together accounted for approximately 60% of all 
global flows of official aid, channelling around $85 billion to support developing countries 
in 2015. The EU’s international development policy is a manifestation of the community’s 
outward solidarity, but it is also part of its external relations toolkit. As such, it serves 
the goals of the EU’s external relations by supporting the creation of a more equitable, 
prosperous, and peaceful world. It also provides the EU with the means of projecting soft 
power in the developing world to achieve political, economic, and ideological influence 
among these countries.
How exactly does this policy area work, what are the main motivations and principles 
behind it, and how effective is it in contributing to the reduction of global poverty? The goal 
of this contribution is to present an overview of the EU’s common international development 
policy, or in other words, the foreign aid flows managed by the EC. It does not discuss aid 
provided by the member states, as these represent a highly heterogeneous set of bilateral 
policies. The EC is a formidable aid provider, as it channels around $15 billion in aid each 
year to developing countries, 10% of all the official aid provided globally. Along with 
the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, and the World Bank, the EC is among 
the world’s largest donors and can have significant effects on developing countries. Given 
its size as a donor and its potential global effects, it is important to get a clear understanding 
of this area of EU external relations.
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Section Two discusses some key concepts and introduces the broader context in which 
the EC operates as an aid donor: the international development regime. This is followed 
by a brief overview of the history of the EC’s foreign aid policy in Section Three. Section 
Four discusses the current set-up of EC development policy, including the legal and strategic 
bases, the funding mechanisms, and how aid resources are allocated. Section Five looks at 
some key recent challenges to EC aid: the diversion of aid from poverty reduction to other 
goals; the discussion on whether the EC is able to influence the aid policies of the member 
states; and the debates on just how effective the EC’s development policy is, and why this 
question is difficult to answer. The final section offers some concluding reflections.
The International Development Regime
Key concepts
To understand the EU’s common development policy, one must look at the broader context 
in which it operates: the international development regime. This concept refers to the norms, 
principles, actors, and processes that govern the transfer of resources from developed 
countries to less developed ones, with the declared goal of supporting their development and 
reducing poverty. A detailed overview of this regime is beyond the scope of this contribution 
(for this, see Degnbol-Martinussen–Engberg-Pedersen 2005), so this section only provides 
a discussion on the regime’s most essential features.
Originating in the years following World War II, the regime is dominated mainly by 
bilateral donor countries, mostly rich countries, which provided approximately $144 billion, 
or 0.32% of their gross national income (GNI) as aid in 2016 (OECD.stat 2017; see Figure 1).
Rich countries acting as bilateral donors of aid are, of course, not the only actors in 
the international development regime. Bilateral donors channel a certain portion of their aid 
through international organisations, or multilateral donors, such the World Bank, various 
organisations in the UN system (including the World Health Organization, UNESCO, 
UNICEF, the UN Food Programme, and others), regional development banks, or the EU. 
These organizations in turn use these resources to run their own aid programmes for devel-
oping countries. The importance of these multilateral donors has been steadily increasing 
in the past decades, and they now account for more than a third of all aid disbursed to 
developing countries. The countries receiving aid are generally developing countries with 
low per capita incomes and levels of human development, usually termed recipient or partner 
countries. The international development regime also includes a large number of private 
actors, including non-governmental organizations and charities – some of which, such as 
the Melinda and Bill Gates Foundation, can be rather large; private companies engaging 
in corporate social responsibility; and even individuals, including experts, diplomats, and 
philanthropists.
It makes sense at this point to clarify what foreign aid actually is. The OECD’s 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC), the body responsible for collecting and 
publishing statistics on foreign aid, created the category of Official Development Assistance 
(ODA, OECD 2017). For a financial flow to classify as ODA: it needs to originate from 
the government of a donor country; its purpose must be the promotion of development, 
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economic growth, or the reduction of poverty; and it must be concessional in financial 
terms, i.e. more favourable than what the recipient could obtain from financial markets. This 
definition excludes a number of financial flows between developed and developing countries. 
Aid provided by rich-country civil society or corporate philanthropy do not count as ODA, 
for example, as these do not originate from the government. Military aid does not count 
as ODA either, as it does not aim to promote development. Humanitarian aid, on the other 
hand, which aims to save lives and alleviate human suffering in the aftermath of a natural or 
human-made catastrophe, is included in ODA statistics. (Radelet 2006) The term foreign 
aid will be used throughout the contribution to refer to ODA.
Figure 1.
Aid flows to developing countries, 1960–2016 (in billion dollars and percentage of donor GNI)
Source: Edited by the author, based on data from OECD.stat 2017.
Foreign aid, however, is not the only tool with which rich countries can promote global 
development. Transferring knowledge and technology, a process called technical assistance 
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is an important aspect in international development. Going beyond donor-recipient relations, 
a more development friendly trade and investment system, curbing illicit financial flows, 
and ensuring global tax justice are all issues in which rich countries could take the lead 
to support global development. These issues, however, are beyond the scope of this 
chapter, which only focuses on the EC’s international development policy. While the term 
international development policy is, in theory, a broader concept than foreign aid, the two 
will be used interchangeably in this contribution.
Motivations and norms
Bilateral donors provide foreign aid for a number of reasons that are usually not seen as 
selfless in the literature. (Alesina–Dollar 2000; Hoeffler–Outram 2011; Szent-Iványi 
2015) These include: political and strategic motivations like supporting allies or gaining 
new ones; business interests, in terms of supporting donor-based companies and producers; 
and security-related motivations, such as creating regional stability, containing epidemics, 
combating terrorism, or reducing flows of migrants.
The international development regime is guided by a number of globally agreed norms, 
most importantly the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). These goals were accepted 
by the UN General Assembly in 2015, and include 169 development targets in seventeen 
groups that need to be achieved by 2030, including: ending poverty and hunger, creating 
quality education, promoting gender equality, affordable and clean energy, promoting 
responsible consumption and production, and protecting life on land and water, etc. 
(UN 2015) The SDGs succeed the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) accepted by 
the UN in 2000, and present an ambitious and comprehensive global development agenda 
to guide the activities of donors and developing country governments.
There is some tension between the motivations for providing aid and the declared 
normative goals of donors. Clearly, some motivations of donors can undermine poverty 
reduction concerns. Giving support to corrupt regimes to win political support, for example, 
will not contribute to reducing poverty in most cases. There are arguments, however, which 
state that many of the security-related challenges faced by rich countries are consequences 
of poverty and failed modernisation processes in developing countries, therefore reducing 
poverty can benefit donors by reducing the effects of global poverty related challenges for 
them. Giving aid to reduce poverty can thus be seen as an “enlightened” self-interest of 
donors.
Aid effectiveness
Despite the significant amounts of resources channelled to developing countries in 
the decades following World War II, as well as global visions of development like the MDGs 
and now the SDGs, many have questioned the effectiveness of the international development 
regime. (Easterly 2006, 2009; Moyo 2009) There is much anecdotal evidence to show 
that aid is not effective in reducing poverty and promoting economic growth. Many African 
countries have received billions of dollars in aid since their independence, and yet per 
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capita incomes are hardly higher in real terms than they were fifty years ago. Aid is seen 
to have been wasted on large, unproductive “vanity projects”, or ended up in the Swiss 
bank accounts of corrupt dictators and their cronies. This popular picture of aid is one 
interpretation of reality, and suffers from heavy distortion by the media. In other views, 
aid has done much good, ensuring the availability of vaccines across the globe, eradicating 
several diseases and getting children into education. The more scholarly debates on the topic, 
however, tend to reinforce the negative conclusions.
The academic literature mostly argues that aid either has no effect on development, 
or that the effects are too small to be meaningful. There are many factors that decrease 
the effectiveness of aid. Donors have been accused of not taking recipient development 
priorities into consideration, for instance, of being unpredictable, and of providing uniform 
solutions in different contexts. They have attached flawed conditionalities to their assistance, 
used aid to promote their exports, and placed significant administrative obligations on 
recipients. Perhaps worst, they have failed to learn from their failures. (Aldasoro et al. 
2010; Riddell 2014) Recipient countries are not without blame either: problems with 
governance, including corruption, rent-seeking politics, and systems of political patronage 
have contributed significantly to decreasing the effectiveness of foreign aid. Countries that 
introduce good policies, govern well, have low levels of corruption, or are more democratic 
tend to use aid more effectively than developing countries that do not meet these criteria. 
(Burnside–Dollar 2000; Kosack 2003; Doucouliagos–Paldam 2010)
Some argue that aid has heavily distorted both political and economic structures and 
processes in developing countries, (Moyo 2009) making the state weaker in the process. 
Aid can provide significant incentives for corruption. Governments may see aid revenues 
as more desirable than collecting income through taxation, which can weaken democratic 
structures. (Moss et al. 2008) Aid can also be a disincentive for reform. Aid can lead to 
a deterioration of the competitiveness of export sectors by raising the prices of scare inputs 
like skilled labour. (Rajan–Subramanian 2011) Aid agencies in developing countries can 
attract skilled workers by paying premium wages, thus poaching talent and expertise from 
the private sector and government.
There have been strong international efforts after the turn of the millennium to increase 
the effectiveness of aid and provide solutions to these problems. Donor and recipient 
countries have agreed, in a series of “high level forums” (Rome in 2003, Paris in 2005, 
Accra in 2008 and Busan in 2011), to improve their coordination, increase transparency, 
ensure that recipients drive the development process with which donors align and ensure 
a stronger focus on results. (Martini et al. 2012) A process called the Global Partnership for 
Effective Development Cooperation has emerged from this to monitor how donors progress 
in implementing these principles. (UNDP–OECD 2016) Improving the effectiveness of aid 
has figured highly on the agenda of many donors, but progress has been generally weak. 
Some donors have done more than others. Donors like the United Kingdom, Sweden, and 
the EC have been at the forefront of implementing aid effectiveness measures. Others, 
however, like the United States, Japan, or the Eastern and Southern EU member states have 
done little to improve their practice. (Hoebink–Stokke 2005; Hoebink 2010)
The international development regime clearly has many flaws: it is driven by donor 
interests and not recipient country development concerns; it is fragmented into a high 
number of donors, and has strong problems with effectiveness. It is nonetheless the global 
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context in which the EU’s international development policy operates, and having a good 
understanding of it allows an appreciation of the possibilities and limitations faced by 
the EU.
Origins and Evolution of EU Development Policy
Origins and development relations up to 1989
The origins and subsequent evolution of the EU’s international development policy have 
been well documented in the literature, (see for example Mold 2007; Flint 2008; Holden 
2013) and therefore this contribution only discusses this process to the degree that is 
absolutely necessary to understand the EU’s current development practice. Until the early 
1990s, the EU’s development policy concentrated almost exclusively on former colonies 
of the member states. These countries, termed the African, Pacific, and Caribbean (ACP) 
group, had formalized relations with the European Economic Community (EEC, the EU’s 
predecessor) under so-called partnership conventions, renewed every five years, that 
regulated their trade with the community and their access to financial resources. The first 
such convention was signed in 1963 between the EEC and eighteen ex-colonies in Yaoundé, 
the capital of Cameroon. The group of participating countries grew continuously; the first 
Lomé Convention signed in 1975 included forty-six ACP countries, and the Cotonou 
Agreement of 2000 had seventy-eight. (See also Sub-chapter: Still a key partner? EU–ACP 
relations)
In the framework of these agreements, the ACP countries were given quota- and 
tariff-free access to the EEC’s market for industrial products (except for clothes and textiles), 
and a separate extra-budgetary fund, the European Development Fund (EDF) was created 
to finance development cooperation with these countries. Relationships between the EEC 
and the ACP, as well as the impacts of the partnership agreements are documented well in 
literature, (Flint 2008) but a few key observations need to be mentioned here. The conven-
tions, and especially the four Lomé conventions between 1975 and 2000, at first were seen 
as highly beneficial for the ACP: EC aid was automatic with few conditions attached, and 
trade preferences were one-sided, meaning the ACP countries did not have to reciprocate 
by providing similarly favourable market access for European products.
In hindsight, however, these arrangements proved highly ineffective. Automatic aid 
turned out to provide disincentives for reform for recipient governments, and the lack of 
conditions fuelled corruption. There were no stipulations in the Lomé conventions for 
political dialogue. (Lister 1998) The trade concessions turned out to be formal, as there 
were hardly any industries in the ACP countries capable of exporting to the EU. Agricultural 
products were not eligible for preferences, and in fact faced the high tariffs imposed by 
the EU’s common agricultural policy. (Laaksonen et al. 2006) After the Uruguay round 
of global trade negotiations and the birth of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 
1994, the trade arrangements in the Lomé conventions came under increasing attack for 
discriminating against non-ACP developing countries and thus going against the principles 
of the WTO. (Alter–Meunier 2006)
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Changes after 1989
The common international development policy underwent significant changes in the 1990s. 
The treaty creating the European Union in 1992, better known as the Maastricht Treaty, 
represented the first effort to provide a clear legal basis for the community’s international 
development policy, and laid down the main goals of the policy area as well as a number 
of principles. (Hoebink 2004) The treaty identified goals as the reduction of poverty, 
the promotion of human rights, the rule of law, and good governance, and mentioned 
a number of principles intended to increase the effectiveness of EC aid. After the 1990s, 
the EC’s development activities broadened beyond the ACP countries, which have more or 
less been the main beneficiaries of EC aid, and the only region towards which a coherent 
programme, in the framework of the partnership conventions, existed. The geopolitical 
changes, especially the end of the Cold War and the rise of international terrorist networks 
and new security threats, meant the EU needed to react. An international development 
policy focusing only on former colonies was no longer tenable for an integration with global 
ambitions.
The first step in creating a truly global development policy came in 1989 with 
the creation of the PHARE1 programme to aid the transition countries in Central and 
Eastern Europe. This was followed in 1991 with the TACIS2 programme, which targeted 
the countries of the former Soviet Union. The MEDA programme was created in 1996 to 
fund cooperation with the countries in the Mediterranean region, and to support the vision 
of creating a free-trade area between the region and the EU. A programme to support 
development and poverty reduction in Asian and Latin American (ALA) countries was also 
started in 1996. The final element of this new global programme structure, CARDS,3 was 
put in place in 2000 to fund stabilization and reconstruction in the countries of the Western 
Balkans.
Table 1 shows how the allocation of EC aid changed between 1970 and 2015, with 
a clear indication of the decreasing importance of sub-Saharan Africa from the 1980s, 
mainly to the benefit of European countries. While the absolute amounts of aid provided 
to sub-Saharan Africa have actually increased between 1970 and 2015 due to the general 
increases in the EC’s aid budget, the region’s relative share has decreased. During the 1980s 
and 1990s, the EU’s assistance has shifted from the focus on former colonies to a more 
balanced global coverage, although it is clear that the EU’s “neighbourhood”, i.e. countries 
in Eastern Europe, the Balkans, North Africa and the Middle East benefit disproportionately. 
Most of these recipients are middle-income countries, with relatively low levels of extreme 
poverty, at least when compared with countries in sub-Saharan Africa and parts of Asia. 
This implies that poverty reduction has become a lesser concern for the EC, and other 
considerations are driving its aid policy, including the need for stability and prosperity in 
the region, and providing pre-accession funding to candidate countries.
1 Poland and Hungary: Assistance for Reconstruction of their Economies.
2 Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States.
3 Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilisation.
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Table 1.
Allocation of European Commission aid among regions, percentages
1970–75 1980–85 1990–95 2000–2005 2010–2015
Europe 1 2 7 16 28
North Africa 5 6 7 7 8
Middle East 4 1 4 6 6
Sub-Saharan Africa 61 53 43 31 29
North & Central America 3 3 5 4 4
South America 2 2 3 3 3
Asia and Oceania 19 18 11 12 12
Unspecified 5 15 20 21 10
Source: Edited by the author, based on OECD.stat 2017.
The decreasing share of sub-Saharan Africa in the EU’s aid allocation was not the only signal 
of the changing relations between the EU and the ACP region. In 2000, a new partnership 
agreement between the EU and the ACP, signed in Cotonou, a city in Benin, represented 
a marked departure from the earlier conventions. It introduced political dialogue between 
the two regions, and all signatory countries needed to acknowledge that respect for human 
rights and democratic principles are central to development (even though it would be difficult 
to classify most of the ACP countries as truly democratic). Some observers have noted 
especially Article 96 of the agreement, which allowed the EU to start a consultation process 
with countries where these democratic principles were violated flagrantly, and ultimately 
the EU can suspend aid to a country under this article. (Portella 2007) Between 2000 
and 2016, Article 96 has been applied in fifteen cases, including Zimbabwe, Guinea-Bissau, 
the Central African Republic, and Togo. The Cotonou Agreement did not fix the EU–ACP 
trading system, which proved too contentious in the negotiations, and the Lomé system was 
simply extended until 2007.
Creating a coherent system
By the turn of the millennium, it was clear that the new network of regional programmes 
lacked coherence. The EU’s development activities were fragmented and had no single 
strategic framework. Beyond the large programmes like the EDF, PHARE, MEDA, or 
ALA, the EC had a total of thirty-five financial instruments, focusing on different regions 
or themes, to fund cooperation with developing countries. (ODI 2007) There was a lack of 
communication among the parts of the EC involved in the different programmes, which led 
to unnecessary duplication of efforts and ineffectiveness. Clare Short, the U.K.’s secretary 
for international development at the time, even dubbed the EC the worst aid agency in 
the world. (The Guardian 2000)
The EC’s development policy clearly needed reform, with a focus on creating greater 
internal strategic coherence. After a short policy statement in 2000, a detailed, single stra-
tegic framework for EC aid was finally accepted by the three main EU institutions in 2005. 
(European Union 2006) Called the European Consensus on Development, it was a landmark 
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document. It laid down the main priorities and principles with which EU development policy 
needed to align throughout the world. These included poverty reduction as the main goal 
of development, acknowledging that poverty is a multi-dimensional concept and requires 
a complex approach. It emphasized the importance of ownership by the recipient countries, 
partnership in setting and reaching development goals, the importance of political dialogue, 
the involvement of civil society, as well as the promotion of gender equality. It also included 
a number of principles related to aid effectiveness, most importantly policy coherence. This 
meant that EU policies other than development should not, at the very least, undermine 
the development of poor countries. EU agricultural policy, fisheries policy, energy policy, 
and trade policy, among others, have all been shown to have negative indirect impacts on 
developing countries, thus negating any potentially positive effects of development aid. 
Furthermore, the European Consensus talked at length about differentiation, i.e. the need 
to tailor assistance to the specific recipient country context, and take the performance and 
needs of the partners more strongly into consideration in aid planning and programming. 
Given that EC aid is meant to complement member state efforts, the European Consensus 
also identified the areas where the EC has a comparative advantage over individual EU 
member states acting alone. This list was rather long, and included supporting trade and 
regional integration, sustainable resource management, infrastructure development, water 
and energy, and rural development and agriculture.
The European Consensus also included a number of requirements for member states, 
and so its focus was not EC aid only. Most importantly, there was a call for member states 
to increase the amount they spend on aid to 0.7% of their GNIs by 2015 (a requirement 
originating from the UN in the 1970s; see also Clemens–Moss 2007; the requirement for 
the post-2004 member states was only 0.33%). According to the principle of complemen-
tarity, member states should also make efforts to specialize their development policies and 
focus on a limited number of sectors and countries where they have a comparative advantage 
over other donors. The document also strengthened the role of the EC as the coordinator 
of member-state aid efforts.
Generally, the European Consensus has been evaluated as successful in bringing 
coherence and creating a clear strategic framework for the EC’s development efforts. 
Although the implementation of the consensus was rather slow, (Carbone 2013) especially 
in getting all EC delegations in partner countries on board, by 2010 its impact was being 
felt. The European Consensus was not a legal document though. It was accepted as a joint 
declaration by the European Commission, the Council of the EU, and the European 
Parliament, and should at best be seen as soft law. The requirements in the European 
Consensus for member states are non-binding. The EC has no way of enforcing that member 
states actually reach the 0.7/0.33% targets. Indeed, only one member state, the U.K., made 
significant efforts to reach the 0.7% target by 2015, although four other member states 
(Denmark, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Sweden) were already spending this much, 
as well. Even the aid increases in the U.K. were not driven by the EU or any desire to align 
with EU recommendations, but by domestic politics. (see Lightfoot et al. 2017) The EC 
has few tools to ensure that member states actually specialize according to their comparative 
advantages, or engage in coordination efforts. While the EC has published a number of 
guidelines in the spirit of the European Consensus, including an Operational Framework 
on Aid Effectiveness that includes more details on the division of labour between donors, 
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all of which have been endorsed by the Council, (Council of the European Union 2011) it 
cannot force member states to adopt these.
In 2011, the EU updated (but did not replace) the European Consensus with a document 
called Increasing the Impact of EU Development Policy: An Agenda for Change. (European 
Commission 2011) This introduced a number of changes, with the view to increasing 
the impact of EC aid. Most importantly, it shifted the goals of EC aid from poverty reduction 
to the promotion of inclusive and sustainable growth for human development. While this 
might seem like semantics, it actually represented an ideological shift. Since the acceptance 
of the MDGs, donors have tended to emphasize poverty reduction and talk less about 
the tools through which it is achieved. The promotion of economic growth through aid was 
seen as discredited, given how growth often did not have positive effects on the poor, and 
only led to greater inequalities. Explicitly emphasizing economic growth, however, meant 
a return to this older rhetoric, and possibly a realization that poverty reduction without 
growth is rarely sustainable.
The Agenda for Change also added a new set of priorities to EC aid: the promotion 
of human rights, democracy, and other key elements of good governance. While the EC’s 
aid policy has become increasingly political since the 1990s, the promotion of democracy 
in recipient countries, although mentioned in the Maastricht Treaty, rarely was voiced so 
explicitly. This may reflect a shift in development thinking, where inclusive (democratic) 
institutions have been increasingly seen as prerequisites for development. (Acemoglu–
Robinson 2012)
These major policy and strategic reforms following the turn of the millennium have 
been accompanied by a number of lower-level, less visible, but perhaps no less important 
reforms. The EC changed the way it planned and programmed its aid by introducing country 
strategy papers (CSPs). These documents are jointly created by the EC and the recipient 
country to identify the main development challenges for the country and the main areas for 
EC assistance. The CSPs were seen as key policy tools in aligning EC aid with recipient 
country priorities and ensuring national ownership. (ODI 2007) A process of “deconcen-
tration” also began after 2000, shifting tasks and responsibilities away from headquarters 
in Brussels towards delegations of the EC in the recipient countries. Delegations received 
much greater responsibilities in planning assistance, as well as making decisions related 
to implementation.
More recent reforms, including the revision of the complicated and fragmented 
structure of financial instruments, and the acceptance of a “new” European Consensus are 
discussed in the following section.
The European Commission’s Current International Development Practice
Legal background and key norms
The 2000s brought significant reform to the EU’s international development policy, turning 
it from one of the world’s worst aid agencies to a “good” one. (Department for International 
Development 2016)
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Many important details on the principles guiding the EC’s development policy are 
provided in Part five of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (Treaty of 
Lisbon), which deals with the EU’s external actions. Specifically, Chapter 1 in Title 3 
details the key principles guiding the EC’s external development policy, as well as the EU’s 
vision on development. The most important provisions of the treaty include the following 
three points. First, development policy is conducted within the framework and under 
the principles and objectives of the EU’s external relations (Article 208, Paragraph 1). 
This means development policy ultimately should serve the foreign policy interests of 
the EU, or at least be coherent with these. Second, “Union development cooperation policy 
shall have as its primary objective the reduction and, in the long term, the eradication of 
poverty” (Article 208, Paragraph 2). Thus, poverty reduction is identified in the Treaty of 
Lisbon as the main goal of EC aid. Third, the EC’s development policy complements those 
of the member states, and member states maintain their own international development 
policies. The EC nonetheless has the responsibility to coordinate the actions of member 
states in their bilateral policies (Article 210). The treaty thus defines development policy as 
a “shared parallel competence” between the EU and its member states.
The European Consensus of 2005 and the Agenda for Change were replaced in 
the summer of 2017 with The New European Consensus on Development. (European Union 
2017) The 2005 and 2011 documents needed updating to reflect the changes in the broader 
international development system, most importantly the acceptance of the SDGs. The New 
European Consensus also aligns development policy with the EU’s broader external 
relations strategy. (European External Action Service 2016)
None of the principles, issues, and responses discussed in the New European Consensus 
however, are actually new. The document consolidates the changes in the EU’s development 
policy and external environment since 2005. It reaffirms poverty reduction and long-term 
eradication as the main goals of EC aid, and brings EU development policy in line with 
the SDGs, most importantly by calling for an integration of the environmental and climate 
aspects of development into EC and member states’ policies, an issue on which the previous 
consensus was rather silent. The implementation of the Paris Climate Agreement of 2015 is 
given special emphasis, and to this end the New European Consensus calls on member states 
and the EC to create a more coherent and consistent EU development policy. The need for 
an EU that acts in a unified manner is reiterated, as the document calls on member states to 
fund joint programmes, work on joint implementation, and pool resources. It emphasizes 
tailoring development policies to country contexts. The New European Consensus maintains 
the emphasis on economic growth introduced in the Agenda for Change, but the long 
discussions on peace, peace- and state-building, and managing migration show the growing 
importance of these issues.
How is development policy funded?
The New European Consensus lays down a vast number of areas towards which the EU 
needs to devote attention and resources. The EC’s aid spending comes from two sources: 
the European Development Fund (EDF) and the EU’s common budget. The EDF, originally 
created in 1957 to provide support for the colonies and overseas territories of the founding 
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members, is outside of the EU’s budget and replenished by member states on a regular basis. 
It provides support for the ACP countries and for the Overseas Countries and Territories 
(OCTs), essentially the few remaining colonies of member states. The current EDF, running 
between 2014 and 2020, is the 11th replenishment, and includes €30.5 billion. Spending is 
regulated by the partnership agreement between the EU and the ACP countries, which, until 
2020, is the Cotonou Agreement.
Development funds in the EU budget are meant to finance aid to all other regions, 
although ACP countries can be eligible for some funds. Within the budget, Heading 4, 
entitled The EU as global player includes funding for all EU external action, including 
development aid. Under Heading 4, the budget is divided further into a number of regional 
and thematic financial instruments, listed in Table 2. The system of financial instruments 
was reformed in 2007, cutting down the complex network of around thirty-five instruments 
and programmes to just nine, significantly streamlining the system.
Table 2.
Budgetary instruments under Heading 4
Instrument Purpose Budgetary allocation for 
2014–2020 (bn euros)
Instrument for Pre-
accession Assistance
Financial support for countries in the pro-
cess of accession to the EU.
11.70
European Neighbourhood 
Instrument
Supporting cooperation and partnership 
with countries in the EU’s neighbourhood, 
i.e. Eastern Europe, North Africa and 
the Middle East.
15.43
Development 
Cooperation Instrument
Combating poverty in developing coun-
tries, mainly but not exclusively in Asia 
and Latin America.
19.66
Partnership Instrument Supporting the external dimensions of 
internal policies and addressing major 
global challenges (non-ODA).
0.95
Instrument for Stability 
and Peace
EU fund for preventing and responding to 
crises around the world.
2.34
European Instrument for 
Democracy & Human 
Rights
Provides support to non-governmental ac-
tors for the promotion of democracy and 
human rights.
1.33
Instrument for Nuclear 
Safety Cooperation
Supports higher levels of nuclear safety, 
radiation protection, and the application 
of efficient and effective safeguards of nu-
clear materials in non-EU countries.
0.25
Humanitarian aid Provides assistance and relief for victims 
of natural or man-made catastrophes.
0.15
Instrument for Greenland Supporting sustainable development in 
Greenland.
0.27
Total 55.81
Source: European Commission 2014
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There have been many discussions about merging the EDF with the EU budget in the past 
decades, especially since the EDF violates the EU’s budget unity principle, wherein all 
expenses and revenues of the EU need to be entered into a single document. (CVCE 
2016) While both the EDF and the budget are implemented by the EC, they have different 
rules for implementation, which complicates EC international development policy. Given 
that member states contribute directly to the EDF according to pre-negotiated keys, EU 
institutions have a limited role in making decisions related to it. Decisions are made by 
the EDF Committee, where member states are represented and have votes proportional to 
their contribution. The EP has been the strongest advocate of EDF “budgetization”, perhaps 
because the EDF’s extra-budgetary position means the Parliament has little scrutiny over 
it. (D’Alfonso 2014) Budgetization has not happened so far because the ACP countries do 
not want to lose their dedicated fund and fear that, if budgetized, funds in the EDF could be 
diverted to fund development cooperation with other regions, or be used for totally different 
purposes more easily. France has championed this ACP view most strongly, and is seen as 
the most vocal opponent of the EDF’s budgetization.
Beyond the funds from the EDF and the common budget, the European Investment 
Bank (EIB) plays a role in funding development projects. The EIB, a non-profit bank owned 
by the EU member states, raises capital by issuing bonds on financial markets and provides 
concessional loans for large-scale development projects which contribute to European 
goals. While the overwhelming majority of projects funded by the EIB are in Europe, it 
has provided loans for projects in around 160 countries.
Key actors
Within the EC, the Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development 
(DG DEVCO) is responsible for designing and implementing the EU’s development policy. 
DG DEVCO works closely with other EC Directorate-Generals (DGs), and especially 
the European External Action Service, to ensure the coherence of EU development 
policy with other aspects of external relations. DG DEVCO plans and proposes policy 
frameworks, strategies, and other guiding documents for development policy, all of which 
must be approved by the council. Together with the partner countries, DG DEVCO plans 
how aid is actually spent, identifying the most suitable ways for disbursing resources and 
identifying specific projects. This is done through the country strategy papers, which are 
the central documents for planning assistance on the country level. In the past years, there 
have been strong efforts by DG DEVCO to ensure that the drafting and review of the CSPs 
is a genuinely inclusive process, involving not only the recipient government, but also civil 
society and other actors. Nonetheless, it has been pointed out that this is not easy with all 
recipients, as many countries have weak governments and negotiating capacities. (ODI 2007)
In some cases, DG DEVCO also manages the resources and tendering procedures, but 
usually this is done by the recipient countries. All calls for development tenders and grants 
financed with EU funds in developing countries can be found on DG DEVCO’s website. 
Tenders refer to procurement of goods and services for specific development projects, 
while grants allow non-governmental organisations to bid for funding to implement their 
development project ideas, provided these fit the priorities of the EU.
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The delegations of the EC in recipient countries represent the EU and are at the fore-
front of implementing the EC’s development policy in terms of managing projects, collecting 
data, and ensuring regular consultation with the recipient country’s government and other 
stakeholders.
Allocation of funding
The regional allocation of EC aid, and how it has shifted in the past decades, has been 
discussed in section three (Table 1). While aid often is associated with large infrastructural 
projects, such as roads and power plants, the sectoral allocation of EC aid in Figure 2 shows 
that this is not the case for the EC’s development policy. The largest sector the EC funds is 
social infrastructure, which includes healthcare and education. This is in line with the EU’s 
emphasis on poverty reduction, as improving these sectors has a clear and relatively fast 
impact on the lives of the poor. The EC also provides a large amount of its assistance as 
budget support; it simply pays money into the national budget of the recipient state. The EC 
monitors budget support carefully, and such funding is covered by the CSPs as well, but 
the recipient government makes the decisions on how the funds are actually allocated.
Figure 2.
Sectoral allocation of EC aid
Source: European Commission 2016a, 29–30.
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Still a key partner? EU–ACP relations
As Table 1 shows, the relative importance of the ACP region has declined in the EC’s 
international development policy over the past three decades. The region is the only one 
with which the EU has a bespoke partnership agreement, however, and benefits from its 
dedicated funding mechanism, the EDF. Yet the Cotonou Agreement is set to expire in 
2020. Initial consultations on its successor began in 2016, with the actual negotiations set 
to start in 2018. The EC has published a communication on the future of the partnership in 
2016. (European Commission 2016b) The most important issues voiced by the EC include 
bringing the partnership agreement up to date with the SDGs, as well as the EU’s existing 
strategic frameworks for external relations and development. New challenges include state 
fragility, terrorism, and migration. Poverty has been reduced, and there has been significant 
economic growth in many ACP countries since 2000, but this has not benefitted every 
country equally, leading to greater heterogeneity. Trade between the EU and the ACP has 
also increased. The new agreement will have to take all of these changes into account, and 
feature even stronger political dialogue.
Political dialogue has been seen by the EC as a successful element in the Cotonou 
Agreement, (European Commission 2016b, 24.) but its full potential has not been reached. 
The EC also calls for greater f lexibility towards the new agreement. ACP countries, 
on the other hand, view the political dialogue element as a way for the EU to promote 
its own values, and the EU is seen as highly selective when it intervenes. (CONCORD 
2014) Nonetheless, ACP countries see the EDF as a key source of funding and would like 
continued access to it.
The EU–ACP trading system also needed significant reforms after 2000, but these 
proved too contentious and were not included in the Cotonou Agreement. To reform 
the trading system, the EU began negotiating economic partnership agreements (EPAs) with 
sub-regions within the ACP group after the turn of the millennium, but these progressed 
slowly. The EPAs were positioned as free trade agreements in which the ACP countries 
would also grant market access to the EU’s products. This proved highly controversial, and 
the EU was accused of promoting its trade interests as opposed to poverty reduction and 
development goals.
As of 2017, EPAs have been signed with most ACP regions or individual countries, and 
some have already been implemented. The final agreements provide a number of favourable 
asymmetries for the ACP countries, including lengthy transition periods for the ACP 
countries in opening their markets to EU products, the possibility of excluding products and 
provisions for infant industry protection deemed sensitive. (European Commission 2017a) 
The EU provides full, tariff- and quota-free market access for the ACP countries. As with 
Article 96 of the Cotonou Agreement, the trade benefits can be suspended for violations of 
human rights though. It will take time to tell how successful the EPAs will be in boosting 
the development of the ACP countries, but they clearly show how the EU’s approach to 
trade preferences has changed.
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Current Challenges
Diversion of aid
There are strong tensions between the declared purpose of EU aid (sustainable poverty 
reduction) and how aid, as a tool of foreign policy, actually is used. Aid can be used for 
a number of purposes other than poverty reduction, including “buying” influence with 
recipient governments, or pursuing other goals that might not be compatible with poverty 
reduction. In the past decade, the EC has faced a number of accusations of diverting parts 
of its aid budget from poverty reduction. Three such diversions are discussed here briefly: 
securitization, climate change adaptation, and mitigation and managing migration.
The securitization of aid refers to using aid for security related purposes, mainly 
increasing the security of the donor. (Duffield 2007) These security concerns of donors, 
and thus discourses over securitization, have become increasingly prominent since the 9/11 
terrorist attacks in 2001. The securitization of aid influences how, to whom, and for what 
purposes aid is given. Aid is thus diverted towards countries where security challenges 
for donors are most apparent, and for purposes such as supporting peace operations or 
strengthening the local police. These may conflict directly with the goals of poverty 
reduction, or may simply leave fewer resources for it.
Concerns over the securitization of EU aid have been rather strong, especially since 
the topic of security has become increasingly prominent in EU documents and the EU 
undertakes more and more missions in the framework of the Common Security and Defence 
Policy. (Furness–Gänzle 2016) The issue of state fragility figured strongly in the original 
European Consensuses and has been emphasized in the new one. There have also been 
strong calls for greater coherence between EU missions and aid funding. Most research 
on this topic finds evidence that EU aid has been securitized, (Keukeleire–Raube 2013) 
and clearly some aid spent by the EC has security objectives rather than development ones. 
(Furness–Gänzle 2016) There are questions whether this really is a deliberate policy of 
securitizing aid, or should rather be interpreted as efforts to increase coherence among 
the EU’s external policies.
Given the increasing challenges of climate change, donors are under pressure to 
support adaptation and mitigation efforts. The UN Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, accepted at the Rio Convention in 1992, mandated rich countries to provide 
support for climate change to poor countries. At the Copenhagen climate talks in 2009, 
donors committed to mobilizing $100 billion per year by 2020. This should be in addition 
to existing aid commitments, but donors have the possibility of “repackaging” their existing 
aid into climate aid. In practice, it is difficult to tell whether aid has been diverted from 
poverty reduction to climate change adaption. There is no clear boundary between climate 
aid and development aid. (Donner et al. 2016) Many aid projects can be counted as both: 
installing solar panels in villages in the Sahel reduces both poverty as well as the need for 
these communities to use greenhouse gas-emitting energy sources. (Donner et al. 2016)
This means it is difficult to tell how the EC is doing in this regard. The EC sees itself 
as a global leader in the fight against climate change and is an important contributor to 
the Green Climate Fund (GCF) and REDD+ (an initiative to combat deforestation), as well as 
a number of other international initiatives. It is putting a larger emphasis on climate-resilient 
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development projects, (European Commission 2015) since long-term sustainable poverty 
reduction is only possible if climate change is taken into account. Many would argue that 
rather than speaking of a diversion of aid, therefore, greater coherence is needed between 
climate change funding and development aid.
Managing migration has become one of the largest foreign policy priorities of the EU 
after the 2015 refugee crisis. There is a common perception that foreign aid can be used to 
support the amelioration of the living conditions in the sending countries, and thus reduce 
the push factors for migration. There is, however, little evidence that development aid can 
reduce migrant flows in the short run, and most studies point out that aid can do little to 
alter the prevailing political and economic circumstances. (Herrero Cangas–Knoll 2016)
Another possible use of aid, however, can be to target the border control and migration 
systems of recipient countries to improve them and ensure that “tighter” borders keep 
potential migrants within their countries. The EU has taken this latter route. It received 
heavy criticism for its 2016 deal, in which Turkey was given 6 billion Euros in humanitarian 
aid in exchange for re-admitting migrants and tighter controls along the Aegean coast. 
(Collett 2016; Gogou 2017) In 2015, the EU created the Emergency Trust Fund for 
Africa, with the goals of fostering “stability in the region to respond to the challenges of 
irregular migration and displacement, and [contributing] to better migration management”. 
(European Commission 2017b) While the fund officially aims to address the root causes of 
migration, many critics have pointed out that the EU is using it to draw African countries 
into tighter cooperation on migration management, return, and readmission. The trust fund 
drew €1.8 billion from the EDF, and has been seen as a diversion of development funds. 
Most of the projects under the trust fund thus have far focused on border, security, and 
irregular migration management activities, and while these can have a positive impact on 
human development trends, this is by no means automatic. (Herrero Cangas–Knoll 2016)
What impact does the EC have on member states?
Significant research has emerged in the past years on whether the EC is able to influence 
the bilateral development policies of its member states. A large body of recommendations 
and soft law was created after the acceptance of the European Consensus in 2005, which 
included a number of soft regulations for member states. Given that there is no way to 
enforce the implementation of these, key questions are whether states comply, and why or 
why not.
Research on these issues can be placed in the broader framework of Europeanization. 
This theory, broadly conceived, aims to explain the domestic impact of the EU (or lack of 
it) in the member states. The basic model on Europeanization, advocated by Risse, Cowles 
and Caporaso (Risse et al. 2001, 6–12.) states that laws, institutions, methods, processes, 
norms, behavioural rules etc. originating from the EU level may be incongruous with 
relevant legislation of the nation states. Depending on how large this gap is, pressures arise 
for the nation state to adapt to the “European way” of doing things. These pressures are 
mediated through domestic institutions, however, and a multitude of factors will influence 
whether and how the country actually changes its policies. These factors can include formal 
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and informal national institutions, veto points, and even the more general economic and 
social context of the country.
The two main ways for Europeanization to happen are through conditionality and 
socialization. (Checkel 2001; Schimmelfennig–Sedelmeier 2005) Conditionality usually 
refers to cases where the EU has strong tools to enforce regulations, either in the form of 
incentives or punishment. Member states are obliged to comply with any hard legislation 
accepted by the EU institutions. Non-compliant member states may be pressured heavily by 
the EC and may even be brought to the European Court of Justice. In the case of accession 
countries, conditionality can be just as explicit, as the EU can have even more leverage on 
these countries than it has on its members (i.e. their accession process can be stalled if they 
do not comply).
There are, however, many policy areas (including international development) 
where hard law is limited and Europeanization relies on much softer processes – a more 
constructivist approach to Europeanization emphasizes the importance of longer-term 
social learning. To be part of the “European family”, you must act European. This involves 
the internalization of European values and formal rules, as well as the gradual development 
of the conviction that that is the only proper way to act. While Europeanization through 
conditionality can be rather explicit and quick, social learning is a slow process and more 
difficult to identify in practice.
Most of the research examines socialization processes and whether these have led 
to convergence between EU and member state bilateral development policies. Many 
contributions have looked at the Central and Eastern European countries, but have found 
evidence only for “shallow” (Horký 2012) or “reluctant” (Lightfoot–Szent-Iványi 2014) 
Europeanization. The Central and Eastern European countries have adopted European 
rhetoric in the field of development, but have not followed by reforming their aid programs 
and bringing them closer to EU requirements.
The broader picture for the entire EU reveals a modest degree of Europeanization; 
(Orbie–Carbone 2016) however, even if there is convergence with the norms of the EU, 
it is difficult to say whether Europeanization is the cause or it is driven by other factors. 
For the Nordic countries, for example, it has been argued that it is not that their de-
velopment policy is being Europeanized, but that the EU’s has been “Nordicised”. 
(Elgström–Delputte 2016) Thus, the convergence between EU and national development 
policies is not driven by the EU influencing its members, but rather a group of members 
influencing the EU. The Nordic countries, as well as some “like-minded” member states 
such as the Netherlands and the U.K., have been seen as the major drivers behind the EU’s 
development policy. The EU’s socialization effects on member state development policies 
are therefore relatively weak.
The impact of EC aid in recipient countries
The ultimate question regarding the EU’s development policy, and aid provided by the EC, 
is how effective it is in reducing poverty – its declared goal. Determining the impact 
of aid provided by a single donor in specific recipient countries is notoriously difficult. 
The immediate outputs from aid projects – new schools, trained healthcare professionals, 
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roads built, new economic policies – are usually visible and easily identifiable. These outputs 
are not usually indicators of impact though. Are children more likely to attend those new 
schools, more likely to learn, more likely to get better jobs later and achieve higher incomes? 
Are the new healthcare professionals really able to help sick people? Do the new roads really 
decrease transport costs, thus stimulating economic activity, leading to more jobs, lower 
unemployment and thus lower poverty? Do the new economic policies really achieve their 
goals in promoting businesses, exports, employment, etc.?
Such questions are difficult to answer. Linking the amount of aid to actual development 
impacts (ultimately, fewer poor people) is not easy for a number of reasons. (Morra-Imas–
Rist 2009) First, can observed decreases in poverty be proven to be a result of aid and not 
some other factor? The number of poor people in a country depends on many circumstances, 
such as government policies, institutions, the business cycle, foreign investment and even 
the weather, which makes it difficult to single out the effect of aid. Most of these factors 
are outside the control of donors. In most developing country contexts, several donors 
are active, and isolating the impact of a single actor is, again, difficult. There is often no 
counterfactual data. What would have happened without aid? The impacts we are interested 
in can be difficult to quantify and expensive to measure. Measuring income or health 
requires expensive surveys, and donors may not budget or plan for these. Donor agencies 
may have incentives against showing failure, moreover, as this could lead to a decrease in 
their budgets. This would mean they have fewer incentives to undertake serious evaluations.
It is therefore hard to say anything about the impact and effectiveness of individual 
donors, even ones as large as the EU. Many EU documents place a heavy emphasis on in-
creasing the effectiveness of aid, and the EU has been a key driver behind the development of 
the global aid effectiveness agenda. The EC’s publications on its aid policy focus on outputs 
though, and not on impacts. The EC produces an annual report on the implementation of EU 
external funding, for example, but it is a mainly descriptive account of the year’s events and 
what the EC has financed, with very few details on actual impacts. (European Commission 
2016a) Nonetheless, the EC has made strong efforts to improve the way it provides aid, 
(OECD 2012) and while this is no guarantee that there are fewer poor people as a result, it 
probably represents steps in the right direction.
Conclusions
This contribution has attempted to provide a comprehensive overview of the EU’s interna-
tional development policy, focusing on foreign aid provided by the EC. It placed the EC into 
the broader international development regime, provided a historical account of the evolution 
of its development policy, discussed the most important details of its current practice, and 
explored some key challenges and issues. Three key findings emerge from this exercise.
First, the EU’s development policy has grown and expanded significantly since its in-
ception. It has developed from a small programme focused on former colonies to a coherent 
global policy aligned with the external policy interests of the integration. The policy not only 
expanded the number of countries it covers and the amount of resources at its disposal, but 
also changed from a qualitative perspective, increasing the effectiveness of aid resources. 
While elements of post-colonialism are still present, the policy is now truly an instrument 
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supporting the EU’s global ambitions. The EU’s common development policy will likely be 
forced to contract after Brexit however; the U.K.’s contributions to the EDF and EU budget 
will be missed, as they make up around 13% of the EC’s development resources. (Lightfoot 
et al. 2017) Brexit also may promote important shifts in the common development policy.
Second, development policy should be seen as an expression of the EU’s actorness. But, 
just how much is the EU able to act as a single, unified actor in international development? 
With 28 member states all acting as donors, and the EC, in essence, acting as a 29th donor, 
is it possible to talk about unified action? While the EC is meant to coordinate European 
development efforts, it does not really have the tools to carry out this role. Some member 
states, especially the Nordic countries, align their development policies well with EU 
requirements, but there is much less evidence of “Europeanization” among the eastern 
and southern members. Each member state seems to follow its interests and priorities in 
international development; a single European voice is often difficult to discern. A number of 
EU-level policies weaken the effects of development policy by hurting developing countries. 
Ensuring greater coherence among these policies is seen as the most important way to 
increase the impact of the EU in the developing world.
Third, there are clear contradictions between what aid is meant for and how it is ac-
tually used. The diversion of aid from poverty reduction to other goals, including managing 
migration or increasing security, is clearly present in the EU’s practice. Foreign aid is a tool 
of foreign policy, and it would be unrealistic to expect any donor, even the EU, to not use aid 
to further its short-term interests. As long as the founding treaties and strategic documents 
express lofty (and worthy) principles such as eradicating poverty or promoting the respect 
for human rights, however, not adhering to them will leave the EU open to criticism.
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The V4 and the EU
Alex Etl
Introduction
The case study on V4 (Visegrád Group or Visegrád cooperation) is special in a book dealing 
with the EU’s regional and bilateral cooperation. This is because the group went through 
a fundamental transformation since its foundation in 1991. In the beginning, it was a vague 
initiative, aiming to facilitate cooperation among its members, who had freshly regained their 
independence. Soon the V4 became the common denomination of four countries, all eager to 
join the European and Euro–Atlantic integration process. Having completed their accession 
successfully in 2004, members turned the group into a sub-regional cooperation within the EU, 
whose goal is to protect its member states’ common interest and strengthen their collective voice. 
Meanwhile, after 2015, the V4 also started to appear as an alternative to that of the European 
mainstream.
This chapter explores how the EU–V4 relations have changed through the course of trans-
formation from an external, regional domain to an internal partnership. Keeping in mind the fact 
that the V4 has become an integral part of the European Union, the analysis clearly necessitates 
slight modifications, compared to other case studies of the book. Thus the chapter is constructed 
as follows. The first part will start with the V4’s historical background between 1991 and 2004. 
It proceeds with the introduction of institutional relations, which in this special case will mostly 
focus on the V4’s institutional positions within the European Union. The  second part of the study 
will demonstrate the challenges and opportunities ahead the EU–V4 relations. One the one hand, 
it will focus on the role of the “Visegrád brand”, and highlight its importance for the Group, 
while it will also introduce the added value of the V4 to the EU’s external relations. On the other 
hand, the analysis will also highlight political, social and economic challenges of the Visegrád 
Group, to point out some problems which could fundamentally undermine sustained effective 
cooperation among the V4. The chapter concludes, based on V4 voting patterns in the Council of 
the Ministers of the EU, as well as demographic and economic challenges, that internal division 
in the V4 prevents greater long-term cooperation.
Historical Background, 1991–2004
In 1991, the Visegrád Triangle’s (with its original three members: Czechoslovakia, Poland and 
Hungary) appearance on the European political scene filled in the power vacuum in the region 
left by the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the break-up of the Eastern Bloc. The quick and 
unexpected demise of the bipolar world order established a fundamentally new geopolitical 
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situation on the European continent, especially in the region that existed – as Jenő Szűcs 
famously pointed out – in an in-between position, bordered by the so-called “West” on the line 
of the Elbe–Leitha rivers and by the “East” on the line of the eastern Carpathian Mountains 
and the forests between Poland and Russia. (Szűcs 1983, 1–2.) This region is usually called 
East-Central Europe or Central Eastern Europe, which serves as dual discursive framings: 
“simultaneously in Europe and not yet European”, while also distinct from the East. (Kuus 
2004, 473.)
The countries of this geographical region also shared certain societal and economic 
traits, and have a common history, including the various tragedies of the 20th century. 
The rapid structural changes of the late eighties and early nineties, including the fall of 
the communist regimes, as well as the establishment of democratic political systems and 
free market economies, provided a chance to return to the disrupted course of developing 
nation states in the region. During the early nineties, six main options emerged for the region, 
which also meant different security guarantees. These included, orientation towards the East 
(i.e. Russia); neutrality; maintenance of independent foreign and security policies for each 
nation; integration on a Pan-European level (OSCE); integration on a regional level; and 
integration into the Euro–Atlantic/Western European structures. (Tálas 2008) The new 
situation evoked potential threats in addition to the emerging opportunities, as the fear from 
the return of Russia as well as the example of the Yugoslav wars highlighted the latent tensions 
and the vulnerability of the new European security environment. This, along with the promise 
of development and modernization, pushed the V4 countries quickly towards the Euro–Atlantic 
integration processes.
In parallel to this, the need for stability also led to the emergence of new, regional 
frameworks, with the Visegrád Declaration as their first manifestation, signed by the Polish 
President Lech Walesa, the Czechoslovak President Vaclav Havel and the Hungarian Prime 
Minister József Antal on February 15, 1991. The declaration emphasized the similarities 
between the three countries. Instead of concrete measures though, it rather defined flexible 
areas of future cooperation, including the harmonization of activities with European 
institutions and consultations on security issues; endeavouring free contact among citizens; 
as well as increased cooperation in the fields of economy, infrastructure, ecology, free flow 
of information and minority rights. (Visegrad Declaration 1991) During this initial phase, 
the member states achieved significant successes regarding the elimination of their totalitarian 
regimes; the withdrawal of Soviet troops from their territories; and the reshaping of their 
economic systems. (Dangerfield 2014, 76.)
The transformation period ended in 1992 though, and was followed by a six-year 
deadlock, due to the dissolution of Czechoslovakia and the emergence of the autocratic 
Vladimir Meciar Government in Slovakia, which found itself isolated. On the other hand, 
Vaclav Havel’s successor, Vaclav Klaus also downscaled the role of the Visegrád cooperation. 
(Fawn 2013, 342.) Since the Visegrád became practically paralyzed, it could not provide an 
effective platform for regional cooperation. This provided room for the emergence of a new 
forum, the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA), which served as a “proxy” to 
preserve some key elements of the V4. (Dangerfield 2014, 77.) Since the Visegrád Group 
was technically not functioning, the official accession of the Visegrád countries to the EU 
started independently. Hungary and Poland both submitted their application for membership 
in 1994; the Slovak and Czech applications came in 1995 and 1996, respectively.
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While the V4 was sometimes seen as a platform that can facilitate negotiations with 
the EU, the role of the Group remained at least questionable in this regard. (Dangerfield 
2014, 78.) On the one hand, the more developed Visegrád countries (at that time: the Czech 
Republic and Hungary) regularly emphasized that their performance should be evaluated 
separately. (Czyz 2007, 133.) On the other hand, the general perception assumed that the West 
needed a new puffer zone in the region for the stabilization of Europe, but this did not mean that 
the EU wanted to strengthen the internal cohesion of the Group, as it could have fundamentally 
improved the four countries’ negotiating positions during the accession period. (Inotai–Sass 
1994, 9–12.)
Although accession to the EU was not necessarily the main focus of the Visegrád 
cooperation, the V4 started to revitalize after 1999, due to the resignation of Klaus and 
the electoral defeat of Meciar in 1999. (Fawn 2013, 343.) The first step on this road was 
taken when the prime ministers of the four countries accepted the declaration on Contents of 
the Visegrad Cooperation in Bratislava. (Contents 1999) As the Czech Republic, Hungary and 
Poland were already NATO members, their support for the Slovak accession became a priority 
of the V4 besides cooperation in the fields of education, culture, science and infrastructure. 
Additionally, the Group implemented a non-institutionalized, but practically permanent 
system of cooperation, based on the annually rotating presidencies, the regular meetings of 
prime ministers and other government members as well as state secretaries and ambassadors. 
They also established the International Visegrad Fund (IVF), the only institutionalized body 
of this flexible system.
In 2002, the European Council closed the negotiation processes with 10 applicant 
countries, including all Visegrád members, who signed the accession treaty in April 2003. 
(Czyz 2007, 136). During the next months all four Visegrád countries held referenda on 
the EU accession with a voter turnout between 45 and 60%. Roughly 83% of the voters 
supported membership in Hungary; 92% did so in Slovakia, while only about 77% did in 
the Czech Republic and Poland. The V4 countries joined the European Union on 1 May 2004, 
transforming their relations with the EU member states and within the Visegrád Group.
The International Visegrad Fund (IVF) started its operation in 2000. Its main aim is to 
facilitate cooperation between the citizens of V4 at the grassroots through grant programs, 
scholarships, as well as cultural and scientific projects, which are to the present day open 
for applicants from the Western Balkans or Eastern Europe. The IVF thus directly and 
indirectly strengthens the spirit of cooperation, and the V4’s common identity, through direct 
engagement. The IVF secretariat is situated in Bratislava; its annual budget is approximately 
EUR8 million. Its main governing body is the Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, 
and it is led by the Executive Director. (International Visegrad Fund)
Institutional Relations within the EU
Since the V4 became an integral part of the European Union, technically there are no 
institutionalized relations between the EU and the Visegrád Group, as the EU itself provides 
platforms for this. Therefore, it is impossible to analyse the institutionalized relations 
between the two parties. Instead, the next section will provide a general overview concerning 
the presence of the V4 in the EU institutions.
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As different observers pointed out, the general perception concerning the future of 
the V4 in 2004 was that the group would disappear, since it had lost its relevance. (Fawn 2013; 
Czyz 2007) Shortly after accession though, the four prime ministers accepted the Kroměříž 
Declaration and guidelines regarding their future collaboration. The document highlighted 
areas for potential cooperation within the V4 and the European Union. These included 
cooperation on culture; education, youth exchange; science; civic dimension; cross-border 
development; infrastructure; environment; security; defence and Schengen; consultation about 
the current issues of common interest; active contribution to the EU’s Common Foreign and 
Security Policy, with a special focus on the European Neighbourhood Policy; consultation 
in the area of Justice and Home Affairs; cooperation within the European Economic Area; 
preparation for the accession to the Economic and Monetary Union; and active participation in 
the European Security and Defence Policy. (Guidelines 2004) The guidelines also emphasized 
the role of cooperation with NATO and other international organizations, as well as with other 
countries in the broader Central Eastern European region. (Guidelines 2004) The most visible 
platform of this cooperation with third parties became the so called V4+ format. Although 
the V4 membership remained inexpansible, from this time, the V4 started to develop flexible 
relations with other countries (most notably with Romania, Bulgaria, Austria, Slovenia) and 
with different other regional formats as well (e.g. V4 + Baltic).
The Visegrád Group also increased its representation in European institutions. The most 
visible aspect of this was the election of Donald Tusk as president of the European Council 
in 2014. V4 members also filled important positions within the European Commission. (See 
Table 1.) Generally speaking, the Polish positions are somehow stronger in this regard (Regional 
Policy, Financial Programming and Budget, Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and 
SMEs) but it is also important to note that Slovakia gave two vice presidents of the Commission 
since 2004.
Table 1.
V4 portfolios in the European Commission
Commission Hungary Poland Czech Republic Slovakia
Prodi Regional Policy Trade
Health and 
Consumer 
Protection
Enterprise and 
Information 
Society
Barroso I. Taxation and 
Customs Union
Regional Policy
Employment, 
Social Affairs 
and Equal 
Opportunities
Education, Training 
and Culture
Barroso II.
Employment, 
Social Affairs and 
Inclusion
Financial 
Programming and 
Budget
Enlargement 
and European 
Neighbourhood 
Policy
Inter-Institutional 
Relations and 
Administration 
(Vice President)
Juncker Education, Culture, 
Youth, Sport
Internal Market, 
Industry, 
Entrepreneurship 
and SMEs
Justice, Consumers 
and Gender 
Equality
Energy Union 
(Vice President)
Source: Edited by the author.
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The relative weight of the V4’s institutional presence is symbolized by the group’s rep-
resentation in the European Parliament. The Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia 
altogether have 106 MEPs in the current European Parliament, which is a significant 
number, if we keep in mind that Germany has 96, while France has only 74 representatives. 
As Table 2 demonstrates this number is fragmented among the different fractions of 
the Parliament but the majority of the V4’s MEPs sit with the three biggest fractions: 
the European People’s Party, the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats, and 
the European Conservatives and Reformists. An important element of the V4 brand is that 
its aggregated representation is bigger than any country’s share in the European People’s 
Party and in the European Conservatives and Reformists fractions; this is overshadowed by 
the fact that neither the member states nor the fractions can oblige the MEPs to vote together, 
while other country groupings can have bigger voting power within the given fraction.
Table 2.
The Visegrád Group’s MEPs in the European Parliament 2014–2019
 Czech Republic Hungary Poland Slovakia
V4
Total
Fraction 
Total
Group of the European 
People’s Party (Christian 
Democrats)
7 12 22 6 47 216
Group of the Progressive 
Alliance of Socialists and 
Democrats in the European 
Parliament
4 4 5 4 17 190
European Conservatives and 
Reformists Group
2 0 19 3 24 74
Group of the Alliance of 
Liberals and Democrats for 
Europe
4 0 0 0 4 68
Confederal Group of 
the European United 
Left – Nordic Green Left
3 0 0 0 3 52
Group of the Greens/
European Free Alliance
0 2 0 0 2 51
Europe of Freedom and 
Direct Democracy Group
1 0 1 0 2 45
Europe of Nations and 
Freedom Group
0 0 2 0 2 37
Non-attached Members 0 3 2 0 5 18
Total 21 21 51 13 106 751
Source: European Parliament MEPs www.europarl.europa.eu/meps/en/search.html?politicalGroup=4269
In addition to these quantitative data, it was an important step for all four countries to hold 
the Presidency of the Council. First the Czech Republic in 2009, then Hungary and Poland 
both in 2011 and finally Slovakia in 2016. As such, all of them experienced one of the most 
difficult institutional tasks within the European Union. It also became a common practice 
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that the Visegrád Group issues joint position papers or non-papers to influence the debate 
within the Union concerning any actual agenda points. (Törő–Butler–Grúber 2014, 373.) 
There are regular consultations among the V4 countries on different levels within the EU 
that provide opportunities to harmonize their positions. (Törő–Butler–Grúber 2014, 374.)
Opportunities and Challenges in the Way of the V4
In contrast with the deadlock of the mid-nineties or with the general scepticism after the EU 
accession, the Visegrád Group successfully consolidated its positions within the Union and 
preserved its relevance. For 2010, the voices which described the V4 as a negligible cooperation 
were marginalized. The  second part of this study aims to point out that this was mainly 
the result of the flexible nature of the group which made it possible for the Visegrád Group 
to become a brand. After identifying the characteristics of this brand, the analysis will draw 
attention to those political, societal and economic differences within the V4 which constitute 
the biggest obstacles in the way of the Group.
The V4 as a Brand
There is a general agreement in the literature that the Visegrád Group has become a brand 
during the last decades. (Dangerfield 2014; Fawn 2013; Törő–Butler–Grúber 2014) 
According to the Oxford Dictionary, a brand is a “a type of product manufactured by 
a particular company under a particular name” but it is also a “particular identity or image 
regarded as an asset”. (Oxford Dictionary) These two approaches reveal a lot about the nature 
of the Visegrád, as well. On the one hand, it is clear that the brand needs a company, in 
this specific case the Visegrád Group, constituted by the four countries. This can be seen 
as the internal dimension of the brand. On the other hand, a brand also projects an image 
which can be recognized by outsiders only. In other words, the brand has to be perceived by 
others, it needs an external dimension, as well. In this specific case, this external dimension 
was historically the European Union, as the West was essential for the recognition of the V4. 
However, as a brand cannot exist without external recognition, it cannot be maintained without 
an internal dimension either.
On the external level, several examples highlight that the V4 is a well-recognized 
brand in the EU. Rich Fawn concluded – based on semi-structured interviews with foreign 
diplomats in Budapest and Prague – that most of the interviewees had a positive image of 
the V4, which can influence actions significantly. Fawn also emphasizes that there was no 
doubt regarding the survivability of the Group which is a striking difference compared to 
the attitude in the mid-nineties. (Fawn 2014, 4–8.) Nevertheless, it is also important to note 
that the brand of the Group is not necessarily seen as something positive. The most famous 
example in this regard was probably the criticism from former French President Nicholas 
Sarkozy, who accused the V4 countries with obstruction, due to their regular cooperation 
before European Council meetings. (Mahony 2009) Similarly, the international media can 
also frame the cooperation negatively, as it happened in the case of the famous Economist 
article entitled Big, bad Visegrad. (The Economist 2016) This negative branding has become 
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more and more visible during and after the 2015 migrant and refugee crisis in Europe which 
resulted in a common anti-migration policy on the level of the V4. However, negative branding 
is still branding and it supports the cohesive image of the Group.
As for the internal dimension, the brand building was a conscious process on the political 
level. As Rick Fawn highlights, Visegrád coordinators had already assumed in 2004 that 
the Group is recognized as a brand. (Fawn 2013, 347.) Quite explicitly, the politicians of 
the Visegrád countries tend to refer to the Group as a brand. For example, in 2013 the Polish 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Radoslaw Sikorski stated that “over the last year we have 
strengthened the Visegrad brand and ties within the Group”, while official statements of the V4 
sometimes also refer to the cooperation as a well-known brand. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
the Republic of Poland 2013; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland 2016) Fawn 
also points out that the International Visegrad Found serves as a the most important source of 
data regarding the Visegrád Group which led to an anomaly in the existing literature around 
the Group, as it became sometimes self-referential or positive towards the V4. (Fawn 2013, 
340.) On the societal level, different opinion polls demonstrate the limits of brand building. 
According to the data of the Slovak Institute for Public Affairs from 2003, the Slovak society 
was the most aware of the V4, as 56% of the respondents knew what it is. (Helsusová 2003, 
11.) This number was only 35% in the Czech Republic, 44% in Hungary and 39% in Poland. 
(Helsusová 2003, 11.) The Slovak Institute for Public Affairs conducted a similar research 
in 2015 which highlighted that 54% of the Slovak respondents heard about the V4, while this 
number was significantly lower in the other three countries (37% in the Czech Republic, 26% 
in Hungary and only 17% in Poland). (Gyárfásová–Mesežnikov 2016, 1.) This also means 
that the awareness decreased in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland compared to 2003. 
In contrast with this, the Hungarian Nézőpont Institute published a similar opinion poll in 
2017 which signalled higher numbers regarding public awareness (90% in Slovakia, 84% in 
the Czech Republic and Poland, and 76% in Hungary). (Nézőpont Intézet 2017, 1.) This could 
be the result of the increased attention the V4 got during the “migration quota debate” within 
the EU. However, these findings are overshadowed by the fact that only the 73% of the Slovak 
respondents could name all four member states. The number was 64% for the Czechs, and less 
than 50% for Hungarian and Polish respondents. (Nézőpont Intézet 2017, 1.)
These data and figures point out a controversial process. On the one hand, the brand 
building can be seen as a successful effort on the external level. As some experts also pointed 
out during the last years, this image of the V4 became so successful that outsiders tend to 
assume a coherent Visegrád agenda in every case, even when there is no common interest. 
(Törő–Butler–Grúber 2014, 365.) On the other hand, the opinion polls highlight important 
limits of awareness on the internal level which also demonstrates that the brand is not only 
a political but also a social project.
The brand building is also supported by the V4’s contribution to the foreign policy of 
the European Union. This area has three main aspects. Firstly, the group organized several 
meetings in the V4+ formats with external actors. These included the V4 + GUAM (Georgia, 
Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Moldova), the V4 + Western Balkans (Albania, Montenegro, Serbia, 
Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Slovenia), and other bilateral meetings (e.g. 
V4 + Israel). Secondly, shortly after the accession, the group started to advocate for the Eastern 
Partnership of the European Union. Finally, to some extent the V4 started to represent a role 
model for some EU candidate countries, most notably in the Western Balkan region. The group 
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emerged as an example, since it contributed to the stabilization of the region and also to 
the loose cooperation of its members in specific policy areas.
However, several authors pointed out that these efforts and advantages are rather visible 
than effective. Although the IVF provides grants for the Western Balkans and Eastern 
Partnership regions, there are no enhanced cooperation among the V4 and other, external 
actors. For example, Walsch demonstrated that in case of Bosnia and Herzegovina the V4 
supported specific, low profile project and the Europeanization of the country, but did not 
show willingness for a more active role or a deeper engagement. (Walsch 2015, 438.) 
Similarly, Dangerfield highlighted that the V4 was rather an advocate of the ENP but not 
an initiator of the process, as larger EU member states or other intra-EU alliances (most 
notably between Poland and Sweden) played much greater role. (Dangerfield 2009, 1752.) 
The reason of this limited role can be that the Eastern European region is traditionally less 
important for the Hungarian foreign policy. (Rácz 2011, 159.) Moreover, seeing the V4 as 
a role model does not mean that it could be mechanically transposed to other regions, due to 
its specific geographic, economic, historic and political circumstances. (Rosteková–Rouet 
2014, 192.) Nevertheless, the projected role model image can also add to the EU’s foreign 
policy. Therefore, the Visegrád Group efforts contributed to the V4 brand building process, 
as they helped to project a coherent image of the group, but they did not make a fundamental 
difference in the EU’s foreign policy.
Example for a successful V4 cooperation: Although the Visegrád Group cooperates 
in a number of political areas, only a few of these can transform into material successes. 
One of these is the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) – a seven-year framework 
which defines the EU’s annual budgets. As such, it is an extremely important area for each 
member state. For some of them, a bigger budget is equal with bigger expenses, as they are 
net payers, due to their relatively developed economic situation. For others, an increased 
budget means extra financial sources, as they are net beneficiaries of the MFF. This sys-
tem helps the convergence of less developed member states in different financial areas, 
with primarily the tool of cohesion policy. The V4 countries – together with all of the new 
member states – belong to the group of net beneficiaries, and therefore their direct financial 
interest is to obtain bigger resources. This was the case during the last MFF negotiation 
process as well, which prepared the budget for the 2014–20 period. During the negotiation 
phase, the Visegrád Group became the core pillar of the so-called “Friends of Cohesion” 
group, whose main aim was to protect the Cohesion policy’s budget against potential 
cuts. As some observers pointed out, the V4 had to face a typical prisoner’s dilemma, as 
the traditional net payer member states wanted to cut the budget, and started to approach 
them individually in order to offer small incentives for them to weaken the “Friends of Co-
hesion” group’s resistance. (Kalan–Tokarski–Toporowski 2012, 7.) This was especially 
visible in the case of the Czech Republic, which had to balance between the two groups, as 
the country’s relative economic positions differ from the other V4 members, which pushed 
Prague towards the reduction of the overall budget, while in parallel with the maintenance 
of the Cohesion funds. (Kalan–Tokarski–Toporowski 2012, 7.) Although the negotiations 
led to the overall cut of the MFF, the V4 could reach a significant success, as its members 
remained still the biggest net beneficiaries of the budget. For example, in 2014, Poland and 
Hungary were the two biggest net beneficiaries, EUR 13.748 and 5.681 billion respectively. 
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This number was EUR 3.004 and 1.010 billion in cases of the Czech Republic and Slovakia. 
For 2015, Poland remained the first and the Czech Republic the  second net beneficiaries with 
EUR 9.483 and 5.699 billion. Hungary received EUR 4.636 billion while Slovakia EUR 
3.095 billion. (European Commission) These data aimed to highlight the material successes 
of the Visegrád Group during the negotiation process but this does not mean that the Viseg-
rád countries are the only beneficiaries of the MFF, as other members of the “Friends of 
Cohesion” Group are also among the biggest net beneficiaries (i.e. Romania – with EUR 
4.519 and 5.154 billion and Greece with EUR 5.162 and 4.934 billion for 2014–2015).
Behind the Brand
Solidarity problems
Although brand building became a success story for the V4, this is not necessarily in line with 
internal cohesion and actual decisions of the Group.
Firstly, the power of the brand is countered by the actual voting tendencies in the European 
Union, and specifically in the European Council. It would be logical to assume that the V4 
countries generally should vote together, in order to strengthen their own voice in the EU 
and to strengthen their cooperation for the common cause. However, Table 3 highlights that 
the analysis of the blocking attempts within the Council of the Ministers of the EU does not 
support this claim.
Table 3.
Voting tendencies in the Council of the Ministers of the EU
Total votes (1 January 2010 – 31 December 2017) 869
Votes when at least one V4 country was against a proposal or abstained 70
Votes when two V4 countries were against a proposal or abstained 17
Votes when three V4 countries were against a proposal or abstained 6
Votes when all V4 countries were against a proposal or abstained from the vote 0
Successful blocking attempts (when at least one V4 country was against a proposal or 
abstained and it was rejected by the Council)
0
Source: Council of the European Union – Voting Results www.consilium.europa.eu/en/general-secretariat/
corporate-policies/transparency/open-data/voting-results/1
As Table 3 summarizes, the Council of the Ministers of the EU voted 869 times between 
01 January 2010 and 31 December 2017. Although, the V4 voted together several times during 
1 The source of all voting results was the database of Vote Watch Europe and the chosen timeframe was heavily 
influenced by the fact that the data could be tracked down until 08 July 2014. According to the current rule 
the Council can vote with simple majority, qualified majority or unanimity. Simple majority needs the support 
of 15 members, while qualified majority is established if at least 55% of the member states – representing at 
least 65% of the EU’s population – vote in favour of the proposal. This also means that a blocking minority can 
be established in the Council during qualified majority votes with four members, representing at least 35% of 
the population. Technically, the V4 is not able to create a blocking minority in itself, since it represents only 
12.45% of the total population.
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the analysed period, all of these examples were supportive votes. There were 70 occasions 
when at least one V4 country was against a given proposal or abstained from the vote. This 
is less than 10% of all votes. The first surprising result is that one can observe only 17 cases 
when at least one more Visegrád country also supported a blocking attempt. More importantly, 
only 6 cases emerge from the analysed time frame when at least three Visegrád countries tried 
to block a proposal together and there was no single case when the V4 as a coherent group 
rejected something in the Council of the Ministers of the EU. This also means that there were 
47 blocking attempts when a Visegrád country was left alone by the group. This provides 
significant doubts regarding the efficacy of the Visegrád cooperation, when it comes to actual 
voting. These are further strengthened by the fact that the analysis provided no example, 
when a Visegrád country’s blocking attempt was successful, since all 70 cases resulted in 
the approval of the given proposal.
Another interesting tendency emerges from the analysis of the blocking coalitions among 
the V4, since Poland and Hungary voted together 6 times, the Czech Republic and Hungary 
5 times, which were the strongest blocking coalitions during the analysed period. It is difficult 
to decide if these can be seen as evidence of increased cooperation or as accidental patterns. 
Table 4 also demonstrates that other cases of cooperation regarding the blocking attempts are 
definitely based on an ad hoc practice.
Table 4.
Cases where two or three V4 countries tried to block a vote in the Council of the Ministers  
of the EU between 1 January 2010 and 31 December 2017
Czech Republic with Hungary 5
Czech Republic with Poland 2
Czech Republic with Slovakia 1
Hungary with Poland 6
Hungary with Slovakia 0
Poland with Slovakia 3
Czech Republic with Hungary and Slovakia 1
Czech Republic with Poland and Slovakia 2
Czech Republic with Hungary and Poland 1
Hungary with Poland and Slovakia 2
Source: Council of the European Union – Voting Results www.consilium.europa.eu/en/general-secretariat/
corporate-policies/transparency/open-data/voting-results/
Furthermore, Table 4 suggests that there are several combinations (where the level of 
cooperation was rather low (e.g. Hungary with Slovakia or the Czech Republic with Slovakia). 
This also implies that there are striking differences between the interests of the Visegrád 
member states in some cases, which can further weaken the efficacy of the V4. Another 
important difference is that Bratislava was left alone by the other V4 countries during its 
blocking attempts only once, while Warsaw 18 times. As Table 5 summarizes, these are 
the two extremes in the group, which also shows that Poland and Hungary tend to be more 
isolated in the Council. The data possibly implies that Slovakia has a rather cooperative stance 
in many cases, than the other members of the group.
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Table 5.
Cases where a Visegrád country was left alone during a blocking attempt  
between 01 January 2010 and 31 December 2017
Number of those blocking attempts 
when the country was left alone
Czech Republic 13
Hungary 15
Poland 18
Slovakia 1
Source: Council of the European Union – Voting Results www.consilium.europa.eu/en/general-secretariat/
corporate-policies/transparency/open-data/voting-results/
As such, the voting solidarity of the Visegrád Group is rather based on a misperception than 
on actual cooperation. There was no case during the analysed time frame when the V4 could 
successfully harmonize its member states’ blocking attempt and reject collectively a proposal 
in the Council of the Ministers of the EU.
Political, social and economic difficulties
The actual lack of solidarity highlights that there are significant examples, when the brand does 
not manifest itself in solidarity. The reasons for this can be captured in the clashes of interests 
within the Group, which are rooted in the four countries’ political, societal, and economic 
differences. This is a natural consequence of a cooperation which consists of countries who 
are each other’s competitors in some cases.
On the political level, there are traditional differences among the four states, which 
also originate in their different geographic locations. For example, while Hungary has more 
connections with the EU’s Southern neighbours, especially with the Western Balkans, 
the other three countries and most importantly Poland are more connected to the Eastern 
strategic direction. Furthermore, several authors point out the general differences between 
the Czech/Slovak and the Polish/Hungarian attitudes towards the EU on a political level. In 
this regards the former group is considered generally more closely aligned with the European 
integration process, in contrast with Hungary and Poland. This internal division can also 
influence the cohesion and effectiveness of the V4, as their vision regarding the future of 
the EU might also be fundamentally different. Moreover, there have also been a number of 
cases, where the V4 was not able to develop a common stance. One of these areas is typically 
the Group’s Russia policy, due to the four countries’ different historical experiences, threat 
perceptions and economic interests with regards to Moscow. However, since the V4 is a flexible 
cooperation, these clashes are usually resolved behind the scenes, which makes it possible to 
hide the differences. Practically, in these cases the V4 does not represent a coherent stance, 
and the problematic issue does not appear on the agenda of the Group.
Besides these differences, Table 6 provides an additional insight to the political priorities 
of the four countries, through the summary of the V4 presidencies’ agendas.
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Table 6.
Presidential objectives and priorities of the V4
Year Presiden­cy Objective 1 Objective 2 Objective 3
2000/2001 Polish
Promoting Visegrád in 
the EU/NATO mem-
ber states and within 
the Group
Support Slovakia for 
NATO membership
Strengthening the iden-
tity of the V4
2001/2002 Hungarian
Promoting Visegrád in 
the EU/NATO mem-
ber states and within 
the Group
Support Slovakia for 
NATO membership
Strengthening the iden-
tity of the V4
2002/2003 Slovak Cooperation in the area of 
European integration
Cooperation with third 
countries and regional 
groups
Cooperation within inter-
national organizations
2003/2004 Czech Schengen issues Decide the future of 
the V4
2004/2005 Polish Consultations on the fu-
ture financial perspective
Schengen issues
Participation in 
the Union’s new neigh-
bourhood policy
2005/2006 Hungarian
Strengthening the V4 
identity and communi-
cation
Enhancing cohesion
Promoting transforma-
tion and modernization
2006/2007 Slovak To make V4 a dynamic re-
gional forum
Strengthening coordi-
nation
Improve public aware-
ness
2007/2008 Czech Streamlining V4 coopera-
tion within the EU
V4 Communication and 
Information Strategy
Promoting Democracy 
and Human Rights
2008/2009 Polish Deepen cooperation with 
ENP countries
Improve the free move-
ment of persons
Green Visegrád
2009/2010 Hungarian
Cooperation with 
the Western Balkans and 
Eastern neighbours
Enhanced sectoral co-
operation
Communication
2010/2011 Slovak Enhanced sectoral coop-
eration
Cooperation with 
the Western Balkans 
and Eastern neighbours
Public awareness
2011/2012 Czech Enhanced cooperation 
within the EU
Multiannual financial 
framework
Energy
2012/2013 Polish Enhanced sectoral coop-
eration
Multiannual financial 
framework
Central European cohe-
sion
2013/2014 Hungarian Energy Transport Security
2014/2015 Slovak Energy Transport Security
2015/2016 Czech Cohesion Energy ENP
2016/2017 Polish Strong voice within 
the EU
Synergies Security
2017/2018 Hungarian Dialogue on the future Cooperation with EU 
partners
Migration
Source: Visegrád Group. Presidency Programs www.visegradgroup.eu/documents/presidency-programs2
2 The Table necessarily contains some simplifications, as the Presidency programs do not follow the same 
structure. Sometimes they include more than three priorities, in these cases the first three are represented in 
the table. In other cases, the main goals are not explicitly labelled as priorities and the key words were chosen 
from the agenda of the given program.
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The Table highlights that there are thematically recurring issues, which reflect on the current 
developments within the European Union. These are usually prioritized by consecutive 
V4 presidencies until the given issue remains relevant. (Examples for these areas are 
the multiannual financial framework or accession to the Schengen area). There are also 
a few issues, which are present in the agenda of the presidencies from the beginning. 
These concern the topic of communication or self-definition (identity), which demonstrates 
the importance of brand building for the Group. Similarly, enhanced sectorial cooperation 
appears as a permanently recurring issue on the V4 agenda. However, this is probably 
the most difficult problem for the Group, as the economic and societal differences described 
below will highlight it.
The V4 represents approximately 12.5% of the EU’s population, but distribution among 
the four countries is unequal. Poland has a bigger population (38 million) than the other 
three states (altogether 25.8 million). The exit of the United Kingdom from the EU would 
increase the V4’s population share to 14.3%. (Göllner 2017, 6.) All four states have a low 
fertility rate, however; 1.46 in the Czech Republic, 1.34 in Slovakia and in Hungary, and 
only 1.3 in Poland. (Mazurczak 2014) As Marcela Káčerová and Jana Ondačková pointed 
out, the ageing within the Visegrád Group has progressed much faster during the last 
twenty-five years than in Western Europe. This creates a number of social and economic 
challenges (including the increased pressure on the pension and health care systems). 
(Kácerová–Ondacková 2015) This is further strengthened by a relatively high number of 
emigrants, from the new member states to the more-developed Western countries, which 
usually affect the younger generations, exacerbates the problem. (Vargas-Silva 2012) 
The V4’s positions within the EU, which are directly connected with its voting, thus could 
diminish in the long run.
Table 7.
Population of the V4 (in millions)
Czech Republic Hungary Poland Slovakia V4 EU without V4
10.6 9.8 38 5.4 63.8 444.2
Source: European Union. EU member countries in brief 
https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/countries/member-countries/
As for the economic perspectives of the group, similarly difficult problems can emerge. As 
Table 8 illustrates, the EU accession generally had a positive impact on the V4 countries’ 
GDP level. Nevertheless, the 2008 financial and economic crisis hit the group hard due to its 
strong dependence on EU markets. As EUROSTAT data suggests, the share of non-European 
economies in the exports of the V4 countries is less than 10%, what demonstrates a strong 
exposure to the EU markets. (Mroczek 2017) The main export partner for all four countries 
is Germany, and the V4 provides the biggest export market for the German economy. (World 
Integrated Trade Solution 2015) The Visegrád Group has not recovered yet from the 2008 
crisis and none of the member countries has reached its pre-crisis GDP-level, which means 
its GDP share decreased within the European Union.
On the structural level, all four countries have a relatively weak and small middle 
class that has not become the engine of regional development. The main contribution of 
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the V4 is still at the supplier and assembler level, with a low added value within the EU. 
Another problem for the economy of the V4 is the relative weakness of the regional transport 
systems. This affects both the railway and motorway networks, which operate with just a few 
cross-border connections, and there is no Polish–Hungarian motorway corridor. (Manga 
2014) According to the European Competitiveness Index, all four countries competitiveness 
values are between 0 and – 1, with the exception of two subregions: Western-Slovakia and 
the central part of the Czech Republic. (Annoni–Dijkstra–Gargano 2017) As a result 
of the above mentioned problems, the ESPON Vision Scenarios project only a marginal 
decrease of the structural unbalance between the centrum and the periphery of Europe for 
2030. (Espon 2013, 10.)
Table 8.
GDP of the V4 in billion (current USD)
 
Czech 
Republic Hungary Poland Slovakia V4 EU
Share 
within 
the EU
2004 119 103.7 255.1 57.2 535 13,795 3.88%
2008 235.2 157.3 533.8 100.3 1027 16,398 6.26%
2016 192.9 124.3 469.1 89.5 875.8 19,118 4.58%
Source: The World Bank https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?end=2016&locations=HU-
SK-CZ-PL&start=2004
There are also internal economic differences that further increase the internal problems of 
the group. The first problem, which makes cooperation difficult, is that the four countries 
are each other’s competitors with regards to the capital investments. Furthermore, Slovakia 
was able to join successfully the Eurozone in 2009, which embeds Bratislava more 
deeply in the European integration. Secondly, the Czech Republic, with a well-developed 
industrial sector, is the wealthiest of the four though. According to the data of the World 
Bank, the level of the GDP per capita was 18,266 USD in the Czech Republic, 16,465 USD 
in Slovakia, 12,664 USD in Hungary and 12,372 USD in Poland in 2016. (World Bank 
2016) With the exit of the United Kingdom from the EU, the Czech’s relative position will 
improve, which could have a significant impact on the next multiannual financial framework 
negotiations and the internal cohesion of the V4. This also strengthens the assumption about 
an apparent division within the V4 on the Polish/Hungarian and Czech/Slovak axis.
Conclusion
This chapter aimed to introduce the nature of the EU–V4 relations while also to point 
out how the brand building process precipitated decisions within the Group. The first 
part summarized the historical and institutional background of the EU–V4 relations. 
The chapter proceeded with the analysis of the opportunities and challenges in the way 
of the Visegrád cooperation. The study shed light on the establishment of the “Visegrád 
brand”, which can be seen as the biggest success of the Group. Regarding the challenges, 
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the chapter highlighted those political, social and economic factors which can negatively 
affect the future of the cooperation.
Keeping in mind the controversy between the success of brand building and 
the problems concerning the actual cooperation, the efforts of the V4 to create an alternative 
to that of the European mainstream, have certain limitations. This does not mean that the V4 
is meaningless. Enhanced cooperation is possible, with regards to some specific policy areas 
(e.g. the multiannual financial framework) when the four countries interests are converging. 
In these cases, the power of the brand can have an outstanding role to strengthen the cohesive 
voice of the Group. However, the political, social and economic divisions among the four 
countries make the V4 inadequate to create a sustainable alternative to that of the European 
mainstream. Although the Visegrád brand can be easily maintained in the future, this will 
not manifest into a deeper form of cooperation.
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